Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Jurisdiction to review a district court’s decision to deny a motion for early termination of supervised release; 28 USC § 1291; 18 USC § 3742; United States v. Bowers; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t; Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.; Henderson v. Shinseki; Gonzalez v. Thaler; United States v. Kwai Fun Wong; Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis; Branch v. Smith; Abney v. United States; United States v. Ras (7th Cir.); United States v. Ruiz; Koon v. United States; Whether defendant’s sentence was imposed “in violation of the law”; § 3742(a)(1); § 3583(a); Dillon v. United States; United States v. Doe (2d Cir.)
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] In an amended opinion (see e-Journal #72299 in the 2/6/20 edition for the original opinion) after rehearing, the court concluded, contrary to its original ruling, that it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of defendant-Marshall’s petition to end his period of supervised release. It held that he was not entitled to relief based on the merits where he previously violated the terms of his supervised release. Marshall pled guilty to a drug charge and was sentenced to a period of supervised release, which he violated by moving out-of-state. He received a prison sentence for this violation, and then was sentenced to another period of supervised release. With his probation officer’s recommendation, he filed an unopposed motion for an early termination of supervised release, which the district court denied. In the initial opinion, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. In the amended opinion, it held that it had jurisdiction to review Marshall’s petition under § 1291, which provides the court with a general grant of appellate jurisdiction to review “final” judgments, even though § 3742, the statute that permits the court to review “an otherwise final sentence,” lists only four sentencing errors a defendant can appeal. The court held that it was error to “lightly treat federal statutes as placing limits on our subject-matter jurisdiction . . . .” Even though certain statutes may “constrain a court’s authority, . . . they are waivable and forfeitable limits on that authority.” Therefore, “[o]nly ‘[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a prescription counts as jurisdictional,’ . . . may we treat it as a limit on our subject-matter jurisdiction.” After concluding that it had jurisdiction under § 1291, the court reviewed Marshall’s petition to end his period of supervised release on the merits. It rejected his claim that his sentence was imposed “in violation of the law,” and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to end the period of supervised release where “Marshall violated his conditions of supervised release once before, a legitimate reason for denying a request to end his supervised-release term now.” Affirmed.
Custody dispute under the Juvenile Code (MCL 712A.1 et seq.) & the Child Custody Act (MCL 722.21 et seq.); In re AP; Whether there was proper cause or a change of circumstances justifying a change of custody; Corporan v. Henton; Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer; Shann v. Shann; Best interests of the child; Powery v. Wells; Principle that it is in a child’s best interests to minimize disruptive changes to custody arrangements; Kaeb v. Kaeb; Whether a custodial environment existed; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Brausch v. Brausch; Berger v. Berger; Rains v. Rains; The statutory best interest factors; MCL 722.23; Foskett v. Foskett; Sinicropi v. Mazurek; Wiechmann v. Wiechmann
The court held that the trial court did not err by awarding the child’s (MM) father sole legal and physical custody and terminating its jurisdiction and wardship. During child protective proceedings, all four children were removed from respondent-mother’s care. Three of them were eventually returned to her care, but the father was given sole legal and physical custody of MM. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court erred because the award of sole physical and legal custody of MM to the father was not in MM’s best interests. “Although respondent completed her court-ordered services, it took her over two years to do so, and during that time MM had been residing with” the father. Further, “while respondent was in the process of completing the services, she continually refused to take her medications and had assaulted” one of the other children. She also “continued to maintain a domestic relationship with another individual, despite their history of violent interaction.” The trial court emphasized that the father “had provided MM with a stable home and that MM would maintain continuity if she remained with” him. The court also rejected her claim that it was in MM’s best interests to be in the same household as her siblings, noting that she “also resides with her two half siblings” now, and “has developed a relationship with” them. Further, the trial court encouraged respondent and the father “to work together so that MM could maintain her relationship with [her siblings] and . . . ordered that respondent should have ‘liberal’ parenting time.” Affirmed.
The trial court’s decision to not return the appeal bond; In re Forfeiture of Sur. Bond; Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co.; MCR 7.209(A)(1); MCR 7.204(E)(3); MCR 7.209(B)(1); MCR 7.305(I); MCR 7.209(F)(1); Effect of a stipulation; Board of Cnty. Rd. Comm’rs for Cnty. of Eaton v. Schultz; Contract interpretation; AFSCME v. Detroit; Bank of Am., NA v. First Am. Title Ins. Co.; Whether the bond form governed the case; Principle that a court speaks thorough its written orders; In re Contempt of Henry; Purpose of a stay; In re Contempt of Calcutt; MCR 7.209(F)(1)(c); Stonisch v. Forthright IV, LLC (Unpub.)
The court affirmed the trial court’s decision to not return the appeal bond. The language of the stipulation and the trial court order as to bond revealed “that the parties intended for the bond to apply to the judgment in the 2015 Forthright case as well as” this case. The stipulation stated that defendant had appealed the trial court’s order here “that ‘[d]efendant is liable to Plaintiff on all judgments’ from the 2015 Forthright case (totaling $54,215, including interest). Critically, the stipulation stated that defendant wanted to stay the judgments of the instant case and the 2015 Forthright case ‘during the pendency of the appeals,’ and concluded that defendant’s deposit of a $59,637 appeal bond would result in a ‘stipulate[ion] that enforcement of the judgments are stayed.’” Therefore, the term “appeals” in the stipulation referred “to a stay in the two appeals mentioned, and the stay was intended to apply to judgments" that were mentioned—this case and the 2015 Forthright case. “The language of the filed agreement of the parties states an intention that the bond that defendant paid was to stay the judgment in the 2015 Forthright case, as well as” this case. They agreed in the stipulation “to abide by the ‘terms set forth in the Order Regarding Bond on Appeal.’” The trial court’s order embodied their “agreement that defendant would pay a bond in order to stay the judgments in this and the 2015 Forthright case while defendant was appealing the orders and judgments in those cases.” The trial court’s order as to bond stated that “defendant agreed to ‘prosecute the appeal’ of the trial court’s orders granting summary disposition, entering judgment, and denying reconsideration in the instant case, and perform and satisfy orders pertaining to this case, without similar language about the 2015 Forthright case. However, defendant had already been pursuing appeals in the 2015 Forthright case for 18 months at the time of the order and the trial court ordered that the bond was to stay the judgments in both cases during the pendency of both appeals, rather than just the appeal in” this case. Thus, the trial court’s order as to bond did “require defendant to pursue his appeal of the 2015 Forthright case, and he was obligated to comply with related orders as one of the conditions of the bond.”
Allowance of a disallowed probate claim; Alleged intrinsic fraud on the trial court by misrepresenting the costs incurred on behalf of decedent; Plain error review; Lawrence v. Michigan Unemployment Ins. Agency; Unjust enrichment; Morris Pumps v. Centerline Piping, Inc.; Personal representative (PR)
The court held that defendant failed to establish that fraud occurred, and that the probate court properly found that plaintiff-Hargrow was entitled to reimbursement under an unjust enrichment theory. The case arose from decedent’s sister (Hargrow) “paying bills on his behalf before his death, and requesting reimbursement from his estate . . . .” Defendant asserted “that Hargrow’s testimony and documentation amounted to intrinsic fraud. However, defendant presented no factual proof to support this claim.” The record reflected that the probate “court used Hargrow’s testimony and documents, after questioning her thoroughly on the subject, to conclude that her payments were substantiated. [It] found no fraud after engaging in a thorough examination of the evidence presented at the hearing.” Nothing argued by defendant caused the court to alter that ruling. Further, the factual questions that defendant presented were clarified at trial. Hargrow explained that she was unable to pay expenses out of decedent’s account because one of the co-PRs (Cheryl) was concerned that the other co-PR (Cristina) “was inappropriately spending decedent’s funds, and cleared out his account in order to prevent Cristina from spending any more of his money. Hargrow testified that Cheryl took approximately $30,000 from decedent’s bank account in [10/15], and put it in an account in South Carolina, in Hargrow’s and decedent’s names.” Although she “had access to the joint account, she testified that the reimbursement was for bills she paid out of her own funds before she had access to that money.” Also, she testified that, even after she had access to those funds, she continued to pay some of decedent’s expenses from her own account. She noted that some of his “bills were auto-paid from her account, and that she had not yet received paper checks from decedent’s account, causing her to have to pay from her own account, even after she had access to his funds.” Moreover, she presented receipts and account statements showing her costs incurred, which the probate court relied on in making its findings. It questioned her extensively about “her use of her own account after she had access to decedent’s funds.” It also questioned her as to her travel costs. She “admitted that she was not clear on the total of the travel costs between a vacation that she took and her expenses to travel to decedent’s home. However, she only requested reimbursement for one of the flights, and produced a receipt of her travel cost for trial.” Affirmed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); In re Mason; In re HRC; In re VanDalen; In re LaFrance; Child’s best interests; In re Moss Minors; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re White
Holding that § (c)(i) existed and termination was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. Respondent contested “the trial court’s findings that the issues that led to adjudication continued to exist and that he would not be able to rectify them within a reasonable time.” The record reflected that his “inability to provide proper care or custody for the child because of his parole status for attempted [CSC III] and his lack of stable housing led to the adjudication.” While on parole, he did not “secure adequate housing and although he had employment, no evidence indicated that he had secured or even had plans for employment or housing after his release.” The record reflected that he did not “complete a psychological examination, work on his parenting skills and emotional stability, and failed to overcome his substance abuse problem.” Evidence established that he used drugs while on parole. Also, respondent “possessed and used an unauthorized cellphone to access pornographic websites. In so doing, respondent violated the conditions of his parole which led to his reincarceration.” Although while on parole he started participating “in services such as parenting visits, once he became reincarcerated he no longer had the ability to do so.” Evidence also established that a bond did not exist between him and his child. Respondent participated only in six parenting time visits. The record reflected that, at the time of the termination, he “expected to remain incarcerated for at least two more months and it would be at least another nine months after his earliest release date before reunification could even be considered, at which point the child would have been in care for about two years. Clear and convincing evidence established that the conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist and no reasonable expectation existed that respondent could rectify the conditions within a reasonable time considering” his child’s age. He was “correct that incarceration alone, and drug use alone, do not suffice to terminate parental rights.” However, here “the trial court did not rely on those established facts alone for its decision that statutory grounds existed warranting termination of respondent’s parental rights. Rather, respondent’s drug use, lack of housing, lack of a bond with the child, violations of the conditions of parole, his reincarceration, and failure to participate in services, necessitated terminating his parental rights.”
Petition for removal; Whether there was probable cause to authorize the petition & order temporary placement of the child; MCR 3.965(B)(12); MCL 712A.13a; In re Rood; Release of the child to a parent, guardian, or legal custodian; MCR 3.965(B)(13)(a); Foster-care placement; MCR 3.965(C)(2); MCL 712A.13a(9); Relative placement; MCR 3.965(C)(5); MCL 712A.13a(5)
The court held that the trial court did not err by placing respondent-father's child in foster care. The DHHS sought to remove respondent’s child from his and the mother's care based on an incident of inadequate supervision. The mother’s two elder children were also removed from the home based on respondent's history of abusing them. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by removing his child from the home and placing him in foster care, finding there is "no conflict between MCL 712A.13a(5) and MCR 3.965(C)(2)." MCR 3.965(C)(2) "prevents the trial court from returning a child to an abusive home or a home where the abuser is likely to access the child; while it may be that an abusive home necessitates a foster-care placement under MCR 3.965(C)(2), it is not the only situation justifying such a placement." MCL 712a.13a(5) "addresses a specific—and grave—situation and does not impose any limit on the trial court’s general authority to place a child into foster care other than requiring the trial court to ensure that the abuser will have an opportunity to further harm the child after placement." Moreover, because respondent's abuse of the mother and the children "would justify removing him from the home under MCL 712A.13a(5)," it agreed with the trial court that "this removal would be inadequate to protect the child’s physical and mental health." Finally, the court noted that the incidents and respondent and the mother's "storied relationship indicate that [the child] was at a risk of physical and mental harm in" the mother’s home. "Because this risk could not be alleviated by ordering respondent" out of the home, the trial court did not err by placing the child in foster care. Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), & (j); In re VanDalen; In re HRC; In re Williams; In re Dahms; In re White; Reasonable reunification efforts as to respondent’s disability; In re Gonzales/Martinez; In re Hicks/Brown; In re Frey; In re Terry
Holding that §§ (c)(i), (g), and (j) existed and the trial court did not err by finding that the DHHS made reasonable efforts toward reunification as to respondent-mother’s disability, the court affirmed termination of her rights to the children (J, H, and D). “The conditions that led to adjudication included physical and medical neglect, cognitive impairments and unaddressed mental health issues, substance abuse issues, lack of income, and improper housing.” The trial court ordered her “to complete a treatment plan designed to address those barriers, which included a psychological evaluation; substance abuse evaluation; and participating in and benefiting from parenting classes, parenting time, services with a parenting coach, and infant mental health services.” It also ordered her “to obtain and maintain suitable housing, undergo random drug screens, participate in mental health services, maintain contact with DHHS, and obtain and maintain a legal source of income.” The record showed that she “did not obtain or maintain stable housing during the case, and respondent testified she had been homeless at times during the proceedings and had been ‘struggling’” since 4/18. At the time of termination, she had not interacted with the children in over six months. J and H were in foster care for approximately 14 months, and D had been in care for approximately 9 months. Further, a caseworker testified that respondent did not appropriately interact with the children during supervised parenting time. The record supported the trial court’s determination that she “did not accomplish any meaningful change in the conditions that led to adjudication.” The record also supported the trial court’s decison “that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would rectify her mental health issues, substance-abuse issues, housing instability and parenting barriers in the foreseeable future.” There was no indication that she “would rectify her issues within a reasonable time given the length of time already provided and the lack of progress.”