TOWNSHIP OF OXFORD, UNPUBLISHED
October 19, 1999
Plaintiff,
and
GERALD R. BENTLEY, ARLINE BENTLEY,
RICHARD J. CALOIA, LISA A. CALOIA,
CHARLES W. GARDNER, JUNE V. GARDNER,
JULIA HICKMOTT, DENNIS A. JAMEYFIELD,
DIANN C. JAMEYFIELD, JESSIE G.
REYNOLDS, HARWOOD L. ROWLAND,
SANDRA A. ROWLAND, JOHN D. SHAW,
ADELE K. SHAW, BRUCE WYNKOOP, SUSAN
WYNKOOP, HAROLD ZUSCHLAG and PENNY
ZUSCHLAG,
Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v No. 206581
Oakland Circuit Court
PHILIP HANDLEMAN, Successor-in-Interest to LC No. 80-209683 CE
PIERCE E. WOODWORTH,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Before: Neff, P.J., and Murphy and J. B. Sullivan*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Intervening plaintiffs appeal by leave granted from an order striking
a 1981 injunctive prohibition against guest flights on defendant Philip
Handleman's property in Oxford Township. We affirm.
This case dates back to 1980, when plaintiff Oxford Township
("plaintiff") sought to enjoin former defendant Pierce Woodworth from
developing an airport on his property located in
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* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by
assignment.
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Oxford Township. Intervening plaintiffs are residents living in the
surrounding area who were allowed to join in the action. This matter was
originally assigned to Oakland Circuit Court Judge Farrell E. Roberts.
Following a bench trial, Judge Roberts ruled that Woodworth had a vested
right to operate a private airport on his property, but was permanently
enjoined from operating the airport as a public facility. The court
expressly limited the use of the airport to Woodworth, his wife, and his
children, for personal use only. This Court subsequently affirmed the trial
court's decision and issuance of a permanent injunction. Twp of Oxford v
Woodworth, unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 21, 1983 (Docket No.
59030).
In 1988, Philip Handleman purchased the Woodworth property. Judge Fred
Mester, the successor to Judge Roberts, subsequently held that the 1981
injunction applied to Handleman. In May 1997, Handleman filed a motion to
set aside the 1981 injunction based upon changes in state law that vested
exclusive control over airport operations in the Michigan Aeronautics
Commission ("MAC"), a state agency. After entertaining arguments, Judge
Mester agreed that the portion of Judge Roberts' 1981 injunction that
limited the use of the private airport to the property owner and his
immediate family was invalid and unenforceable and, therefore, entered an
order striking the invalid portion of Judge Roberts' order from the 1981
injunction. Intervening plaintiffs moved for rehearing, but their motion
was denied. This Court subsequently granted intervening plaintiffs'
application for leave to appeal.1 We now affirm.
Defendant Handleman sought relief from the 1981 injunctive order
pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(1)(e). This Court reviews a trial court's decision
to grant relief from a judgment for an abuse of discretion. Hadfield v
Oakland Co Drain Comm'r, 218 Mich App 351, 354; 554 NW2d 43 (1996). "In
civil cases, an abuse of discretion exists when the decision is so
violative of fact and logic that it evidences a defiance of judgment and is
not the exercise of reason, but rather, of passion or bias. Id. at 355.
Intervening plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the trial court's
decision to grant Handleman relief from the injunction and it is that order
that has been appealed in this case. A motion for rehearing or
reconsideration under MCR 2.119(F) requires the moving party to
"demonstrate a palpable error by which the court and the parties have been
misled and show that a different disposition of the motion must result from
correction of the error." This Court reviews a trial court's decision to
deny a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. In re
Berlinger Trust, 221 Mich App 273, 279; 561 NW2d 130 (1997).
Intervening plaintiffs contend that they had a vested right to the
continuation of Judge Roberts' 1981 injunctive order, which prohibited
Handleman from allowing guest flights on the subject property. We disagree.
In general, there is a strong policy favoring the finality of judgments.
However, this case is distinguishable from a typical civil judgment in that
the 1981 judgment included the permanent injunctive order that had
prospective application. Under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(e), a court may grant a
party relief from the effect of an injunctive order if it is no longer
equitable for that judgment to apply prospectively. Sylvania Silica Co v
Berlin Twp, 186 Mich App 73, 76; 463 NW2d 129 (1990). An injunction is
always subject to modification or dissolution by a trial court if the facts
merit such action. Opal Lake Ass'n v Michayw'e Ltd Partnership, 47 Mich App
354, 367; 209 NW2d 478 (1973). Thus, a party that procures a permanent
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injunction against another party does not have a vested right in the
continuation of that
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injunction if the facts or law no longer support continuation of the
injunction. We therefore reject intervening plaintiffs' argument that they
had a vested right to the continuation of the 1981 injunction as a matter
of procedure.
Turning to the merits of Handleman's request for relief from the 1981
injunctive order, we agree that it was no longer equitable for the court to
continue the injunction insofar that it prohibited guest flights on
Handleman's property. The MAC was created pursuant to MCL 259.26(1); MSA
10.126(1). In 1996, legislation was adopted that resulted in significant
changes to the Aeronautics Code. See 1996 PA 370. Significantly, in § 51(1)
of the Aeronautics Code, it was established that the MAC has exclusive
jurisdiction over aeronautical activity within the state. MCL 259.51; MSA
10.151, which became effective July 3, 1996, states:
(1) The commission has general supervision over aeronautics
within this state, with exclusive authority to approve the operation
of airports, landing fields, and other aeronautical facilities within
the state, so as to assure a uniformity in regulations covering
aeronautics. The commission shall encourage, foster, and participate
with and provide grants to the political subdivisions of this state in
the development of aeronautics within this state. The commission shall
establish and encourage the establishment of airports, landing fields,
and other aeronautical facilities. The commission shall promulgate
rules that it considers necessary and advisable for the public safety
governing the designing, laying out, location, building, equipping,
and operation of airports and landing fields. In order to implement
this act, the commission may establish programs of state financial
assistance in the form of grants, leases, loans, and purchases, or a
combination of grants, leases, loans, and purchases, for assisting
political subdivisions or other persons. The commission shall not
grant an exclusive right for the use of an aeronautical facility. . .
.
Before this 1996 amendment, § 51(1) did not contain language stating that
the MAC had exclusive authority to approve the operation of airports and
landing fields within the state.
This Court has recently held that the Legislature intended for the MAC
(along with airport authorities) to have exclusive jurisdiction over
aeronautical activities throughout the state to assure uniformity in laws
regulating aeronautics for the public good. Capitol Region Airport
Authority v Charter Twp of DeWitt, 236 Mich App _; _ NW2d _ (Docket No.
201181, issued July 23, 1999), slip op at 7-8. This Court concluded that,
because exclusive authority for aeronautical activities was granted to the
state agency, that agency was not subject to local land use ordinances or
regulations if those ordinances or regulations related to aeronautical
activities. Id., slip op at 6-8. Therefore, even if a local township had
been granted broad powers to regulate local land use under the Township
Planning Act, MCL 125.321 et seq.; MSA 5.2963(101) et seq., the township's
authority was subservient to the agency's authority in matters related to
the
agency's expertise. Id. However, the township's authority over local land
development could include airport property to the extent that the authority
asserted by a township involves only non-aeronautical uses or development
of the land. Id., slip op at 9.
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On the basis of the above authority, intervening plaintiffs' argument
that the township zoning laws were effectively repealed as a result of the
trial court's interpretation of MCL 259.24a; MSA 10.124a and MCL 259.51(1);
MSA 10.151(1) lacks merit. Townships may still determine the locations of
airports and landing areas, and control non-aeronautical activities, but
may not determine what aeronautical activities take place on the property.
The 1996 amendments to the Aeronautics Code simply operated to clarify the
law in an area where townships had never
previously had express legislative authority to control aeronautical
activities. It also follows that there is no violation of the title-object
clause of the state constitution, Const 1963, art 4, § 24, given that no
zoning laws were effectively repealed by the amendments to the Aeronautics
Code.
To the extent that plaintiff township was asserting a right to control
the activity on defendant Handleman's property, it was attempting to
regulate aeronautical activity. Intervening plaintiffs are similarly
seeking to enforce a restriction that limits the type of flights that may
be made to and from Handleman's property. Intervening plaintiffs' intent to
limit the flight activities exceeds the scope of the township's authority
to regulate Handleman's property in light of the MAC's exclusive
jurisdiction. After defendant Woodworth was granted the right to maintain a
private airport on his property, a right now possessed by Handleman, the
local authority's control over this mater with respect to aeronautical
activities ended and that authority is now vested exclusively with the MAC.
1996 PA 370 also added § 24a to the Aeronautics Code, MCL 259.24a; MSA
10.124a, which, as initially enacted, provided:
"Private landing area" means any location, either on land or
water, that is used for the take-off or landing of aircraft, and is to
be used by the owner or persons authorized by the owner. Commercial
operations shall not be conducted on private landing areas.
This section was recently amended by 1998 PA 268, effective July 17, 1998,
and now provides:
"Private landing area" means any location, either on land or
water, that is used for the takeoff or landing of aircraft, and is to
be used by the owner or persons authorized by the owner.
Notwithstanding any existing limitation or regulation to the contrary,
the owner and any person authorized by the owner shall have the right
to use such private landing area. Commercial operations shall not be
conducted on private landing areas. [Emphasis added.]
This more recent change reflects that the owner of a private landing field
has the right to authorize others to use the landing field, notwithstanding
any limitation or regulation to the contrary. Thus, the Legislature has
made it clear that the owner of a private landing field has the right to
allow guests to use the landing field. Although the latest version of § 24a
had not yet been adopted when Judge Mester issued his decision, it provides
further support for that decision.
Reading §§ 24a and 51(1) together, we are satisfied that Judge Mester
properly granted defendant Handleman's request for relief from the 1981
injunctive order, because it was no longer equitable to continue the
injunction in light of the statutory changes.
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Intervening plaintiffs further argue that the effect of Judge Mester's
ruling and the legislative changes is to effectuate a taking of their
property without just compensation. However, intervening plaintiffs do not
explain what property of theirs has been taken. To the extent they claim a
vested property right in the injunction, that argument is meritless for the
reasons previously discussed.
Intervening plaintiffs next argue that the newly adopted amendments to
the Aeronautics Code violate their rights to due process. Legislation
comports with due process where the legislation bears a reasonable
relationship to a permissible legislative objective. Fort Gratiot Charter
Twp v Kettlewell, 150 Mich App 648, 653; 389 NW2d 468 (1986). The changes
made to the Aeronautics Code were intended to clarify the MAC's authority
over aeronautical matters, as well as promote uniformity and safety in air
travel. Because the amendments had the effect of clarifying the MAC's
jurisdiction and matters within its exclusive control, these changes are
reasonably related to a permissible legislative objective. Thus,
intervening plaintiffs have not shown that the statutory amendments violate
their due process protections, even if the changes adversely affect their
rights.
Intervening plaintiffs also argue that the legislative changes to the
Aeronautics Code had the effect of violating the separation of powers
clause of the state constitution, Const 1963, art 3, § 2. Plaintiffs argue
that the Legislature overstepped its bounds and invaded the judicial
branch's authority because the effect of the statutory amendments was to
invalidate Judge Roberts' 1981 injunctive order. Under the separation of
powers doctrine, the Legislature may not reverse a judicial decision or set
aside a final judgment through a legislative enactment. Wylie v Grand
Rapids City Comm, 293 Mich 571, 582-583; 292 NW 668 (1940).
Intervening plaintiffs' argument is flawed. Judge Roberts' made his
ruling in the absence of any controlling state law on point. Injunctive
relief is an extraordinary remedy that should only issue when justice
requires it and there is no adequate remedy at law. Kernan v Homestead
Development Co, 232 Mich App 503, 509; 591 NW2d 369 (1998). Here, Judge
Roberts' ruling was one in equity only because there was no controlling
legal authority at the time.
It is the Legislature's function to make laws and the judicial branch
is vested with the authority to interpret and apply laws, not make them.
Randall v Meridian Twp Bd, 342 Mich 605, 608; 70 NW2d 728 (1955). It was
certainly within the Legislature's authority to enact a law clarifying the
jurisdiction of the MAC and defining private landing rights. It is not
inappropriate for the Legislature to adopt new legislation in response to
court rulings without violating the separation of powers doctrine if those
statutes apply prospectively to future actions. The Legislature is only
precluded from adopting retroactive legislation that either reopens or sets
aside a final judgment of a court already entered. See Quinton v General
Motors Corp, 453 Mich 63, 82-84; 551 NW2d 677 (1996) (Opinion of Levin,
J.). The effect of the changes made by the Legislature was not to
invalidate the trial court's equity powers, even though the proposed
changes had an effect on the subject matter of the 1981 injunctive order.
We conclude that it was not a violation of the separation of powers clause
for Judge Mester to modify the 1981 injunction in light of the recent
legislative changes.
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Finally, we find no merit to intervening plaintiffs' claim that res
judicata applies. Res judicata does not apply if the relevant facts change
or new facts develop. Labor Council, Michigan Fraternal Order Police v
Detroit, 207 Mich App 606, 608; 525 NW2d 509 (1994). Since 1981, the basis
for the injunctive order has changed as a result of the statutory
amendments made by the Legislature.
Intervening plaintiffs also argue that defendant Handleman’s right to
land planes on his property should be abolished altogether because the
effect of Judge Mester's decision was to expand the rights originally
granted by Judge Roberts in 1981. We find no merit to this argument.
Defendant Handleman's right to operate a private landing strip was
established by the 1981 judgment and this Court affirmed that decision.
This Court is bound to follow its prior decision on that issue as the law
of the case. Freeman v DEC Int'l, Inc, 212 Mich App 34, 37-38; 536 NW2d 815
(1995). However, due to an intervening change in the law that applies to
Judge Roberts' injunctive order, the law of the case doctrine does not
apply to the portion of the court's order prohibiting guest flights and
that portion may therefore be set aside. Moreover, because Judge Roberts'
original intent was to allow defendant Woodworth to operate a private
landing field, as opposed to a public airport, we do not believe the effect
of Judge Mester's ruling was to improperly expand defendant Handleman's
rights.
Intervening plaintiffs also adopt and incorporate by reference the
issues raised by Oxford Township in Docket No. 205688. However, because
Oxford Township's appeal has since been disconsolidated and dismissed by
stipulation of the parties, this issue is no longer properly before this
Court.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Joseph B. Sullivan
1 The Experimental Aircraft Association has been granted the right to
participate in this case as amicus curiae.
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