UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

    SOUTHERN DIVISION

___________________________

 

 

SHERRI J. GRADISHER,

 

Plaintiff,

v.                                                                                             Case No. 1:00-CV-401

 

CHECK ENFORCEMENT UNIT, INC., HON. GORDON J. QUIST

 

Defendant.

___________________________________/

 

OPINION

Plaintiff, Sherri J. Gradisher ("Gradisher"), sued Defendant, Check Enforcement Unit, Inc. ("CEU"), on behalf of herself and a proposed class alleging that CEU violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o, and its Michigan counterpart, the Michigan Collection Practices Act, M.C.L. §§ 339.901-.920 and M.C.L. §§ 445.251-.258.  The Court has previously ruled that CEU is a debt collector under the FDCPA and violated several provisions of that act.  The Court has also entered judgment in favor of Gradisher in the amount of $1,000.00.  Now before the Court is Gradisher's motion for an award of costs and attorney fees.   

                     I.  Background

Gradisher filed her class action complaint in this case on June 2, 2000.  Early in the case, CEU raised the issue of whether it is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA.  On February 28, 2001, after receiving the parties' briefs on the issue, the Court held that CEU was a debt collector and denied CEU's motion for summary judgment.  On May 3, 2001, Gradisher filed a motion for class certification.  The Court issued an Opinion and Order on August 21, 2001, granting the motion for class certification and ordering Gradisher to submit a proposed notice form, method of distribution, and class list to the Court within fourteen days.  Following a series of disputes regarding class membership, Gradisher's counsel mailed the notice to class members.

On January 10, 2002, Gradisher filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding CEU's violations of the FDCPA.  In an Opinion and Order entered on April 5, 2002, the Court granted the motion in part, concluding that CEU had committed multiple violations of the FDCPA.  Following a hearing on damages, the Court granted Gradisher's request to decertify the class due to the de minimis net worth of CEU.  The Court awarded Gradisher the maximum statutory damages of $1,000.00 and entered judgment for Gradisher in that amount on August 26, 2002.

Gradisher now seeks an award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).  In particular, Gradisher requests an award of fees in the amount of $94,083.00, consisting of $80,538.00 for services performed by attorney O. Randolf Bragg^[1] and his firm and $13,545.00 for services performed by attorney Louis R. Lint and his firm.  Gradisher also seeks costs in the amount of $10,860.44.  Finally, Gradisher requests an award of $5,964.00 in fees and $38.28 in costs incurred in  connection with her fee request.

  II.  Analysis

Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), a plaintiff in a "successful action to enforce" the FDCPA is entitled to recover "the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court."  See Wright v. Fin. Serv. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 1994).  CEU does not dispute that Gradisher is entitled to an award of fees and costs.  It argues, however, that the amount of the fee request is unreasonable because many of the hours incurred were unnecessary, excessive, or duplicative.  CEU also objects to certain costs as unnecessary or lacking sufficient description.   

A.          Attorney Fees

The proper method of determining a reasonable attorney fee under the FDCPA is the "lodestar method" utilized in determining reasonable attorney fees in civil rights cases.  Lee v. Thomas & Thomas, 109 F.3d 302, 307 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983)).  "'The primary concern in an attorney fee case is that the fee awarded be reasonable,' that is, one that is adequately compensatory to attract competent counsel yet which avoids producing a windfall for lawyers."  Adcock-Ladd v. Sec'y of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 471 (6th Cir. 1999)).  The starting point in the analysis is the "lodestar figure," which is the product of the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.  See Wayne v. Vill. of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 531 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S. Ct. at 1939).  Duplicative and unnecessary hours should be excluded from the total number of reasonable hours.  Id.

The district court also should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not "reasonably expended."  S.Rep. No. 94‑1011, p. 6 (1976).  Cases may be overstaffed, and the skill and experience of lawyers vary widely.  Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.  "In the private sector, 'billing judgment' is an important component in fee setting.  It is no less important here.  Hours that are not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary pursuant to statutory authority."  Copeland v. Marshall, 205 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 401, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (1980) (en banc) (emphasis in original).

 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S. Ct. at 1939-40.

Issues regarding hours can arise where: (1) there are factual questions about whether the lawyer actually worked the number of hours claimed; (2) there are legal questions about whether the work performed was related to the claims on which the plaintiff prevailed^[2]; and (3) there are mixed questions of law and fact regarding whether the attorney spent too much or duplicitous time on certain matters.  See Coulter v. Tenn., 805 F.2d 146, 150-51 (6th Cir. 1986).  From there, the court must determine whether the fee should be adjusted in light of the results obtained, an inquiry which involves two questions: "First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded?  Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award?"  Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S. Ct. at 1940.^[3]  The party seeking an award of fees bears the burden of demonstrating that the request is reasonable.  See Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1176 (6th Cir. 1990).

1. Hourly Rate

The requested hourly rates of Gradisher's attorneys and their staff are as follows:

O. Randolph Bragg (attorney) $300.00

Craig Shapiro (law clerk) $ 85.00

Michael Kelly (law clerk) $ 85.00

Louis R. Lint (attorney) $175.00

Linda D. Pearson (legal assistant) $ 50.00

 

In setting the proper rate for attorney fees, courts must use the prevailing market rate for similar services of local attorneys with comparable skill, experience, and reputation.  Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-86, 109 S. Ct. 2463, 2470 (1989).  With regard to the task of setting hourly rates, the Sixth Circuit has stated:

In determining what the level of compensation for each category of service should be, the court should look to the fair market value of the services provided.  In most communities, the marketplace has set a value for the services of attorneys, and the hourly rate charged by an attorney for his or her services will normally reflect the training, background, experience and skill of the individual attorney.  For those attorneys who have no private practice, the rates customarily charged in the community for similar services can be looked to for guidance.

Focusing on the fair market value of the attorney's services will best fulfill the purposes of the Fees Awards Act, by providing adequate compensation to attract qualified and competent attorneys without affording any windfall to those who undertake such representation.  The entire purpose of the statutes was to ensure that the representation of important national concerns would not depend upon the charitable instincts of a few generous attorneys.

 

Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 638 (6th Cir. 1979).

CEU has not objected to any of the requested hourly rates, and the Court, being generally familiar with prevailing rates in the local community, finds the requested rates to be reasonable.  With regard to Bragg's rate of $300.00, Gradisher has presented evidence showing that this rate is commensurate with rates in the Western District of Michigan for an attorney of Bragg's experience in consumer class action litigation.  (Anding Aff. ¶ 3.)  Although Bragg has indicated that the Northern District of California has found the prevailing rate for his services to be $400.00, the Court declines to allow that rate without some evidence showing it to be comparable to rates charged in this community by attorneys with similar experience performing similar work.

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

The affidavits submitted by Gradisher's counsel show that her attorneys and their staffs incurred the following numbers of hours: Bragg (236.5); Kelly (110); Shapiro (2.8); Lint (74.3); and Pearson (11.9).  In addition, Gradisher's counsel incurred the following numbers of hours in preparing the attorney fee motion: Bragg (17.6); Shapiro (5.4); Lint (1.2); and Pearson (.3).   CEU contends that the hours incurred by Gradisher's counsel were unreasonable.  In general, CEU contends that the hours were excessive, because it was not necessary for two attorneys to bill time for attending the same depositions and hearings or for two attorneys to bill for telephone calls or correspondence between themselves.  CEU also contends that the hours spent on specific motions, including the motion for class certification, motion to strike exhibits, motion to compel, and Rule 56(f) motion, were excessive.  Finally, CEU contends that the number of hours incurred should be reduced by 50% because Gradisher failed to conduct discovery early in the case which would have disclosed that CEU had a minimal net worth, thus increasing the number of hours incurred as a result of the class certification.

a. Billing by Two Attorneys

There is no hard and fast rule allowing or preventing more than one attorney from attending a deposition, hearing, or trial on behalf of a prevailing party.  For example, in Aquilino v. University of Kansas, 109 F. Supp.2d 1319 (D. Kan. 2000), the court held that it was unreasonable for two attorneys to attend settlement conferences on behalf of the plaintiff, although it was not unreasonable for two attorneys to represent the plaintiff in depositions and during jury deliberations.  See id. at 1326.  In Schofield v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, 919 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Pa. 1996), the court held that it was not unreasonable for the plaintiff to claim fees for two attorneys at trial given the length of trial and the number or witnesses, although the court did hold that there was no reason for a paralegal to sit in at trial.  See id. at 829.  In Black v. M.G.A., Inc., 51 F. Supp.2d 1315 (M.D. Ala. 1999), the court stated that "[t]he hours of multiple attorneys are recoverable as long as the fee claimant shows that the time spent by those attorneys 'reflects the distinct contribution of each lawyer to the case and is the customary practice of multiple-lawyer litigation.'" Id. at 1317-18 (quoting Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 432 (11th Cir. 1999)).  The court in Webner v. Titan Distribution, Inc., 101 F. Supp.2d 1215 (N.D. Iowa 2000), stated, "[g]enerally, the court finds that having two attorneys present at a deposition is unnecessary and duplicative," but allowed an exception in that case because the presence of both attorneys at the depositions contributed to the efficiency of the trial.  Id. at 1232.  Finally, in Schultz v. Amick, 955 F. Supp. 1087 (N.D. Iowa 1997), the court stated:

there is no per se rule that only one attorney should try a § 1983 claim or only one attorney should be compensated pursuant to § 1988.  The proper question is whether the application, for one or more attorneys, is reasonable, eliminating inefficiencies or duplications that might arise from use of more than one attorney.

 

Id. at 1115 (citing A.J. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 865 (8th Cir. 1995)).

Gradisher contends that it was reasonable for two attorneys to perform work on the case because class action cases such as this are inherently complex.  The Court does not disagree with that proposition in general, but CEU's objection deals with two attorneys billing for performing the same task, such as attending depositions and hearings.  Even though this case was a class action and did generate a fair number of court filings, the case was not burdensome: the legal issues were not overly complex, only a few depositions were taken, and only a modest number of documents were involved. Thus, there was no need for two attorneys at depositions and hearings.  However, Bragg and Lint attended the same deposition (the September 14, 2000, Johnson deposition) only once and attended the same hearing on only three occasions.  CEU argues that Bragg's time should be eliminated because Bragg, who is located in Chicago, flew to Grand Rapids for each hearing or deposition and incurred significant expense for airline tickets as well as his travel time.^[4]  CEU contends that it would have been less expensive for Lint, who is located forty miles from this Court, to attend the depositions and hearings.  There is no question that it was more expensive for Bragg, rather than Lint, to attend the deposition and hearings.  However, the billing records show that in the instance of the deposition, Lint attended for only part of the time and Bragg attended the entire deposition.  With regard to the hearings, Bragg acted as lead counsel, and he and his law clerk prepared most, if not all, of the pleadings and papers submitted to the Court.  Because Bragg was most familiar with the motions, it was appropriate for him to attend the hearings.  Therefore, the Court will deduct a total of 14.1 hours spent by Lint on the deposition (9/14/00 Johnson Dep.) and the hearings (1/8/01 Hr'g; 1/23/02 Hr'g.; and 6/12/02 Hr'g). 

CEU also argues that apart from the appearances at the deposition and the hearings, the time billed by Bragg and Lint for telephone calls and correspondence between them was unnecessary because the case could have been handled by a single attorney.  The time records show that Lint performed some separate tasks for which Bragg or his law clerks billed no time.  However, there were several instances where both attorneys billed for the same telephone call, or spent time reviewing the same order, letter, discovery responses from CEU, etc.  In addition, Lint spent time reviewing motions and briefs which had already been filed by Bragg's firm.  However, even though some of Lint's time may have been duplicative, using local counsel, such as Lint was for Bragg, may actually save money by, for example, reducing the amount of travel by out-of-state counsel.  In such cases, it may be necessary for both attorneys to talk about the case and review the same orders, briefs, etc., to remain fully informed of the proceedings and to realize the savings benefit of having local counsel.  Nonetheless, having reviewed attorney Lint's billings, the Court nonetheless determines that some of Lint's time was unnecessary.  Because the Court cannot determine the amount of such time with mathematical certainty, the Court finds that a 10 % reduction of Lint's hours would be sufficient to account for time unnecessarily incurred by Lint.

b. Specific Objections

CEU contends that the time spent on preparing Gradisher's motion to strike exhibits, Rule 56(f) motion, and motion to compel was excessive.^[5]  First, with regard to the motion for class certification, Gradisher's counsel has agreed to reduce the hours spent by the law clerk on the motion from almost fifty to ten.  Given that Bragg spent less than six hours on the motion, the Court finds this to be reasonable.

The Court has also reviewed the billings for the other motions.  According to the Court's tally, Bragg's firm billed 13.7 hours on the motion to strike exhibits, 18.2 hours on the Rule 56(f) motion, and 5.5 hours on the motion to compel.  With regard to the Rule 56(f) motion, Kelly, the law clerk, billed 17.5 hours and Bragg billed .7 hours.  The brief is slightly more than eight pages long and cites only a handful of cases.  Given the nature of the motion, the Court finds that 10 hours would have been a reasonable amount of time to prepare the motion.  Therefore, the Court will reduce Kelly's time by 7.5 hours and will disallow the .7 hours Bragg spent to review and revise the motion and brief.

The Court also finds that the 13.7 hours spent on the motion to strike exhibits was excessive.  Bragg spent 2.8 hours and Kelly billed 10.9 hours for completing the motion.  The billing statement shows an additional hour billed by Kelly on October 11, 2000 – the same day the brief was filed with the Court.  More importantly, the motion and brief combined are only about eight pages long, and the brief cites only three cases.  Six hours would have been a reasonable amount of time to prepare the motion and brief.  Therefore, the Court will allow all of Bragg's time but will reduce Kelly's time by 8.7 hours.  The Court concludes that the 5.5 hours spent on the motion to compel was reasonable and, therefore, will not reduce those hours.  

Although CEU did not have the opportunity to object to the fees sought in the supplemental declarations submitted by Gradisher's attorneys, the Court has reviewed the hours spent on the fee request and finds them to be excessive.  Bragg and Shapiro spent a total of 23 hours on preparation of the motion, the supporting brief, the reply brief, and the Bragg affidavits.  The Court concludes that 15 hours would have been a reasonable amount of time to complete the work in connection with the fee request.  Therefore, 7.6 hours will be deducted from Bragg's hours and .4 hours will be deducted from Shapiro's hours.  The Court finds the number of hours spent by Lint and Pearson on the fee request to be reasonable.

The Court will make an additional reduction of 1.6 hours from attorney Lint's hours.  In reviewing his fee statement, the Court noted that the first seven entries, totaling 1.6 hours, were for work performed on or before April 24, 1999.  Gradisher did not receive the first letter from CEU – the Due Process Notice – until at least June 16, 1999.  Therefore, these hours do not relate to this case.                                                

In sum, the Court finds the following hours to be reasonable: Bragg (246); Kelly (54.9); Shapiro (7.8); Lint (44.8); and Pearson (12.2).  The lodestar figures are as follows:

Attorney Bragg 245.8 hours x $300/hr. = $73,740.00

Law Clerk Kelly   93.8 hours x $  85/hr. = $  7,973.00

Law Clerk Shapiro     7.8 hours x $  85/hr. = $     663.00

Attorney Lint   53.8 hours x $175/hr. = $  9,415.00

Legal Assistant Pearson   12.2 hours x $  50/hr. = $     610.00   

 

Totals 413.7      $92,401.00

 

3. Results Obtained

CEU contends that the lodestar should be adjusted downward by 50% for the results obtained.  CEU cites Altergott v. Modern Collection Techniques, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 778 (N.D. Ill. 1994), in which the court reduced the lodestar figure by one-half.  The court noted that it had suggested early in the case that the plaintiff's lawyers might obtain a judgment by filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings based upon the defendant's admission in its answer that the validation notice contained in the first letter was incomplete and violated the FDCPA.  Id. at 783.  However, the plaintiff's attorneys continued to litigate the case aggressively and, after that point, incurred substantial fees for a "relatively simple case [that] could have and should have been pursued in a far more efficient manner."  Id.

While this case was not complex, it was not "relatively simple" as in Altergott.  In other words, CEU has not suggested that Gradisher could have obtained complete relief by filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  It should be recalled that CEU defended this case aggressively, initially asserting that it was not a debt collector under the FDCPA in a motion for summary judgment, which the Court denied.  Almost a year after the Court's ruling, CEU filed a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal of that decision, which the Court also denied.  CEU filed many other motions, including a motion for relief from an order and a motion for clarification of the Court's ruling on CEU's debt collector status.  In addition, CEU did not admit any violations of the FDCPA, but instead vigorously defended Gradisher's motion for partial summary judgment.  "[D]efense counsel 'cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response.'" Knop v. Johnson, 712 F. Supp. 571, 578 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (quoting City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986)).

The Court does conclude, however, that a downward adjustment is warranted for only partial success.  It is true that Gradisher's attorneys were very successful because the Court awarded Gradisher the maximum statutory damages.  On the other hand, many of the hours expended by Gradisher's counsel were in connection with class certification and other class issues.  Even though a class was certified, no recovery was made on behalf of the class because the Court ultimately decertified the class.  Thus, Gradisher was the only person to have benefitted directly from this litigation.  Moreover, the Court concludes that the hours expended in the litigation are not in line with the level of success achieved in other cases where class recoveries were obtained.  FDCPA class action cases involving substantial class recoveries provide a basis for this conclusion.  In Cortez v. Trans Union Corp., No. 94 C 7705, 1997 WL 7568 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 1997), the plaintiff received only ten percent of the statutory maximum and did not prevail on two of her three claims, but she did obtain a class recovery of almost $80,000.00.  Id. at *3.  The court's opinion does not indicate the number of hours claimed, but the  award was for approximately seventy hours of work.  Id. at *4.  In Avila v. Van Ru Credit Corp., No. 94 C 3234, 1995 WL 683775 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1995), the plaintiff obtained the maximum statutory damages for the class, totaling more than $100,000.00.  Id. at *11.  The court reduced the total hours from 356 to 244.25.^[6]  Id. at *3-10.  Here, the total hours expended by Gradisher's counsel and their staffs was 365.7.

Because the hours spent on class issues in this case did not produce a benefit to the class in terms of an economic recovery, the Court concludes that the fee award should not include time spent on class certification and related issues.  Having thoroughly reviewed the billing records submitted by Gradisher's counsel, the Court will exclude a total of 119 hours spent on class issues from the award (Bragg (54.1); Shapiro (2.0); Kelly (49.9); Lint (9.9); and Pearson (3.1)).^[7]  Therefore, the award will be reduced by $22,529.00 (Bragg ($16,230.00); Shapiro ($170.00); Kelly ($4,241.50); Lint ($1,732.50); and Pearson ($155.00)), for a total fee award of $69,872.00 ($92,401.00-$22,529.00).

B.          Expenses

Gradisher also seeks an award of expenses in the amount of $9,691.83 incurred by Bragg's firm and expenses in the amount of $1,168.61 incurred by Lint's firm.  In addition, Gradisher seeks to recover expenses of $37.28 incurred by Bragg's firm and $1.00 incurred by Lint's firm in connection with the request for fees.  The expenses incurred by Bragg's firm were for telephone/fax, postage, overnight delivery, copying, computer-assisted research, travel (airfare), service of process, and deposition transcripts.  The expenses incurred by Lint's firm were for postage, telephone, filing fees, copying, mileage, parking, deposition fees and transcripts, overnight delivery, and lunch for Gradisher's counsel.  CEU objects to the costs incurred by Bragg for airfare to Grand Rapids.  CEU also maintains that the charges for phone and copying contain no detail, and therefore should be eliminated or reduced.  Finally, CEU contends that expenses for postage and computer-assisted legal research should be considered a part of overhead not normally billed to clients and, therefore, not allowed.

In determining whether a particular expense may be recovered as part of expenses under a statute authorizing awards of attorney fees and expenses, such as § 1692k(a)(3), courts have generally held that an award may include expenses not defined as "costs" in the costs statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1920, if they are of a type billed separately to the client, i.e., not absorbed in the attorney's hourly rate as overhead.  LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Cir. 1998) ("'[A]ttorney's fees awards include those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by attorneys and ordinarily charged to their clients.'") (quoting United States Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 416 (2d Cir. 1989)); Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid, 965 F. Supp. 1017, 1023 (N.D. Ohio 1997) ("An attorney's fee under § 1988 includes those expenses that are incurred in order for the attorney to render his or her legal services and that would normally be charged to a fee-paying client.")

With regard to the expenses incurred by Bragg's firm, the Court notes that there are certain expenses to which CEU does not object and which are recoverable as costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.  Those expenses include $1,145.50 for copies of deposition transcripts.  See Sales v. Marshall, 873 F.2d 115, 120 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that "expenses of taking, transcribing and reproducing depositions" are taxable as costs).  In addition, the service fees in the amount of $130.12 are also taxable as costs.  28 U.S.C. § 1920(3).  Finally, copying expenses may be taxed as costs.  Nat'l Truck Equip. Ass'n v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 972 F.2d 669, 674 (6th Cir. 1992).  According to the Court's tally, Bragg's firm incurred $1,398.45 for copying charges.  However, the Court will reduce this amount by 25% due to lack of any description showing why the charges were incurred, i.e, whether they were reasonably incurred in connection with this case.  Therefore, $1,048.84 will be awarded for copying expenses.

Bragg's firm also incurred expenses for computer-assisted legal research, travel, overnight delivery, postage, telephone, and facsimile.  Courts have found that expenses ordinarily charged to clients include photocopying, travel, telephone costs, postage, and computer-assisted legal research.  Pinkham v. Carnex, Inc., 84 F.3d 292, 294-95 (8th Cir. 1996); Ace Ltd. v. Cigna Corp., No. 00 CIV. 9423 (WK), 2001 WL 1286247, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2001) (quoting Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 111 F. Supp.2d 381, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); Minnick v. Dollar Fin. Group, Inc., No. CIV.A. 02-1291, 2002 WL 1023101, at *150 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2002).  The amount incurred for these charges is $7,367.42.  Although this amount is for expenses that are normally charged to a client separate from the attorney's time, the Court concludes that a 30% reduction, which approximates the number of hours disallowed for class issues, should be applied to expenses (including copying expenses taxed as costs) because some portion of the expenses sought relate to class certification and other class issues, for which no recovery was obtained.  Because the expense statements do not indicate which expenses relate to which aspects of the case, application of the 30% rate is an appropriate method of formulating an adequate reduction.  Therefore, the Court will award $5,891.38 for all expenses other than deposition transcripts and service fees.  The total award for expenses incurred by Bragg's firm, including the $37.28 sought in connection with preparation of the fee request, is $7,204.28.

The expenses incurred by Lint's firm which may be taxed as costs include the $150.00 filing fee, a $270.90 charge for a deposition transcript, and $91.49 for copying.  With regard to the deposition transcript, the Court notes that Lint's statement contains two identical entries for $270.90.  It appears that the second $270.90 charge is a duplicate entry, and therefore, the second charge will be deducted as set forth below.  Finally, the Court will make the same 25% reduction made for Bragg's copying costs due to lack of adequate description.  Thus, the allowable copying charges are $68.62.

The amount of expenses remaining after deducting taxable costs is $656.22.  The following expenses will be deducted that figure: (a) $20.49 lunch charge; (b) $173.08 in mileage in parking fees for attendance at the deposition and hearings also attended by Bragg; and (c) $270.90 for the duplicate deposition charge.  The amount of expenses remaining is thus $260.37 (including copying charges), to which the Court will apply the 30% reduction applied to Bragg's expenses.  Applying the deduction leaves $182.26 in expenses.  Therefore, the total amount of expenses, which includes the filing fee, the deposition transcript charge, the other allowable expenses, and the $1.00 incurred in connection with the fee request, is $604.16. 

                  IV.  Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will award Gradisher attorney fees in the amount of $69,872.00 and expenses in the amount of $7,808.44.  

An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

 

Dated: January 22, 2003               /s/ Gordon J. Quist               

GORDON J. QUIST

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE