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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Whether defendant was entitled to resentencing pursuant to a sentencing agreement; MCR 2.507(G); Sufficiency of the evidence for a meth possession conviction; MCL 333.7402(2)(b)(i)
While the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s meth possession conviction, it concluded she was entitled to resentencing without the habitual offender enhancement. She was sentenced as a third habitual offender to 3 to 20 years. As to her claim she was entitled to resentencing pursuant to a sentencing agreement, “because no agreement was reduced to writing or made in open court, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to resentence defendant strictly” based on her asserted recollections. But the record revealed that on 9/25/20, “a motion and order of nolle prosequi was entered, dismissing the habitual offender notice without prejudice.” The motion stated that the trial prosecutor brought it because the trial court in defendant’s bench trial found her guilty of Count 1, and that the “prosecution will dismiss the Habitual Offender-Third Offense Notice. The motion was signed by the trial prosecutor.” The order stated that the motion was “granted as to the habitual offender notice, and it was signed by the same trial judge who presided over the rest of the proceedings.” The motion and order stated on its face that it pertained to this lower court file number, and it was reflected in the trial court register of actions. The order was entered after defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender, and there was no indication her “sentence was modified. Inexplicably, the order was entered before defendant moved for resentencing, yet at no time did defendant, the prosecutor, or the trial court mention it.” The parties agreed at oral argument “that the order of nolle prosequi was valid and that defendant was entitled to resentencing.” But the court rejected her challenge to her conviction, concluding that the “evidence strongly supported a reasonable inference” she knew about the meth in the container in her car and thus, there was sufficient evidence “to find beyond a reasonable doubt that” she was guilty of meth possession. It affirmed her conviction, vacated her sentence, and “remanded for resentencing without the habitual offender enhancement.”
Sufficiency of the evidence; Conspiracy to distribute cocaine & meth; 21 USC §§ 846 & 841(a)(1); Knowledge; Conspiracy to commit money laundering; § 1956(h); Manifest weight of the evidence; Deliberate-ignorance jury instruction; United States v Warshawsky; Right of confrontation; Allowing a co-conspirator to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege as to certain questions on cross-examination; United States v Gullett; Material variance; Sentencing; Procedural reasonableness; Substantive reasonableness; Effect of a below-Guidelines sentence
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant-Matthews’s convictions of conspiracy to (1) distribute cocaine and meth and (2) commit money laundering, and that they were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, the district court did not err in giving the jury a deliberate-ignorance instruction. The court also found no error in permitting a co-conspirator (C) who testified for the prosecution to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege as to certain questions on cross-examination, and Matthews did not show any variance prejudiced her. As to defendant-Wallace, it held that his below-Guidelines sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Matthews challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to the knowledge element of the convictions. But the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that she “knew of and intended to join the conspiracy.” As to the distribution conspiracy, in addition to the testimony of co-conspirators, text messages between she and C showed that, on one trip, “Matthews was dropping off a delivery of cocaine when a cartel member discovered that two bundles of cocaine were missing. Although the text messages described the cocaine bundles as ‘units,’ [C] later explained that ‘unit’ means ‘[a] kilo of cocaine.’ Matthews discovered that neither her nor [C] was to blame for the missing kilos: she texted [C] that the cartel member to whom she made the drop-off ‘knows it’s not us, it’s the boys that packed them’—meaning, as [C] explained, that the cartel members who packed the kilos into the suitcases must have miscounted.” As to the money laundering conspiracy, “there was sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could infer that Matthews knew that she handled the proceeds from unlawful activity and that she agreed to promote that activity.” As to Wallace, who pled guilty to the conspiracy to distribute count, none of his procedural reasonableness challenges established plain error, and he failed to rebut the presumption that his below-Guidelines sentence was substantively reasonable. He asserted the district court gave excessive weight to his status as a pilot in sentencing him to 60 months. But while the district court appeared motivated by deterrence, he offered nothing showing that it “placed excessive weight on this factor.” Affirmed.
Petition to terminate a parent’s rights to allow for a stepparent adoption; MCL 710.51(6); Financial support; Visit, contact, or communicate
The court vacated the orders denying the petition to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights and denying ZT’s (petitioner-mother’s now-husband) request to adopt the children (NH and EH), and remanded. The court affirmed the trial court’s determination under MCL 710.51(6)(a) that the father “had not provided court-ordered financial support for a period of two years.” However, there was no factual dispute that the father ‘“has regularly and substantially failed or neglected’ ‘to visit, contact, or communicate with’” the children for the requisite two-year period. “MCL 710.51(6)(b) requires the petitioner to establish that the other parent had the ability to visit, contact, or communicate with the children, and substantially failed or neglected to do so for a period of two years.” Contrary to the trial court’s assessment here, the mother made this showing. Thus, it was required to consider whether the termination and adoption would be in NH’s and EH’s best interests. Although the trial court erred in its factual findings relevant to MCL 710.51(6)(b), the mother was not automatically entitled to the relief requested. “On remand, the trial court must consider the statutory factors of MCL 710.51(6) as met and exercise its discretion to further consider whether termination of” the father’s parental rights, and permitting ZT to adopt NH and EH, are appropriate. The trial court is required to weigh their best interests. It “must conduct a full best-interest hearing and consider up-to-date evidence in making this determination.”
Trip & fall on an unmarked fence post; Premises liability; Duty to maintain property; Possession & control of property; Kubczak v Chemical Bank & Trust Co; Statutory liability under MCL 554.139(1); Res judicata; Adair v State; Adjudication on the merits; Limbach v Oakland Cnty Rd Comm’n
The court held that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s claim against defendant-business (SMDM) and her statutory claim against defendant-individual (Mallie), but erred by dismissing her premises liability claim against Mallie because it “failed to consider whether as the ‘possessor’ in ‘control’ of the property, Mallie owed [her] a duty to maintain the premises.” Plaintiff sued defendants after she tripped and fell on an unmarked fence post while trying to deliver a rent payment to Mallie. The trial court summarily dismissed her claims against SMDM on res judicata grounds as she “had previously filed and dismissed a complaint against SMDM ‘with prejudice.’” It also summarily dismissed her claims against Mallie because he was not the “owner” of the property. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by finding her claims against SMDM were barred by res judicata because her current claims arose “from SMDM’s vicarious liability for Mallie’s actions, while the prior action involved claims of direct liability.” It noted she “knew of her vicarious liability claims when she filed her first action; she also filed suit against Mallie and knew that Mallie was at least an agent for SMDM. Her claims arose from a single event or transaction—her appearance on property owned or controlled by SMDM and/or Mallie to make her first rent payment for the property.” Yet she had “voluntarily dismissed her prior complaint against SMDM with prejudice. This was ‘an adjudication on the merits for res judicata purposes,’” requiring that the court affirm the trial court’s ruling. However, the court agreed with plaintiff that the trial court erred by dismissing her premises liability claim against Mallie as an individual as it failed to consider whether he could be held liable as a “possessor” in “control” of the property. The trial court “incorrectly reasoned that Mallie could only be held liable if he were an ‘owner’ of the property. Accordingly, we must vacate the circuit court’s order in this regard.” It noted that evidence supporting Mallie’s “possession or control may be developed during discovery.” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Zoning; Standing to bring a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim; “Unlawful delegation doctrine”; Procedural injury; Causation; Redressability inquiry; Mootness; Planning & Zoning Commission (P&Z Commission)
The court held that whatever the merits of the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, plaintiff-Rice family had standing to bring it where all three elements of standing were met. But the family’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were mooted by amendment of the relevant ordinance. Only the claim for damages survived. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant-Johnstown Village on the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, reversed it on the claim for monetary relief, and remanded. The Rice family devised a plan to annex its 80-acre farm into Johnstown and have the property zoned for a residential development. The application was rejected. Because the farm was not located in Johnstown, but in an adjacent township, the district court held that the family lacked standing to bring its claim. The court concluded that whether or not the family did “enough to survive summary judgment on the merits,” it showed a procedural injury. The family alleged that due to “Johnstown’s unconstitutional delegation to the P&Z Commission, its zoning application was subjected to a standardless and conclusive review by allegedly private parties (the Commissioners), who acted for arbitrary reasons.” Given that the zoning “application was subject to the P&Z Commission’s allegedly unconstitutional process and its outcome affected the family’s ability to develop its land[,]” an injury-in-fact was shown. The court rejected Johnstown’s argument that its ordinance did not apply. The ordinance set “forth the process for considering zoning applications. And there can be no question that the Rice family’s zoning application in fact ran through that process. The family has produced uncontested evidence, moreover, that annexation by Johnstown was not a prerequisite to entering the zoning process; indeed, it was ‘typical’ for the two processes to run concurrently.” The court found that the family showed “the ordinance was applied to it and that the results of the proceeding could have affected the family’s interests.” As to causation, the family showed that “its zoning application was denied through an allegedly unconstitutional process” and the facts here were sufficient to allow “the inference that the zoning and annexation decisions were intertwined.” Finally, whether or not the claim for monetary relief had merit, it satisfied the redressability requirement.