GRACE WILLIAMS, UNPUBLISHED
July 16, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 206917
Wayne Circuit Court
AUTOALLIANCE INTERNATIONAL, INC., LC No. 96-623095 CZ
JAMES SOLBERG, BRUCE BOWMAN and
HENRY SCHULTZ,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Markman and J.B. Sullivan*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Grace Williams, appeals as of right from an order granting
summary disposition to defendants Autoalliance International, Inc., James
Solberg, Bruce Bowman and Henry Schultz, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in
this racial discrimination case.1 We affirm.2
Plaintiff alleged that the individual defendants were agents of
defendants Ford and Autoalliance. Plaintiff further alleged that the
defendants were either employers, or agents of employers, for purposes of
the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2201 et. seq.; MSA 3.548(201) et
seq. She claimed that she was discriminated against because she was an
African-American. Plaintiff claimed that some of the discriminatory acts
included failure to promote, failure to follow internal employment
procedures, interference with her duties, and discharging her, all on
account of race. Plaintiff also alleged that she engaged in protected
activities while employed by defendants, which included filing formal and
informal complaints about the treatment of African-American employees.
Plaintiff contends that, in response to this, defendants retaliated against
her by interfering with her duties, failing to promote her, and eventually
terminating her.
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by
assignment.
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Plaintiff first argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact
precluding summary disposition in this matter. We review a trial court's
grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo. Hawkins v
Mercy Health Services, 230 Mich App 315, 324; 583 NW2d 725 (1998). A motion
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis underlying the
plaintiff's claim. First Security v Aitken, 226 Mich App 291, 304; 573 NW2d
307 (1997). In ruling on the motion, the trial court must consider the
affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other admissible
documentary evidence submitted by the parties. Id. Giving the benefit of
all reasonable doubt to the opposing party, the trial court must determine
whether a record might be developed that would leave open an issue of
material fact upon which reasonable minds could differ. Id. The moving
party must specifically identify the issues on which there are no disputed
facts, and that party also must support its position with affidavits,
depositions, or other documentary evidence. Munson Medical Ctr v Auto Club
Ins Ass'n, 218 Mich App 375, 386; 554 NW2d 49 (1996). The opposing party
then bears the burden of showing by evidentiary materials that a dispute
exists regarding a genuine issue of material fact. Munson, supra. A party
opposing a motion for summary disposition must present more than conjecture
and speculation to meet its burden of providing evidentiary proof
establishing a genuine issue of material fact. Cloverleaf Car Co v Wykstra
Oil Co, 213 Mich App 186, 192-93; 540 NW2d 297 (1995).
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendants intentionally
discriminated against her, in violation of the Michigan Civil Rights Act. A
claim of intentional discrimination may be proved by either indirect or
direct evidence. Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 606; 572
NW2d 679 (1997). The indirect evidence test was set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct
1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973). In Town v Michigan Bell, 455 Mich 688, 695;
568 NW2d 64 (1997), the Michigan Supreme Court articulated the McDonnell
Douglas test in the following manner:
The McDonnell Douglas prima facie approach requires an employee to
show that the employee was (1) a member of a protected class, (2)
subject to an adverse employment action, (3) qualified for the
position, and that (4) others, similarly situated and outside the
protected class, were unaffected by the employer's adverse conduct.
[Town, supra, at 695.]
If a prima facie case of discrimination has been established, the court
then examines whether a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason has been
articulated by defendants. Harrison, supra, at 608. If defendants can
articulate such a reason, the next consideration is whether plaintiff can
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants' articulated
reason was a mere pretext for discrimination. Id.
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants interfered with
the performance of her duties because she was African-American. Further, in
her deposition, she testified that she informed James King, who was
responsible for the intake of complaints of discrimination, several times
that she was not getting the support she required and that she felt it was
due to her race. Plaintiff also testified that King told her that others in
the company had experienced racial discrimination. At a another meeting
with King, plaintiff again expressed her concern that she was being treated
differently because of her race. King suggested that plaintiff speak with
Charles Corbett, her employer at Autoalliance, about the problem. Plaintiff
stated that, after she
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expressed her concerns to Corbett, she noticed that Corbett responded to
her in a different way. Further, plaintiff contends that white employees
with less experience and education received promotions while plaintiff was
denied these positions. Finally, plaintiff alleged that black employees
were required to take tests and interview multiple times, and were
subjected to higher standards than white employees when applying for
promotions. In his affidavit, King averred that "plaintiff mentioned to me
that she did not know why Mr. Corbett was not giving her more support and
wondered whether it was because Mr. Corbett and her co-workers had worked
together for an extended period or whether it might have something to do
with plaintiff's race." King went on to state that "plaintiff threw out the
possibility that her race may be a factor only as an aside."
We do not believe that plaintiff has set forth a claim of intentional
discrimination here through indirect evidence. Assuming that plaintiff was
able to present a prima facie case of discrimination, defendants
articulated non-discriminatory reasons for the specific actions which
plaintiff claimed were indirect evidence of discrimination. Viewing the
evidence in a fight most favorable to plaintiff, reasonable minds could not
differ as to the conclusion that the stated reasons were not a pretext for
discrimination. Town, at 698.
Defendants' brief on appeal contains a myriad of non-discriminatory
reasons for their actions. Defendants argue that during plaintiff's
interview process, she was clearly informed that the position for which she
was interviewing required little or no direct supervision, which is why she
received very little employer support. Further, defendants also point to
plaintiff's own deposition testimony. During her deposition, plaintiff
testified that when she was hired, a board was installed in her office on
which she was to note when she left the office. Plaintiff testified that
there was no sign-out board until she was hired. However, plaintiff went on
to state that everyone in the office was required to note on the board when
they left the office. Plaintiff also complained that she was not allowed to
attend seminars to enhance her skills, yet testified that she never
specifically asked to attend any seminars. Finally, plaintiff stated that
she was singled out because she was required to answer phones and support
the service counter. However, plaintiff testified that white employees were
also required to do these jobs. Plaintiff was asked whether Corbett himself
ever worked the service counter, to which plaintiff responded that was "not
the point." Defendants contend that this evidence demonstrates that
plaintiff was treated the same as white employees.
Plaintiff also averred that African-American employees were subject to
more rigorous standards when applying for promotions and that less
qualified white employees received promotions. In this regard, defendants
point to plaintiff's deposition testimony in which she stated that she was
not making any claims regarding promotions or promotion procedures.
Plaintiff stated that there was "no position to be promoted into," and that
nothing regarding promotion arose during the time she was employed by
defendants. In our judgment, plaintiff clearly and unequivocally stated in
her deposition that she was not making any claims as to promotions or
promotion procedures. Plaintiff cannot now create a genuine issue of
material fact by submitting an affidavit that contradicts this testimony.
Palazzola v Karmazin Prods Corp, 223 Mich App 141, 155; 565 NW2d 868
(1997).
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Plaintiff here has also not presented direct evidence of intentional
discrimination. The principal problem with the racial slurs that plaintiff
claims constitute such evidence is that none of them are attributable to a
decision maker. Plaintiff points to several statements made by supervisors
and managers at defendant Autoalliance, but plaintiff does not point to any
racial slurs made by persons capable of making decisions with regard to
plaintiff's employment. Michigan law states that an example of direct
evidence is a racial slur by a decision maker. Harrison, supra, at 610. At
least two federal circuits agree that racially discriminatory statements by
someone other than a decision maker are not admissible and, in fact, are
more prejudicial than probative. See Nichols v Loral Vought Systems Corp,
81 F3d 38, 41-2 (CA 5, 1996); Slathar v Sather Trucking Corp, 78 F3d 419-20
(CA 8, 1996). Therefore, we hold that plaintiff's claim that there is
direct evidence of racial discrimination sufficient to defeat a motion for
summary disposition also fails.
Plaintiff finally argues that the trial court improperly made
credibility determinations and failed to listen to the evidence before it.
We disagree. Further, plaintiff has effectively abandoned this issue on
appeal. Plaintiff provides no citation to the record in support of her
contentions as she is required to do. MCR 7.212(C)(7). Further, in
plaintiff's entire discussion of the issue, there is not one citation to
any authority. When a party fails to cite authority in support of its
argument, the issue is abandoned for purposes of appeal. Schellenberg v
Rochester Michigan Lodge & Elks Lodge 2225, 228 Mich App 20, 49; 577 NW2d
163 (1998).
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Joseph B. Sullivan
1 Ford Motor was dismissed from this lawsuit and is not a party to this
appeal.
2 This opinion is released following the failure of the parties to submit
their stipulation for dismissal within twenty-one days as directed by this
Court at oral argument.
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