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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Redetermination that some of claimant’s unemployment benefits were obtained fraudulently; MCL 421.32a; Department of Licensing & Regulatory Affairs/Unemployment Ins Agency v Lucente; Unemployment Insurance Appeals Commission (UIAC); Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA); Administrative law judge (ALJ)
The court agreed with claimant that the redetermination as to her unemployment benefits was improperly issued. Thus, it reversed the trial court’s order affirming the UIAC’s decision the UIA could find 5 weeks’ worth of her benefits were fraudulently obtained and that restitution and penalties were appropriate. The 7/30/13 adjudication document addressed various dates that “represented all the weeks previously decided in the [3/11/10] no-fraud redetermination, as well as five weeks ending [3/13/10] through [4/10/10].” This adjudication was the first document the UIA issued as to the weeks ending 3/13/10 through 4/10/10. While the 7/30/13 “document was titled ‘Determination or Redetermination,’ the checked box at the bottom of the page specifically indicated the UIA issued [it] as a redetermination. The UIAC recognized that the document was the first time that the five weeks in question had been addressed and, as a result, considered it a de facto determination as to those weeks.” However, applying Lucente, “the redetermination label on the document improperly directed claimant to the wrong set of options and rights. As a redetermination issued without a prior determination, it must be set aside.” But the court noted in contrast to Lucente’s consolidated cases, “which were timely protested and appealed, claimant” here did not timely act on the 7/30/13 “document regardless of how it was labeled. On one hand, the UIA’s error in sending a redetermination without a prior determination preceded [her] ability to respond. With the document set aside, [her] tardiness in responding is irrelevant. On the other hand, [she] did not timely act on her rights regardless of what the UIA intended the document to be. A series of protests, denials, requests for reconsideration, and new denials labeled ‘redeterminations’ were subsequently exchanged between claimant and the UIA. Although the redeterminations in this exchange addressed the issue of timeliness under § 32a, the UIA eventually granted a hearing with the ALJ to reconsider the issue under § 54(b), fraud. But claimant’s eventual opportunity for a hearing does not undo the fact that the trajectory of the case continued in accordance with the UIA’s original labeling of the [7/30/13] document as a redetermination.” Based on the holding in Lucente, the court concluded “the UIA’s error was not harmless and warranted invalidation of the improperly issued” 7/30/13 redetermination.
Implied warranty of habitability accompanying the sale of new homes; Smith v Foerster-Bolser Constr, Inc; Applicability of Weeks v Slavik Builders, Inc; Right result reached for the wrong reason; Effect of mutual releases in prior litigation; Assignment; Privity; Mecosta Cnty Med Ctr v Metro Group Prop & Cas Ins; Michael Miller Building Company (MMBC)
The court held that defendants were properly granted summary disposition of plaintiffs-home buyers’ implied warranty of habitability claim and that their negligent construction claim was barred by a mutual release in a prior case. Plaintiffs purchased the home from the As. Defendant-MMBC built the home for the As. MMBC sued the As over a fee that they did not pay, and they “counterclaimed that MMBC did not properly construct the house, specifically” asserting improper construction of a chimney. That case ended in a settlement for mutual release. After plaintiffs bought the home, they filed this suit alleging negligent construction and a breach of implied warranty of habitability. As to the latter claim, the court held that the trial court correctly dismissed it because the As “owned the land before the house was built on that land and, thus, could not pass on any implied warranty of habitability that they did not have.” The trial court also relied on the mutual release in granting defendants summary disposition. That release stated that the As, “along with their assigns, fully released MMBC and its agents and employees from any and all causes of action that were or could have been brought in that proceeding. This included the” As’ counterclaim against MMBC as to improper construction of a chimney. Plaintiffs “were in privity with the [As] because they purchased the property from [them], and plaintiffs are the assignees of rights that the [As] had in the prior mutual release because it concerned the property that plaintiffs bought.” Further, plaintiffs acquired an interest when they bought the house “in the chimneys that were affected by the prior mutual release. . . . Plaintiffs succeeded to those rights involved in the prior mutual release, which released the right to sue defendants for defects in the chimney construction.” Affirmed.
Admission of evidence; Relevance; MRE 401; People v Watkins; Whether evidence is probative & material; People v Denson; Respondent-juvenile’s police statements; Custodial interrogation; Miranda v Arizona; Sufficiency of the evidence; Receiving & concealing a stolen motor vehicle (receiving & concealing); Felony-firearm
The court held that the trial court did not err by admitting the challenged evidence, and that the evidence was sufficient to establish two of the charges against respondent-juvenile. His juvenile adjudications included receiving and concealing, felony-firearm, and operating a vehicle without a valid license. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the officers’ testimony on items recovered from the stolen vehicle was inadmissible because it was irrelevant to the charge of receiving and concealing and, in turn, also to the related felony-firearm charge. “Knowingly possessing a BB gun or prop gun tends to make it more likely that respondent knew the vehicle was recently stolen or was even involved in its theft. The remaining items recovered from the vehicle—the backpack, counterfeit money, gift cards, card scanner, computers, marijuana, and scale—are less clear, but still satisfy the low threshold for relevance.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred when it failed to suppress evidence that he admitted to the BB gun’s presence during the traffic stop. He asserted the evidence was acquired in violation of Miranda because he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without being read his rights. Although respondent “was not free to leave, there is no indication that unique circumstances existed to impress upon [him] that he was in police custody at the time of questioning. Respondent was therefore questioned while subjected to a lawful investigatory stop, so he was not ‘in custody’ as required for a Miranda violation.” Finally, the court rejected his contention that the evidence was insufficient to establish the charges of receiving and concealing and felony-firearm. “Even without the evidence of the counterfeit money, gift cards, computers, marijuana, and scale, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings that respondent received and concealed a stolen vehicle.” Affirmed.
Motion to quash; Possession with intent to deliver between 50 and 449 grams of fentanyl; Intent to deliver
The court held that because the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding probable cause that defendant-Moore “had both possession and intent to deliver, the circuit court erred by quashing the bindover and dismissing the case against Moore.” Thus, it reversed and remanded for entry of an order reinstating the charge of possession with intent to deliver between 50 and 449 grams of fentanyl. The prosecution contended the circuit court erred by quashing the bindover and dismissing the case. Moore argued he lacked possession over the fentanyl. The court concluded there was “a question of fact as to whether the bag of fentanyl was in plain view.” Ultimately, the court held that “taken together, the facts and circumstances are sufficient to establish probable cause that Moore constructively possessed the fentanyl.” There was “also sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause that Moore intended to deliver the fentanyl.” Considering the “facts and circumstances, the district court’s finding that there was probable cause to support a finding of intent to deliver is not an abuse of discretion.”
Sufficiency of the evidence for a fourth-degree fleeing & eluding conviction; MCL 257.602a(1) & (2); People v Grayer (After Remand); Intent; Affirmative evasive measures
Holding that there was sufficient evidence of defendant’s intent to support his conviction of fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, the court affirmed. It concluded the evidence was more than sufficient to show that he willfully tried to elude the deputy (M) “and that he took affirmative evasive measures to” do so. His own statements to M “that he heard the siren and saw the emergency lights, yet failed to stop because he was trying to get home, were sufficient to demonstrate the requisite intent and to show actions to flee and elude the police. Moreover, while stopped at the first intersection light and despite the fact that [M] activated his emergency lights, defendant did not pull forward slowly in an effort to find a spot to pull over. Instead, he accelerated to the point of exceeding the speed limit and did not take advantage of the parking lots of approximately 21 businesses to safely pull over.” In addition, after he came “to the second intersection stop, and despite [M’s] activating his siren and emergency lights, defendant again accelerated to the point of exceeding the speed limit and failed to pull his vehicle over. And then defendant swerved around two vehicles and into the oncoming lane of traffic, which the jury could reasonably have construed as constituting evasive action. Defendant continued down the road until finally pulling into the parking lot of the senior living facility. Even then, [M] described that defendant briefly accelerated his vehicle in the parking lot. The one-mile distance with two intermittent stops before defendant pulled over also strongly suggested an intent and effort to flee and elude” M. The court concluded that defendant, “by his own words and his actions, willfully failed to obey, fled, and attempted to elude” M. It rejected his efforts to distinguish his case from Grayer.
Action seeking reimbursement for healthcare services; Whether housing accommodations are allowable expenses under MCL 500.3107(1)(a); Williams v AAA MI; Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co; Admire v Auto-Owners Ins Co; Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
The court held that the trial court properly granted defendant-insurer partial summary disposition of plaintiff-healthcare provider’s claim for payment. As a result of being struck by a vehicle insured by defendant, a pedestrian’s (White) legs were amputated. He required 12-hour care and ADA accessible housing. Plaintiff leased an apartment and provided services for White while billing defendant. Defendant did not pay, and plaintiff filed suit. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by granting partial summary disposition for defendant, noting the evidence demonstrated the apartment was “not of a ‘wholly new essential character’ as compared to the housing White needed before he was injured, so it” was not compensable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). It concluded plaintiff “failed to present evidence that would have created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether White’s post-accident housing expenses were causally related to his injuries.” Affirmed.
Motion to enforce a settlement agreement (SA) as to personal injury protection (PIP) benefits; Judicial bias; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to assert plaintiff’s desire to proceed to trial; Trial court’s failure to order production of a copy of the insurance policy
Concluding plaintiff’s arguments lacked merit, the court affirmed the trial court order granting the motion to enforce a settlement agreement in favor of defendant-insurer (Horace Mann). The case arose from an auto accident. Plaintiff did “not deny that he authorized his attorney to sign the [SA] in his stead” or challenge the validity or the enforceability of the SA. Rather, he challenged the SA’s effect on his rights to further adjudicate the case. He first argued the SA deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial. The SA terminated his “right to a jury trial against Horace Mann.” Because plaintiff did not challenge the validity of the SA, the court presumed it was valid and, by enacting the SA, “plaintiff voluntarily relinquished his right to a jury trial.” Thus, there was “no plain error in the trial court’s failure to preserve plaintiff’s right to a jury trial.” Next, plaintiff contended “Horace Mann failed to pay certain expenses it was obligated to cover.” It was impossible for the court to analyze the issue because the record was silent as to Horace Mann’s payments for PIP benefits. Further, “because plaintiff settled this case in exchange for the release and ‘forever discharge’ of any claims against Horace Mann, it is not evident how Horace Mann’s failure to make any discrete payments in the past would be actionable now.” As such, this argument had no merit. Plaintiff also claimed “the trial judge was biased against him as evidenced by the judge’s attempt to coerce him into settling his case against Horace Mann.” There was no evidence about “what was said during this conversation except for a reference in plaintiff’s supplemental response to Horace Mann’s motion to enforce the settlement in which plaintiff stated, ‘Counsel has informed Plaintiff that should he continue to refuse to sign, the Court advised that this matter would be dismissed.’” Aside from generally claiming judicial bias, he presented no evidence of it. He further claimed “the trial court should have told plaintiff’s counsel that plaintiff wanted to take this case to trial, but he offers no authority for this position. Therefore, both of plaintiff’s challenges to the trial court’s actions fail.” Plaintiff suggested “he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel did not assert his desire to proceed to trial.” The court concluded any remedy he “would have against his counsel would be a malpractice action—which plaintiff does not raise.”
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), & (g); Best interests of the children; In re Olive/Metts Minors
Holding that §§ (c)(i), (c)(ii), and (g) were met, and that termination was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights. Her rights were terminated based on neglect, abuse, and improper supervision of her children. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the DHHS failed to prove a statutory ground for termination. “Respondent failed to rectify her substance-abuse issues. She continued to lack appropriate housing for the children and did not have a verified source of income. Moreover, despite completing a parenting-skills class, she was unable to show that she had benefited. Given the substantial length of time provided for her to rectify the conditions leading to adjudication, and considering the young ages of the children,” the trial court did err by finding termination was warranted under §§ (c)(i) and (c)(ii). In addition, as to the youngest child, the court held that § (g) supported termination. She failed to provide that child “with proper care and custody.” Moreover, given she “had not shown any benefit—not even a minimal decrease—in her substance abuse or an improvement to her parenting skills, there is no reasonable expectation that respondent would be able to provide” that child with proper care and custody within a reasonable time. The court also rejected her claim that termination was not in the children’s best interests, concluding the trial court did not err by finding that terminating respondent’s parental rights was in each child’s best interests.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (j); Children’s best interests
Concluding that §§ (c)(i) and (j) were established and termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed. “The children were made wards of the court primarily because of respondent’s substance abuse, criminality, and incarceration. Respondent was provided with a treatment plan designed to rectify the conditions that led to the adjudication. During the 2½ years the children were in care, respondent did not meaningfully participate in and benefit from the services offered. He did not demonstrate that he could properly parent the children, or that the children would be safe in his care.” As to § (c)(i), DHHS met the evidentiary burden by clear and convincing evidence. Further, the record supported “the trial court’s finding that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would be in a position to safely parent his children within a reasonable time. Respondent had been offered services for years and he never meaningfully engaged in the treatment plan. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err when it found clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent’s parental rights under” § (c)(i). Likewise, the trial court “did not err when it found clear and convincing evidence to terminate” his rights under § (j). “A parent’s failure to participate in and benefit from a service plan is evidence that the parent will not be able to provide a child proper care and custody.” Similarly, a parent’s “failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her service plan is evidence that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent’s home.” Also, as to the children’s best interests, the record supported “a finding that respondent was not able to parent his children, and would not be able to parent them for several years, if ever. By contrast, the children were thriving in a stable home where their needs were being met. Termination was the best avenue for the children to achieve stability, permanence, and finality.”