The e-Journal provides summaries of all opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published and unpublished), and the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (published).
Case Summaries e-Mail to a Friend Printer Friendly Version
Today's e-Journal includes summaries of four Michigan Supreme Court orders under Criminal Law and Municipal/Negligence & Intentional Tort. Cases appear under the following practice areas:
Criminal Law
Issues: Sufficiency of the evidence to support the defendant's first-degree home invasion and felonious assault convictions; People v. Nickens; People v. Wolfe; People v. Wilder; People v. Starks; People v. Chambers; People v. Reese; "Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences"; People v. Carines; Whether the prosecution had an affirmative duty to produce all res gestae witnesses at trial; MCL 767.40a(1) & (5); People v. Unsworth; People v. Burwick
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Case Name: People v. Geierman
e-Journal Number: 53890
Judge(s): Young, Jr., Cavanagh, Markman, Kelly, Zahra, and McCormack
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed in part the Court of Appeals' judgment (see e-Journal # 52713 in the 9/25/12 edition) and reinstated the defendant's felonious assault conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for that crime. "The defendant broke into a home, threatened to strike the occupants with what appeared to be a small bat or club, and thus attempted 'to commit a battery or [committed] an unlawful act that place[d] another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.'" The court noted that the Court of Appeals "is required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution" and "was not empowered to substitute its judgment" for that of the trial court.
Issues: Sufficiency of the evidence to show that defendant possessed and specifically intended to distribute cocaine; People v. Ericksen; People v. Passage; People v. McGhee; Possession "actual" or "constructive"; People v. Flick; People v. Wolfe; "Mere presence" is insufficient to show possession; People v. Hardiman; Ineffective assistance of counsel as to the search warrant; Haines v. Kerner; People v. Ginther; People v. Hawkins; People v. Williams; People v. Davis; Whether there was "probable cause" to issue the search warrant; People v. Warren
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Case Name: People v. Moore
e-Journal Number: 53893
Judge(s): Young, Jr., Cavanagh, Markman, Kelly, Zahra, and McCormack
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment (see e-Journal # 51896 in the 6/21/12 edition) as to its resolution of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim advanced in defendant's Standard 4 brief, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of this issue. In declining to review defendant's ineffective assistance claims, the Court of Appeals "'stress[ed]'" that he "'made no effort to expand the record by moving to remand or for a new trial or evidentiary hearing below, nor [did] he suggest these remedies on appeal,'" but his Standard 4 brief contained two requests for a remand for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Ginther, and he attached to his brief his affidavit, those of the three witnesses whom he asserted defense counsel erred in failing to interview or call, and the allegedly deficient warrant affidavit that defense counsel failed to challenge. The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining question presented. The court denied the motion to remand to the trial court.
Issues: Sufficiency of the evidence to support the defendant's second-degree murder conviction; People v. Fisher; In re Winship; People v. Hawkins; People v. McRunels; The elements of second-degree murder; People v. McMullan; People v. Riddle; People v. Tims; "Malice"; People v. Goecke; People v. Carines; People v. Mills; People v. Hicks; Evidence of "opportunity"; People v. Unger; "Consciousness of guilt"; People v. Kowalski; Attempting to "influence" a witness; People v. Mock; "Motive"; People v. Kuhn; Double jeopardy; People v. Watson
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Case Name: People v. Nelson
e-Journal Number: 53892
Judge(s): Young, Jr., Cavanagh, Markman, Kelly, Zahra, and McCormack
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment (see e-Journal # 52533 in the 9/14/12 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant's remaining issues. The court held that even without "concrete proof of a particular act causing death," the circumstantial evidence was legally sufficient, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he caused the victim's death "with malice." The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining question presented.
Municipal
This summary also appears under Negligence & Intentional Tort
Issues: Governmental immunity; Whether the "highway exception" to governmental immunity applied; The Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA)(MCL 691.1401 et seq.); Plunkett v. Department of Transp.; Haaksma v. Grand Rapids; MCL 691.1407(1); MCL 691.1402; Rowland v. Washtenaw Cnty. Rd. Comm'n; Nawrocki v. Macomb Cnty. Rd. Comm'n; Haliw v. Sterling Heights; Paletta v. Oakland Cnty. Rd. Comm'n; Estate of Buckner v. City of Lansing; Grimes v. Department of Transp.; Duffy v. Department of Natural Res.; "Roadbed" not defined by MCL 691.1402(1); Stabley v. Huron-Clinton Metro Park Auth.; Moser v. Detroit; Whether the plaintiff's claim for damages arising from the decedent's pre-impact fright was barred by the GTLA and the Wrongful Death Act; MCL 600.2922; Wesche v. Mecosta Cnty. Rd. Comm'n; Goldman v. Detroit United R.R.
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Case Name: Estate of Debra Louise Hagerty-Kraemer v. Board of Manistee Cnty. Rd. Comm'rs
e-Journal Number: 53891
Judge(s): Young, Jr., Cavanagh, Markman, Kelly, Zahra, and McCormack
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed the portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment (see e-Journal # 52628 in the 9/20/12 edition) that held that the defendant was not entitled to governmental immunity, and vacated the remainder of the Court of Appeals' analysis because it was unnecessary to the disposition of the case. Plaintiff's decedent was fatally injured when the vehicle she was driving left an unpaved road and hit a tree. Plaintiff "alleged that this accident occurred when an oncoming motorist caused a cloud of dust to rise from the roadway, causing the decedent to lose her orientation, drive into soft sand on the edge of the road, and veer off the roadway." The court held that this "theory of causation failed to point to a condition of the highway in need of repair. A dust cloud rising from an unpaved road is not a defect in the physical structure of the roadbed," as required for liability to arise under the GTLA. Further, a plaintiff "cannot recover in a claim where the sole proximate cause of the injury is a natural substance that has accumulated over a highway." An accumulation of gravel, natural or otherwise, "does not implicate the defendant's duty to maintain the highway 'in reasonable repair.'" The court remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an order granting defendant summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).
Negligence & Intentional Tort
This summary also appears under Municipal
Issues: Governmental immunity; Whether the "highway exception" to governmental immunity applied; The Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA)(MCL 691.1401 et seq.); Plunkett v. Department of Transp.; Haaksma v. Grand Rapids; MCL 691.1407(1); MCL 691.1402; Rowland v. Washtenaw Cnty. Rd. Comm'n; Nawrocki v. Macomb Cnty. Rd. Comm'n; Haliw v. Sterling Heights; Paletta v. Oakland Cnty. Rd. Comm'n; Estate of Buckner v. City of Lansing; Grimes v. Department of Transp.; Duffy v. Department of Natural Res.; "Roadbed" not defined by MCL 691.1402(1); Stabley v. Huron-Clinton Metro Park Auth.; Moser v. Detroit; Whether the plaintiff's claim for damages arising from the decedent's pre-impact fright was barred by the GTLA and the Wrongful Death Act; MCL 600.2922; Wesche v. Mecosta Cnty. Rd. Comm'n; Goldman v. Detroit United R.R.
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Case Name: Estate of Debra Louise Hagerty-Kraemer v. Board of Manistee Cnty. Rd. Comm'rs
e-Journal Number: 53891
Judge(s): Young, Jr., Cavanagh, Markman, Kelly, Zahra, and McCormack
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed the portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment (see e-Journal # 52628 in the 9/20/12 edition) that held that the defendant was not entitled to governmental immunity, and vacated the remainder of the Court of Appeals' analysis because it was unnecessary to the disposition of the case. Plaintiff's decedent was fatally injured when the vehicle she was driving left an unpaved road and hit a tree. Plaintiff "alleged that this accident occurred when an oncoming motorist caused a cloud of dust to rise from the roadway, causing the decedent to lose her orientation, drive into soft sand on the edge of the road, and veer off the roadway." The court held that this "theory of causation failed to point to a condition of the highway in need of repair. A dust cloud rising from an unpaved road is not a defect in the physical structure of the roadbed," as required for liability to arise under the GTLA. Further, a plaintiff "cannot recover in a claim where the sole proximate cause of the injury is a natural substance that has accumulated over a highway." An accumulation of gravel, natural or otherwise, "does not implicate the defendant's duty to maintain the highway 'in reasonable repair.'" The court remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an order granting defendant summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).
Personal Protection Orders
Issues: Denial of respondent's motion to terminate petitioner's PPO; Hayford v. Hayford; In re JK; MCR 2.613(C); MCL 600.2950(4); MCL 600.2950(4)(i); "Stalking"; MCL 750.411h(1)(d); "Harassment" defined; MCL 750.411h(1)(c); Nastal v. Henderson & Assoc. Investigations, Inc.; H J Tucker & Assoc., Inc. v. Allied Chucker & Eng'g Co.; Exclusion of respondent's rebuttal witnesses; Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co.; Linsell v. Applied Handling; MRE 611(a); MRE 402; MRE 401; MRE 103(a); Detroit v. Detroit Plaza Ltd. P'ship; People v. Grant; People v. Elston; Morales v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.; Exclusion of respondent's expert witnesses; MRE 608(a); MRE 608(b); People v. Spanke; Judicial bias; People v. Jackson; MCR 2.003(B) & (C); Cain v. Department of Corrs.; Bayati v. Bayati; Right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment; Abandonment; People v. Matuszak; Caldwell v. Chapman; In re Brock; Department of Corrections (DOC)
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: Berghuis v. Shaw
e-Journal Number: 53761
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Whitbeck, Saad, and Shapiro
The court held, inter alia, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the petitioner-Berghuis's request for a protection order, because the outcome was within the reasonable range of principled outcomes. In 1999, Berghuis testified as a witness in a criminal trial that she called 911 after she saw respondent-Shaw standing on an overpass and aiming a rifle at passing cars. In that case, the jury found Shaw guilty. In 2011, Berghuis filed a petition for an ex parte PPO. She requested that the trial court prevent Shaw from contacting her directly or through third parties. Before the trial court sentenced Shaw in the 1999 case, Berghuis received a threatening letter that had Shaw's fingerprints on it. While incarcerated, he sent Berghuis two letters that contained white powders and stated, "Got ya." Berghuis attached police investigation reports to her petition. The reports indicated that the letters were "bogus 'anthrax' type letters," contained a harmless substance, and contained Shaw's name and his Michigan DOC identification number. Berghuis further alleged that she received "hundreds" of letters from other inmates, and that she frequently received telephone calls from Shaw's prison. Finally, Berghuis alleged that when Shaw was reviewed for parole, he listed her address as the address at which he would live if released. Shaw argued that his statements in the letters served the legitimate purpose of encouraging Berghuis and DOC staff to stop harassing him, and that the trial court erroneously found that the statements were threats. He stated in one instance that Berghuis was "done" and that no one could protect her, and in another instance stated that he would "destroy" Berghuis and her husband. The trial court had copies of the documents before it. Shaw argued that the trial court improperly interpreted his statements as threats because he was only threatening future legal action against Berghuis. She testified that the letters were threats that Shaw would retaliate against her for her testimony during the 1999 trial. The trial court believed Berghuis's explanation over Shaw's. The court deferred to the trial court's credibility assessment of which witness to believe. Given the strong language that Shaw employed in the letters and the more typical meanings of such phrases, the court held that the trial court's determination that the statements contained in the letters were threats was not clearly erroneous. Berghuis alleged and testified that these letters made her feel terrified. Thus, the letters fitted the definition of harassment under the stalking statute.


Association Desired
Employment Available
Employment Wanted
Event/Seminar
For Sale
Office Space
Public Notice
Referrals
Advertising Marketplace
Adoption
ADR
Appellate Practice
Arbitration & Mediation
Attorney Discipline
Business Law
Commercial Litigation
Copyrights
Divorce
Family Law
Federal False Claims
Health Care
Immigration
Intellectual Property
Law Enforcement
Legal Malpractice
Lemon Law
Licensing
Medicare Liens
Patents
Personal Injury
Stockbrokers
Taxation
Trademarks










