Plain Language

To speak effectively, plainly, and shortly, it becometh the gravity of the profession.
— Sir Edward Coke, 1600

Plain English Statutes and Readability

By Reed Dickerson

Part 1 — History, the Problem and the Case for a Statute

In 1965 Reed Dickerson, Professor of Law at the University of Indiana Law School, wrote the classic Fundamentals of Legal Drafting, published by Little Brown and Co., Boston, a book that has become the most referred to of all books on legal drafting. Little Brown and Co. will soon be publishing Professor Dickerson’s Second Edition of Fundamentals of Legal Drafting. With the permission of the author and the publishers, the Michigan Bar Journal and the Plain English Committee are pleased to present excerpts from a chapter in the Second Edition regarding plain English statutes and readability.

A Bit of History

Although it is hard to say when the complaints against legal language began, outrage is hardly new. Legal prolixity came under fire as early as 1566. Thomas Jefferson took up the cudgel in 1778. Jeremy Bentham fumed about legislative long-windedness early in the 19th century. Fred Rodell, writing in 1939, said, “Almost all legal sentences... have a way of reading as though they had been translated from the German by someone with a rather meager knowledge of English.”

The modern push for clear readable legal instruments began in the early 1940’s following Congressman Maury Maverick’s coinage of “gobbledygook” and the Office of Price Administration’s first attempts to impose price controls at the beginning of World War II. Finding that America’s small businessmen could not understand its regulations without the intervention of lawyers, OPA engaged Professor David F. Cavers of the Harvard Law School and Rudolf Flesch to help the agency communicate more effectively with the people whose prices it regulated.

From OPA’s experience came a body of expertise useful in simplifying regulations and statutes. This was improved during the Pentagon’s ten-year post-World War II recodification of the Nation’s military laws and later during the Federal Aviation Agency’s recodification, in the early 1960’s, of the vast accumulation of regulations relating to aircraft. Indeed, this expertise, since refined and extended to private legal instruments remains useful, even today.

Despite these developments, the public visibility of the movement to simplify faded with the war pressures that supported price control. The resulting public passivity went undisturbed, even by the Korean and Vietnamese wars, until the explosion of the consumer movement, which in the early 1970’s turned its attention to instruments that the typical consumers of goods and services are being persuaded to accept: insurance policies, product warranties, and credit documents. At the same time, many small, relatively unsophisticated businessmen were being subjected to a barrage of detailed regulations from agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. As a result, public pressure to simplify legal instruments became even greater than it was during World War II.

Mandating Plain English: First Efforts

The most dramatic development in the drive to simplify the language of private legal instruments came with the emergence of the “plain English” movement. The first glimmerings came in 1974, when Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. and Sentry Life Insurance Co. introduced simplified automobile insurance policies, and in 1975, when Citibank and First National Bank of Boston introduced simplified consumer loan arrangements.

The first week in February, 1977 saw the introduction of the Sullivan Bill in New York which became law the following year, and President Carter’s television “fireside chat” (replete with rocking chair and cardigan sweater), which culminated in an executive order that required plain English in government regulations.

The first efforts to legislate “plain language” show widely differing approaches. New York’s Sullivan law, brainchild of a Citicorp lawyer, Duncan A. MacDonald, protects “consumer” instruments, which are defined as resident-
tainment. In case of non-
"plain language," defined as language
$50,000 or less. The mandated standard
household purposes" and involve
sures required by that Act be made
"clearly and conspicuously." Neither of
examples has much to offer in the

The main value of the plain English
laws appears to be symbolic. Although
York’s Sullivan law is probably (in
any serious sense) unenforceable be-
cause of its “good faith” defense (most
bad draftsmen operate in good faith),
the results that it seems to have helped
produce in that state are impressive.
Decently readable insurance policies
and warranties are now common.

To accelerate this trend, the or-
organized bar (and indirectly the law
other states, which can be delivered
without seriously compromising the
principles of good draftsmanship.
Because a highly developed expertise
for simplifying legal instruments already
exists, it is time that it be put to more
effective use.

And so, a modest case can be made
for a law to help the legal profession
overcome its present, partly justifiable
inertia. Without it, the organized bar
is unlikely to initiate effective action to
improve the clarity and readability of legal

Some Reservations

One problem is that the “plain Eng-
lish” ideal, if not carefully focused, can
be seriously off the mark. “Plain English”
is in many legal contexts anything but
plain. Besides, the concept suggests that
there is an ideal way to say things that
will fit all legal audiences.

Because legal audiences differ
widely, the draftsman should be permit-
ted to adjust his focus accordingly. On
the other hand, no great harm is in-
volved if such a law focuses solely on
professionals who deal with unsophisti-
cated consumers, where mandating a
higher level of understandability makes
some sense. It makes less sense if the
effort is spread over a wider base within
which audiences differ materially.

Judge Harold Leventhal’s observa-
tion that simplifying private instruments
would make it harder to charge what
they are worth10 is relevant but not per-
suasive. His explanation too readily be-
comes an excuse for the status quo,
which is deplorable. The answer is that in most cases the matter can be handled by educating the client, preferably in advance, about what is involved. This will head off most of the unpleasant surprises.

Terms of Art

Another basis for skepticism has been the generally acknowledged necessity of honoring legal "terms of art." This is a problem for a legal term only if there is no usable replacement.

What is a legal "term of art?" Mellinkoff says that it is a "technical word with a specific meaning." A technical meaning, of course, is likely to be unfamiliar to the general public. But the determining factor, he says, is "specificity," which he equates with "precision."

But if unique aptness is not the determining factor, where is the problem? If Mellinkoff is right, the concept of "term of art" is here irrelevant. Semantic precision is not the ultimate, or even main goal in drafting, and its presence does not guarantee suitability. The appropriate measure of aptness is, rather, the draftsman's substantive mission, for which generality and even vagueness are often preferable. The Sherman Act is the classic example.

Mellinkoff's definition of "term of art" may look like a paraphrase of the definition in Webster's Third International Dictionary ("a word or phrase having a specific signification in a particular ... department of knowledge"), but it is not. Because "specific" is closer to "special" than to "precision" and "signification" refers not to the concept, but to the relation between it and its technical name, the gist of "term of art" would seem to be its uniqueness for practical use.

Ironically, Mellinkoff supports this view of semantic precision by many of his own examples. "Laches," "comparative negligence," "merchantable," "tort," and "stare decisis," which he lists as legitimate "terms of art," are all highly general and highly vague. Precision is not the problem. The problem is irreplaceability: To what extent is the draftsman stuck with technical legal terms that are unfamiliar to the general public? Mellinkoff associates terms of art with irreplaceability in his questionable contention that the greater its precision ("sharpness") the greater the chance that a term has no synonym in ordinary English. Many of his non-specific terms of art likewise have no equivalent in plain English. The importance of irreplaceability is hard to avoid.

What we are really concerned with in legal drafting is otherwise apt, but generally unfamiliar, language for which no familiar language is a suitable substitute. This may mean suitable in law or suitable in fact. As an example of the former, the law might permit only one way of expressing an idea. A classic example is D'Arundel's case, which held that if a person wanted to convey land in fee simple, he had to say "to A and his heirs." No substitute, no matter how clearly synonymous, would do.

A modern counterpart is Section 3-104(1)(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides that to be negotiable, a note must "be payable to order or to bearer." This means that it must say "order" or "bearer." Although modern law contains little of this kind of mandated legal suitability, the draftsman must remain alert to the danger.

What about factual suitability? Here, we are talking about a term that refers to a body of law and for which there is no usable substitute with equivalent legal connotations. Examples are "surrender" (of a lease), "merchantable," "unconscionable," and "venue." Until a suitable synonym appears, there is no practicable alternative to using the accepted term or perhaps creating equivalence by express definition. Example: "In this policy, the term 'legal cause' means proximate cause." Here, it is safe to use "legal cause" throughout the rest of the instrument without losing the benefit of the established legal connotations of "proximate cause." Unfortunately, in this instance, the definition would not be very helpful. In many cases, the only other acceptable alternative is a supplementary explanation or referral to a lawyer.

In any event, the outer limits of "term of art" need not concern us. Indeed, it is unnecessary even to refer to the concept. The important thing is that the instances in which the draftsman has no legal or practicable choice as to how something may be effectively stated are few enough to leave him considerable opportunity to simplify or otherwise improve the language of legal documents. As for the unavoidable terms, he always has the option of adding explanatory material if he believes that it would be helpful and not unduly cumbersome. Experience with the Securities Act of 1933 and the recent Truth in Lending Act shows that the danger of "information overload" is a real one.

In any event, technical terms are not the main source of trouble. As Janice Redish has pointed out, "The complexity of the sentence structure is a much greater barrier to understanding ... than the technical vocabulary."15

Footnotes
1. In these first few sections, I have drawn heavily from my paper, Should Plain English Be Legislated?, in Plain English In A Complex Society (The Poynter Society, Indiana Unv. 1980), at 18.
3. 2 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 230 (Boyd ed. 1950).
15. Redish, Drafting Simplified Legal Documents: Basic Principles and Their Application, in Drafting Documents in Plain Language 121, 126 (Practising Law Institute, Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 203, 1979).

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