Friday,
December 3, 2004
Case Summaries
Including summaries of two Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals opinions in the following practice areas: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Employment & Labor Law, and Litigation. |
Case Summaries
Administrative Law
skip to next practice areaIssues: Social security; Denial of plaintiff’s claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act; Whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination plaintiff was not disabled; Whether the ALJ’s decision was based entirely on the “grid rules”; Whether it was error not to reopen a 1978 determination that a prior disability had ceased because of medical improvement; Alleged missing evidence of an unadjudicated mental/psychological impairment; Plaintiff’s need to use a cane; Objective complaints of pain; Duncan v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs.; 20 CFR § 404.1529(b)
Court: U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan
Case Name: Okarski v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.
e-Journal Number: 25348
Judge(s): Lawson
The court concluded the magistrate judge properly reviewed the administrative record and applied the correct law in reaching his conclusion affirming the findings of the Commissioner that the plaintiff was not disabled. The court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations, denied the plaintiff’s motion for remand, and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff was 59 years old and had not worked since 1974 when he was injured while employed as an ironworker. He was found to be disabled from that injury in 1976, but his social security disability benefits were discontinued in 1978 after a continuing disability review (CDR) because he had improved medically. Since he never returned to work, his insured status ceased in March 1982. In his most recent application for disability insurance benefits, plaintiff alleged he became disabled in September 1978, the day after his unfavorable decision following the CDR. He stated he was unable to work due to a long history of degenerative joint disease and assorted sprains, strains, and pains affecting his back. The ALJ concluded plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of sedentary and unskilled work. He found plaintiff fully literate with no transferable skills. Plaintiff argued his use of a cane was a limitation preventing direct application of the grid rules. However, there was no evidence in the record contradicting the finding he could perform a full range of sedentary activity, except his own testimony concerning his limitations due to pain. The ALJ concluded plaintiff overstated his disability due to pain. The Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence on the record.
Bankruptcy
skip to next practice areaIssues: Adversary proceeding to recover a fraudulent transfer; Whether the trustee failed to prove the debtor was insolvent at the time or as a result of the alleged fraudulent transfer as required by MCL § 566.35; Whether approval for attorney fees is required when a Chapter 11 case is dismissed
Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court Eastern District of Michigan
Case Name: In re 5900 Associates, L.L.C.
e-Journal Number: 25341
Judge(s): Rhodes
Defendant’s motion for judgment of dismissal was granted. Defendant argued the trustee failed to prove the debtor was insolvent at the time or as a result of the alleged fraudulent transfer, as required by M.C.L. § 566.35. The challenged transfer was a mortgage granted to the defendant by the debtor on May 5, 1998, as security for an indemnity agreement. The evidence established at that time, the debtor had three creditors. Only the claim of the third creditor was in dispute for purposes of determining whether the debtor was insolvent at the time. The trustee claimed the debtor’s obligation to the creditor was $166,119.81 pursuant to a promissory note, and therefore the total of the debtor’s liabilities ($841,119.81) exceeded the value of its assets ($800,000). Defendant claimed the debtor’s obligation to the creditor was less than $125,000, and therefore the total of the debtor’s liabilities was less than the value of its assets. Defendant’s argument was based on the contention a substantial part of the creditor’s claim was for fees for legal services he provided to the debtor in connection with the debtor’s prior Chapter 11 bankruptcy, for which he did not obtain court approval as required. The court held approval was clearly required and therefore the creditor’s claim against the debtor was unenforceable to the extent of the $55,000 in fees for services on the debtor’s prior bankruptcy case. Consequently, the court found at the time of the challenged transfer, the debtor’s liabilities did not exceed the value of its assets and the debtor was not insolvent.
Civil Rights
skip to next practice areaThis summary also appears under Employment & Labor Law
Issues: Retaliation under § 1983; Sex-based wage discrimination; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Equal Pay Act; Day v. Wayne County Bd. of Auditors
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit
Case Name: Birch v. Cuyahoga County Probate Court
e-Journal Number: 25352
Judge(s): Clay and Keith; Concurring in part, Dissenting in part - Gibbons
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff’s retaliation claims. Plaintiff, a magistrate in an Ohio Probate Court, appealed the January 27, 2003 order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-Probate Court and the presiding judge of the Probate Court on her claims for race and sex discrimination. Plaintiff alleged that, in retaliation for her complaints to the defendant-judge about what she perceived to be sex discrimination, her employment was terminated, she was “threaten[ed],” and her work was scrutinized more closely. Defendants argued plaintiff could not bring a retaliation claim under § 1983, because the claim was premised on the allegation defendants retaliated against her for exercising a right created by Title VII (the right to oppose unlawful activity), not the Constitution. The court held arguably the First Amendment independently protects a government employee from retaliation for complaints about discriminatory employment practices, which are a matter of public concern. Moreover, the rationale of Day, which prevents state government employees from bypassing Title VII’s administrative processes and going directly to court, did not apply to a plaintiff like this one, who was exempt from Title VII’s protections. Ultimately, plaintiff’s retaliation claims failed as a matter of law because she could not establish a prima facie case. The record showed the judge rescinded the termination in his next breath and plaintiff continues to be employed as a magistrate with the Probate Court. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Issues: § 1983 claims against defendants-police officers for unlawful arrest and excessive force; Probable cause to arrest; Heck v. Humphrey; Qualified immunity; Whether the magistrate engaged in impermissible fact finding in violation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Effect of the fact plaintiff’s state appeal of his assault and battery and resisting and obstructing a police officer convictions was still pending; Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan; Supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s pendent state law claims
Court: U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan
Case Name: Cazier v. Toft
e-Journal Number: 25349
Judge(s): Lawson
Plaintiff could not succeed on his § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest for disturbing the peace because in light of the information given in the dispatch, the first officer’s observations when he arrived on the scene, plaintiff’s admitted refusal to move away from the post office counter and his ignoring the officer’s lawful instructions, probable cause existed for the arrest. Further, since plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove what the defendants-officers did was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established constitutional rights, they were entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. Therefore, the court dismissed these claims with prejudice. Defendants were called in on a complaint plaintiff would not move away from the counter after he was refused further service. When one of the defendants asked plaintiff to move away from the counter, he refused, an altercation ensued, and the defendants forcibly took him to the ground, administering pepper spray and handcuffing him. Plaintiff later bit one of the officers. He was subsequently convicted of resisting and obstructing a police officer and assault and battery (on which a state appeal was pending) but acquitted of disturbing the peace. Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful arrest on the assault and resisting and obstructing charges, and his state law claims, were dismissed without prejudice.
Full Text Opinion
Constitutional Law
skip to next practice areaThis summary also appears under Family Law
Issues: Claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 related to the adoption of two children and the alleged denial of due process; Facial and as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of MCL 710.45 and MCL 710.24a; Standing; Issue preclusion; Whether plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a tangible personal injury; Subject matter jurisdiction; Whether the defendants-circuit courts and circuit judges had Eleventh Amendment immunity; The Rooker-Feldman doctrine; Howard v. Whitbeck; Catz v. Chalker; The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction; Conspiracy under § 1983 to deprive plaintiffs of their due process rights; Abstention; Anti-injunction Act; Conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of their civil rights under § 1985; Habeas corpus
Court: U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan
Case Name: Smith v. Oakland County Circuit Court
e-Journal Number: 25215
Judge(s): Borman
The plaintiffs-Smiths, as adoptive parents whose children were removed from them on April 17, 2003, without a hearing, and who were never alleged to be, much less proven to be, unfit parents, had standing to sue to assert their federal constitutional right to due process after the adoption was overturned and the children were taken away. The case revolves around two minor children, sisters who became available for adoption due to tragic events occurring in their biological family. The case also involves two other families, the Smith family of Clinton County (plaintiffs), and the Cromwell family of Oakland County (defendants-Cromwell), both seeking to adopt the sisters. On March 17, 2003, Clinton County Family Court Judge Robertson issued orders of adoption of the sisters by the Smiths. The orders were subsequently revoked by two court orders, both of which were issued without notice to the sisters’ then-parents, the Smiths. Oakland County Family Court Judge Pezzetti issued the first order on April 12, 2003; the second order was issued by the Clinton County judge who had ordered the adoptions to the Smiths a month earlier. Plaintiffs alleged their due process rights were violated based on the failure to be noticed and/or provided an opportunity to attend the hearings resulting in the loss of their children, and challenged the constitutionality of MCL 710.45 and MCL 710.24a. The court granted the defendants-Oakland County and Clinton County Circuit Courts’ motions to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, and granted Oakland County Judge Anderson’s motion to dismiss because there was no evidence her conduct violated the Smiths’ due process rights. The court denied the motions to dismiss by Oakland County Circuit Judge Pezzetti and Clinton County Circuit Judge Sullivan (vice Judge Roberson) because they were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and also denied the Cromwell-defendants’ motion to dismiss.
This summary also appears under Municipal
Issues: Claims arising from the lake level set pursuant to the Island Lake Level Act; Damages based on gross negligence; Doctrine of issue preclusion; 42 USC § 1983; The Rooker-Feldman doctrine; Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim based on inverse condemnation; Ripeness; Subject matter jurisdiction
Court: U.S. District Count Eastern District of Michigan
Case Name: VanWulfen v. Montmorency County
e-Journal Number: 25350
Judge(s): Lawson
Defendants-county and drain commissioner’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. Defendants claimed the higher year-round water level of the lake did not cause the damage to the plaintiff’s property, at least with respect to the settling of the house’s foundation, and they were not obliged to provide just compensation to the private land owner for the consequence of the public regulation. They claimed plaintiff was foreclosed from alleging a causal connection between the higher lake level and the damage to the house because that issue was determined adversely in a prior judicial proceeding, and the doctrine of issue preclusion barred relitigating the question. They also claimed plaintiff’s gross negligence claim was barred because the state court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the same claim. The court held plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based on the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause grounded in the theory of inverse condemnation was not barred by either the doctrine of issue preclusion or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The hearing in the county court establishing the normal level of the lake was not an adjudication proceeding and the state court in the inverse condemnation case did not reach the merits since it looked to the lake level proceeding as a predicate for applying the doctrine of issue preclusion. However, the claims were not ripe for adjudication, and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear them. The court further held plaintiff’s gross negligence claim was barred by a prior state court ruling. The state court held plaintiff had failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a material question of fact regarding the claim and defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Litigating the gross negligence claim in federal court, therefore, was precluded.
Criminal Law
skip to next practice areaThis summary also appears under Litigation
Issues: Habeas corpus; Recharacterization of a pro se habeas petition pursuant to § 2241 without notice; Whether the rule of In re Shelton requiring notice before a petition can be recharacterized as a § 2255 petition applies to petitions recharacterized as § 2254 petitions; Construction of the pro se complaint; Whether the district court erred by not liberally construing the pro se petition as a civil rights complaint brought pursuant to § 1983; Erwin v. Edwards; The “leniency standard”
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit
Case Name: Martin v. Overton
e-Journal Number: 25351
Judge(s): Siler, Batchelder, and Rogers
Deciding an issue of first impression, the court held under the rule in Shelton, the petitioner should have been afforded the opportunity to withdraw his pro se petition for medical treatment prior to its recharacterization by the district court, without notice to him, as a habeas petition under § 2254, or the district court should have dismissed his petition without prejudice to his potential § 1983 claims. Thus, the rule in Shelton requiring notice before a petition is recharacterized as a § 2255 petition, applies to petitions recharacterized as §2254 petitions. Petitioner, a Michigan state prisoner, had an operation while in a correctional facility in Jackson. His treating physician ordered a follow-up visit, but before the physician could reexamine him, he was transferred to a correctional facility in the Upper Peninsula. Petitioner filed a petition styled as “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” pursuant to § 2241, seeking his return to the Jackson facility for treatment with the physician. The district court interpreted, and recharacterized, the petition as a habeas corpus action pursuant to § 2254 without notice. However, the district court determined the substance of the petition was the alleged deprivation of adequate medical treatment, a subject more appropriately reached under § 1983. The district court then applied Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the District Courts and dismissed the petition with prejudice. The court also held a pro se motion should not be recharacterized by the district court from an apparent habeas petition to a civil rights claim. Reversed and remanded.
Issues: Whether defendant was denied due process when the prosecution allegedly intimidated a potential defense witness into not testifying at trial; Ineffective assistance of counsel; The Confrontation Clause; Consecutive sentences; Prior consistent statement; Sufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s convictions of first-degree home invasion, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and attempted kidnapping
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: People v. Bechtol
e-Journal Number: 25355
Judge(s): Per Curiam - Neff, Smolenski, and Schuette
Defendant was not denied due process when the prosecution allegedly intimidated a potential defense witness into not testifying at trial. The record established the prosecutor did not intimidate the proposed witness into not testifying. The prosecutor never told the witness he would be prosecuted if he testified. Instead, the prosecutor advised the trial court, out of the presence of the witness and jury, it may need to inform the witness of his rights under the Fifth Amendment. Defendant additionally argued the witness did not have a valid Fifth Amendment right to assert. The witness wrote a letter to defense counsel offering favorable testimony in exchange for defense counsel’s procuring the dismissal of various charges pending against the witness. The witness also threatened to not testify if counsel did not comply with his demands. Given the concern this could expose the witness to prosecution, the court rejected defendant’s argument. Affirmed.
Issues: Whether the trial court’s jury instructions defining home invasion were confusing and unintelligible; Whether defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict was violated when the trial court did not instruct the jury they must render a unanimous verdict as to the same criminal act
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: People v. Hall
e-Journal Number: 25361
Judge(s): Per Curiam - Borrello, Murphy, and Neff
The jury instructions defining home invasion as a whole fairly presented the issues to be tried and were not confusing or misleading to the jury. Defendant claimed he was denied a fair trial because the trial court’s jury instructions defining home invasion were confusing and unintelligible. The prosecutor alleged defendant broke into the dwelling with the intent to commit or committed felonious assault or assault. The trial court instructed the jury on the elements for home invasion and the elements for felonious assault and assault as the underlying crimes for the home invasion charge. The trial court also explained defendant was not charged with felonious assault or assault. The felonious assault and assault instructions were given in connection with the home invasion charges as the underlying charges to the home invasion. The trial court explained to the jury the assault instructions were part of the home invasion offenses and defendant was not charged with a separate offense of felonious assault or assault. Affirmed.
Issues: Sufficiency of evidence to prove defendant knew the snowmobile was stolen to support his conviction of receiving and concealing stolen property; Jury instruction regarding possession of a snowmobile with an altered VIN; Whether evidence regarding a house robbery and stolen trailer unfairly prejudiced defendant
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: People v. Jeffries
e-Journal Number: 25363
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Meter, Wilder, and Schuette
Since it was established the defendant paid only $500 for a snowmobile with a market value as much as seven times that amount and he provided a false version of events to the police about the circumstances under which he bought the vehicle, there was sufficient evidence he knew the snowmobile was stolen to support his conviction of receiving and concealing stolen property with a value of $1,000 or more, but less than $20,000. A detective testified the defendant recounted a version of events in which he bought the snowmobile from an unknown man in the Flint area for $1,600, but the Secretary of State paperwork and testimony indicated defendant bought the snowmobile from an identified woman. The evidence the defendant lied to a police detective about the circumstances in which he bought the snowmobile and the price he paid was significant evidence of consciousness of guilt—it implied defendant was attempting to provide a false version of events to avoid discovery of the fact he bought the snowmobile with guilty knowledge of it being stolen property. Thus, the prosecutor presented more than the circumstantial evidence necessary to support a finding defendant had knowledge the snowmobile was stolen. Affirmed.
Issues: Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on second-degree murder in addition to the charged offense of first-degree premeditated murder; Whether there was a sufficient showing of due diligence in finding a particular witness; Whether the witness’s preliminary examination testimony should have been introduced at trial; MRE 804(a)(5); People v. Cummings
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: People v. Johnson
e-Journal Number: 25373
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Meter, Wilder, and Schuette
Since the evidence provided a basis for finding premeditation and deliberation were disputed, the jury could rationally conclude there was no premeditation and deliberation and the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on second-degree murder in addition to the charged offense of first-degree premeditated murder. A trial court may instruct on a lesser offense if the charged offense involves a disputed factual element that is not an element of the lesser offense and a rational review of the evidence would support the lesser offense instruction. Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder related to the killing of the victim, who apparently had gotten into an argument with defendant’s girlfriend. Defendant argued identity was an issue but no one seriously disputed the murder was premeditated. At one point defense counsel requested an involuntary manslaughter instruction, asserting the killing happened so quickly while there was an argument going on and “...he didn’t have cause to think and he acted recklessly with total disregard for human life.” If, as defense counsel asserted, this happened quickly and apparently in response to an argument the victim was having with defendant’s girlfriend, the jury could (and apparently did) find it did not involve prior planning and thought. Affirmed.
Issues: Prior convictions used to enhance defendant’s sentence following his convictions of OUIL third offense and driving with a suspended license; MCL 257.625(17)(MCL 257.625(16) at the time of defendant’s sentencing); People v. Callon
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: People v. Kareus
e-Journal Number: 25368
Judge(s): Memorandum – Meter, Wilder, and Schuette
Since the two convictions used to enhance defendant’s sentence were identified well before sentencing and he did not express why he believed they were invalid, a proper challenge to the prior convictions would have been futile. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal concerned the prior convictions used to enhance his sentence. The statute in effect at the time of sentencing provided a prior conviction shall be established at sentencing by an abstract of conviction, a copy of the defendant’s driving record, or an admission by the defendant. The statute does not require separate findings of fact or impose trial-type evidentiary burdens. Callon provides “[It] is incumbent on a defendant to first mount an effective challenge to invoke his right to a hearing on a contested fact at sentencing and, thus, the need for an evidentiary hearing with a finding by the trial court based on a preponderance of the evidence.” Defendant repeatedly asked which of his prior convictions would be considered for enhancement. However, from the time the information was amended, there was no question which two convictions were being relied on by the prosecutor. Moreover, defendant’s driving record was placed before the trial court. Affirmed.
Issues: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in holding defendant’s custodial statements were involuntary; Whether under People v. Boyd defendant was required to testify in order to preserve his challenge to the trial court ruling his custodial statements could be used only for impeachment purposes; People v. Finley; Luce v. United States
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: People v. Lucero
e-Journal Number: 25354
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Kelly and Murray; Concurrence - Murphy
On remand from the Supreme Court, the court held the trial court abused its discretion in holding defendant’s custodial statements were involuntary. The trial court erroneously relied upon defendant’s intoxication as the sole justification for finding the statements to be involuntary. Defendant’s statements could not be involuntary without some finding of police misconduct or coercion, and the trial court made no such finding. The court further held under Boyd, defendant failed to preserve his objections to the trial court’s in limine ruling that his involuntary statements were available for impeachment purposes. Without defendant testifying, the court was left to speculate whether the prosecution would have used the evidence for impeachment purposes and whether the trial court would have changed its ruling during trial. The court did not believe the difference existing in this case was significant enough to remove it from the principles set forth in Boyd and Luce. By requiring defendant to testify, his right to testify and to not incriminate himself were preserved. Affirmed.
Issues: Juror misconduct; People v. Graham; Motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; Statute of limitations; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Prosecutorial misconduct; Appeals to the jury’s sympathy; Denigration of defense counsel; Whether the prosecution argued facts not in evidence; Shifting the burden of proof; Whether the prosecutor infringed on defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent; The Confrontation Clause; Constitutionality of Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: People v. Olszewski
e-Journal Number: 25357
Judge(s): Per Curiam - Zahra, White, and Donofrio
The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, an evidentiary hearing based on juror misconduct. Defendant’s claim
of juror misconduct was based upon affidavits from two jurors stating another juror (Juror 7), who denied during voir dire she had been a victim of a sexual assault, informed the jury during deliberations she had in fact been the victim of sexual abuse. Defendant was not arguing Juror 7’s statements to other jurors during deliberations concerning her previous experience with sexual abuse affected the verdict, but rather to establish Juror 7 was incompetent or she would have been excused for cause. Thus, defendant was not offering the affidavits to impeach the verdict, but only to establish his claim he was denied a fair and impartial jury. Contrary to defendant’s claim reversal was required, the proper remedy was to remand for an evidentiary hearing in which defendant may present evidence in regard to whether (1) he was actually prejudiced by the presence of the juror in question or (2) the juror was properly excusable for cause. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s claim of juror misconduct, but affirmed in all other respects.
Issues: Errors in scoring OVs 7 and 12; Whether there were substantial and compelling reasons for the trial court’s upward departure in sentencing; People v. Babcock; Whether the defendant was denied his right to due process and equal protection when the trial court granted the prosecutor’s challenge for cause; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Applicability of Blakely v. Washington
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: People v. Williams
e-Journal Number: 25367
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Cavanagh, Kelly, and H. Hood
The trial court did not err in scoring OV 7 at 50 points, which may be scored if the victim was treated with terrorism, sadism, torture, or excessive brutality. The doctor who performed the surgery on the victim’s broken jaw testified the fracture she sustained was so severe that, in order to repair it, he had to cut open her neck to access the jaw. The victim still bears a scar from the surgical procedure. The victim testified she had to take medication for the continuing pain and she has never regained full use of her memory and faculties. There was also evidence the defendant intended to produce such suffering. Although defendant testified he did not intend to seriously injure the victim, he also testified he punched her twice causing her to fall to the ground bleeding, her face looked “crushed” and she was “gasping for air.” The extent of the victim’s injuries also supported the conclusion the suffering was intentional. Because there was evidence to support the trial court’s scoring of OV 7, defendant failed to establish plain error. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection to this scoring. Further, even if the trial court erred in scoring OV 12, the OV level would remain the same after deducting 5 points, and defendant’s total points would have only been reduced to 95 points, which would not have changed the recommended range. Affirmed.
Issues: Habeas corpus; Whether the trial court erred in submitting the first-degree murder charge to the jury resulting in a compromise verdict; Admission of gruesome photographs of the victim; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Whether the sentence was based on inaccurate information
Court: U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan
Case Name: Skrzycki v. Lafler
e-Journal Number: 25345
Judge(s): Gadola
Finding there was no merit to any of petitioner’s four claims, the court denied the petition for habeas corpus with prejudice. Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and was sentenced as a second habitual offender to a term of 35 to 70 years imprisonment. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence and the Michigan Supreme Court denied his delayed application for leave to appeal. The court concluded the trial court did not err in submitting the first-degree murder charge to the jury because there was sufficient evidence to do so. The Michigan Court of Appeals determined the victim’s wounds, the medical examiner’s finding the victim was smothered to death by hand (which would have taken several minutes), and the fact petitioner dumped the body in an alley, indicated he had time to consider his actions and intended to kill the victim, and supported the submission of the charge to the jury. The court agreed and concluded the decision of the Court of Appeals was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Given the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable juror could have found petitioner had a sufficient opportunity to take a “second look” at his action and he intended to kill the victim.
Issues: Search and seizure; Motion to suppress evidence seized from defendant’s vehicle in a traffic stop; Whether the police had probable cause to make the initial stop; Consent to vehicle search; Whether the police had reasonable suspicion to further detain defendant after determining he was not under the influence of intoxicants; United States v. Richardson; United States v. Erwin; United States v. Burton
Court: U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan
Case Name: United States v. Williams
e-Journal Number: 25346
Judge(s): Gadola
The court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the firearm and marijuana seized from his vehicle during a traffic stop, concluding the police officers had probable cause for the initial stop, defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the vehicle search, and the officers’ further detention of defendant after determining he was not intoxicated was not an unreasonable seizure. The initial stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers had probable cause to suspect defendant was driving under the influence after his vehicle was observed crossing outside its lane of traffic several times on the interstate, with surrounding traffic. The court also found defendant’s request to stay in the vehicle during the search did not constitute a condition such that his consent was limited. After he was told his desire to stay in the vehicle and the officer’s ability to search it were mutually exclusive, he voluntarily exited and, after being checked for weapons, consented a second time to the search. Finally, while the officers did not have any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity after ascertaining defendant was not under the influence, the further questioning of defendant was not unreasonable. The deputy’s questions were limited to inquiring about the potential presence of contraband and seeking consent to search the vehicle.
Employment & Labor Law
skip to next practice areaThis summary also appears under Civil Rights
Issues: Retaliation under § 1983; Sex-based wage discrimination; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Equal Pay Act; Day v. Wayne County Bd. of Auditors
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit
Case Name: Birch v. Cuyahoga County Probate Court
e-Journal Number: 25352
Judge(s): Clay and Keith; Concurring in part, Dissenting in part - Gibbons
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff’s retaliation claims. Plaintiff, a magistrate in an Ohio Probate Court, appealed the January 27, 2003 order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-Probate Court and the presiding judge of the Probate Court on her claims for race and sex discrimination. Plaintiff alleged that, in retaliation for her complaints to the defendant-judge about what she perceived to be sex discrimination, her employment was terminated, she was “threaten[ed],” and her work was scrutinized more closely. Defendants argued plaintiff could not bring a retaliation claim under § 1983, because the claim was premised on the allegation defendants retaliated against her for exercising a right created by Title VII (the right to oppose unlawful activity), not the Constitution. The court held arguably the First Amendment independently protects a government employee from retaliation for complaints about discriminatory employment practices, which are a matter of public concern. Moreover, the rationale of Day, which prevents state government employees from bypassing Title VII’s administrative processes and going directly to court, did not apply to a plaintiff like this one, who was exempt from Title VII’s protections. Ultimately, plaintiff’s retaliation claims failed as a matter of law because she could not establish a prima facie case. The record showed the judge rescinded the termination in his next breath and plaintiff continues to be employed as a magistrate with the Probate Court. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Family Law
skip to next practice areaThis summary also appears under Constitutional Law
Issues: Claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 related to the adoption of two children and the alleged denial of due process; Facial and as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of MCL 710.45 and MCL 710.24a; Standing; Issue preclusion; Whether plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a tangible personal injury; Subject matter jurisdiction; Whether the defendants-circuit courts and circuit judges had Eleventh Amendment immunity; The Rooker-Feldman doctrine; Howard v. Whitbeck; Catz v. Chalker; The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction; Conspiracy under § 1983 to deprive plaintiffs of their due process rights; Abstention; Anti-injunction Act; Conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of their civil rights under § 1985; Habeas corpus
Court: U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan
Case Name: Smith v. Oakland County Circuit Court
e-Journal Number: 25215
Judge(s): Borman
The plaintiffs-Smiths, as adoptive parents whose children were removed from them on April 17, 2003, without a hearing, and who were never alleged to be, much less proven to be, unfit parents, had standing to sue to assert their federal constitutional right to due process after the adoption was overturned and the children were taken away. The case revolves around two minor children, sisters who became available for adoption due to tragic events occurring in their biological family. The case also involves two other families, the Smith family of Clinton County (plaintiffs), and the Cromwell family of Oakland County (defendants-Cromwell), both seeking to adopt the sisters. On March 17, 2003, Clinton County Family Court Judge Robertson issued orders of adoption of the sisters by the Smiths. The orders were subsequently revoked by two court orders, both of which were issued without notice to the sisters’ then-parents, the Smiths. Oakland County Family Court Judge Pezzetti issued the first order on April 12, 2003; the second order was issued by the Clinton County judge who had ordered the adoptions to the Smiths a month earlier. Plaintiffs alleged their due process rights were violated based on the failure to be noticed and/or provided an opportunity to attend the hearings resulting in the loss of their children, and challenged the constitutionality of MCL 710.45 and MCL 710.24a. The court granted the defendants-Oakland County and Clinton County Circuit Courts’ motions to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, and granted Oakland County Judge Anderson’s motion to dismiss because there was no evidence her conduct violated the Smiths’ due process rights. The court denied the motions to dismiss by Oakland County Circuit Judge Pezzetti and Clinton County Circuit Judge Sullivan (vice Judge Roberson) because they were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and also denied the Cromwell-defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Insurance
skip to next practice areaIssues: No-Fault Act survivor’s loss benefits; Claim of dependency
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: Chester v. Farmers Ins. Exch.
e-Journal Number: 25364
Judge(s): Memorandum - Meter, Wilder, and Schuette
The trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition and denied plaintiff’s motion for partial summary disposition. Plaintiff filed suit seeking a declaration the decedent, who died in an automobile accident on May 30, 1994, was the natural father of her son, who was born on May 27, 1994, and the decedent’s no-fault insurer was obligated to pay no-fault survivor’s benefits. The question of the minor’s dependency was to be determined by the facts as they existed at the time of the decedent’s death. MCL 500.3110(2) set outs no guidelines by which to determine paternity. However, other statutes setting out methods for determining paternity in order to set support obligations or to grant status as an heir for purposes of intestate succession rely on objective methods such as genetic testing or formal acknowledgment. Genetic testing could not be performed because the decedent’s body was cremated, and before his death he took no steps to acknowledge formally the minor was his child. Plaintiff cited no authority to support her assertion her unsubstantiated claim was sufficient to establish dependency under MCL 500.3110. Affirmed.
Full Text Opinion
Litigation
skip to next practice areaThis summary also appears under Criminal Law
Issues: Habeas corpus; Recharacterization of a pro se habeas petition pursuant to § 2241 without notice; Whether the rule of In re Shelton requiring notice before a petition can be recharacterized as a § 2255 petition applies to petitions recharacterized as § 2254 petitions; Construction of the pro se complaint; Whether the district court erred by not liberally construing the pro se petition as a civil rights complaint brought pursuant to § 1983; Erwin v. Edwards; The “leniency standard”
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit
Case Name: Martin v. Overton
e-Journal Number: 25351
Judge(s): Siler, Batchelder, and Rogers
Deciding an issue of first impression, the court held under the rule in Shelton, the petitioner should have been afforded the opportunity to withdraw his pro se petition for medical treatment prior to its recharacterization by the district court, without notice to him, as a habeas petition under § 2254, or the district court should have dismissed his petition without prejudice to his potential § 1983 claims. Thus, the rule in Shelton requiring notice before a petition is recharacterized as a § 2255 petition, applies to petitions recharacterized as §2254 petitions. Petitioner, a Michigan state prisoner, had an operation while in a correctional facility in Jackson. His treating physician ordered a follow-up visit, but before the physician could reexamine him, he was transferred to a correctional facility in the Upper Peninsula. Petitioner filed a petition styled as “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” pursuant to § 2241, seeking his return to the Jackson facility for treatment with the physician. The district court interpreted, and recharacterized, the petition as a habeas corpus action pursuant to § 2254 without notice. However, the district court determined the substance of the petition was the alleged deprivation of adequate medical treatment, a subject more appropriately reached under § 1983. The district court then applied Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the District Courts and dismissed the petition with prejudice. The court also held a pro se motion should not be recharacterized by the district court from an apparent habeas petition to a civil rights claim. Reversed and remanded.
Municipal
This summary also appears under Constitutional Law
Issues: Claims arising from the lake level set pursuant to the Island Lake Level Act; Damages based on gross negligence; Doctrine of issue preclusion; 42 USC § 1983; The Rooker-Feldman doctrine; Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim based on inverse condemnation; Ripeness; Subject matter jurisdiction
Court: U.S. District Count Eastern District of Michigan
Case Name: VanWulfen v. Montmorency County
e-Journal Number: 25350
Judge(s): Lawson
Defendants-county and drain commissioner’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. Defendants claimed the higher year-round water level of the lake did not cause the damage to the plaintiff’s property, at least with respect to the settling of the house’s foundation, and they were not obliged to provide just compensation to the private land owner for the consequence of the public regulation. They claimed plaintiff was foreclosed from alleging a causal connection between the higher lake level and the damage to the house because that issue was determined adversely in a prior judicial proceeding, and the doctrine of issue preclusion barred relitigating the question. They also claimed plaintiff’s gross negligence claim was barred because the state court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the same claim. The court held plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based on the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause grounded in the theory of inverse condemnation was not barred by either the doctrine of issue preclusion or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The hearing in the county court establishing the normal level of the lake was not an adjudication proceeding and the state court in the inverse condemnation case did not reach the merits since it looked to the lake level proceeding as a predicate for applying the doctrine of issue preclusion. However, the claims were not ripe for adjudication, and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear them. The court further held plaintiff’s gross negligence claim was barred by a prior state court ruling. The state court held plaintiff had failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a material question of fact regarding the claim and defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Litigating the gross negligence claim in federal court, therefore, was precluded.