Post-judgment motion for sanctions; MCR 2.114(D) & (E); MCR 2.625(A)(2); MCL 600.2591(1) & (3)(a); Guerrero v. Smith; An attorney’s affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into a pleading’s factual & legal viability before it is signed; LaRose Mkt. v. Sylvan Ctr.; Objective standard; Attorney Gen. v. Harkins; Whether tortious interference & defamation claims were frivolous; Reasonable inquiry into trade secrets; Credibility; In re Noecker; The Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act (MUTSA) (MCL 445.1901 et seq.); § 6 of the MUTSA; MCL 445.1906; Principle that a claim is not devoid of legal merit if it is feasible; Thomas Indus. v. C & L Elec.; Circumstances where the law is undeveloped & unclear; Kitchen v. Kitchen; Improper purpose; Whether the action was initiated to harass defendants; Speculation; Skinner v. Square D Co.

The court affirmed the denial of defendants’ motions for sanctions, noting the absence of authority requiring an attorney to independently verify all factual allegations before filing a complaint, and finding that the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that plaintiff’s counsel made a reasonable inquiry into the existence of trade secrets before filing the complaint. Defendants sought sanctions while the case was pending on the basis that plaintiff’s defamation and tortious interference claims were frivolous. In filing its second amended complaint early on, plaintiff effectively withdrew those claims, narrowing the triable issues in the case. The court noted that withdrawing them did “not itself equate to an acknowledgement that those claims were filed in violation of MCR 2.114,” and it would not “discourage a voluntary narrowing of the issues.” Further, the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the facts and circumstances, and to determine whether there was a violation of MCR 2.114. As to defendants’ post-judgment motion for sanctions, plaintiff’s counsel’s affidavit revealed that he reviewed the trade secrets. While a conflict existed “between counsel’s statement at a motion hearing—that he had not reviewed the trade secret documents—and his affidavit, the trial court was in the best position to judge counsel’s credibility,” and the court did not have “the definite and firm conviction necessary to conclude that the trial court clearly erred by finding that counsel made a reasonable inquiry.” The fact that the trial court rejected plaintiff’s interpretation of § 6 of the MUTSA “did not render plaintiff’s argument totally devoid of legal merit. Plaintiff presented a legitimate argument, indirectly supported by secondary authority and the statute, that the protective order did not comply with” § 6. The court noted that it was significant that, while “plaintiff’s position did not prevail, it was advanced under circumstances in which the law is undeveloped and unclear, and a state of ambiguity does not warrant the imposition of sanctions.” Finally, speculation “and conjectural musings are insufficient evidence to support a finding of improper purpose.”

Whether the bankruptcy court complied with the court’s mandate on remand; Waste Mgmt. of OH, Inc. v. City of Dayton (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Scott v. Churchill; United States v. Moored; Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Comerica Bank (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Moore; Whether the bankruptcy court’s rulings on the cattle’s ownership were clearly erroneous; Onkyo Europe Elec. GMBH v. Global Technovations Inc. (In re Global Technovations Inc.); Whether the appellee-bank proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it had the superior interest in the property & that the debtor owned all the cattle sold at auction; Brown v. United States (D SD)

The court held that the bankruptcy court did not contravene its mandate on remand by holding a hearing on the question of ownership of the debtor’s (Purdy) cattle, and affirmed its decision that appellant-Sunshine Heifers was not entitled to a share in the proceeds of the cattle auction. Purdy used his cattle as collateral for a loan from appellee-Citizens First Bank and signed a security agreement in conjunction with the loan. He later leased cattle from Sunshine Heifers and signed additional security agreements. After he filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy, the cattle were auctioned, and the bankruptcy court awarded the proceeds to Citizens First. The dispute between Citizens First and Sunshine in the bankruptcy court was “whether the leases between Purdy and Sunshine were true leases or disguised security agreements.” The bankruptcy court ruled that the transaction was “a per se security agreement” and that “Citizens First’s ‘prior perfected liens attach[ed] to all cows on [Purdy’s] farm on the date the Petition was filed[.]’” In a prior appeal, the court remanded to the bankruptcy court after holding that Citizens First “‘failed to demonstrate that the “Dairy Cow Leases” were actually security agreements in disguise.’” The bankruptcy court again found for Citizens First. In this appeal, Sunshine continued to argue it was entitled to a share of the auction proceeds. The court first rejected Sunshine’s claim that the bankruptcy court violated its mandate on remand, holding that the court had not found in Sunshine’s favor in its initial ruling, and that the bankruptcy court had not erred by conducting an evidentiary hearing where the remand was “general.” As to the merits, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court legitimately rejected Sunshine’s “branding evidence” as “not probative,” and found that “Purdy sold all of the Sunshine cattle before the bankruptcy petition date.” Further, Citizens First proved “by a preponderance of the evidence that Purdy owned all of the cattle that were sold at auction.” The court held that “the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that a creditor’s interest in after-acquired property attaches at the point that the debtor used the creditor’s funds or funds constituting a part of the creditor’s collateral to acquire the property. In this case, Citizens First’s interest in the cattle attached as soon as Purdy used funds comingled with the Citizens First account to purchase the Sunshine cattle.”

Whether the bankruptcy court complied with the court’s mandate on remand; Waste Mgmt. of OH, Inc. v. City of Dayton (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Scott v. Churchill; United States v. Moored; Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Comerica Bank (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Moore; Whether the bankruptcy court’s rulings on the cattle’s ownership were clearly erroneous; Onkyo Europe Elec. GMBH v. Global Technovations Inc. (In re Global Technovations Inc.); Whether the appellee-bank proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it had the superior interest in the property & that the debtor owned all the cattle sold at auction; Brown v. United States (D SD)

The court held that the bankruptcy court did not contravene its mandate on remand by holding a hearing on the question of ownership of the debtor’s (Purdy) cattle, and affirmed its decision that appellant-Sunshine Heifers was not entitled to a share in the proceeds of the cattle auction. Purdy used his cattle as collateral for a loan from appellee-Citizens First Bank and signed a security agreement in conjunction with the loan. He later leased cattle from Sunshine Heifers and signed additional security agreements. After he filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy, the cattle were auctioned, and the bankruptcy court awarded the proceeds to Citizens First. The dispute between Citizens First and Sunshine in the bankruptcy court was “whether the leases between Purdy and Sunshine were true leases or disguised security agreements.” The bankruptcy court ruled that the transaction was “a per se security agreement” and that “Citizens First’s ‘prior perfected liens attach[ed] to all cows on [Purdy’s] farm on the date the Petition was filed[.]’” In a prior appeal, the court remanded to the bankruptcy court after holding that Citizens First “‘failed to demonstrate that the “Dairy Cow Leases” were actually security agreements in disguise.’” The bankruptcy court again found for Citizens First. In this appeal, Sunshine continued to argue it was entitled to a share of the auction proceeds. The court first rejected Sunshine’s claim that the bankruptcy court violated its mandate on remand, holding that the court had not found in Sunshine’s favor in its initial ruling, and that the bankruptcy court had not erred by conducting an evidentiary hearing where the remand was “general.” As to the merits, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court legitimately rejected Sunshine’s “branding evidence” as “not probative,” and found that “Purdy sold all of the Sunshine cattle before the bankruptcy petition date.” Further, Citizens First proved “by a preponderance of the evidence that Purdy owned all of the cattle that were sold at auction.” The court held that “the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that a creditor’s interest in after-acquired property attaches at the point that the debtor used the creditor’s funds or funds constituting a part of the creditor’s collateral to acquire the property. In this case, Citizens First’s interest in the cattle attached as soon as Purdy used funds comingled with the Citizens First account to purchase the Sunshine cattle.”

Alter ego/successor liability; Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co.; De facto merger; Craig v. Oakwood Hosp.; “Mere continuation”; Chase v. Michigan Tel Co.; Pearce v. Schneider; Shue & Voeks, Inc. v. Amenity Design & Mfg., Inc.; Ferguson v. Glaze (Unpub.); Gougeon Bros., Inc. v. Phoenix Resins, Inc. (Unpub.); In re Clements Mfg. Liquidation Co. (Bank. ED MI); “Continuity of the enterprise”; Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co.; Starks v. Michigan Welding Specialists, Inc.; Whether the mere continuation & continuity of the enterprise exceptions are the same; Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Metro Title Corp.; Abandonment of claims of error; Villadsen v. Mason Cnty. Rd. Comm’n; Principle that a trademark derives value only though its connection with the goods or services with which it is used; Detroit Creamery Co. v. Velvet Brand Ice Cream Co.; Sale or assignment of a mark; 15 USC § 1060(a)(1); Sanctions for a frivolous action; In re Attorney Fees & Costs; MCR 2.114(F) & 2.625(A)(2); MCL 600.2591(1) & (3); Unjust enrichment; Karaus v. Bank of NY Mellon

Concluding that plaintiff abandoned any claim of error as to the applicability of any exception but the continuity of the enterprise exception, and in light of the decisions in Starks and Commonwealth (providing that this exception does not apply in cases involving judgment creditors), the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants on plaintiff’s alter ego/ successor liability claim. It also held that plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim lacked any arguable legal merit and thus, affirmed the trial court’s award of sanctions. Defendant-Tubby’s “is in the business of ‘franchising independent businesses selling submarine style sandwiches and other related food products . . . .’” According to defendants, defendant-JB Development was organized for the purpose of purchasing the “Just Baked” service mark. Plaintiff obtained a judgment against Just Baked around the same time, and sued defendants alleging they were liable for that money judgment “under theories of alter ego/successor liability and unjust enrichment.” The court noted that where a corporate “‘purchase is accomplished by an exchange of cash for assets, the successor is not liable for its predecessor’s liabilities unless one of five narrow exceptions applies.’” On appeal, plaintiff only argued that the trial court erred in granting defendants summary disposition because it presented sufficient evidence to show that “the ‘continuity of the enterprise’ exception applied as between Just Baked and defendants.” Plaintiff’s failure “to argue or set forth the applicable law regarding the other exceptions” constituted abandonment of any claim of error as to those exceptions. Further, even considering the other exceptions the parties mentioned (de facto merger and mere continuation), plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to survive defendants’ summary disposition motion. As to the award of sanctions to defendants, the court noted that while plaintiff labeled its second claim “Alter Ego/Successor Liability,” it was clear from reading the complaint as a whole that it only raised a successor liability claim, and the court was “not persuaded that the trial court was clearly mistaken when it decided to impose sanctions” as to this claim.

Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under 42 USC § 1983; Sykes v. Anderson; Webb v. United States; King v. Harwood; Gregory v. City of Louisville; Fox v. DeSoto; Jones v. Clark Cnty. (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Facts & context provided by the complaint; Ashcroft v. Iqbal; Motion to dismiss; Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli; Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly; Fabrication of evidence claim; Stemler v. City of Florence; Withholding of evidence claim; Brady v. Maryland; Kyles v. Whitley; Moldowan v. City of Warren; Qualified immunity; Evans-Marshall v. Board of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist.; Wesley v. Campbell

Holding that plaintiff-Mills sufficiently pleaded claims for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, and suppression of evidence, and that qualified immunity was not warranted at this time, the court reversed the district court’s order dismissing his claims under Rule 12(b)(6). After Mills served 11 years in prison for rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and casual exchange of a controlled substance, he was released based on the results of newly tested DNA evidence. He brought several claims against the investigating officials. The district court found that the grand jury indictment conclusively established probable cause. The court held in King that “pre-indictment nontestimonial acts that were material to the prosecution of a plaintiff could rebut the presumption of probable cause established by a grand-jury indictment.” Because the defendant-DNA analyst’s (Jenkins) report “was the linchpin of the prosecution’s probable cause, the fact of a pre-existing indictment does not trump the fact that—if the complaint’s allegations are taken as true, as we must take them—Jenkins termed exculpatory evidence ‘inconclusive’ ‘despite clear evidence that CM’s underwear contained semen from multiple men that [were] not Mr. Mills.’” The revelation of evidence that Mills had been excluded as the source of DNA found in the victim’s “underwear would have collapsed the foundations of the prosecution’s probable cause (at least based on the account provided in [the] complaint).” The court also concluded that Mills “sufficiently pleaded that Jenkins acted in a knowing or reckless manner.” Finally, it was “clear that Jenkins ‘ma[d]e, influence[d], or participate[d] in the decision to prosecute.’” Thus, the court held that “Mills sufficiently pleaded a claim of malicious prosecution under” § 1983. It also held that the district court improperly dismissed his fabrication of evidence claim where the factual allegations were “sufficient to show the creation of material known to be false that had an effect on the judgment of the jury. Moreover, the knowing requirement of fabrication-of-evidence claims is satisfied for the same reason as” in the malicious prosecution claim. Further, his withholding of evidence claim alleged that there was “additional DNA evidence—classified by Jenkins as ‘inconclusive’—that was in fact exculpatory.”

Alter ego/successor liability; Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co.; De facto merger; Craig v. Oakwood Hosp.; “Mere continuation”; Chase v. Michigan Tel Co.; Pearce v. Schneider; Shue & Voeks, Inc. v. Amenity Design & Mfg., Inc.; Ferguson v. Glaze (Unpub.); Gougeon Bros., Inc. v. Phoenix Resins, Inc. (Unpub.); In re Clements Mfg. Liquidation Co. (Bank. ED MI); “Continuity of the enterprise”; Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co.; Starks v. Michigan Welding Specialists, Inc.; Whether the mere continuation & continuity of the enterprise exceptions are the same; Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Metro Title Corp.; Abandonment of claims of error; Villadsen v. Mason Cnty. Rd. Comm’n; Principle that a trademark derives value only though its connection with the goods or services with which it is used; Detroit Creamery Co. v. Velvet Brand Ice Cream Co.; Sale or assignment of a mark; 15 USC § 1060(a)(1); Sanctions for a frivolous action; In re Attorney Fees & Costs; MCR 2.114(F) & 2.625(A)(2); MCL 600.2591(1) & (3); Unjust enrichment; Karaus v. Bank of NY Mellon

Concluding that plaintiff abandoned any claim of error as to the applicability of any exception but the continuity of the enterprise exception, and in light of the decisions in Starks and Commonwealth (providing that this exception does not apply in cases involving judgment creditors), the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants on plaintiff’s alter ego/ successor liability claim. It also held that plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim lacked any arguable legal merit and thus, affirmed the trial court’s award of sanctions. Defendant-Tubby’s “is in the business of ‘franchising independent businesses selling submarine style sandwiches and other related food products . . . .’” According to defendants, defendant-JB Development was organized for the purpose of purchasing the “Just Baked” service mark. Plaintiff obtained a judgment against Just Baked around the same time, and sued defendants alleging they were liable for that money judgment “under theories of alter ego/successor liability and unjust enrichment.” The court noted that where a corporate “‘purchase is accomplished by an exchange of cash for assets, the successor is not liable for its predecessor’s liabilities unless one of five narrow exceptions applies.’” On appeal, plaintiff only argued that the trial court erred in granting defendants summary disposition because it presented sufficient evidence to show that “the ‘continuity of the enterprise’ exception applied as between Just Baked and defendants.” Plaintiff’s failure “to argue or set forth the applicable law regarding the other exceptions” constituted abandonment of any claim of error as to those exceptions. Further, even considering the other exceptions the parties mentioned (de facto merger and mere continuation), plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to survive defendants’ summary disposition motion. As to the award of sanctions to defendants, the court noted that while plaintiff labeled its second claim “Alter Ego/Successor Liability,” it was clear from reading the complaint as a whole that it only raised a successor liability claim, and the court was “not persuaded that the trial court was clearly mistaken when it decided to impose sanctions” as to this claim.

Motion to suppress confession; People v. Vaughn; Miranda v. Arizona; Custodial interrogation; Stansbury v. California; Howes v. Fields; Oregon v. Mathiason; United States v. Patterson (7th Cir.); United States v. LeBrun (8th Cir.); People v. Hill; Tankleff v. Senkowski (2nd Cir.); Statements after Miranda warnings; Oregon v. Elstad; Missouri v. Seibert; Voluntary statement; People v. Cipriano; Whether error was harmless; People v. Whitehead; Expert testimony; Whether proposed testimony related to the barred diminished capacity defense; People v. Carpenter; Opinion testimony; People v. Heft; Request to redact statements; MRE 402; People v. Musser; MRE 401 & 403; People v. Mills

Holding that the trial court should have suppressed portions of the defendant-Root’s videotaped statement and that the error was not harmless, the court vacated her conviction and remanded for a new trial. She was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder. She argued that her inculpatory statements were inadmissible because the detectives failed to advise her of her constitutional right against self-incrimination as required by Miranda before subjecting her to a custodial interrogation. Based on a careful review of the record, the court held that “by the time detectives were able to procure a confession from Root, the interrogation had turned custodial.” The question on appeal was whether she was in custody for purposes of the rule stated in Miranda at some point before Detective D formally notified her that she was under arrest. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court held that by the time she asked whether—or concluded that—she was “being arrested,” a reasonable person in her position would believe, as she did, “that she was no longer at liberty to end the interrogation and leave. A reasonable person would believe that if she did not immediately confess or tell her version of the story, she would be arrested on the charge of first-degree murder and obviously not be free to leave. For this reason, the detectives had an obligation at least by that point to advise Root of her rights in accordance with Miranda. Because they did not do so, the statements she made after that point could not be used against her.” Because their failure to warn her “consistent with Miranda was more akin to the inadvertent mistake in Elstad, and was not part of an interrogation technique designed to evade the requirements of Miranda as found in Seibert,” whether her later statements were inadmissible depended on whether she made the statements voluntarily. Under the totality of the evidence, it appeared that she voluntarily chose to confess to her involvement in victim’s death. The admission of her statements “after the detectives should have advised her of her rights, but before they actually advised her of her rights,” could not be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Affirmed.

Injunctive relief; Janet Travis, Inc. v. Preka Holdings, LLC; Alliance for Mentally Ill of MI v. Department of Cmty. Health; Irreparable harm; Pontiac Fire Fighters Union Local 376 v. City of Pontiac; A labor union’s duty of fair representation; Martin v. East Lansing Sch. Dist.; Goolsby v. Detroit; Vaca v. Sipes; Knoke v. East Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist.; A union’s “broad discretion” to decide what grievances to pursue to arbitration; Silbert v. Lakeview Educ. Ass’n; Pearl v. Detroit; Lowe v. Hotel & Rest. Employees Union, Local 705; Collective bargaining agreement (CBA)

The court held that the trial court did not err by denying the plaintiff-former employee’s motion for a preliminary injunction obligating the defendants-city and union to arbitrate, or by summarily dismissing his breach of the duty of fair representation claim against the union or his contract claim against the city. The city terminated plaintiff’s employment as Assistant Director of its Public Works Department after determining that he violated city rules. Its decision was based on allegations that he made certain comments while holding an unloaded rifle that was found in a police cruiser that had come in for maintenance. The union facilitated negotiations between plaintiff and the city, but declined to pursue a formal grievance on his behalf. Plaintiff then filed suit, claiming the union breached its duty of fair representation and the city breached the CBA by firing him without just cause. He also sought a preliminary injunction, asking the trial court to compel arbitration, which it denied. The trial court then granted defendants’ motions for summary disposition. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a preliminary injunction, noting that, at the time he filed his complaint, the city was no longer contractually obligated to arbitrate his grievance. Further, he “failed to make a showing of irreparable harm because he could obtain an adequate remedy at law in the form of money damages if he prevailed” on his claims. Moreover, “the balance of harms and the public interest factors favor[ed] the trial court’s decision.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his claim that the union breached its duty of fair representation, noting “the mere fact that [it] did not strictly follow the grievance procedure does not mean that it breached its duty of fair representation.” The union “made its decision only after concluding that the grievance lacked merit and that pursing the grievance would not be in the best interests of the majority of the union membership.” Affirmed.

Motion to change domicile; Jurisdiction; MCR 7.208(A)(4); MCL 722.27(1)(c); MCL 552.17(1); Lemmen v. Lemmen; Whether a change in domicile dispute concerns the child’s care & custody; Rains v. Rains; Statutory interpretation; Robinson v. City of Lansing; GC Timmis & Co. v. Guardian Alarm Co.; Apsey v. Memorial Hosp.; Whether MCL 552.17(1) should be read in pari materia with the Child Custody Act (CCA) (MCL 722.21 et seq.); Detroit v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co.; Purpose of the CCA; Berger v. Berger

Holding that the trial court erred in finding that it lacked the authority to consider the defendant-mother’s motion for a change of domicile and modify the divorce judgment while her appeal was pending, the court reversed. The judgment prohibited the exercise of parenting time in any country not a party to the Hague Convention. This applied at the time to Pakistan. Defendant appealed the divorce judgment, challenging only the trial court’s denial of her motion for attorney fees. She later filed the motion at issue here, seeking to relocate with the parties’ child to Pakistan as soon as possible, asserting that Pakistan had completed steps to become a party to the Hague Convention. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff-father that it lacked authority to set aside or amend the judgment of divorce while defendant’s appeal from the divorce judgment was pending before the court. Defendant argued that “the trial court was authorized to consider the issue of domicile under MCR 7.208(A)(4), MCL 722.27(1)(c) and MCL 552.17(1).” The court agreed. While plaintiff was correct that there was “no case law applying MCL 552.17(1) as an exception to" MCR 7.208(A) in a case involving change of domicile, his “reading of Lemmen is myopic.” Although Lemmen “considered the interplay of MCL 552.17(1) and MCR 7.208(A) in the context of child support, the Court framed the issue before it in general and comprehensive terms: ‘At issue here is whether MCL 552.17(1) and MCL 552.28 fall within an exception to the rule of MCR 7.208(A) that a trial court may not amend a final judgment after a claim of appeal has been filed or leave to appeal has been granted.’” Lemmen’s reasoning applied equally to situations involving custody. The court found that applying the exception of MCR 7.208(A)(4) “where a trial court is presented with a motion to change domicile after a claim of appeal has been filed in this Court is consistent with the purpose of” the CCA. While “MCL 552.17(1) is not part of the CCA, it ‘relate[s] to the same person or thing, or the same class of persons or things,’ and should be read in pari materia with” the CCA.

Divorce; Child support; MCL 722.3; Paulson v. Paulson; Milligan v. Milligan; Whether the trial court properly deviated from the Michigan Child Support Formula (MCSF) to exempt plaintiff from paying child support; Burba v. Burba (After Remand); MCL 552.605(2); Stallworth v. Stallworth; The trial court’s findings of fact; MCR 2.613(C); Beason v. Beason; Borowsky v. Borowsky; Ewald v. Ewald; 2013 MCSF 104(A), (D), & (E)

The court reversed the judgment of divorce entered by the trial court, in which the trial court declined to order the plaintiff-mother to pay child support, and remanded. The defendant-father argued that the trial court erred by deviating from the MCSF to exempt plaintiff from paying child support. The trial court stated on the record what the deviation would be and the reason for the deviation. It “then entered a child support order incorporated by reference into the judgment of divorce stating the amount of plaintiff’s child support obligation calculated by application of the child support formula, how the child support order deviates from the formula, and the reason why the trial court determined that application of the child support formula would be unjust or inappropriate in this case.” Thus, it complied with MCL 552.605(2) in deviating from the child support formula. However, defendant argued that “the trial court erred by finding that the amount of child support dictated by the MCSF was unjust or inappropriate,” and in deviating from the MCSF to exempt plaintiff from paying child support. Here, as in Paulson, “the trial court was presented with circumstances not addressed in the MCSF.” As in Paulson, the Social Security Dependent Benefits “being received by the child would be offset against the support obligation if the child’s benefits were being paid through the noncustodial parent’s earnings record or if the child were placed with plaintiff instead of defendant.” Because the trial court was presented with circumstances not addressed in the MCSF "and similar to those in Paulson,” it correctly found that this was potentially a case supporting deviation from the child support formula. However, the record did not indicate that it considered the parties’ relative incomes, the child’s needs, “or any other particular circumstances of this case. While deviation may be appropriate,” the record did not show that “the trial court considered the specific facts necessary to make that determination.”

Post-judgment motion for sanctions; MCR 2.114(D) & (E); MCR 2.625(A)(2); MCL 600.2591(1) & (3)(a); Guerrero v. Smith; An attorney’s affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into a pleading’s factual & legal viability before it is signed; LaRose Mkt. v. Sylvan Ctr.; Objective standard; Attorney Gen. v. Harkins; Whether tortious interference & defamation claims were frivolous; Reasonable inquiry into trade secrets; Credibility; In re Noecker; The Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act (MUTSA) (MCL 445.1901 et seq.); § 6 of the MUTSA; MCL 445.1906; Principle that a claim is not devoid of legal merit if it is feasible; Thomas Indus. v. C & L Elec.; Circumstances where the law is undeveloped & unclear; Kitchen v. Kitchen; Improper purpose; Whether the action was initiated to harass defendants; Speculation; Skinner v. Square D Co.

The court affirmed the denial of defendants’ motions for sanctions, noting the absence of authority requiring an attorney to independently verify all factual allegations before filing a complaint, and finding that the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that plaintiff’s counsel made a reasonable inquiry into the existence of trade secrets before filing the complaint. Defendants sought sanctions while the case was pending on the basis that plaintiff’s defamation and tortious interference claims were frivolous. In filing its second amended complaint early on, plaintiff effectively withdrew those claims, narrowing the triable issues in the case. The court noted that withdrawing them did “not itself equate to an acknowledgement that those claims were filed in violation of MCR 2.114,” and it would not “discourage a voluntary narrowing of the issues.” Further, the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the facts and circumstances, and to determine whether there was a violation of MCR 2.114. As to defendants’ post-judgment motion for sanctions, plaintiff’s counsel’s affidavit revealed that he reviewed the trade secrets. While a conflict existed “between counsel’s statement at a motion hearing—that he had not reviewed the trade secret documents—and his affidavit, the trial court was in the best position to judge counsel’s credibility,” and the court did not have “the definite and firm conviction necessary to conclude that the trial court clearly erred by finding that counsel made a reasonable inquiry.” The fact that the trial court rejected plaintiff’s interpretation of § 6 of the MUTSA “did not render plaintiff’s argument totally devoid of legal merit. Plaintiff presented a legitimate argument, indirectly supported by secondary authority and the statute, that the protective order did not comply with” § 6. The court noted that it was significant that, while “plaintiff’s position did not prevail, it was advanced under circumstances in which the law is undeveloped and unclear, and a state of ambiguity does not warrant the imposition of sanctions.” Finally, speculation “and conjectural musings are insufficient evidence to support a finding of improper purpose.”

Injunctive relief; Janet Travis, Inc. v. Preka Holdings, LLC; Alliance for Mentally Ill of MI v. Department of Cmty. Health; Irreparable harm; Pontiac Fire Fighters Union Local 376 v. City of Pontiac; A labor union’s duty of fair representation; Martin v. East Lansing Sch. Dist.; Goolsby v. Detroit; Vaca v. Sipes; Knoke v. East Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist.; A union’s “broad discretion” to decide what grievances to pursue to arbitration; Silbert v. Lakeview Educ. Ass’n; Pearl v. Detroit; Lowe v. Hotel & Rest. Employees Union, Local 705; Collective bargaining agreement (CBA)

The court held that the trial court did not err by denying the plaintiff-former employee’s motion for a preliminary injunction obligating the defendants-city and union to arbitrate, or by summarily dismissing his breach of the duty of fair representation claim against the union or his contract claim against the city. The city terminated plaintiff’s employment as Assistant Director of its Public Works Department after determining that he violated city rules. Its decision was based on allegations that he made certain comments while holding an unloaded rifle that was found in a police cruiser that had come in for maintenance. The union facilitated negotiations between plaintiff and the city, but declined to pursue a formal grievance on his behalf. Plaintiff then filed suit, claiming the union breached its duty of fair representation and the city breached the CBA by firing him without just cause. He also sought a preliminary injunction, asking the trial court to compel arbitration, which it denied. The trial court then granted defendants’ motions for summary disposition. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a preliminary injunction, noting that, at the time he filed his complaint, the city was no longer contractually obligated to arbitrate his grievance. Further, he “failed to make a showing of irreparable harm because he could obtain an adequate remedy at law in the form of money damages if he prevailed” on his claims. Moreover, “the balance of harms and the public interest factors favor[ed] the trial court’s decision.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his claim that the union breached its duty of fair representation, noting “the mere fact that [it] did not strictly follow the grievance procedure does not mean that it breached its duty of fair representation.” The union “made its decision only after concluding that the grievance lacked merit and that pursing the grievance would not be in the best interests of the majority of the union membership.” Affirmed.