e-Journal

The e-Journal provides summaries of all opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published and unpublished), and the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (published).

Case Summaries e-Mail to a Friend Printer Friendly Version

Cases appear under the following practice areas:

Criminal Law (6)
Family Law (1)
Native American Law (1)
Termination of Parental Rights (2)

Criminal Law

skip to next practice area

Issues: Search and seizure; Motion to suppress evidence; People v. Hyde; "Reasonableness"; People v. Snider; The "search incident to a lawful arrest" exception to the warrant requirement; Arizona v. Gant; People v. Solomon; "Probable cause"; People v. Reese; Grounds for a valid "investigatory stop"; People v. Champion

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. Applewhite

e-Journal Number: 53464

Judge(s): Per Curiam – Talbot, Markey, and Riordan

Holding that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant for possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver and thus, the search incident to his arrest was valid, the court concluded that the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress. While conducting surveillance, officer B noticed defendant standing at a corner and not moving with the normal flow of foot traffic. While observing him for approximately 30 minutes, B saw 6 individuals contact defendant, and each contact lasted a minute or less. Initially, each time defendant had contact with one of the individuals, they briefly stepped out of B's sight. B changed his position so he would not lose sight of defendant to witness the fifth and sixth contacts. B saw defendant "put his arm down . . . into his underwear" after contact. B and another officer (O) testified that immediately after contacting defendant, the fifth individual repeatedly tried to light an object held to his mouth, consistent with use of crack cocaine. O believed she observed a hand-to-hand drug transaction. Officers approached defendant and asked him if he had anything illegal. He stated, "[i]t's all right there" and looked down, toward his waistband. An officer handcuffed defendant and searched the area he had indicated. The officer found a tobacco pouch in defendant's pocket containing sandwich bags and a substance, which later tested positive for cocaine. A subsequent search found a pouch inside defendant's pants but outside his underwear containing his identification and $253. The court concluded that the "observations of defendant's behavior, and his response regarding his possession of illegal substances, provided the police with probable cause to arrest" him for possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver and the search was valid. The court noted that even if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him when they first approached, "there were grounds for a valid investigatory stop at that time." In the course of that valid investigatory stop, the police established probable cause to arrest him when he made his incriminating statement. The court affirmed his bench trial conviction of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of a controlled substance.

Full Text Opinion

Issues: Whether the defendant's CSC I convictions were "against the great weight of the evidence"; People v. Cameron; People v. Gadomski; "Plain error" review; People v. Carines; Witness credibility as an issue for the trier of fact; People v. Unger; "Exceptional circumstances"; People v. Lemmon; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v. Schumacher; People v. Watson; People v. Dobek; People v. Bahoda; Curative jury instruction; People v. Callon; Presumption that jurors follow their instructions; People v. Abraham

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. Cronin

e-Journal Number: 53409

Judge(s): Per Curiam - M.J. Kelly, Hoekstra, and Stephens

[The court ordered that the motion for reconsideration of its earlier opinion (see e-Journal # 52836 in the 10/9/12 edition) was granted, its prior opinion was vacated, and the court issued a new opinion.] On reconsideration, the court held, inter alia, that it was not persuaded that defendant's convictions of eight counts of CSC I were against the great weight of the evidence. "Mere conflicting evidence is not sufficient to render the victim's allegations patently incredible or inherently implausible." Further, the fact that the victim was impeached with her possible motivation to lie did not render her testimony patently incredible or inherently implausible. Defendant claimed that the victim's testimony was incredible or inherently implausible because no one discovered the abuse despite many opportunities to do so, she was troubled and had a strong motive to lie and falsely accuse him, the prosecution's medical evidence about the victim's injuries was contradicted, and any injuries she received could have been caused by another person. The court noted that the fact that no one discovered the abuse even though there were opportunities to do so did not render the victim's testimony patently incredible or inherently implausible in light of her explanations. Also, the medical evidence presented by defendant to contradict the prosecution's medical evidence was merely another factor for the jury to consider. The conflicting evidence relied on by defendant to support his claim did not contradict indisputable physical facts or laws, did not defy physical reality, was not so inherently implausible that it could not be believed by a reasonable juror, and did not constitute serious impeachment evidence rising to the level of an exceptional circumstance. The court also noted that the prosecutor improperly argued that the victim's story remained consistent throughout the investigation and prosecution of the case. No record testimony supported this and the challenged comments were plain error. However, the court concluded that the error did not require reversal because a timely instruction could have alleviated any prejudicial effect. The defendant failed to show that the prosecutor's improper argument resulted in any outcome-determinative error. Affirmed.

Full Text Opinion

Issues: Jury instructions on "aggravated stalking"; People v. Dobek; People v. Fennell; Statutory interpretation; MCL 750.411i(2); People v. Threatt; "Stalking" defined; MCL 750.411i(1)(e); MCL 750.411h(1)(d); "Course of conduct" defined; MCL 750.411i(1)(a); MCL 750.411h(1)(a); "Harassment" defined; MCL 750.411i(1)(d); MCL 750.411h(1)(c); "Unconsented contact"; MCL 750.411i(1)(f); MCL 750.411h(1)(e); Whether the jury should have been instructed that stalking requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to engage in behavior that he knew would cause the victim emotional distress; Nastal v. Henderson & Assoc. Investigations, Inc.; Sufficiency of the evidence to support defendant's aggravated stalking conviction; People v. Herndon; Whether defendant's text messages would cause a "reasonable person" to feel emotional distress

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. Ireland

e-Journal Number: 53452

Judge(s): Per Curiam – Talbot, Markey, and Riordan

Holding that the jury was properly instructed as to the elements of aggravated stalking and that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction, the court affirmed his conviction. He argued that it was error that the jury was not instructed that stalking required the prosecution prove that he intended to engage in behavior that he knew would cause the victim emotional distress. The Michigan Supreme Court analyzed the criminal stalking statute in Nastal, and concluded that to demonstrate stalking (1) "there must be two or more acts of unconsented contact[,]" (2) "that actually cause emotional distress to the victim" and (3) "would also cause a reasonable person such distress." Thus, the court held that to prove stalking, the prosecution was not required to show that defendant knew his behavior would cause the victim emotional distress. As to the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant did not dispute that there were three unconsented contacts - two text messages sent to the victim and one Facebook message sent to her roommate after defendant was told not to contact the victim. Because he "was specifically told that the victim wanted no further contact, the messages constituted unconsented contact." Also, the victim testified to feeling emotional distress after defendant sent the messages, and defendant did not dispute that there were aggravating circumstances. However, he asserted that his text messages would not cause a reasonable person to feel emotional distress. In 1/11, he sent the victim a Facebook message that called her an "integral cog in the plots" against him, accused her of being promiscuous and "perpetual[ly] cheating" on her boyfriend, and indicated that she was "actively pursu[ing] STDs" to give to her boyfriend. The message went on to say that he once saw the victim as a symbol of perfection and believed that she was "the most beautiful girl" that he had ever seen, but concluded by saying that the sight of her now gave him "an unmistakable urge to vomit." He also referenced the victim on Facebook in a post that stated that he had a "strong desire to sleep with a girl [he] would otherwise despise just to see what all the fuss is about." Another Facebook post by defendant indicated that the victim allegedly received money for sex and engaged in "hundreds of incidents of infidelity," and made other sexually related comments about her. Defendant also text messaged the victim and stated, "Before you hear through the grapevine or see my post on Facebook, I wanted to tell you I plan on having sex with you in the near future." After receiving the text message about his desire to have intercourse with her, which the victim testified would have to be without her consent, she went to the police to make a complaint as she was scared and unsure if defendant was going to come after her. While the two text messages he later sent to the victim were "seemingly innocuous," both occurred after the police advised him not to contact her. The first text message was sent no more than 10 minutes after the police told him to cease contact. Thus, the court concluded that within the context of defendant's contact with the victim before the two text messages were sent, a rational jury could find that the elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Full Text Opinion

Issues: Sufficiency of the evidence to convict the defendant of a fraudulent insurance act (MCL 500.4511(l)) and false report of a misdemeanor (MCL 750.411a(1)(A)); People v. Wolfe; People v. Nowack; People v. Unger; Whether the admission into evidence of the note from a bystander to an accident containing the license plate number of the truck that struck S's car violated defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause; People v. Fackelman; Crawford v. Washington; People v. Taylor; Davis v. Washington; Applicability of Fackelman and Bullcoming v. New Mexico; Whether the trial court properly admitted the recording of the 911 call made by S in which she reported the license plate number to the operator on the ground that the evidence was hearsay; Hardrick v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n; "Present sense impression exception" to the hearsay rule; MRE 803(1); Ykimoff v. WA Foote Mem'l Hosp.; People v. Hendrickson; MRE 805

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. Lee

e-Journal Number: 53411

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Wilder, Gleicher, and Boonstra

The court held, inter alia, that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant filed a false police report and fraudulently filed an insurance claim when she was involved in an accident at B and C streets. Thus, the court affirmed her convictions for a fraudulent insurance act and false report of a misdemeanor. The case arose from a car accident that occurred in 2/07, during which S's car was struck by a black Lincoln pick-up truck. The driver of the Lincoln drove off without stopping at the scene of the accident. A bystander who witnessed the accident saw the license plate number of the Lincoln and provided that number to S on a piece of paper. The Lincoln truck was owned by defendant. Later that day, defendant reported to her insurance company that she had been involved in a car accident at M and L streets and the driver that struck her drove off without stopping. Defendant also reported the alleged accident to the police. Defendant denied having been in an accident earlier that day. Later, she was charged with, and convicted of, insurance fraud and filing a false police report. The court concluded that the bystander's note and the 911 tape were properly admitted into evidence. Also, an accident reconstructionist (O) stated that the damage to defendant's pick-up was consistent with being in the accident. O further testified that the pick-up was involved in only one accident and the description of the accident at a different location was not consistent with the damage to defendant's pick-up truck. Thus, there was sufficient evidence that defendant filed a false police report and fraudulently filed an insurance claim when she claimed she was involved in an accident at a different location. The court also held that the defendant's evidentiary issues were abandoned on appeal. There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions.

Full Text Opinion

Issues: Sufficiency of the evidence to support the defendant's extortion, making a "terrorist threat," and using a computer to commit a crime convictions; MCL 750.213; People v. Fobb; People v. Trevino; People v. Percin; People v. Fort; People v. Igaz; People v. Atcher; First Amendment argument; RAV v. City of St. Paul; "Threats"; CJI2d 21.3; MCL 750.543m(1) and (2); MCL 750.543b(a); MCL 752.796(1); "Privileged communications"; People v. Stanaway; Admission of conversations defendant had with his attorney and with a doctor (recordings of which were found on computer equipment seized from defendant's home); MCL 767.5a(2); MCL 330.1750(1); MCL 330.1700(h); "Harmless error"; People v. Lukity; Whether the extortion statute is unconstitutionally "vague"; People v. Morey; Alleged evidentiary errors; "Relevant evidence"; MRE 401 and 402; MRE 403; "Other acts" evidence; MRE 404(b)(1) and (2); People v. Mardlin; People v. Sabin; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v. Pratt; People v. Bahoda; Jury instruction that the attorneys' arguments were not evidence; People v. Watson; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 4 and 13; People v. Harmon; Remand for the ministerial correction of the PSIR to show the correct OV 4 score; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Carbin; Fruitless objections; People v. Darden

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. Markham

e-Journal Number: 53437

Judge(s): Per Curiam – Talbot, Markey, and Riordan

Holding, inter alia, that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of extortion, making a "terrorist threat," and using a computer to commit a crime, the court affirmed his convictions and sentences. However, the court remanded for ministerial correction of his PSIR to show a score of 0 points for OV 4. The convictions arose due to a "ready-to-serve" fee imposed on the water bills of some unoccupied parcels that defendant owned in a city. The first part of his argument on appeal turned on whether the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that he made a threat. The court noted that he "repeatedly communicated his intent to inflict violent and 'bloody' harm in a context and manner that suggested the seven alleged victims were his present targets." He made the statements directly to the people present at the 10/26/09 city council meeting and indirectly via his website and through FBI agents, who he knew would inform the potential "targets" of the threat. "The statute does not require direct communication." While defendant "might not have actually intended any real harm and 'conditioned' harm on the occurrence of a future event, his intent to harm is irrelevant." The court noted that a dictionary defines "threat" in the context used by the statute as "a declaration of an intention to inflict punishment, injury, etc. as in retaliation for, or conditionally upon, some action or course." The conditional nature of the threat is what makes it extortion - "otherwise, it would simply be a prediction of inevitable harm." Defendant's argument that he was only "considering" committing the threatened acts did not make his words a lesser threat, only a less predictable threat. The jury heard the evidence and decided that the words constituted threats. The court concluded that defendant's "words were not mere hyperbole or heat-of-the-moment exaggerations but planned statements intended to provoke a particular response. They were threats." While he argued that he did not seek to gain anything, but only sought information about the legality of the fee, he insisted that the city stop collecting the fee if it was not legal, and he refused to accept any argument or evidence that the fee was, in fact, legal. "Thus, in addition to a potential economic benefit of property free of the ready-to-serve fee, he attempted to compel city officials to bypass the legal procedures for repealing or amending ordinances and adopt his interpretation of what the ordinance should entail," particularly in his 1/11/10 letter. In that letter, he admitted to intentionally making threats in order to compel action from city personnel. There was also sufficient evidence that he made a threat of terrorism. In his own words, he tried "to motivate the City by suggesting . . . the possibility of bloody retribution." If he was serious, he violated MCL 750.543m(1)(a). If he was simply exaggerating in an effort to get his own way, he violated MCL 750.543m(1)(b). "Because of the extremity of the violence" defendant expressed, and "because of the nature of the victims as members of a public body attempting to perform their civic duty," the court concluded that the evidence supporting the extortion convictions was also sufficient for the jury to find that the requirements of MCL 750.543m were met. Further, because direct, face-to-face communication of the threat is not required under either extortion or terrorism, the statements on his website constituted use of a computer to commit a crime and satisfied MCL 752.796.

Full Text Opinion

Issues: Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 11 and 13; People v. Endres; People v. Babcock; People v. Johnson; People v. Muchie; People v. Osantowski; People v. Francisco; Whether the sentencing offense was part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity; MCL 750.520c(1)(a)(sexual contact with a person under 13 years of age)

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. Rodriguez

e-Journal Number: 53459

Judge(s): Per Curiam - O'Connell, Cavanagh, and Donofrio

On appeal following defendant's conviction of CSC II where he was convicted and was sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth offense to 18 to 26 years' imprisonment, the court upheld the trial court's scoring of OVs 11 and 13, and affirmed. His conviction arose from his sexual assault of MR, who was 11 at the time of trial. She identified him as her cousin's father. MR testified that defendant, who was living with her family at the time of the sexual abuse, came into her bedroom at night on multiple occasions, pulled down her pajama bottoms, and "would rub her vaginal area and stick his finger in [her]." On appeal he challenged the trial court's scoring of OVs 11 and 13 and claimed that he was denied due process when the trial court scored 25 points for OV 11 because the jury acquitted him of CSC I, which contains a penetration element, and convicted him of CSC II. Thus, he argued the trial court effectively sentenced him for an offense for which the jury acquitted him. The court held that the fact the jury acquitted him of CSC I did not preclude the trial court's scoring of 25 points based on its decision that penetration had occurred. He also argued that the trial court erred in scoring 25 points for OV 13 regarding a continuing pattern of criminal behavior because he was convicted of only one offense involving a crime against person within a 5-year period. The record supported the trial court's scoring of 25 points under OV 13. The court held that the record supported the trial court's determination that the sentencing offense was part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity involving three or more crimes against a person.

Full Text Opinion

Family Law

skip to next practice area

Issues: Grandparenting time; MCL 722.27b(4); Whether the plaintiff-grandmother met her burden of establishing that the lack of grandparent visitation raised a "substantial risk of harm" to the minor child; Keenan v. Dawson; Deference to a fit parent's decision about grandparenting time; DeRose v. DeRose; The "great weight of the evidence" standard; Fletcher v. Fletcher

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: Hollis v. Miller

e-Journal Number: 53410

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Shapiro and Gleicher; Concurrence - Gleicher; Dissent - Ronayne Krause

[In an order, the court ordered that the lead opinion, concurring opinion, and the dissenting opinion, which were previously released (see e-Journal # 53165 in the 12/3/12 edition) were vacated and issued new opinions.] The court held that this was not a custody case but was a case for grandparenting time. Further, because the trial court erred in determining that the plaintiff-grandmother met her burden of showing that there was a risk of substantial harm to the child by having no contact with her, the court reversed the trial court's order. The defendant-father and plaintiff's daughter are the child's parents. They were never married. The defendant has had sole custody of the child since 2006, and a no contact order prevents the mother from seeing the child. No action to change custody was filed. The plaintiff and her family were active in the child's life to varying degrees until late 2009, or early 2010. Defendant began denying plaintiff visitation. The court noted that plaintiff was required to produce sufficient evidence that the denial of contact would result in a substantial risk of harm to the child to overcome the presumption that defendant's denial of grandparenting time would not result in a substantial risk of harm. The court concluded that the trial court did not give deference to defendant's decision. Plaintiff's evidence consisted of testimony from friends and relatives. While several witnesses testified about the close relationship plaintiff and her family had with the child, "none could provide personal observations of how the later lack of contact affected the child." Plaintiff opined that she believed that the child was suffering emotional harm because he did not know why contact had ceased. She also admitted that she had no personal knowledge of his reaction. The maternal grandfather testified that the lack of contact had a negative effect on the other grandchildren. The Legislature has decided "to set up a presumption that denial of grandparenting time by a fit parent does not create a substantial risk of harm." Reversed.

Full Text Opinion

Native American Law

skip to next practice area

This summary also appears under Termination of Parental Rights

Issues: Termination of respondent-mother's parental rights under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g) and (j); In re McIntyre; In re Gazella; Whether the trial court properly compared the mother's home with the foster homes; In re Foster; Best interests of the children; In re Trejo Minors; In re Olive/Metts; Procedural due process; Kampf v. Kampf; "Plain error"; People v. Carines; In re Utrera; In re Juvenile Commitment Costs; In re Brock; MCR 3.974; MCR 3.975(E); MCR 3.974(A)(1) and (3); Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Cicotte; People v. Pickens; Strickland v. Washington; Reunification efforts; People v. Ericksen; In re Newman; Termination of respondent-father's parental rights under §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j); The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 USC § 1901 et seq.); 25 USC § 1912(a); In re Morris; Alleged ICWA-notice violation (failure to address SKV's possible Indian heritage); The Children's Trauma Assessment Center (CTAC)

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: In re Vanostran

e-Journal Number: 53513

Judge(s): Per Curiam – Servitto, Markey, and Murray

The court held that the trial court properly terminated both respondents-parents' parental rights to all but one of their children where the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children's best interests. The court affirmed the order terminating respondents' parental rights to JV, DV, RV and DJV, but conditionally reversed the order terminating their parental rights to SKV, and remanded to the trial court for resolution of the notice issue under the ICWA. All five children had special needs. The child protective proceeding spanned eight years. The court concluded that the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the respondent-mother failed to rectify conditions that had constituted failure to provide proper care for the children, and that there was no reasonable expectation she would do so within a reasonable time. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating the mother's parental rights under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (g). Also, the evidence and assessments performed by the CTAC showed the children had suffered physical and traumatic emotional harm in her care. The fact that her home environment, ability to parent and protect, and relationship with the respondent-father had not changed significantly during the 2009-2012 proceeding showed the children would likely suffer additional harm if returned to her home. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating the mother's parental rights under § 19b(3)(j). As to the father's claim that he was denied a full, fair proceeding and an adequate opportunity to be heard, the court concluded that the context in which the trial court's challenged statements were made showed no plain error occurred. The father also raised the issue of SKV's possible Indian heritage on appeal. He was not SKV's father when the question of Indian heritage arose in 2004, but adopted him in 2006, and was his legal father when now raising this issue on appeal. The parties agreed that the trial court record did not show ICWA notice was provided in 2004. The proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand.

Full Text Opinion

Termination of Parental Rights

Issues: Termination of the respondent-mother's parental rights under §§ 19b(3)(b)(ii), (g), and (j); In re Trejo Minors; In re Mason; In re Newman; In re Utrera; In re McIntyre; Termination of the respondent-father's parental rights under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(ii), and (k)(iii); Best interests of the children; Mother - Petitioner-DHS's lawyer's alleged misconduct; "Plain error"; In re HRC; Reetz v. Kinsman Marine Transit Co.; Hunt v. Freeman; People v. Bahoda; People v. McGhee; Whether an expert was properly permitted to testify that AC was credible and had been abused and that it was her opinion that CC had also been abused; People v. Peterson; Hearsay; MRE 801(c); Whether it was proper for the trial court to rely on Dr. A's testimony as to the father; Whether the trial court should have relied on the DHS's witnesses who interviewed the children; In re Jones; Father - Alleged DHS's lawyer's misconduct; "Other acts" evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); People v. VanderVliet; Lewis v. LeGrow; People v. Sholl; Ineffective assistance of counsel; In re Rogers; People v. Matuszak; People v. Pickens; People v. Johnson; Whether the trial court properly relied on Dr. A's findings as to the family's evaluation

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: In re Adams/Crigler

e-Journal Number: 53511

Judge(s): Per Curiam – Saad, K.F. Kelly, and M.J. Kelly

The court held that the trial court properly terminated both respondents-parents' parental rights to their 12 children where the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence and termination was in the children's best interests. The family has a long history with CPS dating to 1998. The children were removed for a six-month period from 11/10 to 5/11. Shortly after they were returned, the DHS filed a new petition for removal after AC reported being physically abused by the respondent-father as punishment for talking to investigators. Then, other children began disclosing physical and sexual abuse in the home. The trial court found that the evidence supported termination under § 19(b)(3)(b)(ii) because the children's allegations of abuse were credible and because the respondent-mother continued to stay with the father, even though she knew that he had been sexually abusing the children. Although the mother argued that AC's allegations of abuse were not credible, the credibility of her testimony was for the trial court, as the trier of fact, to resolve. Further, testimony was offered that AC exhibited the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, and that her lying was consistent with that disorder and her other emotional problems. Also, AC's accounts of abuse were consistent with the abuse described by other children. The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed to protect the children from repeated, ongoing abuse, and that, considering her inability or unwillingness to change, there was a reasonable likelihood that the children would be harmed if placed in her home. The same evidence also supported the trial court's reliance on §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j) as additional grounds for termination. The court held that the trial court's findings as to the father's long-term sexual and physical abuse of the children provided ample support for its determination that §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(ii), and (k)(iii) were established by clear and convincing evidence. The court held that there was no merit to his argument that it was pure conjecture for the trial court to find that the children would be harmed if returned to his custody. This finding was supported by the evidence of long-term abuse in the family home, as well as the evidence that shortly after the children were returned in 5/11, the father lined them up and demanded to know who had "snitched," following which AC was physically abused because the father believed that she spoke with the authorities. Contrary to the father's argument, the absence of broken bones or other physical scars or injuries to the children did not establish that they could be safely returned to his custody. Affirmed.

Full Text Opinion

This summary also appears under Native American Law