Legal malpractice; Due process; Elba Twp. v. Gratiot Cnty. Drain Comm’r; Reed v. Reed; In re Contempt of Henry; Notice & an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; Hinky Dinky Supermarket, Inc. v. Department of Cmty. Health; Vicencio v. Jamie Ramirez, MD, PC; Hearing notice requirements; MCR 2.107(A)(1) & 2.119(C)(1); Harmless error; People v. Carines; Applicability of MCR 2.504(B)(2) & 2.517; Samuel D Begola Servs., Inc. v. Wild Bros.; Order granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7); Maiden v. Rozwood; Motion to stay proceedings; People v. Bailey; Whether discovery would have provided factual support for plaintiff’s claims; VanVorous v. Burmeister; Statute of limitations; MCL 600.5805(4); Accrual; MCL 600.5838(1); Fante v. Stepek; Six-month “discovery rule”; MCL 600.5838(2); Levinson v. Trotsky; Fraudulent concealment of a claim; MCL 600.5855; Brownell v. Garber; Breach of contract claim duplicative of the legal malpractice claim

While plaintiff did not receive proper notice of the hearing on defendant-attorney’s motion to dismiss or for summary disposition, and the court assumed he was denied a right to participate, it held that any error was harmless because his claim was barred by the statute of limitations (SOL) and he was not prejudiced by his inability to respond. Defendant represented plaintiff in appellate proceedings after his criminal conviction. Her representation ended in 2013. Plaintiff, acting in propria persona, sued in 2017, alleging legal malpractice and breach of contract. He was still incarcerated. The court noted that there was no evidence “that a notice of hearing was ever filed, much less served upon plaintiff,” as to defendant’s motion. It concluded that “no notice ‘reasonably calculated’ to apprise plaintiff of the hearing date was given;” thus, there was a violation of his right to due process. However, the hearing only lasted about one minute, and the record did not support plaintiff’s contention that “defendant advanced new or expanded” arguments. The transcript revealed “nothing more than a brief summary of the main argument of her motion—that plaintiff’s case should be dismissed because her representation of plaintiff ended in 2013.” He also argued that the trial court orally ruled for her without the benefit of his response, which was docketed by the clerk several hours after the hearing. But the trial court did not issue its order until five days later, and “it is well settled that a court speaks through its orders, not through its oral pronouncements.” Also, the trial court stated in denying reconsideration “that it reviewed both parties’ briefs before issuing its summary disposition order and that it based its decision solely on the briefs.” Thus, the notice error was harmless. As to plaintiff’s claim that the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact, the court found that the order was sufficient for appellate review. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in “failing to decide (or impliedly denying) plaintiff’s motion to stay proceedings pending discovery.” As to the SOL, he admitted that defendant’s representation ended in 2013, and the court held that there was no merit to his fraudulent concealment claim. Affirmed.

Search & seizure; Whether the search complied with the Fourth Amendment; Probable cause; When & how the seizure occurred; Timing of the officers’ decision to investigate the truck; Terry stop; People v. Barbarich; People v. Barbee; Timing of the officers arrival in the police car at the location where the vehicle was parked; People v. Jenkins; Brendlin v. California; United States v. Knotts; Texas v. Brown; Whren v. United States; United States v. Carr (6th Cir.); Officers’ approach on foot & removal of defendant from his car; People v. Kazmierczak; People v. Freeman; Whether in light of the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA) (MCL 333.26421 et seq.) the smell of burned marijuana justifies criminal investigation; Authority to consider the issue; Associated Builders & Contractors v. City of Lansing; MCL 333.26427(b)(3)(B); People v. Carlton; Felon in possession (FIP); Carrying a concealed weapon (CCW)

Holding that the search complied with the Fourth Amendment and was supported by probable cause, the court reversed the trial court’s order suppressing the firearm, vacated the order dismissing the case, and remanded. Defendant was charged with FIP of a firearm, FIP of ammunition, CCW in a vehicle, and felony-firearm after a search of his truck in which police found a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol. “The trial court’s analysis that officers violated the Fourth Amendment hinged entirely on what it called ‘pretext’ and was premised on the trial court’s finding that no traffic offense had occurred.” The crucial issue was when and how that seizure occurred. There were three possible alternatives: when the officers drove to investigate the truck, when they arrived at the location where it was parked, and when they got out of the car and removed defendant from his vehicle. The trial court never explicitly reached a conclusion on this issue, “referring only to ‘pretext’ for ‘the stop,’ stating that ‘[t]here was not a reasonable suspicion to approach the vehicle.’” The court held that none of the three possibilities “would support a finding that the officers’ actions were anything other than the consensual approach of officers to an individual in a public place.” The trial court erroneously disregarded the fact that their approach did not implicate the Fourth Amendment, and erroneously disregarded the basis that Officer B “gave for conducting the actual search of the vehicle, which was the evidence of marijuana emanating from defendant’s vehicle.” Their subjective reasons for stopping alongside the truck were “irrelevant because regardless of intent, the police could do so in the manner in which they did without offending the Fourth Amendment. Further, while at that lawful vantage point, the officer smelled marijuana—all before any seizure occurred—which gave the officers probable cause to search” the truck without a warrant. Thus, the “trial court erred when it excluded the evidence seized during the search on the basis that the officers needed to have a valid justification to stop next to defendant’s vehicle on a public street.” Defendant’s claim that in light of the MMMA the smell of burned marijuana could not justify criminal investigation was not persuasive. The court has held that “a person using marijuana in a parked car in a parking lot open to the public is in a ‘public place’ within the meaning of the MMMA. Accordingly, if the MMMA does not apply to a parked vehicle in a parking lot open to the public, then it likewise could not apply to a parked vehicle on a public street.” As he was using marijuana in his truck on a public street, the MMMA’s protections did not apply.

Sufficiency of the evidence; Felony murder; MCL 750.316; Underlying felonies; MCL 750.316(1)(b); People v. Gayheart; CSC III; People v. Hutner; Malice; People v. Smith; People v. Flowers; Consent; People v. Waltonen; Effect of intoxication; MCL 768.37(1); Physical helplessness; MCL 750.520a(m); People v. Perry; Motion to suppress DNA evidence; MCL 28.176; Whether the DNA statute is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague; Maryland v. King; People v. Green; People v. Burton; Presumption of constitutionality; People v. Thomas; Right to counsel; Custodial interrogation; Miranda v. Arizona; People v. Akins; People v. Tierney; McNeil v. Wisconsin; Michigan v. Harvey; Smith v. Illinois; Fare v. Michael C; Davis v. United States; Voluntariness; People v. Robinson; People v. Sears; Proper invocation of counsel; People v. Sexton; Right to a fair & impartial jury; People v. Tyburski; Motion to change venue based on pretrial publicity; People v. Jendrzejewski; People v. Prast; Waiver; People v. Clark; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Seals; Trial strategy; People v. Anderson; People v. Dixon; Failure to make a futile objection; People v. Ericksen; Admission of photographic evidence; MRE 103(a)(1); People v. Mills; Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; People v. Eddington; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Sclafani v. Peter S Cusimano, Inc.

The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of felony murder for sexually assaulting and killing a woman who was walking home from a Halloween party, and that he was not entitled to the suppression of his DNA evidence or his custodial statement. It also held that he was not entitled to a new trial based on adverse pretrial publicity, and that the probative value of photographic evidence was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice He was also convicted of concealing the death of an individual. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that his felony murder conviction was unsupported because there was insufficient evidence that he committed the underlying felony of CSC III. It noted that the essential elements of CSC III were proven “beyond reasonable doubt where defendant admitted having sexual intercourse with [the victim], and [her] costume and facial fractures were evidence from which the jury could infer that penetration was accomplished by force.” The court also rejected his claim that wrongful retention of his DNA warranted a new trial, finding that the taking of his DNA sample constituted a lawful search and seizure incident to his arrest under MCL 28.176, which has a “good-faith” exception. “Michigan has adopted the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule concerning searches and seizures and in any event, defendant’s claim of improper retention lacks merit.” It next rejected his contention that statements he gave to law enforcement were obtained through violation of his right to counsel, finding it was “not outside the range of principled outcomes for the [trial] court to have found that defendant’s request for counsel was conditional on whether there was an attorney available at the time of his interrogation.” The court further rejected his argument that he was entitled to a new trial based on adverse pretrial publicity, noting that he waived the issue and failed to show his trial counsel was ineffective “because trial counsel effectively and properly used peremptory challenges to remove taint from the jury pool.” Finally, it held that the probative value of photographic evidence was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Affirmed.

Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Nix; People v. Gioglio (On Remand); People v. Douglas; Failure to object to allegedly inadmissible evidence; Matters of trial strategy; People v. Rockey; People v. Heft; People v. Benton; Failed strategy; People v. Stewart; Deference to the trial court’s superior ability to assess witness credibility; People v. Farrow; People v. Peerenboom; Failure to object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct & to allegedly improper opinion testimony; MRE 701; People v. Fomby; People v. Oliver; Richardson v. Rider Truck Rental, Inc.; Failure to raise a futile objection; People v. Ericksen; Alleged failure to investigate & present evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence; Failure to offer impeachment evidence; Admissibility of defendant’s videotaped police statement; People v. Harris; Constitutional right to counsel during interrogation; People v. Tierney; Edwards v. Arizona; People v. Elliott

Holding that trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance and that defendant’s videotaped police statement was properly admitted at trial, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial, and affirmed his felonious assault and felony-firearm convictions. He first contended that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the admission of audio-recorded hearsay statements by victim-H’s eight-year-old child, K, who asserted that she saw part of the incident. However, the court agreed with the trial court that counsel opted not to object as a matter of trial strategy, and that defendant “failed to overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s strategy was within the range of reasonable professional conduct.” It found that counsel’s primary reason for not objecting to K’s “recorded hearsay statement—that it was more advantageous to accept the recorded statement than risk injurious live testimony—was objectively reasonable and within the range of reasonable professional conduct, particularly considering that the child’s statement was not entirely inconsistent with defendant’s statement and that trial counsel was able to effectively argue during closing argument why the jury should not believe the child’s statement.” Counsel was also not ineffective for failing to raise futile objections to the prosecution’s remarks, which were not improper, or to the testimony of two police officers about the nature of defendant’s injuries, as their testimony was admissible under MRE 701. While defendant argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and introduce evidence of a 2013 incident to show H’s propensity for violence, it was “undisputed that trial counsel was aware of the incident and made a strategic decision not to present it.” As to the claim that defendant’s videotaped police statement was inadmissible because it was obtained after he invoked his right to counsel, the trial court discounted his testimony and found that the police witnesses’ testimony was credible. Further, he never mentioned invoking his right to counsel in the video, and he signed a written Miranda waiver form.

Custody; MCL 722.28; Sinicropi v. Mazurek; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Change of circumstances or proper cause; Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer; McRoberts v. Ferguson; Statutory best interest factors MCL 722.23(b), (c), & (d)

The court held that a change of circumstances and proper cause were established for purposes of MCL 722.27(1)(c), and that the trial court did not adequately weigh and consider the children’s living situation and the events that occurred after defendant-father took them to Wisconsin. Thus, it reversed the denial of plaintiff-mother’s motion for reconsideration and to reopen proofs (which it considered a request to change custody subject to MCL 722.27(1)(c)), and remanded. It found that “the fact that defendant quit his job and went to Wisconsin with the children to pursue a logging opportunity probably sufficed in and of itself to satisfy the statutory threshold to modify a prior custody order. Regardless, [his] serious failure to properly care for” them while in Wisconsin demanded further proceedings. He testified at an evidentiary hearing that they all lived in a tent for the first few days, that he left 12-year-old E to look after “her younger siblings while he worked during the day, that he allowed the children to use a motorboat absent his or any adult’s presence, and that he taught” E to drive and permitted her to drive on a private logging road. They later moved into a cabin. E testified that he “would call to check on them periodically during the day, but he did not return for lunch.” If she was unable to get a fire going, the children would eat canned food or cold hot dogs. She also testified that she and eight-year-old M “would swim in the lake and catch frogs, occasionally joined by” 10-year-old J, “who stayed at a friend’s house a few days a week.” E testified that she used a microwave when they moved into the cabin, and that she gave J “his medication until defendant started doing it” but that defendant often forgot. E also stated “there were no showers at the campsite and that she developed a skin infection ‘on her private area,’ which defendant essentially did not address.” Plaintiff testified that when the children were returned to her care, she took M and E to the doctor, who told her E’s “rash was caused by a hygiene problem” and M had constipation. “Because plaintiff established both a change of circumstances and proper cause, the trial court erred in not revisiting the best-interest factors and must do so on remand.”

Divorce; Motion to terminate spousal support; Modification of spousal support on a showing of changed circumstances since the divorce; MCL 552.28; Lemmen v. Lemmen; Loutts v. Loutts (After Remand) (Loutts II); Gates v. Gates; Principle that cohabitation alone is not a changed circumstance; Petish v. Petish; Kersten v. Kersten; Motion for modification of child support; Paulson v. Paulson; MCL 552.605(2); Change in circumstances; Kosch v. Kosch; MCL 552.517(f)(i) & (iv); 2017 Michigan Child Support Formula (MCSF); 2017 MCSF 3.03(A), (C)(4), & (D); 2017 MCSF 4.04(A); Request to be named “primary custodian” of the parties’ minor child; The Child Custody Act (MCL 722.21 et seq.); Modifying a custody award; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Lieberman v. Orr; Proper cause or a change of circumstances; Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer; Brausch v. Brausch; Clear & convincing evidence; Hunter v. Hunter; Distinction between physical & legal custody; Varran v. Granneman (On Remand); Attorney fees; MCR 3.206(D)(1) & (2)(a); Myland v. Myland; Reed v. Reed; Stallworth v. Stallworth; Hanaway v. Hanaway; Request for remand to a different judge; MCR 2.003(C)(b); Canon 2(A) of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct; Actual or apparent bias; In re MKK

The court held that while the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant-ex-husband’s motion to terminate spousal support or in awarding plaintiff-ex-wife attorney fees, it did so in denying his request that child support be reviewed and recalculated because he established reasonable grounds for a review. Further, he adequately set forth a claim for change of the physical custody of the parties’ remaining minor child and the trial court should have determined whether a change in circumstances existed. The court denied his request for remand to a different judge. The parties divorced in 2010. He filed the motion at issue in 2017. As to spousal support, the court found that the trial court’s error in “describing its holding as being based on a lack of change of circumstances” was harmless. The trial court conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing on the motion and took testimony about “both parties’ living situations, income, ability to work, and other factors relevant to an award of spousal support.” It based its decision on their respective positions, “not merely on the lack of a change of circumstances since the entry of the last support order.” Further, its decision to deny the motion was within its discretion in light of plaintiff’s testimony about her expenses and the “great disparity in income between the parties after a 21-year marriage.” However, as to child support, the previous “order was based on the child spending 82 overnights at defendant’s home.” Plaintiff acknowledged that he resided with defendant 98% of the time the previous year. The parties’ incomes had also changed since the prior order. After remand for recalculation based on their current incomes and the child’s actual overnights, a modification will be appropriate if the difference between the current order and the recalculation meets the minimum threshold requirements under the MCSF. Remand was also required for the trial court to “determine whether there has been a change in circumstances, where the child’s established custodial environment is, whether a change in custody is warranted, and so that it may consider the best-interest factors . . . .” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Legal malpractice; Due process; Elba Twp. v. Gratiot Cnty. Drain Comm’r; Reed v. Reed; In re Contempt of Henry; Notice & an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; Hinky Dinky Supermarket, Inc. v. Department of Cmty. Health; Vicencio v. Jamie Ramirez, MD, PC; Hearing notice requirements; MCR 2.107(A)(1) & 2.119(C)(1); Harmless error; People v. Carines; Applicability of MCR 2.504(B)(2) & 2.517; Samuel D Begola Servs., Inc. v. Wild Bros.; Order granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7); Maiden v. Rozwood; Motion to stay proceedings; People v. Bailey; Whether discovery would have provided factual support for plaintiff’s claims; VanVorous v. Burmeister; Statute of limitations; MCL 600.5805(4); Accrual; MCL 600.5838(1); Fante v. Stepek; Six-month “discovery rule”; MCL 600.5838(2); Levinson v. Trotsky; Fraudulent concealment of a claim; MCL 600.5855; Brownell v. Garber; Breach of contract claim duplicative of the legal malpractice claim

While plaintiff did not receive proper notice of the hearing on defendant-attorney’s motion to dismiss or for summary disposition, and the court assumed he was denied a right to participate, it held that any error was harmless because his claim was barred by the statute of limitations (SOL) and he was not prejudiced by his inability to respond. Defendant represented plaintiff in appellate proceedings after his criminal conviction. Her representation ended in 2013. Plaintiff, acting in propria persona, sued in 2017, alleging legal malpractice and breach of contract. He was still incarcerated. The court noted that there was no evidence “that a notice of hearing was ever filed, much less served upon plaintiff,” as to defendant’s motion. It concluded that “no notice ‘reasonably calculated’ to apprise plaintiff of the hearing date was given;” thus, there was a violation of his right to due process. However, the hearing only lasted about one minute, and the record did not support plaintiff’s contention that “defendant advanced new or expanded” arguments. The transcript revealed “nothing more than a brief summary of the main argument of her motion—that plaintiff’s case should be dismissed because her representation of plaintiff ended in 2013.” He also argued that the trial court orally ruled for her without the benefit of his response, which was docketed by the clerk several hours after the hearing. But the trial court did not issue its order until five days later, and “it is well settled that a court speaks through its orders, not through its oral pronouncements.” Also, the trial court stated in denying reconsideration “that it reviewed both parties’ briefs before issuing its summary disposition order and that it based its decision solely on the briefs.” Thus, the notice error was harmless. As to plaintiff’s claim that the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact, the court found that the order was sufficient for appellate review. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in “failing to decide (or impliedly denying) plaintiff’s motion to stay proceedings pending discovery.” As to the SOL, he admitted that defendant’s representation ended in 2013, and the court held that there was no merit to his fraudulent concealment claim. Affirmed.

Writ of superintending control action arising from plaintiff’s removal as the mayor; Shepherd Montessori Ctr. Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp.; People v. Burton; Abuse of discretion; Edry v. Adelman; Removal for cause; MCL 168.327; Wilson v. Council of City of Highland Park; Quasi-judicial powers of a city council; Bonner v. City of Brighton; Hawkins v. Common Council of City of Grand Rapids; Judicial review; MCR 3.302(A); Department of Pub. Health v. Rivergate Manor; MCR 3.302(B) & (D)(2); In re Credit Acceptance; Act of removing an elected official as a primarily administrative proceeding; Appeal of Fredericks; Substantial evidence; In re Payne; Hostile work environment; MCL 37.2103; Chambers v. Trettco, Inc.

The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff-Nichols a writ of superintending control in this action arising from his removal as the defendant-city’s mayor by the defendant-city council following a hearing to consider allegations of sexual harassment made by city employees, because he failed to establish that the council had a clear legal duty to reinstate him as the mayor. Nichols argued that the circuit court erred when it held that he did not satisfy his burden of establishing that the city council “failed to perform a clear legal duty when it failed to comply with the city charter.” The city charter mandated that removal of an officer shall be for cause only. The “charge” against Nichols “arose following an investigation of allegations of sexual harassment by city employees in the course of their employment.” If established, this “would be a sufficient and relevant reason for removal from office for cause.” He neither argued nor provided any law to the contrary. The court next considered the proceedings required for removal of a public officer. It concluded that, because “the city council’s act of removing an elected official for cause is primarily an administrative proceeding, an appeal challenging the substantive merits of the removal decision is not available.” Nichols argued that “the city council had a clear legal duty to reinstate him” as mayor and as a result, “the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a writ of superintending control.” He identified the same alleged “fatal errors” that he relied on in the circuit court, which were rejected. The court likewise rejected “these allegations of fatal error, and mostly for the same reasons the circuit court rejected each claim of error.” It found that the city council “could conclude from the evidence that the charge of misconduct in office was sufficiently established, warranting a vote to remove Nichols from office.” Affirmed.

Termination under §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii), (b)(i) & (ii), (g), (j), & (k)(i) & (iii); Principle that a court speaks through its written orders & judgments; In re Contempt of Henry; Whether reunification services were required; MCL 722.638(3); In re Rood; In re Plump; In re Moss Minors; Children’s best interests; In re Trejo Minors

The court held that the trial court properly terminated both respondent-parents’ parental rights where multiple statutory grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence and it was in the children’s best interests. To the extent that the trial court terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights based on § (k)(iii), it clearly erred by doing so. The case “indisputably involved serious physical injuries suffered by the children as a result of” her neglect, but the record contained no evidence that she abused the children “by way of ‘[b]attering, torture, or other severe physical abuse.’ To the contrary,” two witnesses—including a doctor (H), “an expert in pediatric medicine, pediatric emergency medicine, and child abuse—explicitly testified that there was no evidence that the children had been physically abused. Nonetheless, the trial court’s error was harmless because only one statutory ground need be established to terminate parental rights,” and the record fully supported termination under §§ (b)(i), (g), and (j). H “testified that the children suffered from mild to moderate dehydration and malnutrition." Four of them were diagnosed with failure to thrive. H testified that their skin “injuries were caused by adverse conditions over a period of several days, a week, or longer.” Their conditions led to the filing of criminal charges against the mother, for which she pled guilty to fourth-degree child abuse. This evidence supported the trial court’s finding that she caused them to suffer physical injury and failed to provide proper care or custody. She also “failed to provide proper care by repeatedly leaving the young children unsupervised overnight, in a house that was filthy with excrement, urine, and sewage.” The children were also exposed to domestic violence between the mother and respondent-father. The trial court did not clearly err by finding that her “parental deficiencies were so severe that there was no reasonable expectation that they could be remedied within a reasonable time, notwithstanding her articulated acceptance of responsibility and her participation in voluntary services.” She could not avoid termination by attributing her deficiencies to past events in her life. As to the father, he was content to leave the children to her “inadequate care, without ensuring that she was capable of or able to provide proper care.” His failure to actively involve himself in their lives and his resignation of them to her care “in such an obviously unfit environment justified termination under” §§ (a)(ii), (b)(ii), (g), (j), and (k)(i). Affirmed.

Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), & (k)(ii); Waiver; In re Hudson; Holmes v. Holmes; Principle that only one statutory ground must be proven; In re Ellis; Best interests of the children; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re White; In re Moss Minors; Anticipatory neglect; In re LaFrance Minors

The court held that the trial court properly terminated respondent-father’s parental rights to the children where he waived his right to appellate review by failing to challenge the statutory grounds for termination, and where termination was in the children's best interests. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that evidence supporting termination of his parental rights under § (j) was not clear and convincing. It noted that he waived this argument by failing to dispute that the statutory grounds had been met and that, even if he had not waived appellate review, his failure to challenge the remaining statutory grounds rendered the issue moot. It also rejected his claim that termination was not in the children’s best interests, noting that he was convicted of sexually abusing the children’s 13-year-old half-sister, and that “continuation of [his] parental rights would be harmful to [them] because it would interfere with their ability to overcome the negative consequences of respondent’s sexual assault as part of a cohesive family unit.” Affirmed.

Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (i), & (j); In re Trejo Minors; In re DMK; In re Rood; In re Moss Minors; In re Williams; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re TK

The court held that the trial court properly terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights to the child (K) where the statutory grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence and reasonable reunification efforts were made. The condition that led to adjudication—respondent’s substance abuse—continued through 29 months of services while K was in care and approximately 7 months of services while K remained in her home, and had not been rectified by the time of the termination hearing. The mother had received two additional years of substance-abuse related services to no avail. Despite these extensive services, she tested positive for cocaine 11 times during these proceedings, and missed 37 drug screens. She continued to abuse cocaine after becoming pregnant with M, and that child suffered withdrawal after birth. Not only had the mother not rectified this condition, there was ample evidence that she would not be able to rectify the condition within a reasonable time. K had already been in foster care for nearly 2½ years. Respondent had not curbed her addiction despite receiving services since 2010, and made excuses for her positive test results. Thus, termination was supported under § (c)(i). Evidence of her drug abuse further supported termination under §§ (g) and (j). She attempted to provide proper care and custody for K for several months in 2015. However, her drug use made it impossible. She once ceded custody of K for his safety and the DHHS ultimately removed K from respondent’s care to keep him safe. Given her inability to benefit from extensive and lengthy substance abuse treatment, the trial court did not err in determining that the mother would be unable to provide proper care and custody for K within a reasonable time and that K would be in danger of harm if returned to her home. Termination was clearly supported under § (i). The trial court had previously terminated respondent’s parental rights to C1 and C2 “on serious neglect grounds due to her substantial substance abuse and concomitant inability to safely tend to the three children then in her care.” Affirmed.