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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.

 

 

Case Summary

Includes summaries of one Michigan Supreme Court opinion under Municipal/Zoning and one Michigan Supreme Court order under Criminal Law.


Cases appear under the following practice areas:

  • Constitutional Law (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 72930
    Case: Adams & Boyle, PC v. Slatery
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: Moore and White; Dissent – Thapar
    Issues:

    Abortion rights during the pandemic; Planned Parenthood of Se. PA v. Casey; Jacobson v. Massachusetts; Roe v. Wade; Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v. Taft; McCormack v. Herzog (9th Cir.); In re Rutledge (8th Cir.); In re Abbott (5th Cir.); Robinson v. Attorney Gen. (11th Cir.); Preliminary injunction analysis; Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.; Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell; American Civil Liberties Union Fund of MI v. Livingston Cnty.; Irreparable harm; Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., TE; The injunction’s scope; Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England; Personal protective equipment (PPE); Dilation & evacuation (D&E)

    Summary:

    The court affirmed the district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction, holding that plaintiffs-healthcare providers’ and their patients’ Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by Tennessee’s Executive Order (EO)-25, which delayed abortions along with other elective procedures during the COVID-19 crisis. However, it modified the injunction to permit enforcement of the EO where women would not be harmed by a delay. As part of its COVID-19 response, the State of Tennessee issued a three-week ban on elective surgeries. Plaintiffs successfully sought an injunction from the district court enjoining the State from enforcing the ban as it applied to abortions. The district court emphasized that the ban on elective surgery “was ‘likely’ to last past April 30, and . . . ‘[d]elaying a woman’s access to abortion even by a matter of days can result in her having to undergo a lengthier and more complex procedure that involves progressively greater health risks . . . or can result in her losing the right to obtain an abortion altogether.’” On appeal, in concluding that plaintiffs were likely to win on the merits, the court emphasized that, “[a]s of today, a woman’s right to a pre-viability abortion is a part of ‘the fundamental law.’” In some applications, EO-25 constituted “‘beyond question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by [that] fundamental law.’” The court found, in contrast to Jacobson, it was difficult to understand how the EO can bear a “‘real’ and ‘substantial’ relation to the state’s public health goals[,] . . . given the paltry amount of PPE saved, and limited amount of in-person contact avoided by halting procedural abortions for a three-week period (not to mention the lack of expert medical opinion in support of the State’s position).” The court also determined that under EO-25, a woman, especially a low-income woman, “would be at risk of losing her constitutional rights, or at least of incurring substantial physical, emotional, and financial harms en route to exercising those rights . . . .” The court found that the State’s competing injury claims were “speculative and abstract[,]” and did not outweigh the harm to plaintiffs and their patients. But it made some changes to the injunction’s scope, ordering the district court to modify its order so that it enjoins “the State from enforcing EO-25 against Plaintiffs to the extent they provide procedural abortions to . . . three categories of patients[,]” including women who were likely to be forced to have a D&E “instead of an aspiration procedure if their procedures are delayed until after” 4/30/20. However, plaintiffs were required to delay the procedures where it is safe to do so until after EO-25’s expiration.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Criminal Law (5)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 72931
    Case: People v. Kennedy
    Court: Michigan Supreme Court ( Order )
    Judges: McCormack, Viviano, Markman, Zahra, Bernstein, Clement, and Cavanagh
    Issues:

    Request for a DNA expert; Whether defendant’s constitutional challenge was preserved; People v. Anderson (After Remand); U.S. Const. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington; Due process & a criminal defendant’s interest in expert assistance; People v. Kennedy

    Summary:

    In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed the part of the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 71101 in the 8/21/19 edition) that held defendant’s constitutional challenge was unpreserved. It also vacated the remainder of the judgment and remanded “for reconsideration under the standard for preserved constitutional error.” It noted that, pursuant to Strickland, the “Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment . . . .” The court concluded that, because a criminal defendant’s interest in expert assistance under Kennedy “is grounded in due process,” and defendant’s trial court motion for such assistance sought relief under the Sixth Amendment, “his due process challenge was preserved.”

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 72831
    Case: People v. Cinpak
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Cavanagh, Beckering, and Gleicher
    Issues:

    Delayed sentencing; MCL 777.1; Whether the reference to “other leniency compatible with the ends of justice” & defendant’s rehabilitation in MCL 771.1(2) grants trial courts discretion to dismiss a defendant’s conviction after a period of delayed sentencing (especially over the prosecution’s objection); People v. Monday; People v. Leonard; People v. Smith; People v. Boynton; Dismissal under the common law; People v. Stewart

    Summary:

    Holding that the trial court’s dismissal of the case over the prosecution’s objection based on MCL 777.1 was prohibited by case law, the court reversed, vacated the dismissal order, and remanded with instructions to reinstate defendant’s conviction. She was convicted of resisting and obstructing a police officer. The issue on appeal was “whether the Legislature’s reference to ‘other leniency compatible with the ends of justice and the defendant’s rehabilitation,’ MCL 771.1(2),” gives trial courts the “discretion to dismiss a defendant’s conviction after a period of delayed sentencing, especially” when the prosecution objects. The court held in Monday that this language “was not ‘broad enough to allow dismissal.’” The court concluded that the takeaway from Monday was “that MCL 777.1 is not a ‘permissive statute’ under which a trial court may dismiss a conviction.” Monday was cited with approval in Leonard. Further, the Michigan Supreme Court’s strong language in Smith supported reversal here. However, the court noted that while the law did not allow the trial court to dismiss the case, Monday provided “guidance for a remedy in this situation.” Defendant’s criminal record included “a list of minor offenses. The agent preparing the PSIR recommended the imposition of fines and costs rather than jail or probation given [defendant’s] ‘very minimal criminal history’ and the stellar scores [she] received on a risk assessment.” Even the arresting officer stated “in his victim impact statement that jailtime was not warranted.” Defendant was “a widow with two children, who put herself through school and was then working 60 hours each week to support her family alone. The trial court’s vociferous support of [her] and inclination toward leniency appear justified. To ensure that the punishment truly fit the crime,” the court urged the prosecution to reconsider her case and “freshly assess whether compassion and mercy warrant a different approach. The destruction of [her] nursing career seems to us a disproportionate penalty, even though [she] did not submit immediately to” the officer’s commands.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 72820
    Case: People v. Ezerkis
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Cavanagh, Beckering, and Gleicher
    Issues:

    Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Trakhtenberg; People v. LeBlanc; People v. Lockett; Strickland v. Washington; People v. Vaughn; Trial strategy; People v. Unger; People v. Dixon; Failure to make a meritless objection; People v. Ericksen; Prejudice; People v. Bosca; A substantial defense; People v. Putman; Failure to develop an issue on appeal; Mitcham v. Detroit; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v. Watson; People v. Bahoda; People v. Meissner; People v. Thomas; People v. Seals; Cumulative error; Presumption that jurors follow their instructions; People v. Abraham; Abandonment of an issue; People v. Harris

    Summary:

    The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, and that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct requiring reversal. He was convicted of assault with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration, CSC IV, and aggravated indecent exposure based on the victim’s allegations that he exposed his penis to her, fondled both of her breasts, and put his hand down her pants. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. “Defense counsel’s decision to not obtain and admit into evidence the police reports at trial is presumed to be trial strategy.” In addition, “[t]he record does not indicate that there were any other witnesses to the alleged incidents aside from defendant and the victim, and [he] has not identified any witnesses that counsel failed to present at trial.” He also failed to provide “any affidavits identifying proposed testimony that would have benefited his defense.” Further, his argument that he had no substantial defense because defense counsel failed to conduct a pretrial investigation was meritless “because defense counsel’s theory of the case was that defendant did not commit the acts alleged by the victim.” The court also rejected defendant’s claim that the prosecutor committed error requiring reversal during closing arguments, finding that “her arguments were based on the evidence and reasonable inferences” from the evidence, and there was no prejudice. Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 72817
    Case: People v. Neal
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Cavanagh, Beckering, and Gleicher
    Issues:

    Prosecutorial misconduct; People v. Craig Gordon Brown; People v. Ullah; People v. Cooper; People v. Dobek; People v. Meissner; Principle that, in the examination or cross-examination of a witness, no inquiry may be made regarding prior arrests or charges against such witness that did not result in conviction; People v. Falkner; Principle that an unproven charge may not be offered to impeach a witness but may be offered for other purposes; People v. Yarbrough; Character inferences; People v. Bass; Rebuttal evidence; People v. Figgures; People v. Yager; Jury instructions; Presumption that jurors follow their instructions; People v. Abraham; Curative instruction; People v. Musser; Harmless error; People v. Mitchell; People v. LeBlanc; People v. Knapp; Assault with intent to murder (AWIM)

    Summary:

    Holding that the prosecution committed misconduct, that it was not cured, and that it prejudiced defendant’s credibility to the point that it denied him the right to a fair and impartial trial, the court reversed his convictions and sentences on four counts of AWIM and four counts of felony-firearm, and remanded. On appeal, the court found that “the prosecutor first erred by inquiring into the nature of defendant’s prior arrests on cross-examination.” It noted that the prosecutor “brought up evidence of defendant’s prior arrests to impeach [his] statement that he had never been in trouble before, which is prohibited under Yarbrough. There is no indication [that his] prior arrests for domestic violence demonstrated any bias, prejudice, or motivation to falsify testimony at trial, which would have been admissible. The effect of introducing this evidence was highly prejudicial because it could invite jurors to make the impermissible character inference that defendant was a ‘bad person’ for committing previous crimes and therefore was more likely to commit crime again.” In addition, his “statement that he had not been in trouble before did not open the door to extensive questioning about the nature of his prior arrests.” The court also found that the prosecutor “erred by repeatedly mischaracterizing defendant’s second interview with police.” Because the prosecutor’s repeated insinuations that defendant only changed his story when confronted with the results of the DNA testing were “entirely unfounded,” the line of questioning was improper and prejudicial. It next found that the error was not cured, noting “the jury was given the limiting instruction a full day after it heard defendant’s testimony, during which time the jury was presented with another witness and closing statements.” As such, “the error was not fresh enough in the jury’s minds for the limiting instruction to cure the error.” Finally, it found that the prosecutor erred by mischaracterizing prior witness testimony, and that the error was not harmless. “There is no doubt that this erroneous presentation of evidence undermined defendant’s testimony, injected prejudice, and affected the jury’s verdict.”

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 72847
    Case: United States v. Fowler
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: Donald, Norris, and Moore
    Issues:

    Sentencing; Special assessment under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act; 18 USC § 3014(a)(3); Whether defendant waived his right to appeal the special assessment in the plea agreement; United States v. Smith; United States v. Toth; United States v. Bowman; United States v. Droganes; United States v. Janatsch (10th Cir.); United States v. Calderon; United States v. Bolin (7th Cir.); Whether the district court committed plain error by assessing the $5,000 under § 3014 without determining indigency or whether defendant was able to pay; United States v. Kent; United States v. Shepherd; United States v. Wandahsega; United States v. Vonner; Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); Henderson v. United States; States; United States v. Woodruff; Sentencing; Substantive & procedural reasonableness; United States v. Jeter; United States v. Cabrera; United States v. Van (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Recla; United States v. Brooks (7th Cir.); United States v. Gonzales (9th Cir.)

    Summary:

    The court affirmed defendant-Fowler’s sentence for violating the conditions of his supervised release for possessing child pornography. But it vacated the imposition of a $5,000 assessment where he did not waive his right to challenge the assessment in the plea agreement and the district court committed plain error by failing to address his ability to pay the assessment. He first challenged the special assessment. The government argued that Fowler waived his right to challenge the assessment in his plea agreement. All parties agreed that the special assessment was not mentioned in the plea agreement. The court noted that it assigns “a greater degree of responsibility” to the government than to a defendant “‘for imprecisions or ambiguities in the plea agreements,’” and thus it concluded that Fowler was not precluded from challenging the $5,000 special assessment. It also held that the district court committed plain error by assessing the $5,000 under § 3014 without determining indigency or whether Fowler was able to pay. As to Fowler’s argument that his 36-month sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release was substantively and procedurally unreasonable, the court determined that the district court did not consider an uncorroborated statement in a supervised release violation report. Therefore, his sentencing challenge failed. The court remanded the case for a determination of indigency.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Family Law (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 72835
    Case: Richards v. Richards
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Cavanagh, Beckering, and Gleicher
    Issues:

    Divorce; Distribution of assets; Berger v. Berger; Cassidy v. Cassidy; Failure to assign a value to one party’s business while counting the business’s debts against the value of the marital estate; Olson v. Olson; Steckley v. Steckley; Wiand v. Wiand

    Summary:

    The court vacated the property division in the divorce judgment and remanded for either reconsideration or further explanation, holding that the trial court erred in disparately treating the parties’ businesses in calculating the value of the marital estate without explaining its decision. In lieu of ordering defendant-ex-husband (David) to pay plaintiff-ex-wife (Christy) a lump sum for her share of the marital assets, it ordered David to continue paying the mortgage on Christy’s business property. She challenged the trial court’s “failure to assign a value to David’s business while counting the business’s debts against the value of the marital estate.” The court found that neither party met their burden of establishing the value of either business. “Christy presented evidence that David’s car sales business had approximately $500,000 in inventory. That inventory secured a $300,000 line of credit. Common sense dictates, however, that the remaining $200,000 would not be pure profit. For example,” salaries, a mortgage, “utilities, advertising, insurance, and other costs of business, but Christy presented no evidence in this regard.” It would not have been possible for the trial court to value David’s business without further information. “Similarly, the parties presented little evidence about the value of Christy’s business.” The court has held, “If the court does not have ample information from the expert testimony presented to determine a fair value, it may appoint its own disinterested appraiser to assist the court.” Here, there was no expert testimony, and in light of “the parties’ agreement that David’s business was not worth much, the [trial] court could reasonably determine that assigning an independent evaluator would have been cost prohibitive.” Without sufficient evidence, it “did not clearly err in determining that it could not assign a value to David’s business.” However, it treated the businesses disparately in calculating the marital estate’s value. It “included David’s business line of credit as a marital debt.” But the trial court “did not count the miscellaneous business debts connected with” Christy’s salon “as a marital debt; the credit card debts representing supplies for the salon were treated as Christy’s separate debt. The business line of credit was collateralized with the used car inventory and was used to keep the dealership stocked. Although the dealership real estate also served as collateral for the line of credit, it appears inequitable to treat the parties’ businesses differently in this regard. Ultimately, if the inventory and supply debt of one business were treated as separate or marital property, the same should be true of the other.”

    Full Text Opinion

  • Litigation (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Malpractice

    e-Journal #: 72827
    Case: Fasse v. Alpena Reg'l Med. Ctr.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Boonstra, Riordan, and Redford
    Issues:

    Medical malpractice; Discovery sanction; Woods v. SLB Prop. Mgmt., LLC; Donkers v. Kovach; Hardrick v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n; Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co.; MCR 2.313(B)(2)(c); Kalamazoo Oil Co. v. Boerman; Vicencio v. Jaime Ramirez, MD, PC; Duray Dev., LLC v. Perrin; Sherman v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.; Kalaj v. Khan

    Summary:

    Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking plaintiff’s expert witness, the court affirmed. Plaintiff filed this medical malpractice case “alleging that defendants were directly or vicariously liable for misdiagnosing plaintiff as having colon cancer.” Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by striking her sole expert (Dr. L) as a discovery sanction. Plaintiff argued that the Dean factors weighed “against the trial court’s imposition of a severe sanction akin to dismissal.” While the trial court did not explicitly reference the Dean “factors in its order striking plaintiff’s sole expert witness, it noted in its prior order sanctioning plaintiff that plaintiff had exhibited a history of noncompliance with discovery orders and of unresponsiveness to defendant’s requests.” Although the court was not unsympathetic to plaintiff and her counsel, it was unable to determine that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the sanction of striking her expert after further noncompliance. “It appeared from the record that plaintiff continually failed to cooperate with defendants’ numerous attempts to schedule [L’s] deposition, and had a long history of not responding to defendants’ discovery requests, prompting multiple motions, court hearings, and court orders.” Further, plaintiff failed “to produce any evidence that she attempted to reschedule the deposition by providing dates of availability within the time frame of the order.” The trial court specifically noted in its order that it was “mindful of the unfortunate pattern of plaintiff’s noncompliance with prior discovery orders[.]” The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that her “discovery violations represented a ‘pattern’ rather than mere accident, and that plaintiff had a history of noncompliance.” Moreover, this pattern represented a history of engaging in deliberate delay. Further, her repeated discovery violations prejudiced defendants. Plaintiff’s “failure to respond to defendants’ five attempts to schedule a deposition date over a two-month period and failure to respond to any discovery requests required defendants to file multiple motions to compel and hindered defendants’ ability to prepare a defense.” Additionally, her failure “to comply with a stipulated order to file a preliminary witness list, and only disclosing [L] as her expert on the very last day of the deadline for filing final lay and expert witness lists, shortened the time that defendants had before trial to depose him and prepare a defense; this shortened time was further shortened by plaintiff’s unresponsiveness" in scheduling the deposition. The third and fourth Dean factors were satisfied.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Malpractice (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Litigation

    e-Journal #: 72827
    Case: Fasse v. Alpena Reg'l Med. Ctr.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Boonstra, Riordan, and Redford
    Issues:

    Medical malpractice; Discovery sanction; Woods v. SLB Prop. Mgmt., LLC; Donkers v. Kovach; Hardrick v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n; Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co.; MCR 2.313(B)(2)(c); Kalamazoo Oil Co. v. Boerman; Vicencio v. Jaime Ramirez, MD, PC; Duray Dev., LLC v. Perrin; Sherman v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.; Kalaj v. Khan

    Summary:

    Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking plaintiff’s expert witness, the court affirmed. Plaintiff filed this medical malpractice case “alleging that defendants were directly or vicariously liable for misdiagnosing plaintiff as having colon cancer.” Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by striking her sole expert (Dr. L) as a discovery sanction. Plaintiff argued that the Dean factors weighed “against the trial court’s imposition of a severe sanction akin to dismissal.” While the trial court did not explicitly reference the Dean “factors in its order striking plaintiff’s sole expert witness, it noted in its prior order sanctioning plaintiff that plaintiff had exhibited a history of noncompliance with discovery orders and of unresponsiveness to defendant’s requests.” Although the court was not unsympathetic to plaintiff and her counsel, it was unable to determine that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the sanction of striking her expert after further noncompliance. “It appeared from the record that plaintiff continually failed to cooperate with defendants’ numerous attempts to schedule [L’s] deposition, and had a long history of not responding to defendants’ discovery requests, prompting multiple motions, court hearings, and court orders.” Further, plaintiff failed “to produce any evidence that she attempted to reschedule the deposition by providing dates of availability within the time frame of the order.” The trial court specifically noted in its order that it was “mindful of the unfortunate pattern of plaintiff’s noncompliance with prior discovery orders[.]” The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that her “discovery violations represented a ‘pattern’ rather than mere accident, and that plaintiff had a history of noncompliance.” Moreover, this pattern represented a history of engaging in deliberate delay. Further, her repeated discovery violations prejudiced defendants. Plaintiff’s “failure to respond to defendants’ five attempts to schedule a deposition date over a two-month period and failure to respond to any discovery requests required defendants to file multiple motions to compel and hindered defendants’ ability to prepare a defense.” Additionally, her failure “to comply with a stipulated order to file a preliminary witness list, and only disclosing [L] as her expert on the very last day of the deadline for filing final lay and expert witness lists, shortened the time that defendants had before trial to depose him and prepare a defense; this shortened time was further shortened by plaintiff’s unresponsiveness" in scheduling the deposition. The third and fourth Dean factors were satisfied.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Municipal (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Zoning

    e-Journal #: 72932
    Case: DeRuiter v. Township of Byron
    Court: Michigan Supreme Court ( Opinion )
    Judges: Bernstein, McCormack, Markman, Zahra, Viviano, Clement, and Cavanagh
    Issues:

    Whether defendant’s zoning ordinance (regulating the location of registered medical marijuana caregiver activities & requiring that a primary caregiver obtain a permit before cultivating medical marijuana) was preempted by the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA) (MCL 333.26421 et seq.); Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming (Ter Beek I & II); “Primary caregiver”; MCL 333.26423(k); “Qualifying patient”; MCL 333.26423(l); “Enclosed, locked facility”; MCL 333.26423(d); Prohibition against penalizing qualifying patients & primary caregivers who are in compliance with the MMMA; MCL 333.26424(a) & (b); Medical use of marijuana; MCL 333.26423(h); MCL 333.26427(a); Statutory interpretation; People v. Mazur; Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward; People v. Bylsma; Local government control over matters of local concern; City of Taylor v. Detroit Edison Co.; State preemption of local laws; Gun Owners, Inc. v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch.; Detroit v. Ambassador Bridge Co.; National Amusement Co. v. Johnson; Detroit v. Qualls; Miller v. Fabius Twp. Bd.; Direct conflict; People v. Llewellyn; Whether the MMMA nullifies a municipality’s inherent authority to regulate land use under the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA) (MCL 125.3101 et seq.)

    Summary:

    Holding that defendant-township’s home-occupation zoning ordinance did not directly conflict with the MMMA, the court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary and remanded. Plaintiff, a registered qualifying patient and primary caregiver under the MMMA, cultivated medical marijuana on rented commercially zoned property in defendant’s boundaries. Her landlord was directed by defendant’s supervisor to cease and desist or face legal action. When defendant attempted to enforce the ordinance, she sought a declaratory judgment as to its legality. Defendant then sought the same. The trial court held that the ordinance directly conflicted with, and thus was preempted by, the MMMA, and granted her motion for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the ordinance directly conflicts “with the MMMA because the act protects a registered caregiver from ‘penalty in any manner’ for ‘assisting a qualifying patient . . . with the medical use of marihuana’ so long as the caregiver abides by the MMMA’s volume limitations and restricts the cultivation to an ‘enclosed, locked facility.’” It concluded that “because an enclosed, locked facility could be found in various locations on various types of property, regardless of zoning, this requirement is not in conflict with a local regulation that limits where medical marijuana must be cultivated.” Further, because the “geographical restriction imposed by [the] ordinance adds to and complements the limitations imposed by the MMMA,” the court did not believe there was “a contradiction between the state law and the local ordinance.” It then held that the MMMA does not nullify a municipality’s inherent authority to regulate land use under the MZEA “so long as the municipality does not prohibit or penalize all medical marijuana cultivation” and “does not impose regulations that are ‘unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations established by state law.’” Finally, it rejected plaintiff’s claim that the permit requirement directly conflicted with the MMMA because it impermissibly infringed her medical use of marijuana, noting this requirement did not effectively prohibit the medical use of marijuana. As such, defendant “may require primary caregivers to obtain a permit and pay a fee before they use a building or structure" in the township to cultivate medical marijuana.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Termination of Parental Rights (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 72838
    Case: In re Wiertalla
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Sawyer, Letica, and Redford
    Issues:

    Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(i); Child’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re BZ; In re LaFrance Minors; In re Trejo Minors; In re White; The Child Custody Act (CCA); In re COH; Child Protective Services (CPS)

    Summary:

    Holding that the trial court correctly determined that termination served the child's (A) best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. He argued that the only evidence offered was his judgment of sentence, the CPS investigator’s testimony, and A’s biological mother’s (K) testimony, none of which addressed the best interests of A. The record reflected, “however, that the trial court reviewed evidence on the whole record at length to determine whether termination served” A’s best interests. The trial court specifically addressed the applicable factors discussed in White, “such as the child’s bond to the parent, the history of domestic violence, the history of visitation, and possibility of future adoption. The trial court also addressed several factors from the CCA, such as emotional bonds, moral fitness, and the length of respondent’s incarceration, and explained how each factor weighed in favor of finding that termination served” A’s best interests.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Zoning (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Municipal

    e-Journal #: 72932
    Case: DeRuiter v. Township of Byron
    Court: Michigan Supreme Court ( Opinion )
    Judges: Bernstein, McCormack, Markman, Zahra, Viviano, Clement, and Cavanagh
    Issues:

    Whether defendant’s zoning ordinance (regulating the location of registered medical marijuana caregiver activities & requiring that a primary caregiver obtain a permit before cultivating medical marijuana) was preempted by the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA) (MCL 333.26421 et seq.); Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming (Ter Beek I & II); “Primary caregiver”; MCL 333.26423(k); “Qualifying patient”; MCL 333.26423(l); “Enclosed, locked facility”; MCL 333.26423(d); Prohibition against penalizing qualifying patients & primary caregivers who are in compliance with the MMMA; MCL 333.26424(a) & (b); Medical use of marijuana; MCL 333.26423(h); MCL 333.26427(a); Statutory interpretation; People v. Mazur; Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward; People v. Bylsma; Local government control over matters of local concern; City of Taylor v. Detroit Edison Co.; State preemption of local laws; Gun Owners, Inc. v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch.; Detroit v. Ambassador Bridge Co.; National Amusement Co. v. Johnson; Detroit v. Qualls; Miller v. Fabius Twp. Bd.; Direct conflict; People v. Llewellyn; Whether the MMMA nullifies a municipality’s inherent authority to regulate land use under the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA) (MCL 125.3101 et seq.)

    Summary:

    Holding that defendant-township’s home-occupation zoning ordinance did not directly conflict with the MMMA, the court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary and remanded. Plaintiff, a registered qualifying patient and primary caregiver under the MMMA, cultivated medical marijuana on rented commercially zoned property in defendant’s boundaries. Her landlord was directed by defendant’s supervisor to cease and desist or face legal action. When defendant attempted to enforce the ordinance, she sought a declaratory judgment as to its legality. Defendant then sought the same. The trial court held that the ordinance directly conflicted with, and thus was preempted by, the MMMA, and granted her motion for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the ordinance directly conflicts “with the MMMA because the act protects a registered caregiver from ‘penalty in any manner’ for ‘assisting a qualifying patient . . . with the medical use of marihuana’ so long as the caregiver abides by the MMMA’s volume limitations and restricts the cultivation to an ‘enclosed, locked facility.’” It concluded that “because an enclosed, locked facility could be found in various locations on various types of property, regardless of zoning, this requirement is not in conflict with a local regulation that limits where medical marijuana must be cultivated.” Further, because the “geographical restriction imposed by [the] ordinance adds to and complements the limitations imposed by the MMMA,” the court did not believe there was “a contradiction between the state law and the local ordinance.” It then held that the MMMA does not nullify a municipality’s inherent authority to regulate land use under the MZEA “so long as the municipality does not prohibit or penalize all medical marijuana cultivation” and “does not impose regulations that are ‘unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations established by state law.’” Finally, it rejected plaintiff’s claim that the permit requirement directly conflicted with the MMMA because it impermissibly infringed her medical use of marijuana, noting this requirement did not effectively prohibit the medical use of marijuana. As such, defendant “may require primary caregivers to obtain a permit and pay a fee before they use a building or structure" in the township to cultivate medical marijuana.

    Full Text Opinion

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