Issues: Automobile negligence; MCL 257.401(1); Elements of a prima facie negligence case; Case v. Consumers Power Co.; Clark v. Dalman; MCL 257.627(1); MCL 257.672(1); MCL 257.648(1); Whether the trial court resolved fact questions and determined the witnesses' credibility in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that defendants-Cooley and Quinn fulfilled their duty of reasonable care; In re Handelsman; Lysogorski v. Bridgeport Charter Twp.
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: Estate of Edilee Kail Roberts v. Cooley
e-Journal Number: 50564
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Wilder, Hoekstra, and Borrello
The court held that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary disposition as to whether defendant-Cooley's actions after he realized he had driven beyond the driveway into which he wished to turn and defendant-Quinn's actions in slowing or stopping in the travel lane of the road were reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, the court reversed the trial court's order granting them summary disposition and remanded for further proceedings. The case arose from a motor vehicle accident on a curved portion of a two-lane highway with a "substantial" paved shoulder. The weather at the time of the accident was clear and sunny, and the road was dry. The plaintiff-PR's decedent was driving her motorcycle northbound on the road. A succession of three vehicles was driving southbound on the road - a truck driver by Cooley, a van driven by Quinn, and a truck driven by defendant-Adams. After Cooley missed a right turn into a driveway, he pulled his truck onto the shoulder of the road. Seeing him slowing and pulling to the side of the road, Quinn either slowed her van or stopped it completely in the roadway or partially on the shoulder of the roadway. "In an effort to avoid colliding with Quinn, who he perceived to be stopped in the southbound lane of the roadway as he rounded a sweeping curve," Adams drove his truck across the double yellow center line into the northbound lane, colliding with the decedent's motorcycle and causing her death. Adams and his father (the owner of the truck) reached a settlement with plaintiff and were dismissed from the case. Cooley and Quinn successfully moved for summary disposition. Quinn argued that reasonable minds could not conclude that she acted negligently, and that her conduct was appropriate and reasonable. Cooley argued that the evidence did not show that he breached any applicable duty or that his truck was a proximate cause of the decedent's death. The court noted that like Adams, Cooley and Quinn "had a duty to operate their vehicles with the degree of ‘reasonable care that would be exercised by a person of ordinary prudence under all the existing circumstance,'" and "in the manner prescribed by the motor vehicle code." In determining that there was no question of material fact that Cooley and Quinn fulfilled this duty, "the trial court impermissibly resolved questions of fact and determined the credibility of witnesses." The court concluded that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there were questions of material fact as to "whether Cooley and Quinn operated their vehicles in a nonngeligent manner in the moments immediately preceding the accident." To determine if either Cooley or Quinn acted negligently, the trier of fact had to resolve outstanding issues as to the manner in which Cooley operated his truck upon passing the driveway and whether he pulled completely onto the shoulder of the road or remained in the travel lane, and whether Quinn appropriately stopped or slowed in the travel lane when approaching his truck. The court concluded that competent evidence was presented "from which it could be inferred that Cooley made a sudden or abrupt stop and/or that he was not completely off the travelled portion of the roadway when Quinn came upon his vehicle." There was also evidence from which a jury could find that Quinn responded to the presence of Cooley's truck other than by "‘easily slow[ing] her vehicle,'" and that the degree of her response was not warranted by the circumstances.
This summary also appears under Insurance
Issues: Automobile negligence; Whether the No-Fault Act (MCL 500.3101 et seq.) obligated defendant-Progressive (insurer) to pay PIP benefits flowing from the injuries plaintiff-Ian sustained in the 2008 motorcycle accident that he asserted arose from a 2007 accident; MCL 500.3105(1); MCL 500.3113(b); Miller v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.; Shinabarger v. Citizens Ins. Co.; Scott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Kochoian v. Allstate Ins. Co.; Putkamer v. Transamerica Ins. Corp. of Am.; Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Royal Indem. Co. (6th Cir.); DeSot v. ACIA; People v. Johnson; Whether the trial court properly declined to grant summary disposition based on MCR 2.116(C)(8); Dalley v. Dykema Gossett PLLC
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: McPherson v. McPherson
e-Journal Number: 50609
Judge(s): Per Curiam - Meter and Gleicher; Dissent - K.F. Kelly
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff-Ian, the court held that sufficient evidence established a question of fact as to whether the 2008 motorcycle crash "originated from," "had its origin in," "grew out of," or "flowed from" the 2007 car accident. Thus, the court held that the trial court properly ruled that fact questions precluded summary disposition in the defendant-Progressive's favor. In 11/07, Ian rode as a passenger in a car driven by his brother, defendant-Christopher. Christopher lost control of the vehicle and it struck a freeway guardrail. Ian's head struck a deployed airbag. According to Dr. A, Ian suffered a grand mal seizure triggered by the head injury and his ingestion of Adderal, a prescribed amphetamine. A opined that Ian also probably has an "underlying genetic predisposition" to seizures. After hospitalization for treatment of the initial seizure, Ian received follow-up neurological care from Dr. S, an epilepsy specialist. Progressive was responsible for paying no-fault benefits related to the 2007 accident. In 9/08, while riding his motorcycle Ian "sort of had the same feeling I had from my first seizure, and then I didn't have enough time to pull over or anything. Before I knew it, I just kind of blacked out." His motorcycle crossed four lanes of traffic and struck a parked car. He suffered severe injuries in the 2008 accident, including ventilator-dependent quadriplegia. Ian submitted to Progressive a first-party, no-fault benefits claim arising from the motorcycle crash. It denied coverage, asserting that his claim related only to the 2008 accident and that he forfeited any entitlement to benefits because he neglected to insure the motorcycle. However, the accident for which Ian sought first-party no-fault benefits occurred in 11/07. He contended that his current injuries, including his seizure disorder, arose from his brother's operation of the insured motor vehicle that struck the guardrail. Drs. S and A unequivocally connected Ian's seizure disorder to the trauma he experienced when his head collided with the air bag. "This evidence could support a jury's reasonable conclusion that Ian's 2008 bodily injuries arose from Christopher's operation of the vehicle involved in the 2007 crash. Alternatively stated, the connection between Ian's injuries and the 2007 accident 'is not so remote or attenuated as to preclude a finding that it arose out of the use of a motor vehicle.'" The evidence reasonably supported that "the causal connection between the injury and the use of the motor vehicle was more than incidental, fortuitous, or 'but for.'" The court rejected Progressive's argument that the motorcycle accident constituted a separate and superseding cause of Ian's spinal cord injury, supplanting any relationship between the first accident and the second. "Had Ian injured his spinal cord in 2008 by falling from a ladder during a seizure, Progressive would potentially bear liability. That Ian instead suffered a seizure while riding a motorcycle does not, standing alone, eliminate any connection between his 2007 head injury and the 2008 events." Ian established a triable issue of fact whether his spinal injuries arose from Christopher's operation of the vehicle involved in the 2007 accident. While it was indisputable that the motorcycle accident constituted the most proximate cause of Ian's spinal cord injury, he asserted that his quadriplegia "arose out of" Christopher's operation of a motor vehicle. He based his benefit claim solely on the 2007 accident. Thus, the issue was whether any evidence supported that his quadriplegia arose from that accident. Evidence supported that the first accident bore a "connective relationship" with the second. Affirmed.
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