Issues: Whether the petitioner's conviction for providing a materially false document to the government under 18 USC § 1001(a)(3) was a "crime involving moral turpitude" for purposes of removal under 8 USC § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); Matter of Pinzon (BIA); Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder; Kellermann v. Holder; Novatchinski v. Holder (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Imran v. Holder (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Whether her representations were "material"; Amendment of Notice to Appear (NTA); Lin v. Holder; United States v. Hougham; "Waiver of removal"; 8 USC § 1227(a)(1)(H); Taggar v. Holder (9th Cir.); Gourche v. Holder (7th Cir.); § 1182(h); Rivas v. U.S. Attorney. Gen. (11th Cir.); Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA); Immigration Judge (IJ)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit

Case Name: Fayzullina v. Holder

e-Journal Number: 59227

Judge(s): Rogers, Guy, and Donald


In an opinion originally issued as an unpublished decision, the court held that the BIA properly ordered the Russian petitioner's removal for having been convicted of providing a materially false document to the government, "a crime of moral turpitude." Petitioner-Fayzullina entered into a "sham marriage" to avoid immigration laws. She contended that a violation of § 1001(a)(3) was not a crime of moral turpitude for purposes of removal under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The court noted that the BIA has "'long held that crimes involving fraud or making false statements have been found to involve moral turpitude.'" Further, the court has held that "the BIA's interpretation of 'crime involving moral turpitude' is reasonable." Petitioner also argued that while she acknowledged having pleaded guilty to lying about her marriage in her I-485, "the government had not adequately established that her misrepresentation was material." However, a person who pleads guilty under § 1001(a)(3) "necessarily admits having knowingly used a document that is materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent." The IJ did not violate the petitioner's due process rights by sua sponte amending the NTA to cite the correct statute under which she pleaded guilty, and the BIA correctly concluded that she was not eligible for a waiver of removal. The court denied the petition for review.


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