CHARLES J. RYANT, FOR PUBLICATION
January 14, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee, 9:05 a.m.
v No.213711
Leelanau Circuit Court
CLEVELAND TOWNSHIP, LC No.97-004100 CZ
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Kelly and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant (“township board”) appeals as of right from an
order granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff, based
on the determination that when the township supervisor, in the
presence of a quorum of the township board, addressed the
township planning commission, the township board engaged in
“deliberat[ion] toward or rendering a decision on a public
policy,” in violation of the Open Meetings Act (“OMA”), MCL
15.261 et seq.; MSA 4.1800(11) et seq.1 We reverse.
Plaintiff is a member of the Cleveland Township planning
commission. He alleged that during two separate planning
commission meetings, Township Supervisor Walt Daniels, who is a
member of the township board, addressed the planning commission
regarding a zoning issue. Also present at each of these meetings
were Mark Kalena (a member of the planning commission), Louise
Patterson (recording secretary for the planning commission), and
Bessie Mussil, all of whom were members of the township board.
The township board is made up of five members and, thus, a quorum
of the township board was present at each meeting.
The trial court held that because Daniels addressed the
planning commission in the presence of a quorum of the township
board, the board was engaged in deliberations toward rendering a
decision regarding a matter of public policy, without proper
notice, in violation of the OMA. The court acknowledged that the
board had not intentionally violated that act, but held that
intent is not necessary. The township board contends that this
reasoning was erroneous, and that the notice requirements of the
OMA do not apply to chance gatherings. We agree.
MCL 15.262; MSA 4.1800(12), defines certain terms with
regard to application of the OMA and states, in pertinent part:
(a) “Public body” means any state or local
legislative or governing body, including a board,
commission, committee, subcommittee, authority, or
council, which is empowered by state constitution,
statute, charter, ordinance, resolution, or rule to
exercise governmental or proprietary authority or
perform a governmental or proprietary function.
(b) “Meeting” means the convening of a public
body at which a quorum is present for the purpose of
deliberating toward or rendering a decision on a public
policy.
* * *
(d) “Decision” means a determination, action,
vote or disposition upon a motion, proposal,
recommendation, resolution, order, ordinance, bill, or
measure on which a vote by members of a public body is
required and by which a public body effectuates or
formulates public policy.
MCL 15.263; MSA 4.1800(13), provides, in pertinent part:
(1) All meetings of a public body shall be open
to the public and shall be held in a place available to
the general public. All persons shall be permitted to
attend any meeting except as otherwise provided in this
act . . . . The exercise of this right shall not be
dependent upon the prior approval of the public body.
However, a public body may establish reasonable rules
and regulations in order to minimize the possibility of
disrupting the meeting.
(2) All decisions of a public body shall be made
at a meeting open to the public.
(3) All deliberations of a public body
constituting a quorum of its members shall take place
at a meeting open to the public.
The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is
to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515;
573 NW2d 611 (1997). Statutory language should be construed
reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the act. Barr v Mount
Brighton, Inc, 215 Mich App 512, 516; 546 NW2d 273 (1996). The
first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of
the statute. In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich
396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). The fair and natural import of
the terms employed, in view of the subject matter of the law,
should govern. In re Wirsing, 456 Mich 467, 474; 573 NW2d 51
(1998). If reasonable minds can differ as to the meaning of a
statute, judicial construction is appropriate. Adrian School
Dist v Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System, 458
Mich 326, 332; 582 NW2d 767 (1998).
Unless defined in the statute, every word or phrase of a
statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, taking
into account the context in which the words are used. MCL 8.3a;
MSA 2.212(1); Western Michigan University Bd of Control v State,
455 Mich 531, 539; 565 NW2d 828 (1997). If the statute provides
its own glossary, the terms must be applied as expressly defined.
Tryc v Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich 129, 136; 545 NW2d
642 (1996). Otherwise, a court may consult dictionary
definitions. Popma v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 446 Mich 460, 470; 521
NW2d 831 (1994).
There is no dispute that the township board and the planning
commission are anything other than “public bod[ies]” as defined
by the OMA, and subject to the requirements of MCL 15.263: MSA
4.1800(13). To constitute a “meeting” of a “public body,” as
contemplated by the OMA, the following elements must be present:
(1) a quorum, (2) deliberation and/or rendering of a decision,
(3) on a matter of public policy. OAG, 1979-80, No 5437, p 36
(February 2, 1979).
The Legislature failed to define the term “deliberating” in
the context of the OMA. Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed), defines
this word as “the act of carefully considering issues and options
before making a decision or taking some action; esp., the process
by which a jury reaches a verdict; as by analyzing, discussing,
and weighing the evidence” (emphasis added). The word
“discussion” is defined as the act of exchanging views on
something; a debate. Id. (emphasis added). Although Black’s Law
Dictionary does not define “debate,” the Random House Webster’s
Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed) (1998), defines the word as “a
discussion, as of a public question in an assembly, involving
opposing viewpoints.”
The record suggests that the trial court based its decision
to grant plaintiff summary disposition on OAG, 1989-90, No 6636,
p 253 (October 23, 1989). The court stated:
And isn’t deliberation one board member expressing
a view or opinion, or providing information while
others are listening? I mean, isn’t that what
deliberation is . . . .
In OAG, 1989-90, No 6636, supra, the attorney general opined
that, while members of the board of commissioners who were also
members of the planning commission committee could discuss public
issues at planning commission meetings, non-committee-member
commissioners could attend the meetings as observers. Id. So
long as the non-member commissioners did not engage in
deliberations or render decisions at planning commission
meetings, the meetings need not be posted as meetings of the
board of commissioners. Id. The attendance of a quorum of the
board of commissioners at the planning commission meeting in that
situation would constitute a “chance gathering or conference not
designed to avoid this act.” 2 OMA, § 3(10). We find the same
to be true here.
We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the
township supervisor’s comments before the planning commission
rose to the level of “deliberating toward or rendering a decision
on” the proposed zoning amendment. The record does not show that
any of the other township board members present exchanged any
affirmative or opposing views, debated the proposed amendment or
engaged in any discussion regarding the statements made by the
township supervisor. Except for Kalena, who was a township board
member of the planning commission and had every right to comment
at the properly noticed public commission meetings, the other
township board members present where there essentially as
“observers.” OAG, 1989-90, No 6636, supra. As long as the
township board members did not engage in deliberations or render
decisions, the subject meetings did not need to be noticed as
meetings of the township board. Id. There is no evidence that
the proposed zoning amendment, a matter of public policy, was
discussed by the members with each other at the subject meetings.
See OAG, 1979-80, No 5437, p 36 (February 2, 1979).
Because we conclude that there was no “deliberating toward”
or rendering of any decisions by the quorum of the township board
present at the planning commission meetings, the notice
requirements of the OMA were not violated and the trial court
erred in so ruling.
Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in
favor of defendant. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
_______________________________
1 The trial court did not state under which subrule of MCR 2.116
it rendered its decision. However, since the trial court went
beyond the pleadings in rendering its decision, we will consider
the motion as granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
2 The Kansas Court of Appeals has addressed a similar situation
under the Kansas Open Meetings Act, KSA 75-4317 et seq., and has
held that the provisions of the act do not extend to informal
gatherings of a quorum of a public body. Stevens v Bd of Co
Comm’rs, 10 Kan App 2d 523; 710 P2d 698 (1985). The Kansas Court
looked at whether the meeting was “prearranged” or spontaneous,
planned, or with the commissioners’ express or implied
understanding that they would be meeting.
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