Issues: Due process; Exculpatory evidence; Brady v. Maryland; People v. Hanks; People v. Hunter; Arizona v. Youngblood; Preservation of evidentiary issues for appeal; People v. Grant; MCL 768.27a(1); People v. Watkins; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Ginther; People v. LeBlanc; People v. Carbin; Strickland v. Washington; People v. Payne; Trial strategy; People v. Unger; Futile objections; People v. Milstead; Whether the outcome of trial would have been different; People v. Whitfield; Sufficiency of the evidence; People v. Cain; Aggravated indecent exposure; Open "exposure"; People v. Neal; People v. Huffman; Accosting a child for immoral purposes; People v. Kowalski; CSC I; People v. Szalma; People v. Gadomski; CSC II; People v. Lemons; Great weight of the evidence; People v. Herbert; People v. Lemmon; People v. Mechura; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v. Aldrich; People v. Ackerman; Shifting of burden of proof; People v. Abraham; Issue preservation; People v. Giovannini; Requirements and purpose of criminal complaint; MCR 6.101; People v. Higuera; Sufficiency of indictment or information; MCL 767.45(1); Polygraph tests; People v. Phillips; Reversible error; People v. Knox; Use of perjured testimony; People v. Aceval; Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; People v. Reed
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: People v. Carroll
e-Journal Number: 55861
Judge(s): Per Curiam - Sawyer, O'Connell, and K.F. Kelly
The court held that defendant was properly convicted of one count of aggravated indecent exposure, one count of accosting a child for immoral purposes, two counts of CSC I, and two counts of CSC II, and properly sentenced, as second habitual offender, to 1 to 3 years for aggravated indecent exposure, 2 to 6 years for accosting a child for immoral purposes, 8 to 22-1/2 years for each conviction of CSC II, and 25 to 40 years for each count of CSC I. On appeal, the court rejected each of the arguments in his initial brief. It held that, (1) defendant's due process rights were not violated by the detective's failure to preserve his notes because he failed to prove there was anything material, (2) the trial court's decision to admit evidence of defendant's prior sexual offenses was not plain error, nor did the prosecutor commit prosecutorial misconduct by introducing the evidence, (3) defense counsel was not ineffective, and (4) defendant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. The court also rejected each of the arguments in defendant's supplemental brief. It found that, (1) the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence, (2) he was not deprived of his right to a fair trial based on prosecutorial misconduct because the judge's jury instruction cured any prejudice defendant suffered as a result of the prosecution's misstatement of the evidence, and (3) he was not denied effective assistance of counsel. Finally, the court rejected each of the arguments in defendant's Standard IV brief. It concluded that, (1) the assistant prosecuting attorney was permitted to bring the charges, (2) the trial court had jurisdiction, (3) the felony information notified defendant of all the charges against him, (4) the prosecution was not required to dismiss the charges even though defendant passed a polygraph examination, (5) his confrontation rights were not violated, (6) he was not denied a right to fair trial based on "perjured" testimony as the alleged testimony did not impact the outcome of the trial, and (7) he was "not prejudiced by the mistakes made by previous appellate counsel, and previous appellate counsel's performance was not ineffective." Affirmed.
Issues: First-degree home invasion; MCL 750.110a(2); People v. Wilder; Identity; People v. Yost; Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences as proof of the elements of the crime; People v. Bennett; Evaluation of witnesses' credibility in ruling on motions for a directed verdict; People v. Lemmon; In-court identification; Suggestiveness of identification procedure; Neil v. Biggers; Disclosure of evidence; MCR 6.201(A) & (B); Brady v. Maryland; People v. Johnson; People v. Taylor; Reliability of scientific evidence; MRE 702; People v. Coy; Right to confront witnesses; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 20; People v. Payne; Crawford v. Washington; Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts; Testimonial hearsay; People v. McDaniel; People v. Dinardo; People v. Dendel; Chain of custody; People v. White; Prosecutorial misconduct; Curative instructions; People v. Unger (On Remand); Comments on post-arrest silence; Doyle v. Ohio; People v. Borgne; Fletcher v. Weir; Jenkins v. Anderson; People v. Dunham; Sentencing; "Two-thirds rule"; People v. Tanner; Requirement that the court affirm a within-guidelines sentence; People v. Gibbs; Mitigating factors; People v. Osby; People v. Triplett; Abandonment of issues on appeal; People v. Harris
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: People v. Farley
e-Journal Number: 55825
Judge(s): Per Curiam - Owens, Jansen, and Hoekstra
The court held that defendant was properly convicted of first-degree home invasion and sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 150 to 300 months' imprisonment. It rejected his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a directed verdict because the description of the intruder the homeowner provided to police did not match defendant's height and weight, making the homeowner "not credible." It found that the homeowner "provided a sensible reason for each disparity" and "there was expert testimony that defendant was a major contributor to DNA recovered from a button" found in the house. It next rejected his argument that his due-process rights were violated when the trial court failed to suppress the homeowner's in-court identification of defendant because he was subjected to an improperly suggestive in-person lineup, finding that he offered no supporting evidence. As to his claim that the prosecution violated his due-process rights when it did not give defense counsel information relating to the second photographic lineup that occurred at the district court, the court noted that while MCR 6.201(A) and (B) make it "mandatory to disclose written statements of witnesses and police reports, there can be no discovery violation when the report does not exist at the time of the request. Further, the detective testified that he informed the prosecutor and the defense counsel, at the district court, of the homeowner's positive identification. Thus, defendant knew that the homeowner had made a positive identification, which eliminated any surprise at trial." Also, there was "no indication that the detective's report contained any other statements made by the homeowner that would have been favorable to the accused." The court also rejected his argument that the prosecution's DNA evidence lacked a proper foundation and the trial court erred when it admitted a lab report that was hearsay and violated the Confrontation Clause. "Other than mere assertions" as to the unreliability of the lab's methodologies, he failed to explain how the procedures and statistical probabilities used by the lab were actually unreliable or failed to comply with generally accepted lab procedures. Further, it was the testifying analyst's "analysis and report that linked defendant's DNA to the DNA found on a button at the crime scene," and she testified at trial and was "amply" cross-examined. The court further rejected defendant's argument that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he stated, during closing argument, that defendant did not appear for a police interview, noting that "because the prosecution's comments during closing argument concerned defendant's consent to and subsequent nonappearance at an interview that was to occur before his arrest, the commentary did not violate defendant's due-process rights." Finally, the court rejected his sentencing claims. Affirmed and remanded for the trial court to amend the judgment of sentence to reflect his status as a fourth habitual offender.
Issues: "Hearsay" evidence; MRE 801(c); People v. McDade; Statements made for the purpose of medical treatment; MRE 803(4); People v. Mahone; People v. McElhaney; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 8; Asportation; MCL 777.38(1)(a); People v. Spanke; People v. Steele; People v. Cox; People v. Thompson; Scoring of OV 10; MCL 777.40(1)(a); "Predatory conduct"; MCL 777.40(3)(a); People v. Huston; People v. Cannon; Exploitation of the victim's youth; MCL 777.40(1)(b); Scoring of OV 3; MCL 777.33(1)(d)
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: People v. Kares
e-Journal Number: 55879
Judge(s): Per Curiam - Meter, Servitto, and Riordan
The court held that trial court did not err in allowing testimony from the sexual-assault nurse regarding the victim's statements for purposes of medical treatment, and properly scored OVs 8, 10, and 3. Defendant was convicted of CSC III and sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 300 to 700 months in prison. On appeal, the court rejected defendant's argument that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from the sexual-assault nurse recounting the victim's reported history. Defendant claimed her testimony should have been excluded as hearsay because it involved statements made for the purpose of collecting evidence in a criminal prosecution, not for medical treatment. But the court disagreed, finding that it "was offered to describe the process of the medical examination and the routine gathering of information necessary for such an examination" and was therefore admissible even if it was hearsay. The court also rejected defendant's argument that the trial court erroneously scored OV 8 at 15 points, finding that, "in using promises to entice her to come to his apartment, the 'victim was asported to another place of greater danger.'" It next rejected his argument that the trial court erroneously scored OV 10 at 15 points, finding that "defendant engaged in a course of predatory conduct that made 'the victim an easier target for the sexual assault.'" Finally, the court rejected defendant's argument that the trial court erred in scoring OV 3 at 10 points for "bodily injury requiring medical treatment [that] occurred to a victim," finding that the trial court did not plainly err in this determination. Affirmed.
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