• Criminal Law (4)
• Employment & Labor Law (1)
• Family Law (2)
• Tax (1)
• Termination of Parental Rights (1)

Criminal Law

 

Issues: Sufficiency of the evidence to convict the defendant of two counts of second-degree murder, felon in possession, and felony-firearm; People v. Mayhew; MCL 767.39; People v. Smielweski; "Mere presence"; People v. Wilson; People v. Robinson; People v. Fetterley; People v. Lemmon; Juror misconduct; People v. Messenger; People v. Haywood; People v. Petri; Removal of defendant's relatives from the courtroom during voir dire; People v. Vaughn; People v. Carines; Const. 1963, art. 1, §§ 20, 2, and 17; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Brown; People v. Julian; People v. Caballero; People v. Ginther; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v. Thomas; People v. Marji; "Civic duty, fear, or passion"; People v. Potra; People v. Pennington; Composition of the jury array; People v. Bryant; Cumulative error

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. Hicks

e-Journal Number: 53531

Judge(s): Per Curiam - O'Connell, Cavanagh, and Donofrio

 

The court held, inter alia, that there was evidence, in addition to T's testimony, that could persuade a rational trier of fact that defendant aided and abetted in the murders and was not merely present at the crime scene. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a directed verdict challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, or the motion for a mistrial challenging the verdict as against the great weight of the evidence. The case arose from the double homicide of the L cousins. P shot and killed both cousins at a park. Defendant was prosecuted as an aider and abettor. The prosecution's theory was that P and defendant, while under the influence of drugs, took the victims to a remote location planning to shoot them simultaneously. When defendant's gun malfunctioned, P shot the cousins in succession. On appeal, defense counsel contended, among other things, that the trial court improperly denied the defendant's motions for a directed verdict based on the insufficiency of the evidence and in denying a motion for a new trial based on the great weight of the evidence. Defendant argued that T's testimony was not credible and did not tend to prove that defendant aided and abetted in the murders. T had been incarcerated with defendant and testified about purported conversations he had with him about the murders. Defendant argued that T's timing of the events could readily be rebutted by police testimony and that T could have learned about defendant's presence at the murders, including the tendency for his gun to jam, from a newspaper article. The court concluded that T's testimony that defendant intended to participate in the murders was not the only evidence of defendant's active involvement and that T's testimony was impeached to some extent. Also, T's testimony that defendant intended to participated in the murders was not the only evidence of defendant's active involvement. After defendant fled from police, a gun was recovered that was malfunctioning in a way that would cause it to jam. The gun was identified by a witness as defendant's gun. Thus, there was evidence in addition to T's testimony, that could persuade a rational trier of fact that defendant aided and abetted in the murders and was not merely present at the crime scene. The court also held that the other issues defendant raised on appeal had no merit and affirmed his convictions and sentences.

 

Issues: Sentencing; Whether the trial court properly required the defendant to register as a sex offender under the SORA; MCL 28.724(5) and MCL 769.13 (as they were in effect at the time of sentencing); People v. Williams; People v. Lee; People v. Whalen

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. Hoffman

e-Journal Number: 53490

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Whitbeck, Fitzgerald, and Beckering

 

In this case the Supreme Court remanded for consideration as on leave granted "of the . . . issue regarding the claimed failure of the sentencing court to comply with the procedural requirements" of MCL 28.724(5) and MCL 769.13 before ordering defendant to register as a sex offender. The court vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. In pleading guilty, defendant admitted that he had placed a surveillance camera in his stepdaughter's bedroom, but claimed that the camera was installed for the purpose of capturing images of his stepson stealing. The camera captured roughly 500 images, 2 of which were images of his stepdaughter's exposed breasts. Defendant admitted that he kept all of the recorded images, but said that he had never looked at them. At sentencing on 3/21/11, he objected to the prosecutor's request that he be required to register as a sex offender pursuant to SORA. The trial court determined that defendant was required to register as a sex offender under the SORA's catchall provision (MCL 28.722(e)(xi)). The lower court record lacked any evidence establishing compliance with the SORA procedures in MCL 28.724(5). At a hearing on defendant's motion to correct the judgment of sentence, the trial court said that, "I had hoped that my - my transcript reflected that we actually had a signature by Mr. Hoffman before we moved forward in the proceedings, and that would have been my - my preferred course of action and I don't see that that was done." The record was also silent as to whether defendant's duties under SORA were explained to him, "and with regard to whether the registration was forwarded to the State Police before the trial court imposed sentence." Further, the judgment of sentence indicated that defendant must register as a sex offender, but did not state as required by MCL 769.13 that his registration was required because the offense fell within the catchall provision. Thus, defendant's sentence was invalid and he was entitled to resentencing. On remand, the trial court shall comply with the procedural requirements of MCL 28.724(5) and MCL 769.13 before requiring defendant to register as a sex offender.

 

Issues: Whether the trial court properly admitted the testimony of the victims-KBT, RR, and FR under both MRE 404(b) and MCL 768.27a where defendant claimed the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; People v. Martzke; People v. Yost; People v. Lukity; People v. Whittaker; "Plain error"; People v. Carines; People v. Smith; Whether specific consideration of MRE 404(b) was necessary; People v. Watkins; MRE 403; People v. Wilson; People v. Mardlin; Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to respond to the prosecution's notice of intent to present "other acts" evidence before trial and failure to adequately object to the admission of the evidence during trial; People v. Davis; People v. Pickens; People v. Matuszak

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. McAllister

e-Journal Number: 53580

Judge(s): Per Curiam – Hoekstra, Borrello, and Boonstra

 

The court held that the other acts testimony of the victims-KBT, FR, and RR provided evidence the defendant had a propensity to sexually abuse children when given the opportunity, and that the testimony was probative for that reason. Further, it tended to support the victim-HR's credibility, which defense counsel attacked at trial. Thus, the court could not find that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting KBT's other acts testimony, or that admission of the other acts testimony given by FR and RR constituted plain error affecting defendant's substantial rights. The court also held that defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel. Defendant's convictions in this case were the result of CSC perpetrated on HR in the 1990s. Defendant was a friend of HR's father, and began sexually assaulting HR when she was seven or eight years old. The abuse stopped in 1998 when HR reported the abuse to law enforcement. However, defendant was not prosecuted at that time and the case was eventually closed. The case was reopened in 2010 after defendant was accused of sexually abusing another child, KBT. During defendant's trial as his sexual abuse of HR, evidence regarding CSC perpetrated by defendant on KBT in 2008 was introduced pursuant to MRE 404(b) and MCL 768.27a. Other acts evidence as to defendant's alleged sexual abuse of HR's siblings, RR and FR, on multiple occasions in the 1990s was also introduced during trial. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of KBT, RR, and FR because the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The other acts evidence was apparently admitted pursuant to MRE 404(b) and MCL 768.27a. However, the court has explained that in cases where listed offenses are at issue, analysis of whether the other acts evidence is admissible "begins and ends with MCL 768.27a." Defendant argued that the evidence was inadmissible because it failed the balancing test of MRE 403. The court held that specific consideration of MRE 404(b) was not necessary. As to the first factor, the other acts evidence concerning defendant's alleged sexual abuse of KBT, FR, and RR were similar to the charged crime because all the alleged instances of sexual abuse involved defendant's opportunistic predation of prepubescent children who knew and trusted him. Further, the sex acts following hide and seek as described by FR matched the instances of oral sex that HR endured when playing hide and seek with defendant. The sexual abuse RR suffered corresponded to the "dry humping" that HR detailed. As to the second factor, the other acts described by FR and RR were contemporaneous with defendant's charged offenses against HR. However, there was a wide gap in time between the events defendant was charged with in this case and the incident involving KBT. As to the third factor, the abuse of KBT happened only once, but she almost immediately reported the abuse, thereby preventing any further acts. The other acts involving FR and HR occurred frequently over an extended period of years. Further, the other acts evidence presented by KBT, FR, and RR bolstered HR's credibility and rebutted defendant's attack on her credibility advanced during trial. The parties made no specific arguments as to the final factors. Defendant's convictions of three counts of CSC I were affirmed.

 

Issues: Sufficiency of the evidence to convict the defendant of two counts of carjacking; Statutory analysis; People v. Hammons; People v. Davis; MCL 750.529a; MCL 750.529a(1); People v. Koonce; People v. Kern; People v. Laidler; Griswold Props., LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co.; Paige v. Sterling Heights

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. McFarland

e-Journal Number: 53534

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Saad, Sawyer, and Cavanagh

 

The court held that consistent with the carjacking statute and Davis, because defendant stole one vehicle, he should have been convicted of and sentenced for a single count of carjacking. Thus, the court vacated his conviction and sentence for one of the counts of carjacking. In 9/10, W pulled his van into a gas station. He contended that defendant pointed a gun and him and said, "drop all your stuff and get out of your car." W complied by getting out of the van, while leaving behind his cell phone, money, and glasses. Defendant also ordered a passenger (G) to get out of the van. G left his money and cell phone and climbed out of the van. Defendant then drove the van away from the gas station and was caught by the police a short time later. On appeal, he argued that insufficient evidence supported his two carjacking convictions, but the essence of his argument was a question of law - whether the jury could convict him of two counts of carjacking because he used a threat of violence to order both W and G out of the van and then stole the vehicle, or only one count of carjacking because regardless whether two passengers occupied the van, defendant stole just one vehicle. The issue involved interpretation of the carjacking statute. In Davis, A left his car running with a passenger inside. When A returned to his car, the defendant pointed a gun at him and ordered him to get back and also ordered the passenger to get out of the car. The jury convicted that defendant of two counts of carjacking because defendant took the car from both A and his passenger. The court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed one carjacking conviction and ruled that the carjacking statute in effect at that time allowed for only one carjacking conviction where the defendant stole one motor vehicle from both the driver and the passenger. Since then, the statute was amended. The prosecutor argued that the Legislature changed the focus of the statute from the stolen vehicle to the victim, which suggested its intent to require multiple convictions if a defendant, while stealing or trying to steal a vehicle, uses or threatens force or violence or places in fear more than one occupant of the vehicle, which here, would include both the driver W and the passenger G. The court concluded that the Legislature did not change the statute "in a way that runs afoul of Davis." Thus, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part.

 

Employment & Labor Law

 

Issues: Unemployment benefits; Whether the claimant voluntarily left work under MCL 421.29(1)(a); The Michigan Employment Security Act; MCL 421.2; Jenkins v. Employment Sec. Comm'n; MCL 421.2(1); Korzowski v. Pollack Indus.; Warren v. Caro Cmty. Hosp.; McArthur v. Borman's, Inc.; Clarke v. North Detroit Gen. Hosp.; Ackerberg v. Grant Cmty. Hosp.; Whether the case was controlled by the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins; Wickey v. Appeal Board of MI Employment Sec. Comm'n; Whether the Board of Review (BR) properly determined that the claimant voluntarily left her employment; Citizens for Common Sense in Gov't v. Attorney Gen.; MCL 421.38; Whether the trial court applied correct legal principles; Boyd v. Civil Serv. Comm'n; Const. 1963, art. 6, § 28; Whether an agency's decision is authorized by law; Ross v. Blue Care Network; The Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA)

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: Sheppard v. Meijer Great Lakes Ltd.

e-Journal Number: 53579

Judge(s): Per Curiam – Whitbeck, Fitzgerald, and Beckering

 

On remand from the Supreme Court, the court held that because the appellee-Meijer terminated the claimant-Sheppard's employment, she did not voluntarily quit under MCL 421.29(1)(a). Thus, the court concluded that the trial court did not apply the proper legal standards to determine whether the BR's denial of Sheppard's unemployment benefits was authorized by MCL 421.29(1)(a). The court held that it was not. Thus, the court vacated the decisions of the trial court and BR and remanded for reinstatement of Sheppard's unemployment benefits. Sheppard worked as a full-time receptionist for a non-party (B) and as a part-time clerk for Meijer. In 2/09, B terminated Sheppard's employment because of its financial difficulties. Sheppard then requested a two-month leave of absence from Meijer. Her last day of work was 2/8/09. M, Sheppard's supervisor at Meijer, testified that he spoke with Sheppard and explained that she would need a formal written approval from the store director, H, for her leave of absence. M testified that he assumed that Sheppard requested and received formal approval. She testified that she believed M received the approval. M testified that Sheppard "left believing that she had a[n] approval to have a voluntary leave." Her employment file did not contain a written approval for a voluntarily leave of absence, and H determined that Sheppard's leave was not properly authorized. H terminated Sheppard's employment on 3/29/09. She began receiving unemployment benefits in 4/09. Meijer protested her unemployment claim and requested a redetermination, claiming that she had voluntarily resigned. The UIA determined that Sheppard was not qualified for unemployment benefits because of misconduct. The hearing referee agreed. She appealed the hearing referee's decision to the BR, which determined that she abandoned her employment. The court held that the trial court did not apply the correct legal principles when it determined that the BR's decision was authorized by law. The BR "erred as a matter of law when it determined that Sheppard left work voluntarily and was thus disqualified for unemployment benefits under MCL 421.29(1)(a)." The BR erred in determining that "Sheppard voluntarily quit her job when she took two-month leave of absence." Meijer actually terminated her employment. Because she was discharged, her departure was not voluntary. Thus, the court held that the BR erred in applying MCL 421.29(1)(a) when it determined that Sheppard voluntarily quit her job.

 

Family Law

 

Issues: Divorce; The Domestic Relations Arbitration Act (MCL 600.5070 et seq.): Motion to vacate a domestic relations arbitration award; Whether the arbitrator exceeded his powers; Washington v. Washington; Spousal support award; Berger v. Berger; Myland v. Myland; Distinguishing Hammoud v. Hammoud (Unpub.); Division of the marital estate; Sparks v. Sparks; Woodington v. Shokoohi; Cunningham v. Cunningham; Skelly v. Skelly; Whether the arbitrator's findings of fact were specific and detailed enough; Nalevayko v. Nalevayko; The arbitrator's refusal to modify a temporary order issued by the trial court; Claim that the arbitrator should have awarded reimbursement for the defendant-husband's payment of property taxes and mortgage principal on real property during the pendency of the divorce; Review of an arbitration award; DAIIE v. Gavin; Krist v. Krist

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: Cullens v. Cullens

e-Journal Number: 53547

Judge(s): Per Curiam – Hoekstra, Borrello, and Boonstra

 

Holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant-husband's motion to vacate the domestic relations arbitration award and its entry of a judgment of divorce incorporating the arbitrator's decision. The parties were married for 24 years and had 1 minor child at the time the plaintiff-wife filed for divorce. Defendant argued on appeal, inter alia, that the arbitrator acted contrary to controlling law in awarding spousal support, by failing to take into account defendant's ability to pay. The court disagreed, noting that the arbitrator made detailed findings of fact as to spousal support. In his motion to correct errors in the arbitration decision, defendant asserted that the arbitrator failed to take into account his estimate that his monthly bills would total over $9,000 and thus, he would be forced to invade assets to pay the spousal support award. Defendant had submitted detailed monthly budgets to the arbitrator indicating his monthly bills were in the range of $5,000 per month. The arbitrator stated, "I see no reason to adjust any of my decisions or awards on account of defendant's representation of his monthly bills totaling $9,009.63." Thus, it was apparent that "the arbitrator considered defendant's representations as to his monthly bills in making his decision." The court concluded that "no evidence that the arbitrator acted in contravention of controlling law is discernible from the face of the award itself." Defendant also argued that the arbitrator exceeded his powers in dividing the personal property portion of the marital estate. He alleged that the arbitrator failed to address his request for personal property items to be deemed separate non-marital property, and failed to assign value to household furnishings. The court noted that the arbitrator considered the Sparks factors in making his property division. "The arbitrator first found that 'both parties contributed substantially to the creation and maintenance of their net worth.'" He then found that "'the durability of a marriage disappeared long ago due largely to hurtful choices defendant made' and stated that 'I incorporate defendant's fault into my decision by giving plaintiff the benefit of the doubt on some close and contested valuation issues . . . . The ages and health of the parties, their life status, and the source of the property are neutral factors in the decision.'" The arbitrator attached a list of personal property, Attachment 1, to the decision, awarding the parties all personal property currently in his or her possession or control, and ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $5,447 to equalize the value of these possessions. He also stated that he "'considered divergent representations both parties made about a substantial collection of collectibles and coin operated machines.'" The court again concluded that there was no error apparent from the face of the arbitration award requiring vacation of the award.

 

Issues: Consent judgment of divorce provision as to the payment of uninsured medical expenses; Motion for relief from a FOC judgment; MCR 2.612(C)(1)(c); Rose v. Rose; "Misrepresentation"; Titan Ins. Co. v. Hyten; An action or conduct as a representation; M&D, Inc. v. W.B. McConkey; Requirement that a party's reliance on a misrepresentation be "reasonable"; Bergen v. Baker; Effect of the fact the parties had an "adversarial relationship"; Cooper v. Auto Club Ass'n; "Causation"; Whether the defendant-ex-husband might be entitled to relief from the judgment on other grounds; MCL 552.511a; "Claim" defined; Central Wholesale Co. v. Chesapeake & OH Ry. Co.; Williams v. Williams; MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f); Heugel v. Heugel

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: Niell v. Schmoke

e-Journal Number: 53532

Judge(s): Per Curiam – Hoekstra, Borrello, and Boonstra

 

Holding that the trial court erred in modifying the FOC judgment on the basis of an alleged misrepresentation by the plaintiff-ex-wife, the court vacated the trial court's order granting the defendant-ex-husband's motion under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(c) for relief from the judgment. However, the court remanded the case for further factual development to determine whether defendant may be entitled to relief from the judgment on other grounds. The dispute involved a provision in the parties' consent judgment of divorce as to the payment of uninsured medical expenses for their children. Their minor daughter was admitted to an accredited residential treatment center (IH). Plaintiff initially paid all the costs from her personal funds. She did not send the bills to defendant as she received them, but she asked IH to send copies of the bills to him to keep him "in the loop." She testified that IH tried to obtain payment from defendant's health insurer, but that she received a denial of coverage. "She testified that 'right after' the insurance company denied coverage, she sought payment and reimbursement from defendant by way of her filing of a Complaint for Enforcement of Health Care Expense Payment" with the FOC. Defendant did not file an objection, and a money judgment was entered by the FOC for plaintiff in the amount requested ($47,974). When defendant did not make any payment on the judgment, plaintiff filed a motion and order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Defendant later filed a motion requesting relief from judgment. The court held that the trial court erred in granting him relief based on misrepresentation. The trial court found that defendant believed there was an agreement that IH would be paid for with the daughter's college fund, and that there was a misrepresentation by plaintiff. However, the court concluded that it was not clear from the record that plaintiff actually made a representation at the meeting at issue. The trial court found it important that plaintiff knew that defendant wanted to use the college fund, and yet she never explicitly said "no." When they discussed using the college fund, she nodded her head. Based on that, the trial court found that a representation was made. The court concluded that the record did not unambiguously support the conclusion that plaintiff's nod was "a highly misleading action . . . ." The record also did not support the conclusion that she "intended this representation as a positive assertion, or that she intended defendant act on this representation." At the time of the meeting, plaintiff did not know that defendant's insurance plan would refuse to pay the daughter's treatment bills. Had she planned to keep him ignorant of his responsibility until after the daughter was treated, she would not have requested IH send him duplicate bills. Further, "it strains credulity that defendant would trust plaintiff sufficiently, during a negotiation for payment of potentially $70,000 or more worth of medical costs, to believe that they had a binding agreement based on a simple nod." The court held that the reliance element of misrepresentation was not satisfied. There also was "a serious causation issue" in this case. However, because the prerequisites for the filing of the Complaint for Enforcement of Health Care Expense Payment may not have been satisfied as of the time of its filing, the court remanded for further factual development in that regard.

 

Tax

 

Issues: Tax exemptions; Whether the dormitory across the street from a religious school qualified as a "house of worship" under MCL 211.7s; Briggs Tax Serv., LLC v. Detroit Pub. Schs.; Michigan Tax Tribunal (MTT); Liberty Hill Hous. Corp. v. Livonia; ProMed Health Care v. Kalamazoo; Michigan Christian Campus Ministries, Inc. v. Mount Pleasant; Institute in Basic Life Principles v. Watersmeet Twp.; National Music Camp v. Green Lake Twp.

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: Congregation Mishkan Israel Nusach H'ari v. City of Oak Park

e-Journal Number: 53494

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Cavanagh, Hoekstra, and Shapiro

 

Concluding that the property at issue was not predominantly used for teaching the beliefs taught at the religious school across the street, but as a residence for students who practice and observe those beliefs, the court held that petitioner's dormitory did not qualify for a tax exemption under MCL 211.7s. Petitioner was granted a tax exemption by the MTT. Under the act, "houses of public worship" include buildings or other facilities owned by a religious society and used predominantly for religious services or for teaching the religious truths and beliefs of the society. The property at issue is an apartment complex used to house students who attend the religious school across the street. The court noted that tax exemptions are strictly construed in the government's favor. When a petitioner attempts to prove an existing exemption applies, it must do so by a preponderance of the evidence. The sole basis under which the property could qualify for an exemption under the statute and the basis under which the MTT found for petitioner is that the apartments are "used predominantly for . . . teaching the religious truths and beliefs" of petitioner. Petitioners' students spend the great majority of their time engaging in religious study in the congregation's main synagogue structure across the street from the apartments. They also eat their meals and observe rituals relevant to eating in the main synagogue structure. The students reside in the apartments - they sleep and conduct their personal hygiene in their apartments and keep their possessions there. The also use the apartments for study and some recreation. At the relevant time 56 students lived in the apartments along with 3 dorm counselors who have undergone rabbinical training but were not yet ordained. Petitioner presented testimony from two rabbis explaining that petitioner's branch of Judaism involves strict adherence to hundreds of commandments, many of which address how to perform ordinary tasks of life and which require offering of prayers to be said when the tasks are performed. Thus, there are precise religious rules governing how one sleeps, awakens, dresses, conducts personal hygiene, inter alia. Rabbi S, dean of the school, testified that "They [the students] study in the building or the congregation, and then across the street they reside - that's where their housing is." The court concluded it did not find "competent, material, and substantial evidence" to support the MTT's conclusion that the apartment building "is used predominently for . . . teaching the religious truths and beliefs of the society" as required to qualify for a tax exemption under MCL 211.7s. The facts in the case were similar to those in Michigan Campus Ministries. Here, it was undisputed that the "overwhelming majority" of the time the students spend in the apartments is while they are sleeping. The statute only allows for an exemption when the property is "predominantly" used for holding religious services or teaching religious truths and beliefs, and the record did not provide a basis for such a conclusion in this case. Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition for the respondent.

 

Termination of Parental Rights

 

Issues: Termination of parental rights pursuant to §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j); Best interests of the children; In re Trejo Minors; In re Miller

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: In re J.D.H.

e-Journal Number: 53597

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Stephens, Owens, and Murray

 

The court held that the trial court properly terminated the respondent-father's parental rights where the statutory bases for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence and termination was in the minor children's best interests. The case began when M.M.H. was born testing positive for marijuana. Concerns that arose later included that J.D.H. and B.B.H. were found outside playing in the family car without any parental supervision, the mother dropped off the two older children at the paternal grandmother's home because she could not care for them, and that the parents took the two older children to the maternal grandparents' home when they could not feed them, leaving the four-month old baby home alone. A petition for temporary court wardship was authorized and the children were removed from the home. The parents consented to the trial court's jurisdiction in 10/10. The father only partially complied with the trial court's orders. He complied fairly well with orders to maintain suitable housing and a legal source of income, and attended parenting classes and visitation with the children. However, importantly, his participation in counseling was sporadic and he did not benefit from it. There was no evidence of any substance abuse by the father. The trial court suspended the mother's parenting time in 6/11 and in 11/11, the trial court authorized a petition requesting termination of her parental rights, ordered the father to have no contact with the mother and otherwise to take steps to end his relationship with her. The mother's parental rights were terminated in 4/12. At the time of the father's termination trial, he was on probation for credit-card fraud. He was arrested by a probation officer for failure to pay about $3,000 in court-ordered restitution. He was released on bond but failed to appear for sentencing on the probation violation. A bench warrant was issued for his arrest, which remained open at the time of the termination hearing. The greater concern was the he continued to have contact with the children's mother and allowed contact with the children in violation of court orders. He had progressed to unsupervised visits with his children. On Halloween, he took them to the maternal grandparents' home where the mother appeared. The foster parent testified that the father admitted to the visit with the mother when returning the children and said he thought it was the right thing to do. The foster mother testified that visits with the mother were hard on the children and caused some regression in their behavior. The hearing referee concluded that the father could not be trusted to protect the children from contact with their mother. He claimed that he had filed for divorce, but there was no proof of this. The court held that there was a risk of harm to the children if they returned to their father and that termination was in the children's best interests. Affirmed.

 

Classifieds

Announcement
Association Desired
Employment Available
Employment Wanted
Event/Seminar
For Sale
Office Space
Public Notice
Referrals
Advertising Marketplace

Fields of Practice

Adoption
ADR
Appellate Practice
Arbitration & Mediation
Attorney Discipline
Business Law
Commercial Litigation
Copyrights
Divorce
Family Law
Federal False Claims
Health Care
Immigration
Intellectual Property
Law Enforcement
Legal Malpractice
Lemon Law
Licensing
Medicare Liens
Patents
Personal Injury
Stockbrokers
Taxation
Trademarks

Disclaimer