

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

KENNETH AARON MALONE,

Defendant-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED

October 16, 2026

9:06 AM

No. 331903

Macomb Circuit Court

LC No. 2015-001129-FH

ON REMAND

Before: LETICA, P.J., and MURRAY and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In our prior opinion, we affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s request to be removed from the sex offender registry under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 *et seq.* *People v Malone*, 348 Mich App 264, 266; 18 NW3d 18 (2023), vacated in part ___ Mich ___; 32 NW3d 63 (2026). In doing so, we rejected defendant’s contention that lifetime registration under SORA constituted cruel or unusual punishment under our state constitution. *Id.* Our Supreme Court vacated our analysis in part III and remanded the matter to this Court to analyze defendant’s facial and as-applied constitutional challenges in light of *People v Kardasz*, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 165008).¹ After examining *Kardasz*, we continue to affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s request to be removed from the sex offender registry under SORA.

¹ See *People v Malone*, ___ Mich ___; 32 NW3d 63 (2026). In this order, our Supreme Court also advised that it had recently remanded a similar issue in lieu of granting leave to appeal. *People v Spencer*, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket Nos. 169399; 169418). The *Spencer* case is currently pending before this Court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In our prior opinion, we set forth the following facts:

Defendant was born on April 4, 1998. He was characterized as cognitively and emotionally impaired and received special education services throughout his school years. When defendant was in the tenth grade he brought a knife onto high school property and was suspended. As a juvenile, in 2014, he was arrested for domestic violence, and his adjudication resulted in a term of probation. Later, in 2015, he was arrested for domestic violence and disturbing the peace; he pleaded *nolo contendere* to disturbing the peace, and this adjudication also resulted in a term of probation.

Defendant's mother proffered that defendant was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Additionally, defendant reported that he had a history of auditory hallucinations. Specifically, he claimed that auditory hallucinations commanded him to either commit suicide or commit acts of criminal sexual conduct (CSC). On March 3, 2015, defendant's mother was caring for the victim, 14-month-old KP, and a three-year-old. Defendant took the victim into the bedroom for a nap. When defendant did not return, his mother went to the bedroom to check on them. Defendant was lying on the bed with the victim with a blanket covering them. When his mother asked what defendant was doing, he admitted that he was masturbating. She removed the blanket and found that defendant had his pants and underwear pulled down. Additionally, the victim's pajamas and diaper were pulled down, and defendant's penis was touching the victim's buttocks. Defendant's mother called the police.

Initially, defendant explained to the police that he exposed his penis and placed it inside the victim's anus. However, defendant later denied penetrating the victim's anus and claimed to have only placed his penis between the victim's buttocks. Also, during this police interview, defendant acknowledged that he had sexually penetrated his cousin, but the incident was not reported. Although defendant proffered that auditory hallucinations and his prescribed medications caused his behavior, a mental health evaluation performed in March 2015 diagnosed defendant with generalized anxiety disorder and recurrent major depression but not psychotic symptoms. Indeed, defendant attributed his conduct to auditory hallucinations but then admitted that his conduct was the result of his sexual impulses. Defendant was also characterized as oppositional and defiant, and he was physically or verbally aggressive toward adults or peers regardless of whether provoked or not.

Defendant was charged as an adult with first-degree CSC (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a). After consulting with two court-appointed attorneys as well as a guardian ad litem, defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree CSC (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a). A psychological evaluation and reoffending assessment determined that defendant had a high risk of reoffending if he did not receive treatment. The trial court sentenced defendant as a Public Act 150 ward and

remanded him to the juvenile justice center until placement in a treatment facility. The trial court further ordered defendant to register under SORA for a Tier III offense.

Under Public Act 150, defendant was placed at a specialized treatment facility. This placement did not yield positive results. Defendant engaged in grooming behavior with peers. Specifically, he sought out younger individuals or individuals with emotional issues in an attempt to take advantage of them. Defendant did not attempt this behavior with strong peers in his group. Defendant was forced to repeat assigned tasks because he lied numerous times. At another review hearing, it was learned that defendant was acting out sexually, denied privileges, removed from his peers, and placed in detention. After he was given a new supervisor and peer group, defendant improved in his behavior, and these small steps were deemed encouraging. It was determined that defendant would remain in the juvenile program.

However, in February 2017, the trial court was advised that defendant should be resentenced as an adult. At the facility, defendant had engaged in inappropriate sexual behaviors, including grooming his peers; made inappropriate comments to staff and peers; and failed to follow the rules. It was concluded that defendant was ineligible for release because he had not incorporated the teachings of the program into daily life. Despite defendant's lower cognitive ability, it was recommended that he remain in a secured environment because he had a "high propensity" to reoffend. After an alternative program for defendant could not be located either in or out of state, defendant was resentenced as an adult to 36 to 180 months' imprisonment.

In 2016, defendant moved for removal from the registration requirements of SORA, claiming that the statute was unconstitutional. The trial court denied defendant's motion. [*Malone*, 348 Mich App at 267-271 (footnotes omitted).]

We concluded that lifetime SORA registration for juvenile offenders, despite a conviction and sentence as an adult, did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution on its face and a hypothetical was insufficient to raise an as-applied challenge. *Id.* at 272, 278-279. As noted, on defendant's application for leave to appeal, our Supreme Court ultimately vacated part III of our prior judgment and remanded the case to us for reconsideration in light of *Kardasz*.

II. *KARDASZ*

We conclude that the application of *Kardasz* does not alter our judgment that the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion for removal from the registration requirements of SORA on facial and as-applied constitutional challenges.

There is a presumption that statutes are constitutional, and the courts construe them as such unless the unconstitutionality is clearly apparent. *People v Shannon*, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 371910), slip op 2. The party challenging the statute's

constitutionality has the burden of proving invalidity, and the challenges arise facially or as-applied. *Id.*, slip op 2-3. “A facial challenge argues that a statute is constitutionally invalid under all circumstances, whereas an as-applied challenge considers the specific application of a facially valid law to individual facts.” *Id.*, slip op 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

In *Kardasz*, a jury convicted the defendant of CSC-I arising from the sexual assault of his five-year-old daughter in 2018. After the defendant was initially sentenced to an excessive statutory minimum, he was resentenced to a term of 25 to 40 years’ imprisonment. The judgment of sentence reflected that the defendant would be required to comply with SORA for his lifetime. The defendant appealed, challenging the constitutionality of SORA, but the Court of Appeals affirmed. *Kardasz*, ___ Mich at ___; slip op 2-3.²

The *Kardasz* Court addressed the history of SORA, its design to comply with federal requirements, its various revisions, and the legislative intent as civil or punitive. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the defendant established by the “clearest proof” that 2021 SORA was so punitive in either purpose or effect to negate the legislative intent characterizing it as civil. Thus, the Court concluded “that the 2021 SORA constitutes punishment.” *Id.* at ___; slip op 32-33.

The *Kardasz* Court next addressed whether the punishment was cruel or unusual:

Having determined that the 2021 SORA is punishment, we now consider whether it is unconstitutional under Michigan’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. We apply the test from *People v Lorentzen*, 387 Mich 167; 194 NW2d 827 (1927), as affirmed in [*People v Bullock*, 440 Mich 15; 485 NW2d 866 (1992)], to assess whether a punishment is “grossly disproportionate.” [*Id.* at 34-35 & n 17]. Under this test, we consider: (1) the severity of the sentence relative to the gravity of the offense; (2) sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction for other offenses; (3) sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense; and (4) the goal of rehabilitation, which is a criterion specifically “rooted in Michigan’s legal traditions.” *Id.* at 33-34.

[The defendant] brings both a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge. To prevail on a facial proportionality challenge, a defendant must show that there are no circumstances in which the punishment would be valid. *Council of Orgs & Others for Ed About Parochiaid, Inc v Governor*, 455 Mich 557, 568; 566 NW2d 208 (1997). An as-applied challenge is less stringent and requires a court to analyze the constitutionality of the statute against the backdrop of the facts developed in the particular case. *Keenan v Dawson*, 275 Mich App 671, 680; 739 NW2d 681 (2007);

² In addition to the SORA registration provisions, the defendant was subject to lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM) under MCL 750.520n. The 2021 SORA, MCL 28.721 *et seq.*, as amended by 2020 PA 295, effective March 24, 2021, was not in existence at the time of defendant’s conviction, sentence, and resentencing. Nonetheless, the parties agreed that the defendant was currently subject to the act, and he failed to raise an ex post facto challenge. The Court declined to grant leave to address the LEM challenge and did not decide the unraised ex post facto issue. *Kardasz*, ___ Mich at ___; slip op 2-4.

Bonner v City of Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 223 & n 27; 848 NW2d 380 (2014) (emphasizing that in a facial challenge, the plaintiffs “do not challenge the [law’s] application in a particular instance”).

Since [the] defendant was convicted as a Tier III offender, we focus our analysis on Tier III offenders. Tier III offenders committed the most severe registrable offenses and are subject to the most onerous requirements under the 2021 SORA. We hold that the 2021 SORA is not grossly disproportionate in all instances. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the 2021 SORA is cruel or unusual on its face. We are similarly not convinced that Tier III registration, as applied to [the] defendant is cruel or unusual. Thus, his as-applied challenge also fails. [*Kardasz*, ___ Mich at ___; slip op 33-34.]

Defendant recognizes that the *Kardasz* Court held that mandatory lifetime registration under 2021 SORA was not categorically cruel or unusual punishment under the state constitution in relationship to adult sex offenders who committed Tier III offenses. Nonetheless, defendant contends that 2021 SORA should not be categorically applied to juvenile sex offenders convicted as adults. He asserts that juveniles are distinguishable from adults because they have “lesser culpability and greater capacity for change.” Defendant further submits that the unique characteristics of the juvenile brain cause lifetime punishments to be more severe than the same punishment imposed on an adult. Therefore, he seeks to extend the caselaw holding life without parole sentences to be unconstitutional when applied to 18-year-olds, *People v Parks*, 510 Mich 225, 268; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), to the 2021 SORA.

But as the *Kardasz* Court acknowledged, a defendant must show that there are no circumstances in which the punishment would be valid to succeed on a facial proportionality challenge. *Kardasz*, ___ Mich at ___; slip op 33. Defendant has not done so. Indeed, the *Kardasz* Court concluded that Tier III offenders committed the most severe registrable offenses, were subject to the most onerous 2021 SORA requirements, and held that the 2021 SORA was not grossly disproportionate in all instances. *Id.*, slip op 33-34. Moreover, the *Kardasz* Court acknowledged the harshness of automatic lifetime imprisonment without consideration of mitigating factors for young offenders was distinguishable. *Id.*, slip op 35. The Court explained that it fell between the extreme of the harshest penalty and a grave sexual offense for which a relatively moderate punishment, the 2021 SORA requirements, was imposed. The Court further rejected the contention that this factor could support an as-applied challenge. *Id.* We cannot discern a valid rationale for exempting juvenile offenders sentenced as adults from 2021 SORA requirements, particularly when the burden of establishing a successful facial proportionality challenge was not met. Life without parole sentences for 18-year-olds have been deemed barbaric as condemning children to die in state custody without consideration of their brain’s neuroplasticity and the capacity for rehabilitation. *Parks*, 510 Mich at 245-246. Although 2021 SORA is determined to be punishment, its punishment is commensurate with the tiered offense committed and the offender may petition for removal if certain requirements are met. See

MCL 28.728c(2), (3).³ The punishment of lifetime registration at issue in this case does not rise to the level of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

The second factor requires examination of the penalty imposed for the offense compared to other offenses. The *Kardasz* Court concluded that Tier III offenses included the gravest sexual crimes, and “lifetime SORA registration for Tier III offenders [was] not a disproportionate punishment relative to the offense committed.” *Kardasz*, ___ Mich at ___, slip op 36-37. This factor is not ascertained premised on the susceptibility of the offender, youthful or otherwise, but on the nature of the offense, the gravest sexual offenses, and the determination that 2021 SORA lifetime registration is not a disproportionate punishment. Thus, the commission of the offense also does not favor a gross disproportionality finding for an as-applied challenge. *Id.*, slip op 37-38. Because this factor addresses the penalty imposed in light of the offenses committed when compared to other offenses, we conclude that the offense’s commission, by a youthful offender, does not warrant divergent treatment. And although Michigan was in the minority of states with a tier system, a lifetime registration requirement, an absence of a risk assessment, and a mechanism to petition for removal for most lifetime registrants, the *Kardasz* Court found that these factors did not favor a finding of gross disproportionality. *Id.*, slip op 39-40. Rather, the fourth factor, SORA’s failure to support rehabilitation, was the only factor to favor a finding of gross proportionality. *Id.*, slip op 40-41.

Ultimately, the *Kardasz* Court concluded:

On balance, the 2021 SORA is not cruel or unusual punishment either in all instances or as applied to [the] defendant. Tier III offenders have committed serious sex offenses. Their punishment is unique to sex offenses, but it is in alignment with a plurality of states that utilize sex-offender-registration schemes in accordance with the federal . . . requirements. Moreover, [the] defendant committed the most elevated registrable offense and has not provided evidence to support a claim that lengthy registration requirements are not appropriate relative to his individualized level of risk of reoffending. [*Id.*, slip op 41-42.]

Although the Supreme Court vacated part III of our prior judgment containing the analysis for reexamination under *Kardasz*, we continue to endorse its rationale:

Defendant contends that lifetime SORA registration for juvenile offenders, even when convicted and sentenced as adults, constitutes, on its face, cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution. We disagree.

³ MCL 28.728c(2) states that, “An individual classified as a tier III offender who meets the requirements of subsection (13) may petition the court under that subsection for an order allowing him or her to discontinue registration under this act.” Similarly, MCL 28.728c(3) reads, “An individual classified as a tier I, tier II, or tier III offender who meets the requirements of subsection (14) or (15) may petition the court under that subsection for an order allowing him or her to discontinue registration under this act.”

“The Michigan Legislature enacted SORA in 1994 . . . ‘to better assist law enforcement officers and the people of this state in preventing and protecting against the commission of future criminal sexual acts by convicted sex offenders,’ MCL 28.721a.” *People v Betts*, 507 Mich 527, 533; 968 NW2d 497 (2021). Although the act initially was a confidential database accessible to law enforcement only, it evolved into a computerized database available to the public online. *Id.* at 533-534. Subsequent amendments to the act required registrants to disclose affiliation with an institution of higher learning; provide an updated photograph, employment status, and vehicle information; and shortened the time frame to comply with registry requirements. *Id.* at 534-535. The *Betts* Court determined that the 2011 SORA amendments contained aggregate punitive effects that negated the state’s intent to deem it merely a civil regulation. *Id.* at 562. Accordingly, it was concluded that retroactive application of the 2011 SORA violates constitutional ex post facto provisions. *Id.* Because severing the amendments and reviving the previous version of SORA did not provide an adequate remedy, the Court held that “the 2011 SORA may not be retroactively applied to registrants whose criminal acts subjecting them to registration occurred before the enactment of the 2011 SORA amendments.” *Id.* at 573-574.

In light of the determination that the 2011 SORA amendments constitute punishment, defendant submits that the lifetime registration requirements violate the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment, Const 1963, art 1, § 16. “When a party asserts a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the party must demonstrate that no circumstances exist under which the statute would be valid.” *People v Dillon*, 296 Mich App 506, 510; 822 NW2d 611 (2012).

To determine whether a punishment is cruel or unusual, courts assess whether it is “unjustifiably disproportionate” to the offense committed by considering four factors: (1) the harshness of the penalty compared to the gravity of the offense, (2) the penalty imposed for the offense compared to penalties imposed for other offenses in Michigan, (3) the penalty imposed for the offense in Michigan compared to the penalty imposed for the same offense in other states, and (4) whether the penalty imposed advances the goal of rehabilitation. [*People v Lymon*, 342 Mich App 46, 82; 993 NW2d 24 (2022), lv gtd 511 Mich 860; 983 NW2d 82 (2023), citing *People v Bullock*, 440 Mich 15, 33-34; 485 NW2d 866 (1992).]

Defendant first submits that the severity of the offense, rubbing his penis against the 14-month-old victim’s buttocks, was not the “most heinous” act because the victim will have no memory of the incident. Defendant further contends that he will be given a social stigma and branded as a sex offender, subject to a plethora of registration requirements, and unable to petition for removal, without consideration of the science pertaining to the juvenile brain, see *People v Parks*, 510 Mich 225, 249-250; 987 NW2d 161 (2022).

Contrary to defendant's assertion, defendant initially reported to the police that he anally penetrated the victim but later claimed that he merely rubbed his penis externally against the victim's buttocks. Regardless of his contention, his conduct nonetheless constituted sexual penetration as that term is defined in MCL 750.520a(r). See *People v Anderson*, 331 Mich App 552, 560-562; 953 NW2d 451 (2020). Furthermore, the victim's mother reported that the victim suffered adverse consequences as a result of the CSC. Specifically, she indicated that the victim woke up during defendant's assault, became "clingier" after the assault, had to sleep with and touch her, and endured years of testing for sexually transmitted diseases. Although defendant contends that the SORA lifetime registration penalty does not account for his commission of the offense at age 16 and his brain development, defendant was sentenced at the age of 17 to a juvenile facility in accord with Public Act 150. Thereafter, he did not comply with the rules of his juvenile placement, began to groom peers that were younger than him or who suffered from emotional issues, engaged in inappropriate sexual behaviors, and failed to obey staff. It was determined that defendant could not be released because he failed to incorporate his training into daily life and that he presented a high risk of reoffending. Indeed, in the PSIR, it was recorded that defendant's sexual impulses were responsible for his behavior, not his mental health diagnoses. Therefore, the trial court determined that it was required to resentence defendant as an adult.

And, contrary to defendant's claim, the offense he committed was one of the "most heinous" offenses. Defendant removed the victim from the care of an adult and took him into another room. There, defendant decided to engage in masturbation and employed the victim in his sexual act by removing the victim's pajamas and diaper to penetrate the victim. The victim, only 14 months old, was limited in the ability to ascertain what was transpiring as well as to articulate the need for help.

Further, defendant had been in the treatment and care of mental health professionals for a number of years. Yet, it did not appear that he benefited from medication and treatment. He committed this offense at the age of 16, was sentenced to a juvenile facility at the age of 17, and was resented as an adult at the age of 19. At the time of his adult sentencing, defendant was deemed a high risk to reoffend. The contention that the severity of the offense does not equate with the harshness of the penalty is not supported by the record evidence. In light of the gravity of defendant's offense, mandatory lifetime registration is a proportionate punishment.

Defendant also contends that the penalty imposed, mandatory lifetime registration, is exceedingly rare and more severe because the punishment will last longer on a youthful offender than an adult. Lifetime registration, however, is not the only mandatory penalty imposed in Michigan. Mandatory lifetime imprisonment is the penalty imposed for first-degree murder, MCL 750.316(1). Two years' imprisonment is the mandatory punishment for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b(1). A second conviction results in the mandatory punishment of five years' imprisonment, and a third

conviction is subject to a mandatory 10-year period of imprisonment. *Id.* Additionally, certain CSC-I convictions may impose a mandatory 25-year minimum sentence, MCL 750.520b(2)(b), or a mandatory life sentence, MCL 750.520b(2)(c). A sentence mandated by the Legislature is presumptively proportional and presumptively valid. *People v Brown*, 294 Mich App 377, 390; 811 NW2d 531 (2011). A proportionate sentence is not a cruel or unusual punishment. See *People v Bowling*, 299 Mich App 552, 558; 830 NW2d 800 (2013). The Legislature has determined offenses for which mandatory punishments are warranted, including murder, weapons crimes, and sex offenses, without regard to the age of the offender. These mandates are presumptively proportional and valid. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh in favor of a finding of cruel or unusual punishment when examining SORA requirements imposed on a youthful offender.

Next, defendant notes that an examination of other jurisdictions reveals that only 18 states have substantially implemented the federal Sex Offenders Registration and Notification Act, 34 USC 20901 *et seq.*; there is no uniform view that these registries operate to improve public safety; and research indicates that the dangerousness of sex offenders has been “overblown.” He further submits that individual considerations of the juvenile are more desirable and appropriate. However, defendant fails to recognize that an individualized approach was taken pertaining to his own circumstances. Specifically, defendant was charged with CSC-I and was permitted to plead to CSC-II. Applying Public Act 150, defendant was remanded to a juvenile facility for treatment.

When defendant did not comply with the rules of the facility, did not obey the staff, and engaged in inappropriate sexual behaviors, he was warned of the consequences of his noncompliance. In an attempt to obtain compliance and ensure that defendant incorporated the lessons of the program into his daily life, defendant was given a new supervisor and new peer group. Again, these efforts failed. Defendant could not simply be released from the program in light of his failure to benefit, and he was deemed a high-risk reoffender. Thus, regardless of the number of states that have adopted sex offender registries, whether the registries benefit public safety, and the recidivism of sex offenders generally, defendant committed CSC-II with a 14-month-old victim. His penalty involved treatment in a juvenile facility. Despite being under the care and supervision of staff, defendant deliberately attempted to groom vulnerable peers and engaged in inappropriate sexual behaviors. Defendant was deemed a high risk for reoffending in light of his continued inappropriate conduct, and he continued to engage in inappropriate acts *in front of supervising adults*. Defendant received an individual assessment of risk, and it was determined that an adult sentence and mandatory SORA registration was required when the diversionary juvenile program failed. Again, this factor does not weigh in favor of the youthful offender.

With regard to the fourth factor, defendant submits that mandatory lifetime SORA registration is contrary to the goal of rehabilitation. In the context of an adult Tier III offender, this Court ruled that SORA's mandatory lifetime registration

would “not assist [the offender’s] rehabilitation.” *People v Jarrell*, 344 Mich App 464, 486; 1 NW3d 359 (2022). Regardless, this Court determined that “the other three factors strongly support that such a punishment is neither cruel nor unusual” *Id.* The same is true in this case, and defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the requirement of mandatory lifetime registration was invalid.

Lastly, defendant submits that remand is warranted for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether mandatory lifetime SORA registration is cruel or unusual punishment as applied to defendant. We disagree.

A statute is not deemed unconstitutional simply because a hypothetical situation may cast doubt upon it. *People v Malone*, 287 Mich App 648, 658-659; 792 NW2d 7 (2010). Rather, the analysis must focus “on whether the statute, as applied to the actions of the individual defendant, is constitutional.” *Id.* at 659. Defendant questions whether he has the ability to comply with the many procedural requirements of SORA in light of his mental capacity and in the absence of assistance. This hypothetical is insufficient to raise an as-applied challenge or to warrant a remand to the trial court.

In summary, the trial court did not err by failing to order defendant’s removal from the mandatory lifetime SORA registration requirements because the procedure did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. [*Malone*, 348 Mich App at 272-279 (footnotes omitted).]

The facts reflect that defendant was diverted to a juvenile facility and was under the care and treatment of mental health professionals for years. He was permitted to plead to a reduced charge of CSC-II and remanded for mental health treatment. But defendant failed to comply with the facility rules and to obey the staff. In fact, he preyed on vulnerable peers and engaged in inappropriate sexual behaviors. A new supervisor and new peer group failed to remedy defendant’s conduct. Defendant’s manipulative acts and sexual impulses controvert his reliance on mental illness and the need to remand for an evidentiary hearing. And the PSIR reflects that defendant’s attorneys did not submit his medical records. In light of the facts, as applied to the facially valid law, defendant failed to prove invalidity.

We again affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for removal from the sex offender registry.

/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Sima G. Patel