Whether the defendant-Township’s denial of a special use permit to plaintiff-Livingston Christian Schools (LCS) violated the Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act’s (RLUIPA) substantial-burden provision; 42 USC § 2000cc(a)(1); LCS’s “leasehold interest” under RLUIPA; § 2000cc-5(5); Whether a land-use regulation imposed a “substantial burden” on LCS’s ability to exercise its religious mission; DiLaura v. Township of Ann Arbor (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Andon, LLC v. City of Newport News (4th Cir.); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill (9th Cir.); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside (11th Cir.); International Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro (9th Cir.); Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cnty. Council (4th Cir.); Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck (2d Cir.); Saints Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin (7th Cir.); Petra Presbyterian Church v. Village of Northbrook (7th Cir.); World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago (7th Cir.); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers (CLUB) v. City of Chicago (7th Cir.)

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that defendant-Genoa Township’s refusal to issue a special use permit to plaintiff-LCS for a Christian school did not “substantially burden” LCS’s right to exercise its religion under the RLUIPA. LCS sought to relocate its school to a church property it leased in the Township. The Township Board denied a special use permit for the school, citing “traffic concerns, inconsistency with the single-family residential zoning of the surrounding area, the failure of the Planning Commission’s proposed conditional approval to mitigate these problems, and the Church’s history of noncompliance with the zoning ordinance” and conditions on prior special use permits. LCS sued, alleging that the refusal violated RLUIPA’s “substantial-burden provision.” The district court granted the Township summary judgment, ruling that the application denial did not impose a substantial burden on LCS where LCS had two other properties that were “adequate alternatives” to the Township property. The court acknowledged that RLUIPA protects leasehold interests in property. The issue was whether the permit denial imposed a substantial burden on LCS’s ability to exercise its religious mission. The Supreme Court has not considered whether a land-use regulation can impose a substantial burden under RLUIPA. The court had only considered the issue in two unpublished cases, DiLaura and Living Water Church of God. Looking at these cases, along with cases from other circuits, the court held that “a burden must have some degree of severity to be considered ‘substantial.’” It considered factors used by other circuits to determine whether a substantial burden could be established, such as “whether the religious institution has a feasible alternative location from which it can carry on its mission[;]” whether it will suffer “substantial ‘delay, uncertainty, and expense”’ due to imposition of the regulation; and “whether LCS’s burden was self-imposed . . . .” The court held that LCS failed to show why the alternative property in Pinckney was inadequate, and the fact that LCS had subsequently leased the property to another entity did not create a substantial burden because it was leased after the special permit was denied. Further, “the unavailability of other land in the particular jurisdiction ‘will not by itself support a substantial burden claim.’” The record did “not indicate that traveling the roughly dozen miles to Pinckney would be unduly burdensome to LCS’s students” or show that “LCS’s religious beliefs required it to locate within Genoa Township specifically.” Affirmed.