September 21, 1999

v                                            No. 209515
                                             Wayne Circuit Court
ERIC HOOPER, a/k/a MICHAEL HEATH,            LC No. 96-008836


Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Smolenski and Gage, JJ.


     After  a  bench trial, defendant was convicted of possession  of  less
than   twenty-five   grams   of   cocaine,   MCL   333.7403(2)(a)(v);   MSA
14.15(7403)(2)(a)(v). The trial court sentenced defendant  as  an  habitual
offender,  third  offense,  MCL  769.11;  MSA  28.1083,  to  three   years'
probation. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.

     Defendant  first contends that the trial court erred  in  denying  his
motion to suppress an inculpatory statement without specifically ruling  on
whether   the   police  coerced  the  statement.  Contrary  to  defendant's
assertion,   however,  the  trial  court  explicitly  rejected  defendant's
suppression hearing testimony that the police coerced his statement:

          [T]he court understands police officers do make threats and they
     do give false testimony sometimes, but I don't believe that Officer
     Torey threatened the defendant with claiming that he was going to put
     the drugs on his person as opposed to somewhere else.

When  faced  with the directly conflicting testimony of defendant  and  the
police   officer   regarding  the  circumstances  surrounding   defendant's
statement, the trial court chose to accept the police officer's version  of
events.   Because   we   must  defer  to  the  trial  court's   credibility
determinations, People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 543; 575 NW2d 16 (1997),
we find no error in the court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.

     Defendant  next argues that he was incarcerated for approximately  one
year  prior  to trial in violation of the 180-day rule and his right  to  a
speedy trial. Initially, we note that defendant's brief on appeal fails  to
provide any factual basis whatsoever from which we may properly examine

his claims, and has thus waived his right to review of these issues. People
v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 588; 569 NW2d 663 (1997). Nonetheless, we will
briefly address defendant's assertions.

     The  180-day  rule  states  that  an  inmate  of  the  Department   of
Corrections must "be brought to trial within 180 days" after the prosecutor
is  given  notice  of  untried charges against  him.  MCL  780.131(1);  MSA
28.969(1)(1);  People  v  Crawford, 232 Mich App 608,  612;  591  NW2d  669
(1998).  In  the  this  case, the lower court record is  unclear  regarding
exactly  when  the prosecutor received notice of defendant's  incarceration
within  the  Department of Corrections. A June 25, 1997 Wayne  County  Jail
Conditional  Release  form represents the earliest record  indication  that
defendant was to be picked up by the Department of Corrections for a parole
violation. Even assuming that June 25, 1997 constitutes the date  on  which
the   prosecutor  received  notice  of  defendant's  presence  within   the
Department  of Corrections, defendant was brought to trial on  November  5,
1997,  no  more than 133 days later. Accordingly, we find no  180-day  rule

     To determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy
trial, this Court considers (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for
the  delay,  (3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy  trial,
and (4) any prejudice to the defendant. People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442,
459;  564 NW2d 158 (1997). Defendant apparently remained incarcerated  from
the  time he was arrested on October 31, 1996, until his November  5,  1997
waiver  trial.  On the first scheduled trial date, May 7, 1997,  the  trial
court  adjourned  the  trial because defendant was in federal  custody  and
unavailable. On the second scheduled trial date, August 14, 1997, the court
granted  a  second  adjournment of trial until  November  5,  1997  because
defendant  had  been  transferred to an unknown prison  facility  prior  to
execution  of  the  trial court's writ of habeas corpus.  These  two  trial
adjournments were not caused by the prosecutor, but derived from the  trial
court's   difficulty  locating  defendant.  Importantly,  defendant   never
asserted  his right to a speedy trial by moving to dismiss based  on  undue
delay,  and  has failed to show or to even allege that the delay prejudiced
him.  Defendant  was  serving  another  sentence  with  the  Department  of
Corrections during a portion of the pretrial delay. Moreover, defendant was
ultimately  sentenced  to three years' probation,  and  therefore  was  not
prejudiced by losing an opportunity to have his sentences run concurrently.
Given  these  considerations, we conclude that no  speedy  trial  violation


                                   /s/ Roman S. Gribbs
                                   /s/ Michael R. Smolenski
                                   /s/ Hilda R. Gage