Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 50,000 cases summarized to date.
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Cases appear under the following practice areas:
- Constitutional Law (1)
- Contracts (1)
- Criminal Law (3)
- Employment & Labor Law (1)
- Freedom of Information Act (1)
Issues: Constitutionality of Michigan's "anti-begging" statute (MCL 750.167(1)(h)); Whether begging is a form of solicitation that the First Amendment protects; Facial challenge; Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder; Carey v. Wolnitzek; United States v. Stevens; The First Amendment doctrine of "overbreadth"; City of Houston, TX v. Hill; Broadrick v. Oklahoma; Glenn v. Holder; Virginia v. Hicks; New York State Club Ass'n v. City of NY; Construing undefined statutory terms according to "common and approved usage"; Jennings v. Southwood (MI); Use of dictionary definitions; Shinkle v. Shinkle (MI App.); U.S. Supreme Court rulings that the First Amendment protects charitable solicitation performed by organizations; Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't; Secretary of State of MD v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc.; Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of NC, Inc.; United States v. Kokinda; Whether the First Amendment protects the solicitation of alms performed by an individual not affiliated with a group; Gresham v. Peterson (7th Cir.); Loper v. New York City Police Dep't (2nd Cir.); Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, FL (11th Cir.); Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville (4th Cir.); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee; Young v. New York City Transit Auth. (2nd Cir.); Whether the statute was "substantially overbroad"; Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party; United States v. Coss; Dombrowski v. Pfister; Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.; Prevention of fraud and duress as substantial state interests; Gooding v. Wilson
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit
Case Name: Speet v. Schuette
e-Journal Number: 55274
Judge(s): Martin, Sutton, and Adams
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] Holding that begging is a form of solicitation protected by the First Amendment and that Michigan's anti-begging statute facially violates the First Amendment, the court affirmed the district court's judgment granting the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on their facial challenges to the statute. "The statute provides that '[a] person is a disorderly person if the person is any of the following: . . . (h) A person found begging in a public place.'" The record showed that the police department that made the underlying arrests in this case recorded 409 reports of incidents of police enforcing the anti-begging ordinance from 2008-11. The court noted that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the First Amendment protects charitable solicitation performed by organizations. As to whether the First Amendment protects the solicitation of alms when performed by an individual not affiliated with a group, the court held that it does, finding Gresham persuasive. Further, the Second, Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits "have similarly held that begging is a type of solicitation protected by the First Amendment." Turning to the issue of whether Michigan's anti-begging statute was substantially overbroad, the court concluded that the record showed the statute reached a substantial amount of begging. "Instead of a few instances of alleged unconstitutional applications, we have hundreds." Of the 409 incident reports, 38% of the people that the police stopped were holding signs requesting help, containing messages like "Homeless and Hungry: Need Work," "Homeless Please Help God Bless," "Lost My Job Need Help," and "Homeless and Hungry Vet." The other 62% of the stops involved people verbally soliciting charity. In 43% of the cases, the police immediately arrested the people who were begging. In 211 cases, people convicted of begging were sentenced directly to jail time. The court concluded that the record bolstered its "'judicial prediction' that 'the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.'" Thus, sustaining the facial challenge was "appropriate because the risk exists that, if left on the books, the statute would chill a substantial amount of activity protected by the First Amendment." The court could not "read the statute to limit its constitutional effect. The statute simply bans an entire category of activity that the First Amendment protects." While the court agreed with the defendant that the prevention of fraud and duress were substantial state interests, "Michigan's interest in preventing fraud can be better served by a statute that, instead of directly prohibiting begging, is more narrowly tailored to the specific conduct, such as fraud, that Michigan seeks to prohibit."
Issues: Action involving fraudulent artwork; Waiver of arbitration; Madison Dist. Pub. Sch. v. Myers; Capital Mtg. Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand; Joba Constr. Co. v. Monroe Cnty. Drain Comm'r; Salesin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.; Defendant-Royal Caribbean's claim that § 12(B) of the cruise ticket contract applied and precluded this litigation; Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Archdiocese of Detroit; MCL 600.5855 (the "fraudulent concealment" statute); Prentis Family Found. v. Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Inst.; Whether the trial court properly found that § 4 of the cruise ticket contract did not apply; Contract interpretation; Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.; Coates v. Bastian Bros., Inc.; Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc.; Smith v. Smith; Doctrine of noscitur a sociis; Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Birmingham
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: Best v. Park W. Galleries, Inc.
e-Journal Number: 55383
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Murphy, Markey, and Riordan
The court held the Park West defendants and defendant-Royal Caribbean waived their right to arbitration and the trial court erred in finding otherwise. A question of fact remained as to whether fraudulent concealment existed to toll the limitations period set forth in § 12(B) of the cruise ticket contract. Further, Royal Caribbean failed to establish that § 4 of the cruise ticket contract applied and precluded this litigation. Appellants purchased artwork while on a cruise from an onboard auctioneer for defendant-Park West. They were later introduced to defendant-Shapiro of Park West, and they completed an "off-board" purchase of more artwork. Sometime later, an independent appraisal showed that the artwork was fraudulent, and further inspection revealed that it was damaged and incomplete. "After almost two and a half years of litigation, the Park West defendants and Royal Caribbean eventually asserted the defense of arbitration. They claimed that an arbitration clause existed in the invoice and entitled them to arbitration." The trial court granted them summary disposition based on the arbitration clause. Appellants argued that the Park West defendants and Royal Caribbean waived their right to arbitration. The court noted that the invoice containing the arbitration clause was the result of an agreement between Park West and appellants, and Park West made no meaningful argument on appeal that it lacked knowledge of its arbitration clause. Further, the invoice was mentioned in the initial complaint, which was served on Park West at the beginning of this litigation. The court also concluded that "the Park West defendants engaged in a course of conduct that was inconsistent with their right to arbitrate." Before ever asserting a right to arbitrate, they filed an answer to the complaint, filed a countercomplaint and third-party complaint, and filed a motion for summary disposition. A "waiver of the right to arbitrate has been found when a party files an answer, a counterclaim, third-party complaint, cross-claim, uses judicial discovery procedures, or files a motion for summary disposition without asserting the right to arbitrate." Thus, "there was 'considerable behavior inconsistent with [defendants'] right to proceed to arbitration.'" However, the Park West defendants, like the trial court, focused on the fact that in the initial complaint appellants pleaded their breach of contract claim based on the certificates of authenticity, not the invoice with the arbitration clause. However, given the broad language of the arbitration clause, Park West could have reasonably raised it in response to the first complaint, regardless of whether appellants focused on the certificates of authenticity. This conclusion was "consistent with the purpose of arbitration, which is to avoid protracted litigation." Royal Caribbean contended that it did not waive its right to assert arbitration because it did not have knowledge of the arbitration clause and did not act inconsistently with that right. However, the court held that in light of the lengthy proceedings where Royal Caribbean did not assert any right to arbitration until almost two and a half years after the complaint was filed, "there was sufficient evidence that Royal Caribbean knew of the arbitration clause and acted inconsistently with that knowledge." Also, "prejudice would result if the Park West defendants and Royal Caribbean were allowed to invoke the arbitration clause at this late stage of the litigation." Reversed and remanded.
Issues: Whether the defendant's sentence after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) was procedurally and substantively reasonable; Gall v. United States; United States v. Brooks; Whether the district court properly applied a four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony pursuant to USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6); United States v. Burns; United States v. Taylor; Whether defendant fired the gun in self-defense; Felony and/or aggravated assault; Whether the district court properly calculated his base offense level; Prior conviction of a "crime of violence"; USSG 2K2.1(a)(4)(A); United States v. Martin; Taylor v. United States; Begay v. United States; "Shepard documents"; United States v. Ford; "Criminal gang activity"; United States v. Armstead; United States v. Sanders; Whether the district court properly assigned a criminal history point for the alleged undocumented juvenile conviction; United States v. Wheaton; United States v. Mustread; Whether the district court properly considered defendant's personal history when considering factors under 18 USC § 3553(a); United States v. Jeross; United States v. Sexton
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit
Case Name: United States v. Adkins
e-Journal Number: 55382
Judge(s): Zatkoff, Griffin, and Kethledge
The district court did not err in sentencing defendant to 46 months of incarceration. First, the district court properly applied an enhancement for his use of ammunition in connection with another felony offense. Second, the district court calculated the correct base offense level given defendant's prior conviction for a violent felony. Third, it correctly assigned a criminal history point for a prior juvenile conviction. Finally, the district court fully considered his personal history and characteristics before imposing a sentence. The court affirmed the district court's sentence. The police and ATF responded to a report of gunshots fired at a gas station. When they arrived, the station manager gave them a security video that showed the shooting incident. The four-minute composite video of the gas station's surveillance footage, which was admitted without objection at sentencing, showed a white SUV driving through the gas station's parking lot as defendant appeared to recognize the SUV. He was shown pulling a handgun from the walking cast boot he wore on his right foot. Walking with the gun at his side and pointed to the ground, he casually paced around and zipped up his hooded sweatshirt before raising the gun, pausing to take aim, and firing several rounds at the SUV as it drove away on an adjacent side street. On the left side of the screen, a bullet appeared to strike the pavement in front of another vehicle near the SUV just as it begins to drive away. Defendant pleaded guilty without a plea agreement and issued a statement accepting responsibility for his actions. Later, he appeared in the district court for sentencing. The PSR recommended a base level of 20 under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). Defendant did not challenge the PSR's recommendation. Nor did he disagree with the government's position in its sentencing memorandum that he committed this offense after sustaining a felony conviction for a crime of violence - criminal gang activity involving aggravated robbery and kidnapping - which triggered § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)'s base level enhancement. At sentencing, the district court calculated a base offense level of 20, implicitly adopting the PSR's finding that defendant committed some part of this offense after sustaining a felony conviction of a crime of violence. The district court then added four levels after finding defendant possessed ammunition in connection with another felony offense - aggravated assault. It then reduced the offense level by two because he accepted responsibility and subtracted an additional level at the government's request. The district court calculated a total offense level of 21 and assessed his criminal history at 4 points, placing him in category III. The court assigned three points for the attempted criminal gang activity conviction and added a point for a CCW juvenile incident. The district court ultimately imposed a sentence of 46 months to be followed by 3 years of post-release control.
Issues: Sufficiency of the evidence to support the defendant's felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition conviction; 18 USC § 922(g); United States v. Morrison; "Hearsay"; Fed.R.Evid. 801(c)(2); United States v. Caver; United States v. Aguwa; United States v. Hearn; Background information; United States v. Evans; 911-call evidence; United States v. Sallins (3rd Cir.); United States v. Reyes (2nd Cir.); Limiting instructions; United States v. Martin; Bruton v. United States; Motion to suppress; Whether a warrantless search and seizure of abandoned property violates the Fourth Amendment; United States v. Robinson; Rakas v. Illinois; Abel v. United States; A "legitimate expectation of privacy"; Smith v. Maryland; Search incident to arrest; Devenpeck v. Alford; Refusal to give a proposed jury instruction on "police negligence"; United States v. Hart
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit
Case Name: United States v. Nelson
e-Journal Number: 55206
Judge(s): Rogers, Kethledge, and Borman
The court held that the district court erred in denying defendant's pretrial motion to prevent the government from presenting testimony regarding a 911 caller's description of the suspect on the grounds that this evidence was inadmissible hearsay. Defendant was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. On appeal, the court rejected defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, finding that the government met the requirements of the statute. It held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to connect defendant to the gun, that he had a prior conviction, and that the gun was not manufactured in Tennessee meaning it traveled in interstate commerce. However, the court found that reversal was nonetheless required because the police officers' testimony about the anonymous 911 caller's description of the suspect was hearsay evidence admitted to prove that defendant possessed a gun. "The five officers' detailed testimony, which was based on an anonymous, out-of-court declarant's observations, went directly to the key issue for jury resolution, was not necessary for the Government to provide the jury with a coherent narrative explaining the officers' actions, and was too prejudicial for the harm to be cured with a limiting instruction." Further, the error was not harmless because it was "more probable than not that it had a material impact on the jury's verdict." The court explained that this was "not a case where evidence of an out-of-court declarant's statements was necessary to provide the jury with a coherent narrative explaining complex interactions between criminal defendants, police officers, and cooperating witnesses." The court further concluded that the curative instructions were not sufficient to eliminate the prejudice on the facts of this case. "Although the district court gave the jury a limiting instruction after each officer's testimony - reminding them that the evidence about the suspect's description was not to be considered for its truth - the prejudicial nature of the evidence and the fact that it went to the key issue for the jury's resolution made it unlikely that the limiting instruction adequately protected [defendant] from prejudice." Finally, the court held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the gun and ammunition, and properly rejected his proposed jury instruction on police negligence. Vacated and remanded.
Issues: "Border search"; Claim the defendant should not have been indicted in this case because the district court erred in dismissing a prior indictment without prejudice rather than with prejudice upon finding a Speedy Trial Act (STA) violation in the earlier case; United States v. Tinklenberg; United States v. Anderson; 18 USC §§ 3161(c)(1) & (1)(D); United States v. Davist; Search and seizure at a border; Motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the laptop computers after they left the airport because they were allegedly searched and seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment; United States v. Coffee; United States v. Flores-Montano; United States v. Yang (7th Cir.); "Extended border search doctrine"; United States v. McGinnis (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Alfonso (9th Cir.); United States v. Guzman-Padilla (9th Cir.); United States v. Cotterman (9th Cir.); 19 USC §§ 1499(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (b)(1-3), and (c)(1); Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal related to "image manipulation"; United States v. Wettstain; "Child pornography" defined; 18 USC § 2256(8); "Sexually explicit conduct"; § 2256(2)(A)(v); The test for "lasciviousness"; United States v. Dost (SD CA); United States v. Brown; United States v. Abboud; Whether the district court committed "plain error" by admitting two government exhibits and by not sua sponte instructing the jury on the statutory definition of an "identifiable minor"; Johnson v. United States; United States v. Angel; Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Phillips; § 2256(9)(A); United States v. Rayborn; § 2256(8)(A); § 2256(9)(A)(i)(I); USC § 2256(9); United States v. Marcus; Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit
Case Name: United States v. Stewart
e-Journal Number: 55371
Judge(s): Griffin, Gilman, and White
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] Applying the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 3161(h)(1)(D), the court held that since one day remained on the speedy-trial clock, and because defendant's 5/24/10 pretrial motion automatically tolled the clock, there was no STA violation. Thus, he was not entitled to dismissal with prejudice. In an issue of first impression, the court also held that the extended border search doctrine did not apply in this case, and the government's border search of defendant's computers did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, the court affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress, but for reasons different than the district court. The court also affirmed his jury convictions of two counts of transporting child pornography. Defendant arrived at an airport on a plane from Japan. He was in possession of two laptop computers. After being stopped by the CBP, and following a search by the ICE at its main office, it was determined that the images on the computer were child pornography. On appeal, he argued that he was unlawfully indicted in Case No. 10-20436 because the district court, upon finding a STA violation in Case No. 09-20415, erred in dismissing the first indictment without prejudice, rather than with prejudice, since the delay in bringing him to trial purportedly caused an "undue hardship" on his personal life. The government responded that under Tinklenberg, there was no STA violation and thus, no basis for a dismissal with prejudice, because defendant's 5/24/10 pretrial motion to dismiss automatically tolled the running of the speedy-trial clock, regardless of whether it "actually" delayed the trial. The defendant filed his motion to dismiss because of a STA violation on the 70th day of the speedy-trial clock. Correctly applying Tinklenberg, which held that "a pretrial motion falls within the § 3161(h)(1)(D) exclusion only if it 'actually cause[s] a delay, or the expectation of a delay, of trial[,]'" the district court determined that defendant's motion filing did not toll the speedy-trial clock because it did not "actually" delay the trial, which was scheduled to begin about two weeks later. Because defendant would not be brought to trial within the statutory period, the district court found a STA violation. In 2011, after he was convicted, but before he was sentenced, the Supreme Court overruled the court's interpretation of § 3161(h)(1)(D), holding that "the filing of a pretrial motion falls within this provision irrespective of whether it actually causes, or is expected to cause, delay in starting a trial." In other words, the speedy-trial clock automatically stops when a defendant files any type of pretrial motion, including a motion to dismiss for a STA violation.
Employment & Labor Law
Issues: Class action arising from the defendant-M&G's announcement that the plaintiffs-retirees would be required to make healthcare contributions; Alleged violation of labor agreements under § 301 of the LMRA; Alleged violation of an employee welfare benefit plan under § 502(a)(1)(B) of the ERISA; Whether the relevant CBAs "vested" in plaintiffs a right to lifetime no-contribution healthcare benefits; Noe v. Polyone Corp.; UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc.; Whether the court's prior opinion in the case (Tackett I) conclusively determined that plaintiffs' retirement benefits had vested; Whether the "cap letters" were part of a CBA; Credibility determinations; United States v. Esteppe; Whether a Letter of Understanding applied to all plaintiffs; United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. NLRB; Effect of Summary Plan Description (SPD); Engleson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.; Moore v. Menasha Corp.; Distinguishing Wood v. Detroit Diesel Corp. (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Effect of subsequent concessions by the union on vested benefits; Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div.; Scope of the permanent injunction granting plaintiffs relief ; Reese v. CNH Am.; Pension, Insurance & Service Award Agreement (P&I Agreement)
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit
Case Name: Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC
e-Journal Number: 55233
Judge(s): Cole, Keith, and Martin
The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the "cap letters" were not part of the pre-2005 CBAs and thus, did not clearly err in interpreting the pre-2005 CBAs as vesting a right to lifetime contribution-free benefits in the pre-8/9/05 retirees. It also did not abuse its discretion in restoring the plaintiffs to the current versions of their benefit plans, rather than to the pre-2007 versions. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. Defendants-M&G and associated health plans appealed the district court's permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs-retirees and dependents and the union that currently represents plant employees. Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against defendants after M&G announced that plaintiffs would be required to make healthcare contributions. The named plaintiffs were retirees from a plant (Apple Grove) that M&G purchased in 2000. After a bench trial, the district court found defendants liable for violating both a labor agreement and an employee welfare benefit plan. It issued a permanent injunction ordering them to reinstate plaintiffs to the current versions of the benefits plans they were enrolled in until 2007 to receive healthcare for life without contributions. The court noted that its prior opinion in the case, Tackett I, did not conclusively determine that plaintiffs' retirement benefits had vested. However, the district court performed its own analysis of the facts on remand. It considered, among other things, (1) documents indicating an agreement between the union and the employers to "cap" health benefits, several "side" letters and the SPD, which were part of the "master" agreements, (2) P&I booklets circulated to Apple Grove employees that described retiree benefits and did not contain any "capping" documents, and (3) testimony from individuals involved in "master" negotiations, Apple Grove local negotiations or both. "In sorting through conflicting recollections of negotiations, the district court noted that several parties with authority to bind M&G and the union rejected or disputed cap letter applicability." The district court did not, as M&G claimed, "treat statements of those with 'binding authority' as dispositive, but it did appear to weigh these statements more heavily than statements from those without binding authority." The court noted that credibility determinations are a matter of fact and a district court's determination receives great deference. "It is not unreasonable to infer that a party with authority to bind would be more likely to be informed regarding important documents." The court also concluded that the "district court's presumption that, in the absence of extrinsic evidence to the contrary, the agreements indicated an intent to vest lifetime contribution-free benefits was in accordance with both Tackett I and the CBA language promising a 'full contribution' to qualifying employees."
Freedom of Information Act
Issues: Case involving a FOIA request by the plaintiff-ACLU seeking release of information from the FBI about its use of community-level racial and ethnic demographic data; "Exemptions" are narrowly construed; Akron Std. Div. of Eagle-Picher Indus, Inc. v. Donovan; Rimmer v. Holder; Exemption 7(A) protecting law-enforcement records whose disclosure "could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings"; 5 USC § 552(b)(7)(A); Manna v. Department of Justice (3rd Cir.); Exemption 1 protecting properly classified records kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy; 5 USC § 552(b)(1); Mays v. Drug Enforcement Admin. (DC Cir.); The § 552(c) exclusions permitting the agency to state that "there exist no records responsive to your FOIA request" whether or not the records actually exist; In camera review by the district court; Jabara v. Webster; Patterson v. FBI (3rd Cir.)
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit
Case Name: American Civil Liberties Union of MI v. Federal Bureau of Investigation
e-Journal Number: 55311
Judge(s): Boggs, McKeague, and Beckwith
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that because the release of publicly available information selectively used in investigations may reveal law-enforcement priorities and methodologies, thus interfering with enforcement proceedings, the defendant-FBI properly applied Exemption 7(A). Also, the plaintiff-ACLU's proposed procedure for resolving § 552(c) disputes was unnecessary and inadequately protective of sensitive information. Rather, an in camera review by the district court is appropriate instead. In 2008, the defendant FBI issued a guide (DIOG) to implement revised guidelines from the DOJ. Concerned that the DIOG loosened restrictions on the FBI's authority and risked leading to illegal profiling of communities, the ACLU submitted a FOIA request to a FBI field office seeking documents about the FBI's authority to collect information about and map racial and ethnic demographics, behaviors, and life style characteristics in local communities. The FBI released 298 pages (48 partially redacted) of training material that was earlier released under a FOIA request in another part of the country. Later, the FBI released 1,553 more pages covering various types of materials. The FBI moved for summary judgment and included an affidavit of an information section chief and a descriptive Vaughn index of the potentially responsive documents. In many cases where the FBI would not release documents, it relied on Exemption 7(A) and Exemption 1. The district granted summary judgment to the FBI and denied the ACLU's cross-motion upholding the FBI's use of both Exemptions 7(A) and 1, among other things. It rejected the ACLU's public-information argument and the ACLU's proposed procedure for adjudicating § 552(c) questions related to the in camera declaration of the FBI. Most FOIA cases are decided on summary judgment, since the primary question is a legal one - whether the withheld documents are covered by one of the statutory exceptions. This is due to the "peculiar posture" of FOIA cases, in which plaintiffs, lacking access to the documents, can only challenge the correct legal standard to the descriptions provided by the government, not the actual content of the underlying documents. The agency's declarations are entitled to a "presumption of good faith." If bad faith is shown or the agency's declarations are insufficient to meet its burden, the district court may seek to examine the withheld documents in camera. The court held that on review of the FBI's declaration in camera, the district court did not err in finding that if an exclusion was employed, it was amply justified. Affirmed.
Arbitration & Mediation
Federal False Claims