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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.

 

 

Case Summary


Cases appear under the following practice areas:

  • Alternative Dispute Resolution (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Employment & Labor Law

    e-Journal #: 69688
    Case: Wolf Creek Prods., Inc. v. Gruber
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Boonstra, Sawyer, and Tukel
    Issues:

    Employment dispute; Judicial review of an arbitration award; Washington v. Washington; Detroit Auto. Inter.-Ins. Exch. v. Gavin; Fette v. Peters Constr. Co.; Miller v. Miller; Motion to vacate an arbitration award; MCR 3.602(J)(2); MCR 3.602(J)(2)(c); MCL 691.1703(1); Waiver; Quality Prods. & Concepts Co. v. Nagel Precision, Inc.; People v. Carter; Principle that contracting parties may tailor the arbitration’s scope & procedure in a way that best suits them; Saveski v. Tiseo Architects, Inc.; Principle that a party may not take a position in the lower proceeding & subsequently seek redress in an appellate court based on a position contrary to that previously taken; Living Alternatives for Developmentally Disabled, Inc. v. Department of Mental Health; Harboring error as an appellate parachute; Dresselhouse v. Chrysler Corp.

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court did not err by denying plaintiffs’ request to vacate the parties’ arbitration award. Plaintiffs voted to terminate defendant’s employment on the ground that he materially breached his employment agreement and covenant not to compete by negotiating a contract in the name of his own company and taking an additional finder’s fee. Defendant then sued plaintiff, but the parties submitted the matter to arbitration. In the arbitration, plaintiffs counterclaimed, alleging “breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with business expectancy, conversion, fraud, and breach of statutory requirement to discharge duties in good faith.” The arbitration panel, in a split decision, ruled for defendant. Plaintiffs then sued to vacate the award, claiming the panel acted outside of its authority by failing to follow the law, and failed to properly interpret the employment contact. The trial court found it was precluded from engaging in contract interpretation when reviewing an arbitration award and thus, could not consider plaintiffs’ argument as to the employment agreement. It also “ruled that because the employment agreement provided that the arbitration panel would decide on ‘[a]ny claims, causes of actions, or demand of whatsoever kind,’ the arbitrators acted within the scope of their authority.” The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred by denying their request to vacate the award, finding that “nothing on the face of the award demonstrate[d] that the arbitrators were precluded from deciding on the issue of whether just cause existed to terminate defendant’s employment.” It noted that plaintiffs were now asking it to do what it is “not permitted to do—namely, to interpret the underlying employment contract and decide if the arbitration panel properly interpreted it.” Further, the face of the award showed “that the parties agreed to allow the arbitrators to decide on the issue of just cause.” As such, plaintiffs could not “now complain because the arbitration panel did what the parties agreed was proper.” Finally, the court rejected their contention that the award should be vacated because the arbitration panel failed to address their counterclaims, noting they “cannot show how the arbitration panel committed any legal error when it did what the parties purportedly requested.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Business Law (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Employment & Labor Law

    e-Journal #: 69692
    Case: Jammal v. American Family Ins. Co.
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: Boggs and Rogers; Dissent – Clay
    Issues:

    Action for benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA); 29 USC § 1132(a); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines; Whether plaintiffs-insurance agents were “employees” under ERISA; §§ 1002(6) & (7); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden; Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc.; Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid; Weary v. Cochran; De novo review of a district court’s determinations on the Darden factors; Peno Trucking, Inc. v. C.I.R. (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Moore v. Lafayette Life Ins.; Brock v. Superior Care, Inc. (2d Cir.); Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc.; Application of the Darden factors; Ware v. United States; Janette v. American Fid. Group, Ltd. (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Effect of the Agency Agreement governing the parties’ business relationship; Brown v. J. Kaz., Inc. (3d Cir.); Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of NE (8th Cir.)

    Summary:

    In this class action, the court reversed the district court, holding that plaintiffs-insurance agents were not defendant-American Family’s “employees” but were “independent contractors” not covered under ERISA. Plaintiffs claimed that American Family treated them like employees but denied them ERISA benefits because it labeled them independent contractors. After a trial before an advisory jury, the district court ruled for plaintiffs. First determining that review of the district court’s conclusions on the common-law agency test set forth in Darden was de novo, the court reviewed the factors and held that the district court “incorrectly applied the legal standards in determining the existence of the Darden factors relating to (1) the skill required of an agent and (2) the hiring and paying of assistants.” Further, it failed to give appropriate weight to some of them, such as “the financial structure of the company-agent” relationship. Under Ware, “‘control and supervision is less important’ than the financial structure of the parties’ relationship.” The court also considered the parties’ Agency Agreement—which provided “in wholly unambiguous terms that agents are independent contractors who retain ‘full control’ over several facets of their business”—and concluded that the district court failed to give this proper consideration. It found that, if it had done so, it would have “further swung the balance in favor of independent-contractor status.” Remanded for further proceedings.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Civil Rights (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 69746
    Case: Jacobs v. Alam
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: Griffin, Daughtrey, and Gibbons
    Issues:

    Claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics; Excessive force, false arrest, malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, & civil conspiracy; Webb v. United States; Robertson v. Lucas; Burley v. Gagacki; Gregory v. City of Louisville; Hooks v. Hooks; Viability of plaintiffs’ claims after the decisions in Ziglar v. Abbasi & Hernandez v. Mesa; Qualified immunity; Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Ashcroft v. al-Kidd; “Probable cause” standard governing whether an officer violated the Fourth Amendment in using deadly force; Tennessee v. Garner; Factors used in determining the reasonableness of the force used; Livermore ex rel. Rohm v. Lubelan; The threat factor; Mullins v. Cyranek; Bouggess v. Mattingly; Whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the defendants-officers’ appeals; Floyd v. City of Detroit; Moldowan v. City of Warren; Seizure; Thompson v. City of Lebanon

    Summary:

    [This appeal was from the ED-MI.] Addressing for the first time the impact of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ziglar and Hernandez on Sixth Circuit case precedent under Bivens, the court held that “plaintiff’s garden-variety Bivens claims” were viable post-Ziglar and Hernandez. It rejected defendant-Alam’s argument that he did not “seize” plaintiff because there was no evidence that his bullets hit him, concluding that this did not matter in determining whether there was an unconstitutional seizure. It also found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider defendants’ appeal on claims where their entire argument was based on it accepting their version of the shooting. Thus, it affirmed the district court’s ruling that Ziglar and Hernandez do not foreclose plaintiff’s Bivens claims and part of the district court’s order as to Alam’s seizure of plaintiff. It dismissed the remainder of defendants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded. Plaintiff alleged “excessive force, false arrest, malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, and civil conspiracy.” Defendants argued on appeal that his Bivens claims were no longer viable after Ziglar and Hernandez, and that they were entitled to qualified immunity in any event. The court found that Ziglar and Hernandez were “not the silver bullets defendants claim them to be—plaintiff’s claims are run-of-the-mill challenges to ‘standard law enforcement operations’ that fall well within Bivens itself.” It noted that it has “provided guidance to individual line officers for how to comply with the Fourth Amendment while carrying out their routine police duties.” As the district court noted, the court has “recognized—for some time now—every one of plaintiff’s Bivens claims.” As to their qualified immunity arguments, in regard to plaintiff’s excessive force claim, because defendants disputed his “I-was-not-a-threat account,” and did not raise a purely legal question about whether his version of events supported “a claim of violation of clearly established law,” it lacked jurisdiction. It also lacked jurisdiction over their appeal as to the fabrication of evidence, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy claims for the same reason.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Contracts (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Family Law

    e-Journal #: 69703
    Case: Ali v. Syed
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Markey, M.J. Kelly, and Swartzle
    Issues:

    Divorce; Award of a money judgment under a contract for payment as consideration for agreeing to the marriage; Whether plaintiff properly pled the contract; Applicability of MCR 2.111(F)(3); Whether the contract was an unenforceable antenuptial agreement; Rinvelt v. Rinvelt; Applicability of Shariah law; Applicability of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine; Winkler by Winkler v. Marist Fathers of Detroit, Inc.; Whether the contract was illusory; Principle that the promise to marry followed by consummation furnishes valuable consideration for a contract to marry; Storey v. Storey; Bland v. Bland

    Summary:

    The court held that the contract for payment as consideration for plaintiff-ex-wife’s agreement to marry defendant-ex-husband was not an attempt at an antenuptial agreement, and that it was not illusory. Further, neither MCR 2.111(F)(3) nor Shariah law applied. Thus, the court affirmed the $47,100 money judgment for plaintiff in the context of their divorce. He negotiated the terms of the parties’ arranged marriage with her father. He agreed to pay plaintiff $51,000 “as mahr, a traditional component of Islamic marriages.” The parties later signed a written contract to this effect. He made payments during the marriage totaling $3,900. After she filed an action for separate maintenance, he filed a counterclaim for divorce. The trial court found “that the parties executed a valid, simple contract and entered a judgment” for plaintiff in the amount of $47,100. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s claim that plaintiff failed to plead the contract under MCR 2.111(F)(3), concluding that it did not apply because she “did not raise the contract as either a defense or an affirmative defense.” The court also agreed with the trial court that “the contract was not an attempt at an antenuptial agreement.” Rather, it was clear from its face “that it did not attempt to address the division of property in the event of divorce.” Instead, it provided that defendant would pay plaintiff $51,000 as consideration for her agreement to marry him. The fact that he made payments to her on this amount during the marriage indicated “that the contracted payment of $51,000 was not an attempt to address the division of property in the event of divorce.” In rejecting his claim that Michigan courts lacked jurisdiction under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the court stressed that it was not interpreting or applying the contract under Shariah law, but rather was applying Michigan law to review the parties’ contract and the divorce judgment. No ecclesiastical questions were involved. Finally, Michigan law has long held “that the ‘promise to marry, followed by consummation, furnished a valuable consideration’ for a contract to marry.” The parties’ contract “was supported by adequate consideration and was not illusory.”

    Full Text Opinion

  • Courts (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Criminal Law

    e-Journal #: 69679
    Case: People v. Scott
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Boonstra and Tukel; Concurrence – Sawyer
    Issues:

    Jurisdiction; People v. Martinez; Smith v. Smith; Execution & enforcement of an appellate ruling; MCR 7.215(F)(1)(a); Deadline for filing an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court; MCR 7.305(C); Requirements for filing an application for leave to appeal; MCR 7.305(A); “Judgment” defined; MCR 7.215(E)(1); Principle that a defendant’s timely application for leave to appeal a judgment of the Court of Appeals serves to stay the proceedings on remand & divests the trial court of jurisdiction during the pendency of the application; People v. Washington; People v. Swafford; Principle that parties may not waive or stipulate subject-matter jurisdiction; Redding v. Redding; Principle that a court’s lack of jurisdiction renders a judgment void; Usitalo v. Landon; Yee v Shiawassee Cnty. Bd. of Commr’s

    Summary:

    Holding that the trial court was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction during the pendency of defendant’s appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, the court vacated his convictions and remanded for a new trial. In a pretrial ruling, the trial court ruled other acts evidence inadmissible. The prosecution appealed, and the court reversed and remanded. Defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied his appeal. However, before the Supreme Court’s ruling, defendant’s trial began and he was convicted of CSC I. On appeal, the court agreed with him that he was entitled to a new trial because the court rules divested the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction during the pendency of his appeal to the Supreme Court. It noted that the requirements of MCR 7.305(A) were satisfied and the prosecution provided no authority to suggest that the court “may question the procedural ‘effectiveness’ of an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, particularly where the Supreme Court deemed the application satisfactory by accepting it and denying it because it simply was not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed—not because the application was somehow procedurally defective.” The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that defendant’s appellate counsel waived the issue, noting that parties may not waive or stipulate subject-matter jurisdiction. “[I]t is clear that under MCR 7.305(C)(7)(a), the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court automatically stayed the proceedings on remand, and the trial court consequently lacked jurisdiction to proceed with defendant’s trial.” Although the Supreme Court “eventually denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal, thereby leaving this Court’s prior ruling in place allowing the admission of” the other acts evidence, with the result that any new trial will be “subject to the exact same ruling that was utilized in defendant’s old trial,” the court nevertheless could not “let the result of the trial stand.” In sum, “the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct proceedings during the pendency of defendant’s application for leave to appeal, and thus defendant’s trial and the resulting judgment of sentence ‘lack force and authority and are considered void.’”

    Full Text Opinion

  • Criminal Law (3)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 69701
    Case: People v. Kein
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Murray, Servitto, and Shapiro
    Issues:

    Sufficiency of the evidence to support defendant’s carrying a concealed weapon (CCW) conviction; MCL 750.227(2); Whether he knew or was aware of its presence; People v. Nimeth; Due process; People v. Harverson; Circumstantial evidence & reasonable inferences; People v. Williams; Whether defendant carried the gun; People v. Butler

    Summary:

    Holding that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of CCW, the court affirmed. The case arose out of a traffic stop. There was strong circumstantial evidence that the recovered gun was in the vehicle while he was an occupant. Officer N found an empty holster stuck in the seam between the front seats. Officer B searched for and located the gun near the route that the vehicle travelled as it pulled into the parking lot. Thus, a jury could reasonably infer that the gun was thrown from the vehicle as it turned into the parking lot. There was also sufficient circumstantial evidence to show that he knew or was aware of the presence of the gun. He was in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. N found the holster in the seam of the front seat between the driver’s and passenger’s seats. “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom, the gun had been in the holster in the seam next to defendant.” Also, he admitted that the gun was his. Thus, a jury could reasonably conclude that he had knowledge of the gun. Finally, there was sufficient evidence to establish that he carried the gun. Despite the inference that he knew about the gun in the vehicle, the prosecution was required to present evidence that defendant carried the gun.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 69715
    Case: People v. Murray
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – K.F. Kelly, Riordan, and Gadola
    Issues:

    Vacation of a guilty plea; MCR 6.310(B); Defendant’s consent; People v. Strong; Interest of justice; People v. Fonville; Plea bargain including a Cobbs agreement; People v. Cobbs; Unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle (UDAA)

    Summary:

    Concluding that defendant clearly indicated that she wanted to withdraw her plea, that she knowingly and unequivocally consented to its withdrawal, and that the trial court’s decision to vacate it was in the interest of justice, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in vacating her plea before sentencing. She was later convicted of carjacking, extortion, receiving or concealing stolen property, and UDAA. She argued that the trial court erred in vacating her earlier guilty plea to extortion and receiving or concealing stolen property, contending that she did not make a formal motion to withdraw her plea or give “her informed, unequivocal consent to vacate” it. But the record clearly contradicted this claim. Her statements “on the record may reasonably be construed as an oral motion to withdraw her plea. The trial court informed defendant that she had the option to withdraw her plea and proceed with trial.” When it asked if this was how she “wished to proceed, she responded in the affirmative with, ‘I’ll go to trial.’ The trial court then explained a second time” that it would allow her to withdraw her plea and go to trial, and she replied, “Okay.” The court added that even if she “did not make an oral motion to withdraw her plea, she repeatedly gave her unequivocal consent” to set it aside and go to trial. The trial court asked her three times whether this was her intent, and she responded affirmatively each time. As to her claim that her consent was uninformed, the trial court told her that, “as a result of withdrawing the plea, she would not be sentenced in accordance with the Cobbs agreement” and asked if she understood. She indicated that she did and again affirmed it was her intent to go to trial. Further, she “had ample opportunity to consult with her attorney,” who was present, but she did not ask for a recess to discuss matters with him. In concluding that the trial court’s decision was also in the interest of justice, the court noted that, in light of the fact she denied the conduct on which the charges were based and asserted at trial “that she ‘never committed any of these crimes against [the victim],’ there could be no mistake that she was asserting her actual innocence.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Courts

    e-Journal #: 69679
    Case: People v. Scott
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Boonstra and Tukel; Concurrence – Sawyer
    Issues:

    Jurisdiction; People v. Martinez; Smith v. Smith; Execution & enforcement of an appellate ruling; MCR 7.215(F)(1)(a); Deadline for filing an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court; MCR 7.305(C); Requirements for filing an application for leave to appeal; MCR 7.305(A); “Judgment” defined; MCR 7.215(E)(1); Principle that a defendant’s timely application for leave to appeal a judgment of the Court of Appeals serves to stay the proceedings on remand & divests the trial court of jurisdiction during the pendency of the application; People v. Washington; People v. Swafford; Principle that parties may not waive or stipulate subject-matter jurisdiction; Redding v. Redding; Principle that a court’s lack of jurisdiction renders a judgment void; Usitalo v. Landon; Yee v Shiawassee Cnty. Bd. of Commr’s

    Summary:

    Holding that the trial court was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction during the pendency of defendant’s appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, the court vacated his convictions and remanded for a new trial. In a pretrial ruling, the trial court ruled other acts evidence inadmissible. The prosecution appealed, and the court reversed and remanded. Defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied his appeal. However, before the Supreme Court’s ruling, defendant’s trial began and he was convicted of CSC I. On appeal, the court agreed with him that he was entitled to a new trial because the court rules divested the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction during the pendency of his appeal to the Supreme Court. It noted that the requirements of MCR 7.305(A) were satisfied and the prosecution provided no authority to suggest that the court “may question the procedural ‘effectiveness’ of an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, particularly where the Supreme Court deemed the application satisfactory by accepting it and denying it because it simply was not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed—not because the application was somehow procedurally defective.” The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that defendant’s appellate counsel waived the issue, noting that parties may not waive or stipulate subject-matter jurisdiction. “[I]t is clear that under MCR 7.305(C)(7)(a), the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court automatically stayed the proceedings on remand, and the trial court consequently lacked jurisdiction to proceed with defendant’s trial.” Although the Supreme Court “eventually denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal, thereby leaving this Court’s prior ruling in place allowing the admission of” the other acts evidence, with the result that any new trial will be “subject to the exact same ruling that was utilized in defendant’s old trial,” the court nevertheless could not “let the result of the trial stand.” In sum, “the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct proceedings during the pendency of defendant’s application for leave to appeal, and thus defendant’s trial and the resulting judgment of sentence ‘lack force and authority and are considered void.’”

    Full Text Opinion

  • Employment & Labor Law (2)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Alternative Dispute Resolution

    e-Journal #: 69688
    Case: Wolf Creek Prods., Inc. v. Gruber
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Boonstra, Sawyer, and Tukel
    Issues:

    Employment dispute; Judicial review of an arbitration award; Washington v. Washington; Detroit Auto. Inter.-Ins. Exch. v. Gavin; Fette v. Peters Constr. Co.; Miller v. Miller; Motion to vacate an arbitration award; MCR 3.602(J)(2); MCR 3.602(J)(2)(c); MCL 691.1703(1); Waiver; Quality Prods. & Concepts Co. v. Nagel Precision, Inc.; People v. Carter; Principle that contracting parties may tailor the arbitration’s scope & procedure in a way that best suits them; Saveski v. Tiseo Architects, Inc.; Principle that a party may not take a position in the lower proceeding & subsequently seek redress in an appellate court based on a position contrary to that previously taken; Living Alternatives for Developmentally Disabled, Inc. v. Department of Mental Health; Harboring error as an appellate parachute; Dresselhouse v. Chrysler Corp.

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court did not err by denying plaintiffs’ request to vacate the parties’ arbitration award. Plaintiffs voted to terminate defendant’s employment on the ground that he materially breached his employment agreement and covenant not to compete by negotiating a contract in the name of his own company and taking an additional finder’s fee. Defendant then sued plaintiff, but the parties submitted the matter to arbitration. In the arbitration, plaintiffs counterclaimed, alleging “breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with business expectancy, conversion, fraud, and breach of statutory requirement to discharge duties in good faith.” The arbitration panel, in a split decision, ruled for defendant. Plaintiffs then sued to vacate the award, claiming the panel acted outside of its authority by failing to follow the law, and failed to properly interpret the employment contact. The trial court found it was precluded from engaging in contract interpretation when reviewing an arbitration award and thus, could not consider plaintiffs’ argument as to the employment agreement. It also “ruled that because the employment agreement provided that the arbitration panel would decide on ‘[a]ny claims, causes of actions, or demand of whatsoever kind,’ the arbitrators acted within the scope of their authority.” The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred by denying their request to vacate the award, finding that “nothing on the face of the award demonstrate[d] that the arbitrators were precluded from deciding on the issue of whether just cause existed to terminate defendant’s employment.” It noted that plaintiffs were now asking it to do what it is “not permitted to do—namely, to interpret the underlying employment contract and decide if the arbitration panel properly interpreted it.” Further, the face of the award showed “that the parties agreed to allow the arbitrators to decide on the issue of just cause.” As such, plaintiffs could not “now complain because the arbitration panel did what the parties agreed was proper.” Finally, the court rejected their contention that the award should be vacated because the arbitration panel failed to address their counterclaims, noting they “cannot show how the arbitration panel committed any legal error when it did what the parties purportedly requested.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Business Law

    e-Journal #: 69692
    Case: Jammal v. American Family Ins. Co.
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: Boggs and Rogers; Dissent – Clay
    Issues:

    Action for benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA); 29 USC § 1132(a); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines; Whether plaintiffs-insurance agents were “employees” under ERISA; §§ 1002(6) & (7); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden; Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc.; Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid; Weary v. Cochran; De novo review of a district court’s determinations on the Darden factors; Peno Trucking, Inc. v. C.I.R. (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Moore v. Lafayette Life Ins.; Brock v. Superior Care, Inc. (2d Cir.); Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc.; Application of the Darden factors; Ware v. United States; Janette v. American Fid. Group, Ltd. (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Effect of the Agency Agreement governing the parties’ business relationship; Brown v. J. Kaz., Inc. (3d Cir.); Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of NE (8th Cir.)

    Summary:

    In this class action, the court reversed the district court, holding that plaintiffs-insurance agents were not defendant-American Family’s “employees” but were “independent contractors” not covered under ERISA. Plaintiffs claimed that American Family treated them like employees but denied them ERISA benefits because it labeled them independent contractors. After a trial before an advisory jury, the district court ruled for plaintiffs. First determining that review of the district court’s conclusions on the common-law agency test set forth in Darden was de novo, the court reviewed the factors and held that the district court “incorrectly applied the legal standards in determining the existence of the Darden factors relating to (1) the skill required of an agent and (2) the hiring and paying of assistants.” Further, it failed to give appropriate weight to some of them, such as “the financial structure of the company-agent” relationship. Under Ware, “‘control and supervision is less important’ than the financial structure of the parties’ relationship.” The court also considered the parties’ Agency Agreement—which provided “in wholly unambiguous terms that agents are independent contractors who retain ‘full control’ over several facets of their business”—and concluded that the district court failed to give this proper consideration. It found that, if it had done so, it would have “further swung the balance in favor of independent-contractor status.” Remanded for further proceedings.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Family Law (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Contracts

    e-Journal #: 69703
    Case: Ali v. Syed
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Markey, M.J. Kelly, and Swartzle
    Issues:

    Divorce; Award of a money judgment under a contract for payment as consideration for agreeing to the marriage; Whether plaintiff properly pled the contract; Applicability of MCR 2.111(F)(3); Whether the contract was an unenforceable antenuptial agreement; Rinvelt v. Rinvelt; Applicability of Shariah law; Applicability of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine; Winkler by Winkler v. Marist Fathers of Detroit, Inc.; Whether the contract was illusory; Principle that the promise to marry followed by consummation furnishes valuable consideration for a contract to marry; Storey v. Storey; Bland v. Bland

    Summary:

    The court held that the contract for payment as consideration for plaintiff-ex-wife’s agreement to marry defendant-ex-husband was not an attempt at an antenuptial agreement, and that it was not illusory. Further, neither MCR 2.111(F)(3) nor Shariah law applied. Thus, the court affirmed the $47,100 money judgment for plaintiff in the context of their divorce. He negotiated the terms of the parties’ arranged marriage with her father. He agreed to pay plaintiff $51,000 “as mahr, a traditional component of Islamic marriages.” The parties later signed a written contract to this effect. He made payments during the marriage totaling $3,900. After she filed an action for separate maintenance, he filed a counterclaim for divorce. The trial court found “that the parties executed a valid, simple contract and entered a judgment” for plaintiff in the amount of $47,100. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s claim that plaintiff failed to plead the contract under MCR 2.111(F)(3), concluding that it did not apply because she “did not raise the contract as either a defense or an affirmative defense.” The court also agreed with the trial court that “the contract was not an attempt at an antenuptial agreement.” Rather, it was clear from its face “that it did not attempt to address the division of property in the event of divorce.” Instead, it provided that defendant would pay plaintiff $51,000 as consideration for her agreement to marry him. The fact that he made payments to her on this amount during the marriage indicated “that the contracted payment of $51,000 was not an attempt to address the division of property in the event of divorce.” In rejecting his claim that Michigan courts lacked jurisdiction under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the court stressed that it was not interpreting or applying the contract under Shariah law, but rather was applying Michigan law to review the parties’ contract and the divorce judgment. No ecclesiastical questions were involved. Finally, Michigan law has long held “that the ‘promise to marry, followed by consummation, furnished a valuable consideration’ for a contract to marry.” The parties’ contract “was supported by adequate consideration and was not illusory.”

    Full Text Opinion

  • Negligence & Intentional Tort (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under School Law

    e-Journal #: 69699
    Case: D.M. Burr Facilities Mgmt., Inc. v. Romulus Cmty. Schs.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Murray, Servitto, and Shapiro
    Issues:

    Conversion; Governmental immunity; The Governmental Tort Liability Act (MCL 691.1401 et seq.); MCL 691.1407(1); Governmental function defined; MCL 691.1401(b); Genesee Cnty. Drain Comm’r v. Genesee Cnty.; Pardon v. Finkel; Ultra vires activity; Richardson v. Jackson Cnty.; Smith v. Department of Pub. Health; The Revised School Code (MCL 380.1 et seq.); Maintenance of school property, entering into contracts with third parties for maintenance, & acquiring equipment for this purpose; MCL 380.11a

    Summary:

    Holding that plaintiff’s conversion claims against defendants-school district and board of education were barred by governmental immunity, the court reversed the trial court’s order denying them summary disposition on these claims. They sought proposals for a service provider to perform maintenance services for the district. Plaintiff submitted the winning bid and the parties entered into a contract. Plaintiff then “purchased and obtained title to the necessary equipment” and used it to perform the contractual services. “At the end of the contract term, defendants barred plaintiff from retaking possession of the equipment.” Plaintiff sued for breach of the contract and also alleged that defendants’ “post-contract retention of the equipment constituted conversion.” Defendants argued that the pertinent activity for purposes of determining whether governmental immunity applied was “maintenance of school property and entering into contracts with third parties for performance of that activity.” These activities, and the acquisition of equipment, are provided for in MCL 380.11a, part of the Revised School Code. The court agreed “with plaintiff that even what can be construed as an authorized activity may be unauthorized where the manner of accomplishing it is so improper that the authorized activity underlying it is of little relevance.” However, the conversion claims here turned “on which party has properly interpreted the contract” and it was undisputed that defendants were “authorized to enter into contracts and to exercise and defend their rights under those contracts. Asserting alleged contract rights does not constitute an ultra vires activity nor is it ‘the intentional use or misuse of a badge of governmental authority for a purpose unauthorized by law . . . .’” Thus, the court concluded that the alleged tort did not occur outside the discharge or exercise of a governmental function. But it noted that plaintiff was not left without a remedy as it had also sued in contract and will be entitled to all contract damages if it prevails. Remanded.

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  • Probate (1)

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    e-Journal #: 69722
    Case: In re Guardianship of Frescura
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – K.F. Kelly, Riordan, and Gadola
    Issues:

    Guardianship; MCL 700.5308; Mootness; In re MCI Telecom Complaint; East Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Kent Cnty. Tax Allocation Bd.; Federated Publ’ns., Inc. v. City of Lansing; Gildemeister v. Lindsay; Garrett v. Washington

    Summary:

    Because the legally incapacitated individual (Frescura) was now deceased, the court dismissed this appeal of the probate court’s order denying petitioner’s petition to modify the guardianship as moot. Petitioner (patient advocate and attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney) contended that she had statutory priority to be appointed Frescura’s guardian and sought “remand to the probate court for a determination of her suitability to serve as guardian. A ‘guardian’s authority and responsibility for a legally incapacitated individual terminates upon the death of the guardian or ward . . . .’” Because Frescura was now deceased, the guardianship no longer existed. Thus, the court was “unable to grant the relief requested by petitioner, rendering the present appeal moot.” It also noted that this was not a matter of public significance that was likely to recur yet evade judicial review.

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  • Real Property (2)

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    e-Journal #: 69702
    Case: Costello v. INDN, LLC
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Murray, Servitto, and Shapiro
    Issues:

    Action for trespass & quiet title; Easement; Penrose v. McCullough; Prescriptive easement; Marlette Auto Wash, LLC v. Van Dyke SC Props., LLC; Matthews v. Natural Res. Dep’t; Mulcahy v. Verhines

    Summary:

    Holding that defendant established a right to a prescriptive easement over a portion of plaintiff’s property, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for defendant. The parties’ shared a driveway. Years earlier, their predecessors in interest executed a parking grant of easement allowing defendant’s predecessor to use a gravel parking area on the south 20 feet of plaintiff’s predecessor’s property as parking for a tenant who ran a hair salon. The document was never recorded, but the hair salon’s employees and customers continuously used the parking area. After the parties acquired the properties, plaintiff blocked the parking area and litigation ensued. Plaintiff sought quiet title of the parking area. Defendant filed a counterclaim, requesting that the trial court confirm its easement to use the parking lot. The trial court found that the parking easement created an imperfect servitude, which ripened into a prescriptive easement. It ordered that the easement may only be used by the customers of the businesses operated on defendant’s parcel. On appeal, the court found that “Mulcahy is highly analogous and controls the outcome in this case.” It noted that because “[a] ‘parking grant of easement’ was prepared and signed by” their predecessors, “there is stronger evidence that the property owner in this case intended to create an easement because the easement document was actually signed. The formal requirements to create a servitude were not met because the easement was not recorded.” However, the “failure to record the easement means that the hair salon’s use of the parking area was made pursuant to the terms of an intended but imperfectly created servitude.” And the “other requirements for a prescriptive easement are also present in this case.” The parties “do not dispute that the requisite 15-year period was met or that the use of the parking area was open and notorious.” Further, although “the use of the parking area was permissive in the sense that plaintiff and her predecessor in interest were aware of that use and did not object, the hostility requirement is still satisfied because the owners of [defendant’s predecessor’s] parcel and their tenants did not actually have a right to use the parking area.” Affirmed.

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    e-Journal #: 69716
    Case: Tambs v. Jennings
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Cavanagh, Markey, and Letica
    Issues:

    Claim & delivery action following a foreclosure & eviction; Foreclosure by advertisement (MCL 600.3201 et seq.); Failure to redeem; MCL 600.3236; Bryan v. JPMorgan Chase Bank; Replevin; Whitcraft v. Wolfe; MCL 600.2920(1); MCR 3.105(A)(1); MCL 600.2920(1)(c); Abandonment; Van Slooten v. Larsen; Sparling Plastic Indus., Inc. v. Sparling

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court should have granted defendants’ motions for summary disposition and involuntary dismissal as there was no genuine issue of material fact that no unlawful detention of the property occurred. Because there was no viable action for claim and delivery as a matter of law, it reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded for entry of judgment for defendants. The court added that, even assuming the case should not have been summarily or involuntarily dismissed, “the trial court clearly erred in finding that plaintiffs had not abandoned the personal property” under the circumstances. There was no dispute that they had notice of the foreclosure by advertisement, and that they failed to redeem the property during the redemption period. After the period “expired without the property’s being redeemed, title vested in the mortgage company.” Thus, plaintiffs no longer held any legal or equitable rights in the property after the expiration of the redemption period. The court held that “defendants never unlawfully detained plaintiffs’ personal property, as necessary to support” a claim and delivery action. The trial court found that they “did not intend to abandon the personal property left behind in the home. The necessary corollary of this” was that if it was not abandoned, defendants must have been unlawfully detaining the personal property “for purposes of the claim and delivery action.” The court held that “the interest or right plaintiffs had in the personal property did not survive expiration of the redemption period, entry of the possession judgment, plaintiffs’ subsequent failure to remove the property by the date to vacate, at which time they left the house unlocked and vulnerable to theft, and plaintiffs’ additional failure later to appear at” a scheduled meeting without a timely excuse. Given “this series of events and failures,” the court held that “as a matter of law, plaintiffs abandoned the personal property they left behind.” The fact that they had removed some of their personal property before the scheduled meeting was “of no significant consequence, as the sequence of events indicated that plaintiffs, in doing so, had removed all of the personal property that they wanted. Plaintiffs’ further efforts to obtain more of the personal property after abandonment had been established could not revive a claim that the personal property had not, in fact, been abandoned—once abandoned, it was too late to try to reclaim rights to the property.”

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  • School Law (1)

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    This summary also appears under Negligence & Intentional Tort

    e-Journal #: 69699
    Case: D.M. Burr Facilities Mgmt., Inc. v. Romulus Cmty. Schs.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Murray, Servitto, and Shapiro
    Issues:

    Conversion; Governmental immunity; The Governmental Tort Liability Act (MCL 691.1401 et seq.); MCL 691.1407(1); Governmental function defined; MCL 691.1401(b); Genesee Cnty. Drain Comm’r v. Genesee Cnty.; Pardon v. Finkel; Ultra vires activity; Richardson v. Jackson Cnty.; Smith v. Department of Pub. Health; The Revised School Code (MCL 380.1 et seq.); Maintenance of school property, entering into contracts with third parties for maintenance, & acquiring equipment for this purpose; MCL 380.11a

    Summary:

    Holding that plaintiff’s conversion claims against defendants-school district and board of education were barred by governmental immunity, the court reversed the trial court’s order denying them summary disposition on these claims. They sought proposals for a service provider to perform maintenance services for the district. Plaintiff submitted the winning bid and the parties entered into a contract. Plaintiff then “purchased and obtained title to the necessary equipment” and used it to perform the contractual services. “At the end of the contract term, defendants barred plaintiff from retaking possession of the equipment.” Plaintiff sued for breach of the contract and also alleged that defendants’ “post-contract retention of the equipment constituted conversion.” Defendants argued that the pertinent activity for purposes of determining whether governmental immunity applied was “maintenance of school property and entering into contracts with third parties for performance of that activity.” These activities, and the acquisition of equipment, are provided for in MCL 380.11a, part of the Revised School Code. The court agreed “with plaintiff that even what can be construed as an authorized activity may be unauthorized where the manner of accomplishing it is so improper that the authorized activity underlying it is of little relevance.” However, the conversion claims here turned “on which party has properly interpreted the contract” and it was undisputed that defendants were “authorized to enter into contracts and to exercise and defend their rights under those contracts. Asserting alleged contract rights does not constitute an ultra vires activity nor is it ‘the intentional use or misuse of a badge of governmental authority for a purpose unauthorized by law . . . .’” Thus, the court concluded that the alleged tort did not occur outside the discharge or exercise of a governmental function. But it noted that plaintiff was not left without a remedy as it had also sued in contract and will be entitled to all contract damages if it prevails. Remanded.

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