e-Journal

Issues: Breach of contract; Spiek v. Department of Transp.; Maiden v. Rozwood; Contract interpretation; Sweebe v. Sweebe; Whether the agreement was a "commission" contract; HJ Tucker v. Allied Chucker; Reed v. Kurdziel; Muir v. Kalamazoo Corset Co.; Whether plaintiff was the "procuring cause" of the shipments; Whether the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's equitable and tort claims

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: Petroff v. Grand Blanc Tractor Sales, Inc.

e-Journal Number: 44276

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Stephens, Cavanagh, and Owens

The trial court erred by granting the defendants' motion for summary disposition holding the parties' agreement was not a "commission" contract. Plaintiff and defendant-GBTS entered into an "exclusive agency agreement" on December 9, 1996. Plaintiff was to serve as GBTS's agent and translator in Bulgaria during negotiations with a Bulgarian company, Hydro, which was supposed to make backhoes for GBTS. Defendant-Steiner signed the agreement as GBTS's president. Plaintiff flew to Bulgaria at GBTS's expense to negotiate with Hydro and monitor the progress in building a prototype backhoe. About six months later, Hydro shipped its prototype to GBTS. It was not satisfactory. According to plaintiff, Steiner instructed him to work with the Bulgarian engineers to fix the problems. However, Hydro was having its own problems and in June 1998, it was ordered to liquidate 80 percent of its capital. In August 1998, plaintiff and Steiner met for the last time. Both parties agreed Steiner told plaintiff there would be no immediate deal with Hydro. The parties did not dispute plaintiff did not do any more work for GBTS. In March 1999, Hydro contacted GBTS, desiring to renew the companies' relationship. Steiner traveled to Bulgaria with a different translator and worked out a deal with Hydro. Plaintiff did not learn of this until September 2007. He sued in July 2008. Plaintiff was correct the case turned on whether the parties' agreement was a commission contract. The trial court failed to recognize plaintiff performed some service for defendants. He traveled to Bulgaria to negotiate with Hydro, and refrained from working for another company, just as was contemplated by the agreement. The trial court erred in interpreting the contract as requiring additional work from plaintiff for each shipment. This was clearly not within its terms. Under the dictionary definition used by the trial court, plaintiff's compensation, which was paid to him as GBTS's agent for performing a service, was a "commission." The trial court's interpretation "incorrectly considered the time of plaintiff's performance when it should have looked at the time payment was due from defendants." This did not mean, however, plaintiff was necessarily owed any commissions. He could not seek compensation for commissions which should have been paid more than six years ago. Further, as defendants pointed out, no shipments were made in immediate response to plaintiff's work - some further dealing had to be done. This did not preclude plaintiff's claim, because he performed as required by the contract, and there was no contractual requirement his efforts be successful. The appropriate common law applicable here was clearly set forth in the seminal case, Reed. What remained was the question of whether plaintiff was the "procuring cause" of the shipments. Because there were issues not yet presented to the trial court, a remand was necessary. Reversed and remanded.

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Criminal Law

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Issues: Whether the evidence was sufficient to identify the defendant as one of the assailants; Whether defendant's sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment; People v. Kimble; People v. Cotton; People v. Colon; Scoring of 25 points for OV 13; People v. Harmon; Whether defendant's constitutional rights were violated when his appellate counsel refused to give him access to the trial transcripts; Griffin v. Illinois; MCR 6.425(G)(2); MCR 6.433(A); Whether defendant was denied equal protection and due process of law by his appellate counsel's failure to give him access to the trial transcripts, and impeding his ability to prepare and file a Standard 4 brief; People v. Adkins

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. Bennett

e-Journal Number: 44315

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Shapiro, Jansen, and Beckering

Given D's definitive identification of defendant at the lineup and at trial, along with the other evidence presented, the court held a rational jury could have found the prosecutor established defendant's identity beyond a reasonable doubt. His convictions arose from a midnight assault against D and his family. Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to identify him as one of the assailants. The record revealed there were some discrepancies between the descriptions of the assailants the victims gave to the police after the incident and their trial testimony. The discrepancies did not require reversal, however, as sufficient evidence of identity existed. Officer W testified when he took S, (D's wife) statement on the night of the crime, she had clearly been victimized. She was visibly upset and very shaken as she tried to tell the officer what happened, and was "all over the place" in giving him a lot of information and jumping around a bit. Officer W did his best to accurately document her descriptions. The officer testified in his experience, people often become confused in giving descriptions to the police. D's identifications of defendant at the corporeal lineup and at trial were definitive. At the lineup, he singled out defendant and told police, "he [defendant] was armed with a rifle. He was most aggressive out of the three. He pointed his gun at me, and my family. He did most of the talking. He was definitely the aggressor." D testified he looked fully at defendant's face three times during the robbery. He acknowledged on cross-examination his views of defendant's face lasted approximately 15 to 20 seconds, 10 seconds, and 8 seconds, respectively. Despite the brevity of his views of the assailant, D testified he was confident in his identification of defendant. Defendant's convictions on eight counts of armed robbery, first-degree home invasion, felon in possession of a firearm, larceny in a building, three counts of felonious assault, and felony-firearm were affirmed.

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Issues: Sufficiency of the evidence to support the defendant's felony-firearm conviction; People v. Taylor; People v. Mayhew; People v. Cline; Claim the prosecution did not present any evidence the firearm at issue was real or was operable; Firearm defined (MCL 750.222(d)); People v. Osantowski; People v. Peals

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. Cook

e-Journal Number: 44296

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Stephens, Cavanagh, and Owens

Since the prosecution did not have to prove operability, pursuant to Peals, the court held the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of felony-firearm beyond a reasonable doubt. He was convicted of armed robbery, carjacking, felonious assault, and felony-firearm. His only claim on appeal was the prosecution did not present legally sufficient evidence to support his felony-firearm conviction because it did not present evidence the firearm at issue was real or was operable. He argued the prosecution was required to prove as part of its case in chief he had an operable firearm. The court noted while there had previously been some controversy over the definition of a firearm (whether the prosecution had to show the firearm at issue was operable), the Supreme Court expressly resolved the operability issue for purposes of the felony-firearm statute in Peals. The Supreme Court held felony-firearm does not require proof the firearm was operable, or reasonably or readily operable. Rather, the statute only requires "the weapon be of a type that is designed or intended to propel a dangerous projectile." The owner of the car defendant carjacked, H, identified the gun (which was initially held by defendant's friend, W, but ended up in defendant's hands) as a .38 revolver. H testified defendant hit him several times with the gun, "which was made out of metal and was not a toy, and thus, likely designed to propel a dangerous projectile." Further, defendant threatened to kill H in the alley, presumably with the firearm, when he and W noticed they were being followed. An eyewitness corroborated H's account. The court also noted if the object was not a firearm, it seemed unlikely defendant would have discarded it. Defendant's convictions were affirmed.

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Issues: Prosecutorial misconduct; Violation of a trial court order prohibiting references to foul language the defendant used after his arrest; People v. Thomas; People v. Noble; Presumption jurors follow their instructions; People v. Graves; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. LeBlanc; Review limited to mistakes apparent on the record; People v. Hurst; Failure to move for a mistrial; People v. Horn; No duty to pursue a futile motion; People v. Brown; Denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict; Sufficiency of the evidence to support the OWI third offense conviction; People v. Aldrich; People v. Nowack; Evidence showing defendant was operating the moped while intoxicated; People v. Wood ; People v. Hardiman

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. Gladding

e-Journal Number: 44290

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Servitto, Bandstra, and Markey

The court held although the trial court admonished the prosecutor for asking defendant a question in violation of a court order, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct depriving him of a fair trial because the record supported the conclusion the prosecutor acted in good faith. Defendant was convicted of OWI third offense, operating a motor vehicle without a license, and marijuana possession. Before opening statements, he challenged the admissibility of testimony about several statements he made after his arrest while en route to jail. He argued they were irrelevant and overly prejudicial because they involved his using foul language with the arresting officer and only showed he was intoxicated, a fact to which he stipulated. The trial court granted his motion. To show defendant's motive to lie, the prosecutor asked him, "Do you recall in the vehicle that you continued to go on about this case and how whether you had a defense attorney or not you were going to beat this and that [the arresting officer] would then walk out of here and he'd be known as a punk bitch?" The trial court sustained defense counsel's objection, instructed the jury to disregard the question, and admonished the prosecutor for intentionally violating its evidentiary ruling. The court concluded the prosecutor could have reasonably determined "evidence referencing the curse words was potentially admissible for purposes other than to prove intoxication." The court noted before asking the question, the prosecutor stated on the record he was asking it to show defendant's motive to lie. "A prosecutor's good faith effort to introduce evidence does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct." Further, the court was convinced "no serious argument can be made that the prosecutor's question using the words 'punk bitch' so prejudiced defendant's case that he would not have been convicted" if they had not been used. The trial court gave a curative jury instruction immediately after its ruling on defense counsel's objection, and defendant failed to show anything to rebut the presumption jurors follow their instructions. Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel and insufficiency of the evidence claims also failed. Affirmed.

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Issues: Sufficiency of the evidence the defendant possessed the drugs to convict her of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine, possession of morphine, and maintaining a drug house; People v. Konrad; "Constructive" possession; People v. Williams; People v. Brown; People v. Wolfe; People v. Thompson; Whether defendant's convictions were against the great weight of the evidence; Expert testimony by a police detective related to the morphine; MRE 702; People v. Dobek; People v. Williams (After Remand); Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. McGhee; Whether "drug profile" evidence was used to convict defendant of the cocaine charge; People v. Murray; People v. Hubbard; People v. Ray; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v. Pegenau; People v. Grayer; People v. Nunez; People v. Izarraras-Placante; People v. Graves; People v. Ackerman

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. Morgan

e-Journal Number: 44307

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Hoekstra, Murray, and M.J. Kelly

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the court held a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant knew of the cocaine and morphine found in the upstairs bedroom of the house she shared with her boyfriend, D, (a self-admitted drug trafficker) and she had the right to exercise control over the controlled substances to convict her of the charged crimes. Numerous pieces of furniture, including a queen size bed, a dresser, a crib, and a toddler's bed were in the bedroom. Adult male and female clothing and children's clothing were also in the bedroom. The cocaine and morphine were found in the dresser, which had no locks. A detective testified prescription morphine was generally in pill form and liquid morphine is used in hospitals. An hospital identification badge belonging to defendant was found in the bedroom. There was also mail addressed to defendant and a checkbook belonging to defendant and D. The evidence was also sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant possessed the cocaine with intent to deliver. The detective testified the amount of cocaine, 35.86 grams, and the fact it was found on a plate next to razor blades and near a scale, plastic baggies, and three piles of cash, indicated drug trafficking. The evidence was also sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant kept or maintained a drug house. A plastic baggie with cocaine residue was found in a trash bag outside defendant's house and other plastic baggies with cocaine residue were found in the dresser. The detective testified because of the large amounts of cocaine residue in the baggies, he believed at some point, each baggie held a large quantity of cocaine. Unused "coin size ziplock baggies" were found in the dresser, and these appeared to be for "packaging smaller quantities for sale[]." The evidence of the baggies together with the other evidence indicating narcotics trafficking was evidence of a degree of continuity. Affirmed.

Full Text Opinion

Issues: Sufficiency of the evidence to convict the defendant of felon in possession, manufacture of marijuana, and felony-firearm; MCL 750.224f; People v. Pierce; People v. Avant; People v. Burgenmeyer; "Possession"; People v. Nunez; MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii); CJI2d 12.1; People v. Hunter; Whether defendant "possessed" the marijuana plant

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: People v. Rodgers

e-Journal Number: 44293

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Murphy, Meter, and Beckering

Concluding it was reasonable for the jury to infer the defendant both knew the location of the firearm found in his bedroom and had reasonable access to it because he admitted to a detective he kept it for protection, thus, there was sufficient evidence presented for a rational jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of, inter alia, felon in possession. The elements of felony-firearm are the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit a felony. In this case, the felony was felon in possession. Before trial, the parties stipulated the second element of felon in possession existed at the time of the offense at issue where it was clear the case arose during a parole compliance check. Defendant contended there was insufficient evidence he possessed the firearm found during the search of his girlfriend's house. He contended there was no testimony anyone observed him holding or reaching for a firearm and there was no fingerprint or other forensic evidence showing he handled the firearm. He also argued there was no paperwork belonging to him in the rooms where the firearm and marijuana plant were found, and other people lived in the house or had access to it. The court noted defendant listed the address where the gun was found as his residence when he filled out his parole paperwork. When speaking with a detective he confirmed he lived at the house with his girlfriend. On the night of the search, he claimed the bedroom where the gun was found was not his, but was seen coming out of that room on the day he was apprehended. The officers discovered male clothing in the room and the other residents of the house were women and children, it was reasonable for the jury to infer it was his room. Although he argued there was insufficient evidence he possessed the marijuana plant, possession is not an element of manufacturing marijuana. The detective testified defendant admitted he grew the marijuana plant as a hobby to prove to himself he could do it. On the morning of his arrest, defendant came out of a room in which a magazine describing how to grow marijuana was found. Affirmed.

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Negligence & Intentional Tort

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Issues: Wrongful death claim; Whether the defendant-landlord owed the decedent-tenant a statutory duty to provide him with a portable ladder to use an alternative means of egress in the event of a fire; Case v. Consumers Power Co.; Fultz v. Union-Commerce Assoc.; MCL 554.139; Woodbury v. Bruckner (On Remand); Halloran v. Bhan; People v. Williams; People v. Lively; Nastal v. Henderson & Assoc. Investigations, Inc.; Building Official and Code Administrators (BOCA) § 611.1; Whether defendant could not escape liability because a reasonable person in its position would have provided decedent with an alternative means of egress from the second-floor window of his apartment; Restatement Torts 2d § 288; Cipri v. Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc.

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: Estate of Brannon v. KZ Props., LLC

e-Journal Number: 44260

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Hoekstra, Bandstra, and Servitto

The trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary disposition because the defendant did not have a statutory duty to provide the decedent with a portable ladder to use as an alternative means of egress in the event of a fire. Early one morning a fire broke out in decedent's apartment (one of several apartments located in a building owned by defendant) while he was asleep. The exact cause of the fire was unable to be determined. By the time decedent was awakened, the fire blocked his ability to safely exit through the front door of his apartment, which was the only door leading to a main hallway. Consequently, he jumped from a window in his second floor apartment suffering severe burns, broken bones, and paralysis. Following the fire, he suffered several bouts of pneumonia, one of which led to his death. The plain language of BOCA § 611.1 clearly states the secondary means of egress required under the statute would necessarily have to service the entire floor and it must be accessed without going through another living unit. Here, since an alternative means of egress from decedent's second-floor window (in this case, plaintiff's proposed portable ladder) would not be a means of egress everyone on the second floor could use without passing through another living unit, defendant was not required to provide one. A portable ladder for use in the event of a fire, under the facts of this case, would not meet the requirements of BOCA. Affirmed.

Full Text Opinion

This summary also appears under Real Property

Issues: Dismissal of plaintiffs' trespass and nuisance claims without prejudice; McKelvie v. Mount Clemens; MCR 2.504(A)(2); Walbridge Aldinger Co. v. Walcon Corp.; African Methodist Episcopal Church v. Shoulders; Rosselott v. County of Muskegon; Effect of a warranty deed; McCausey v. Ireland; MCL 565.151; Prejudice caused by a voluntary dismissal; Grover by Grover v Eli Lilly & Co. (6th Cir.); Requirements to maintain a nuisance or trespass action; Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co.; Motion for sanctions; Maryland Cas. Co. v Allen; Ypsilanti Twp. v. Kircher; Dismissal of abuse of process, civil conspiracy/concert of action, IIED, and prescriptive easement claims; Maiden v. Rozwood; West v. General Motors Corp.; Corley v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.; Karbel v. Comerica Bank; Bonner v. Chicago Title Ins. Co.; Young v. Motor City Apts. Ltd. Dividend Hous. Ass'n No, 1 & No. 2; Friedman v. Dozorc; Advocacy Org. for Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n; Hayley v. Allstate Ins. Co.; Rosenberg v. Rosenberg Bros. Special Account; Mino v. Clio Sch. Dist.; Teadt v. Lutheran Church Missouri Synod; Early Detection Ctr., PC v. New York Life Ins. Co.; Plymouth Canton Cmty. Crier, Inc. v. Prose; West MI Dock & Mkt. Corp. v. Lakeland Invs.; MCL 600.5801; Goodall v. Whitefish Hunting Club; Quiet title; Sackett v. Atyeo; MCL 600.2932; Adverse possession; Thomas v. Rex A. Wilcox Trust; Pulcifer v. Bishop

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: Foster-Woutinen v. Jones

e-Journal Number: 44318

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Murray, Markey, and Borrello

The trial court, inter alia, did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the plaintiffs' trespass and nuisance claims without prejudice. The case arose from a dispute over the use and ownership of land abutting Walled Lake known as Outlot A, a 20-foot wide parcel. Plaintiffs sought voluntary dismissal of their trespass and nuisance claims after conceding the warranty deed granted by the defendants-Lakes and the Wos failed to convey all the interests of the original plattors of Outlot A. This concession was significant because a warranty deed is deemed to convey an interest in fee simple and "include[s] the usual covenants of title, including the covenant of seisin and of good right to convey, the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the covenant against encumbrances, and the covenant to warrant and defend the title." Thus, plaintiffs' concession amounted to an admission the warranty deed was defective. Further, when plaintiffs' concession was considered in conjunction with the court's finding their adverse possession claim was meritless, the extent of the interest plaintiffs acquired in Outlot A was entirely unclear. It also appeared plaintiffs' failure to determine the extent of the Lakes' interest in Outlot A - and thus, the extent of the interest plaintiffs acquired - was due to their own oversight. Indeed, plaintiff-Beshears admitted she merely assumed the Lakes and Wos could grant a valid warranty deed and she did not research the extent of their interests in Outlot A. It was only after defendant-Jones's search of public records during discovery plaintiffs conceded the warranty deed failed to convey the interests of the original plattors. Notwithstanding plaintiffs' oversight, however, on balance it could not be said the trial court's decision fell outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. The court noted, inter alia, plaintiffs continued prosecuting their other meritorious claims, it was not clear at this stage in the proceedings their trespass and nuisance claims lacked merit, there was no requirement a property owner must have a fee simple interest to maintain an action in trespass or nuisance, and, most importantly, while Jones may have to bear additional costs if plaintiffs refile their trespass and nuisance claims, the trial court allowed the parties to file motions for sanctions, costs, and attorney fees at a later date. The court affirmed in all respects, except for the dismissal of Jones's prescriptive easement claim, and remanded.

Full Text Opinion

Real Property

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This summary also appears under Negligence & Intentional Tort

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: Foster-Woutinen v. Jones

e-Journal Number: 44318

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Murray, Markey, and Borrello

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Termination of Parental Rights

Issues: Termination of parental rights pursuant to §§ 19b(3)(g), (h), and (j); Whether the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over the minor child; § 2(b)(1); "Abandonment"; In re BZ; In re Nelson; § 2(b)(2); In the Matter of Curry; In re SR; MCR 3.977(J)

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: In re Johnson

e-Journal Number: 44345

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Hoekstra and M.J. Kelly; Concurrence - Murray

Concluding the trial court erred in exercising jurisdiction over the minor child because the trial court did not find the respondent-father, when able, failed to properly provide for the child's needs, there was no evidence the minor child was aware of the offenses respondent committed against an unrelated child or the offenses affected her, the evidence did not establish he abandoned her, the evidence did not show she was without proper custody or guardianship, and there was no showing her custodial environment was unfit, the court reversed. Respondent and J are the parents of K, born in November 1998. In November 2008, the DHS filed a petition for the trial court to take custody of K and to terminate respondent's parental rights. The petition alleged while investigating a referral indicating one of J's other children was sexually abused by a family friend, DHS learned respondent had been convicted of CSC against a minor and sentenced to 6 to 15 years' imprisonment. Termination was requested pursuant to §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (h), and (j). At an adjudication trial, a DHS employee testified while investigating the report about the sexual abuse of the other child abused by a family friend, she was told respondent was "in prison for molesting a child." A DHS employee testified when respondent committed the CSC offenses he was not living with K, who lived with J, but he did have a father/daughter relationship with her. According to the employee, the DHS considered respondent an unfit parent based solely on his CSC offenses. The trial court found the information respondent would not be around for a significant period in the child's life satisfied §§ 2b(1) and (2) and the DHS proved the statutory grounds for termination. The court disagreed and held the evidence offered at trial did not support a finding respondent was neglectful as defined in any of the four provisions of § 2(b)(1) or failed to provide a fit home as defined in § 2(b)(2). Thus, the trial court erred in exercising jurisdiction over the child. Because a court cannot terminate parental rights under § 19b(3) unless jurisdiction exists under § 2(b), the trial court clearly erred.

Full Text Opinion

Issues: Termination pursuant to §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), and (k)(ii); Claim a DHS employee's testimony did not establish the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing legally admissible evidence or termination was in the children's best interests; MCR 3.977(E)(3)(b); MCL 712A.19b(5); Waiver; Holmes v. Holmes; People v. Matuszak

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: In re Kresuk

e-Journal Number: 44284

Judge(s): Memorandum - Stephens, Cavanagh, and Owens

Holding the respondent-father's claim on appeal a DHS employee's testimony did not establish the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing legally admissible evidence or termination was in the children's best interests was waived, the court affirmed the trial court's order terminating his parental rights. Respondent pleaded no contest to an original petition for jurisdiction and termination of his parental rights to his two minor children based on allegations of sexual abuse of one of the children. He was not convicted of CSC, but was serving a 2 to 15-year prison sentence and was subject to a no-contact order until the children were 18 years old. Based on respondent's plea and a DHS employee's testimony, the trial court found it had jurisdiction over the children, termination of respondent's parental rights was warranted under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), and (k)(ii), and termination was in the children's best interests. Respondent's counsel admitted at the plea proceeding the DHS employee's testimony was sufficient to support the statutory grounds for termination, stated she had no objection to the trial court finding termination was in the children's best interests based on the employee's testimony, and added respondent did not contest this best interests finding. Thus, the court concluded this issue was waived. Affirmed.

Full Text Opinion

Issues: Termination of parental rights pursuant to §§ 19b(3)(g), (i), (j), (l), and (m); In re McIntyre; In re Miller; In re Newman; In re Terry; In re Rood; The best interests of the child; In re Trejo Minors

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)

Case Name: In re Mims

e-Journal Number: 44341

Judge(s): Per Curiam - Shapiro, Jansen, and Beckering

Since the respondent-mother previously voluntarily released her parental rights to two other children, her parental rights to a third child were terminated earlier for failure to comply with the terms of a PAA, particularly as to her mental illness and substance abuse issues, and where she was in prison at the time of this proceeding, the court held trial court did not clearly err in finding the statutory grounds for termination of her parental rights to this child were established by clear and convincing evidence and in terminating those rights. The record disclosed the respondent conceded the existence of a statutory ground for termination. Termination of parental rights need only be supported by a single statutory ground. Although she contended petitioner was required to offer her services before proceeding to termination, where termination is requested at the initial dispositional hearing, the DHS need not develop and consider a service plan, if it justifies its decision not to do so. Under the circumstances, petitioner was justified in requesting termination of her parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing without providing a service plan or offering services. Affirmed.

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