The e-Journal provides summaries of all opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published and unpublished), the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (published), and the Eastern and Western U.S. District Courts (those opinions the district courts post electronically).

Wednesday, September 6, 2006

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Case Summaries

Admiralty
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This summary also appears under Litigation

 

Issues: Show cause order directing plaintiff to demonstrate why the complaint should not be dismissed for failure to comply with the court's order directing plaintiff to provide the precise location of the defendant-ship; The Abandoned Shipwreck Act (ASA)(43 USC §§ 2101-2106); MCL § 324.76102(2)

Court: U.S. District Court Western District of Michigan

Case Name: Great Lakes Exploration Group LLC v. The Unidentified, Wrecked and (For Salvage-Right Purposes), Abandoned Sailing Vessel

e-Journal Number: 33001

Judge(s): Bell

 

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate good cause for its failure to comply with the court's prior order directing it to provide the precise location of the defendant-ship. The ship was believed to be "the Griffin," the French explorer La Salle's ship, considered to be the first European vessel to navigate the Great Lakes. Based upon the applicable statutes, the State has a clear interest in exploratory activities taking place on the state-owned bottomlands of Lake Michigan, particularly where the target of the exploration is believed to be a sailing vessel of significant historical value. Moreover, based on the applicable provisions, the State may have a superior claim of ownership to the ship. In order to determine any rights it may have or wish to assert in this matter, the State must be given basic information, such as the precise location of the ship, so it can investigate its claim under the ASA and other law to determine such basic issues as whether defendant is a ship, whether, assuming it is, it has historical value, and whether it is embedded. Without viewing the ship in its present condition in its precise location, the State can only speculate as to its rights. Accordingly, it is absolutely necessary the State be given the ship's precise location. Although repeatedly ordered to do so, plaintiff failed to provide the precise location of the ship to the State. The identification of the three circles encompassing about 2.3 square miles did not allow the State to investigate. Rather, it forced the State into “a fishing expedition.” This did not comply with the court's order. Plaintiff was given 10 days to provide the State with the precise location of defendant. If plaintiff fails to comply, an order will be entered dismissing the complaint without prejudice.

 

Full Text Opinion

Civil Rights
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This summary also appears under Municipal

 

Issues: Claims under § 1983 related to an allegedly unreasonable search and seizure; Whether the officers’ warrantless search of the home was unconstitutional; Preclusive effect of the state court judgment; Von Herbert v. City of St. Clair Shores (Unpub.); Whether the Hamburg officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they went onto the back deck of the home and entered the home without a search warrant; Curtilage; United States v. Dunn; Widgren v. Maple Grove Twp.; Whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they went onto the deck in order to knock and talk at the back door; Whether the officers observed a medical emergency; Exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement; Whether the Pickney officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered the home without a search warrant; United States v. Hensley

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit

Case Name: Hardesty v. Hamburg Twp.

e-Journal Number: 33042

Judge(s): McKeague and Norris; Dissent – Martin

 

Deciding an issue of first impression related to whether the knock and talk investigative technique may be extended beyond the front door to an inquiry at the back door, the court adopted an approach taken by other circuits and held the officers’ decision to proceed around the house to seek a back door was within the scope of the knock and talk investigative technique already recognized by the circuit. Police officers are permitted to enter private property and approach the front door in order to ask questions or ask for consent to search the premises. But knocking at the front door will not always result in the officers being able to initiate the permitted conversation (where nobody is home or someone may be home but not hear the knocking). When the circumstances indicate someone is home and knocking at the front door proves insufficient to initiate a conversation with the person sought, officers should not be categorically prevented from carrying out their investigative function. The court held when knocking at the front door is unsuccessful in spite of indications someone is in or around the house, an officer may take reasonable steps to speak with the person being sought out even where such steps require an intrusion into the curtilage. Since someone was present in the home in this case, knocking on the front door was unsuccessful, proceeding around the house and onto the back deck was a reasonable step, and that step was directed towards initiating a conversation with the person or persons in the house. Therefore, the Hamburg officers’ entry into the curtilage in order to effectuate the knock and talk investigative technique did not violate plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs did not establish a constitutional violation, and all defendants were entitled to a judgment in their favor. Affirmed.

 

Full Text Opinion

 

This summary also appears under Constitutional Law

 

Issues: § 1983; Claims the defendant-officer violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully entering his home, arresting him, and using excessive force to effectuate the arrest; Exigent circumstances; Ewolski v. City of Brunswick; Mincey v. Arizona; Thacker v. City of Columbus; Heck v. Humphrey; Cummings v. City of Akron; Qualified immunity; Dunigan v. Noble; Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc.; Whether the defendant-city violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by maintaining a policy causing the alleged Fourth Amendment violations; Thomas v. City of Chattanooga

Court: U.S. District Court Western District of Michigan

Case Name: Schreiber v. Moe

e-Journal Number: 32841

Judge(s): Bell

 

The court granted in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment because plaintiff was unable to demonstrate a constitutional violation occurred since his false arrest, illegal imprisonment, and most of his excessive force claims were barred by Heck. Plaintiff’s misdemeanor arrest and his claims of false arrest and illegal imprisonment stemmed from his altercation with the defendant-officer and his warrantless arrest. Thus, a finding the officer lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of the misdemeanor conviction stemming from the arrest because it would undermine the basis of the misdemeanor charge. However, plaintiff’s excessive force claim was only barred in part because it also encompassed the allegation the officer kicked him five times while he was handcuffed and in custody in a police car. This portion of the claim was not barred by Heck because it was not inextricably intertwined with the parties' initial altercation and plaintiff’s misdemeanor conviction. The warrantless entry claim failed because based on the totality of the circumstances, it was clear from the undisputed evidence the officer’s entry into plaintiff’s home (and his continued presence there) was justified by the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Through his observations, the officer corroborated the information received from the 911 caller about a threat to a minor child and, while standing at the open front door, made additional observations supporting a warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part.

 

Full Text Opinion

Constitutional Law
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This summary also appears under Civil Rights

 

Issues: § 1983; Claims the defendant-officer violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully entering his home, arresting him, and using excessive force to effectuate the arrest; Exigent circumstances; Ewolski v. City of Brunswick; Mincey v. Arizona; Thacker v. City of Columbus; Heck v. Humphrey; Cummings v. City of Akron; Qualified immunity; Dunigan v. Noble; Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc.; Whether the defendant-city violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by maintaining a policy causing the alleged Fourth Amendment violations; Thomas v. City of Chattanooga

Court: U.S. District Court Western District of Michigan

Case Name: Schreiber v. Moe

e-Journal Number: 32841

Judge(s): Bell

 

The court granted in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment because plaintiff was unable to demonstrate a constitutional violation occurred since his false arrest, illegal imprisonment, and most of his excessive force claims were barred by Heck. Plaintiff’s misdemeanor arrest and his claims of false arrest and illegal imprisonment stemmed from his altercation with the defendant-officer and his warrantless arrest. Thus, a finding the officer lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of the misdemeanor conviction stemming from the arrest because it would undermine the basis of the misdemeanor charge. However, plaintiff’s excessive force claim was only barred in part because it also encompassed the allegation the officer kicked him five times while he was handcuffed and in custody in a police car. This portion of the claim was not barred by Heck because it was not inextricably intertwined with the parties' initial altercation and plaintiff’s misdemeanor conviction. The warrantless entry claim failed because based on the totality of the circumstances, it was clear from the undisputed evidence the officer’s entry into plaintiff’s home (and his continued presence there) was justified by the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Through his observations, the officer corroborated the information received from the 911 caller about a threat to a minor child and, while standing at the open front door, made additional observations supporting a warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part.

 

Full Text Opinion

Corrections
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Issues: Petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 USC § 2241 challenging the validity of certain Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulations governing placement within BOP facilities; Petitioner’s eligibility to serve the last six months of his sentence in a halfway house; 18 USC §§ 3621(b) and 3624(c); Memorandum opinion by the Attorney General’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and the subsequent publication of 28 CFR §§ 570.20 and 570.21; Request for injunctive relief; United States v. Jalili; Whether a TRO was appropriate; Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a) and (b); Summit County Cent. & Exec. Comm. v. Blackwell; Whether counsel should be appointed for the petitioner; 18 USC § 3006A(a)(2)(B); McFarland v. Scott

Court: U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan

Case Name: Hacker v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

e-Journal Number: 32727

Judge(s): Lawson

 

In this habeas action regarding the petitioner’s eligibility to serve the last six months of his sentence in a halfway house, challenging the validity and implementation of §§ 570.20 and 570.21, the court held while a TRO was not appropriate, an injunction might be an appropriate remedy and ordered the respondents to answer the petition and motion for a preliminary injunction. The court also concluded the appointment of counsel for the petitioner was warranted. Following the issuance of a memorandum opinion by the OLC and the subsequent publication of §§ 570.20 and 570.21, the BOP no longer had the discretionary authority to place an offender in a community corrections center or halfway house. Petitioner sought an order restraining the BOP from imposing the regulations as they related to the execution of his sentence. While injunctive relief is not a typical remedy in habeas cases, § 2241 is the appropriate vehicle for a federal prisoner to challenge the manner in which his sentence is executed and injunctive relief had been granted by district courts in the Sixth Circuit under similar circumstances. The court found the drastic remedy of a TRO without reasonable notice and a response from the government was unjustified, but petitioner had made a sufficient showing to suggest he might be entitled to a preliminary injunction.

Full Text Opinion

Employment & Labor Law
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Issues: Claims under the LMRDA (29 USC §§ 401-531) and Michigan common law; Whether plaintiff exhausted his internal union remedies; Holmes v. Donovan; The LMRDA and freedom of speech (§ 411(a)(5)); Ad hoc retaliation; Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No.6; United Food & Commercial Workers v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union; Wrongful discharge against Michigan public policy; Dudewicz v. Norris-Schmid Inc.; Wrongful discharge in contravention of the union’s just cause policy; Whether plaintiff was laid off or terminated; Leadon v. Detroit Lumber

Court: U.S. District Court Western District of Michigan

Case Name: Ardingo v. Potter

e-Journal Number: 32811

Judge(s): Enslen

 

The court held the plaintiff properly exhausted his internal union remedies, he was the victim of ad hoc retaliation by defendant-Potter, the union did not discipline him related to his freedom of speech, the LMRDA provided his exclusive remedy for any retaliation generated by his free speech, and questions of fact remained as to plaintiff’s claim of wrongful discharge in contravention of the union’s just cause employment policy, and denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue. Defendant is a labor organization and Potter is its elected president. Plaintiff was hired as business agent. In 2000, the U.S. Department of Labor began an investigation into the union’s finances and a grand jury was convened. In response, the union established a legal defense fund to reimburse officers for legal expenses that could not be paid out of union funds. Plaintiff was asked to commit $5,000, but he contributed $1,260, and because he did not give the requested $5,000, he was told,” things could change for him.” Plaintiff announced his plan to run for the office of union vice-president. Later, plaintiff claimed Potter began a crusade to force him out of the union. Plaintiff was reassigned from his position to work exclusively with the union’s effort to organize Wal-Mart employees. Plaintiff cooperated with the government’s investigation of the union. Later, plaintiff was reassigned to other states to organize Wal-Mart employees. Plaintiff sued under the LMRDA alleging defendants violated his freedom of speech, unlawfully disciplined him, violated Michigan public policy by terminating him, and he was wrongfully terminated contrary to the union’s just cause policy. The court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion.

 

Full Text Opinion

 

This summary also appears under Insurance

 

Issues: ERISA action challenging the termination of long-term disability (LTD) benefits; Whether the district court properly upheld the defendant-plan administrator’s determination terminating the LTD benefits plaintiff had been receiving on the ground her condition had improved; Whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious; McDonald v. Western-S. Life Ins. Co.; Conflict of interest; Whether the plan administrator was arbitrary in failing to consider the award of disability benefits plaintiff secured from the Social Security Administration (SSA); Calvert v. Firstar Fin., Inc.; The medical evidence

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit

Case Name: Glenn v. MetLife

e-Journal Number: 33040

Judge(s): Daughtrey and Keith; Concurrence – Merritt

 

The district court erred by upholding the defendant-plan administrator’s determination terminating the LTD benefits plaintiff had been receiving on the ground her condition had improved, finding the decision was not arbitrary and capricious, and granting summary judgment to the defendants. The record did not support the conclusion defendant’s denial of plaintiff’s claim was the result of a deliberative process or was based on substantial evidence. Plaintiff’s disability claim was initially approved. However, defendant later notified plaintiff her benefits would be terminated based on the administrative decision “[t]here is no supportive medical documentation of the exacerbation of your cardiac condition and symptomology, due to subjective complaints of work-related stress.” Defendant acted under a conflict of interest since it was authorized both to decide whether an employee was eligible for benefits and to pay those benefits. It also acted in unacknowledged conflict with the SSA’s determination of disability. In denying benefits, defendant offered no explanation for crediting a brief form filled out by plaintiff’s doctor while overlooking his detailed reports. This inappropriately selective consideration of plaintiff’s medical record was compounded by the fact the occupational skills analyst and the independent medical consultant were apparently not provided with full information from her doctor on which to base their conclusions. There was also no adequate basis for the plan administrator’s decision not to factor in one of the major considerations in plaintiff’s pathology, the role stress played in aggravating her condition and in preventing her return to “gainful work or service for which [she is] reasonably qualified.” Taken together, these factors reflected a decision by defendant that could only be described as arbitrary and capricious. Reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate plaintiff’s LTD benefits, retroactive to the date on which they were terminated.

 

Full Text Opinion

Insurance
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Issues: Claims related to a fire loss; Whether the trial court properly prohibited defendant-Auto Owners from raising the defense of plaintiffs’ failure to timely file a proof of loss because defendant did not comply with MCL 500.2006(3); Dellar v. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co.; Whether defendant sent plaintiffs a copy of the policy; Whether defendant should be estopped from raising the defense; Whether a letter agreement was a valid modification of the policy; Adell Broad. Corp. v. Apex Media Sales, Inc.; Whether defendant properly raised its defenses of arson, fraud, and false swearing; Sanborn v. Income Guar. Co.; Whether plaintiff-Tammy Appleton was an innocent coinsured; Borman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.; Meyers v. Center Line; Whether the “innocent coinsured” doctrine applied to the proof of loss and debris removal issues; Williams v. Auto Club Group Ins. Co.

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: Appleton v. Westfield Ins. Co.

e-Journal Number: 33038

Judge(s): Per Curiam – Bandstra, White, and Fort Hood

 

The trial court erred to the extent it precluded defendant-Auto Owners from raising the defense of plaintiffs’ failure to timely file a proof of loss and the court concluded questions of fact existed regarding the effect of a letter agreement as it pertains to defendant’s proof-of-loss filing requirement and whether defendant should be estopped from raising plaintiffs’ failure to timely file a proof of loss as a defense. A fire completely destroyed plaintiffs’ home insured by defendant and Westfield Insurance. Both companies required a proof of loss form to be filed within 60 days of the loss. The parties allegedly agreed Westfield would adjust the claim and apportion the loss with defendant. The agreement was purportedly memorialized in a letter sent by defendant’s agent to Randy Appleton. Plaintiffs’ proof of loss was not mailed to defendant until more than two months past the deadline. Plaintiffs argued defendant should be estopped from raising the defense of the late proof of loss because it did not send them a proof of loss form or a copy of their policy. The court held plaintiffs were not entitled to summary disposition based on estoppel because there was a factual disparity in the evidence regarding the prior mailing and receipt of the policy, and there was no indication any failure to send a copy of the policy after the claim affected their ability to timely comply with the proof of loss requirement. Finally, the question of estoppel hinged on the validity of the letter agreement as a modification of the insurance policy and there was a question of fact as to the effect of the letter. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

 

Full Text Opinion

 

This summary also appears under Employment & Labor Law

 

Issues: ERISA action challenging the termination of long-term disability (LTD) benefits; Whether the district court properly upheld the defendant-plan administrator’s determination terminating the LTD benefits plaintiff had been receiving on the ground her condition had improved; Whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious; McDonald v. Western-S. Life Ins. Co.; Conflict of interest; Whether the plan administrator was arbitrary in failing to consider the award of disability benefits plaintiff secured from the Social Security Administration (SSA); Calvert v. Firstar Fin., Inc.; The medical evidence

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit

Case Name: Glenn v. MetLife

e-Journal Number: 33040

Judge(s): Daughtrey and Keith; Concurrence – Merritt

 

The district court erred by upholding the defendant-plan administrator’s determination terminating the LTD benefits plaintiff had been receiving on the ground her condition had improved, finding the decision was not arbitrary and capricious, and granting summary judgment to the defendants. The record did not support the conclusion defendant’s denial of plaintiff’s claim was the result of a deliberative process or was based on substantial evidence. Plaintiff’s disability claim was initially approved. However, defendant later notified plaintiff her benefits would be terminated based on the administrative decision “[t]here is no supportive medical documentation of the exacerbation of your cardiac condition and symptomology, due to subjective complaints of work-related stress.” Defendant acted under a conflict of interest since it was authorized both to decide whether an employee was eligible for benefits and to pay those benefits. It also acted in unacknowledged conflict with the SSA’s determination of disability. In denying benefits, defendant offered no explanation for crediting a brief form filled out by plaintiff’s doctor while overlooking his detailed reports. This inappropriately selective consideration of plaintiff’s medical record was compounded by the fact the occupational skills analyst and the independent medical consultant were apparently not provided with full information from her doctor on which to base their conclusions. There was also no adequate basis for the plan administrator’s decision not to factor in one of the major considerations in plaintiff’s pathology, the role stress played in aggravating her condition and in preventing her return to “gainful work or service for which [she is] reasonably qualified.” Taken together, these factors reflected a decision by defendant that could only be described as arbitrary and capricious. Reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate plaintiff’s LTD benefits, retroactive to the date on which they were terminated.

 

Full Text Opinion

Litigation
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This summary also appears under Admiralty

 

Issues: Show cause order directing plaintiff to demonstrate why the complaint should not be dismissed for failure to comply with the court's order directing plaintiff to provide the precise location of the defendant-ship; The Abandoned Shipwreck Act (ASA)(43 USC §§ 2101-2106); MCL § 324.76102(2)

Court: U.S. District Court Western District of Michigan

Case Name: Great Lakes Exploration Group LLC v. The Unidentified, Wrecked and (For Salvage-Right Purposes), Abandoned Sailing Vessel

e-Journal Number: 33001

Judge(s): Bell

 

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate good cause for its failure to comply with the court's prior order directing it to provide the precise location of the defendant-ship. The ship was believed to be "the Griffin," the French explorer La Salle's ship, considered to be the first European vessel to navigate the Great Lakes. Based upon the applicable statutes, the State has a clear interest in exploratory activities taking place on the state-owned bottomlands of Lake Michigan, particularly where the target of the exploration is believed to be a sailing vessel of significant historical value. Moreover, based on the applicable provisions, the State may have a superior claim of ownership to the ship. In order to determine any rights it may have or wish to assert in this matter, the State must be given basic information, such as the precise location of the ship, so it can investigate its claim under the ASA and other law to determine such basic issues as whether defendant is a ship, whether, assuming it is, it has historical value, and whether it is embedded. Without viewing the ship in its present condition in its precise location, the State can only speculate as to its rights. Accordingly, it is absolutely necessary the State be given the ship's precise location. Although repeatedly ordered to do so, plaintiff failed to provide the precise location of the ship to the State. The identification of the three circles encompassing about 2.3 square miles did not allow the State to investigate. Rather, it forced the State into “a fishing expedition.” This did not comply with the court's order. Plaintiff was given 10 days to provide the State with the precise location of defendant. If plaintiff fails to comply, an order will be entered dismissing the complaint without prejudice.

 

Full Text Opinion

Municipal
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This summary also appears under Civil Rights

 

Issues: Claims under § 1983 related to an allegedly unreasonable search and seizure; Whether the officers’ warrantless search of the home was unconstitutional; Preclusive effect of the state court judgment; Von Herbert v. City of St. Clair Shores (Unpub.); Whether the Hamburg officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they went onto the back deck of the home and entered the home without a search warrant; Curtilage; United States v. Dunn; Widgren v. Maple Grove Twp.; Whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they went onto the deck in order to knock and talk at the back door; Whether the officers observed a medical emergency; Exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement; Whether the Pickney officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered the home without a search warrant; United States v. Hensley

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit

Case Name: Hardesty v. Hamburg Twp.

e-Journal Number: 33042

Judge(s): McKeague and Norris; Dissent – Martin

 

Deciding an issue of first impression related to whether the knock and talk investigative technique may be extended beyond the front door to an inquiry at the back door, the court adopted an approach taken by other circuits and held the officers’ decision to proceed around the house to seek a back door was within the scope of the knock and talk investigative technique already recognized by the circuit. Police officers are permitted to enter private property and approach the front door in order to ask questions or ask for consent to search the premises. But knocking at the front door will not always result in the officers being able to initiate the permitted conversation (where nobody is home or someone may be home but not hear the knocking). When the circumstances indicate someone is home and knocking at the front door proves insufficient to initiate a conversation with the person sought, officers should not be categorically prevented from carrying out their investigative function. The court held when knocking at the front door is unsuccessful in spite of indications someone is in or around the house, an officer may take reasonable steps to speak with the person being sought out even where such steps require an intrusion into the curtilage. Since someone was present in the home in this case, knocking on the front door was unsuccessful, proceeding around the house and onto the back deck was a reasonable step, and that step was directed towards initiating a conversation with the person or persons in the house. Therefore, the Hamburg officers’ entry into the curtilage in order to effectuate the knock and talk investigative technique did not violate plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs did not establish a constitutional violation, and all defendants were entitled to a judgment in their favor. Affirmed.

 

Full Text Opinion