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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Sufficiency of the evidence; Right to a unanimous jury verdict; MCR 6.410(B); People v. Cooks; People v. Fullwood; Unanimous verdict instruction; M Crim JI 16.25; Premeditation; MCL 750.316(1)(a); People v. Bass; People v. Oros; People v. Gonzalez; People v. Tilley; People v. Jackson; People v. Johnson; Consciousness of guilt; People v. Unger; People v. Usher; People v. Perry; People v. McGhee; People v. Casper; Felony murder; MCL 750.316(1)(b); People v. Gayheart; Torture; MCL 750.85; Evidence; Chain of custody; People v. Prast; People v. White; People v. Jennings; Foundation; People v. Beamon
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s torture conviction, and that there were no evidentiary errors. He was convicted of first-degree murder under multiple theories. The trial court sentenced him as a second offense habitual offender to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and 19 to 30 years for the torture conviction. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that there was insufficient evidence to support his torture conviction, and thus, it was impossible to know whether the jury reached a unanimous verdict on the first-degree murder conviction. He also claimed the trial court was required to instruct the jury that its verdict must be unanimous as to premeditated murder or felony murder. The trial court “was not required to give a specific unanimity instruction . . . because there was sufficient evidence to establish both first-degree premeditated murder and felony murder, the charges were proved by substantially the same evidence, and there was no evidence of juror confusion.” In addition, there was sufficient evidence that he was the murderer, there was premeditation, and “a substantial amount of circumstantial evidence showing consciousness of guilt was also submitted to the jury.” There was “sufficient evidence of the underlying felony of torture for the jury to find defendant guilty both of that underlying offense and of first-degree murder under a felony murder theory.” The evidence of confinement was significant, there was “considerable evidence of the victim’s struggle,” and there was evidence of torture. Finally, the court rejected his contention that the trial court erred by allowing the admission of DNA evidence found on a pair of his blue gym shorts because there was no proper foundation laid to admit the evidence and the handling of the shorts before their collection by forensic scientists contaminated them and broke the chain of custody. “The chain of custody does not begin until the evidence is seized by police.” Further, the “handling of the shorts had not substantially changed their condition before they were collected by law enforcement.” Moreover, the prosecution “laid the proper foundation for the DNA’s admission.” Affirmed.
Jury instruction on the defense of duress for the offenses of unlawfully driving away an automobile (UDAA) & failure to stop at the scene of an accident; People v. Gillis; People v. Armstrong; People v. Guajardo; M Crim JI 7.6; People v. Henderson; Sentencing; Reasonableness; People v. Lockridge; Proportionate sentence; People v. Milbourn; People v. Steanhouse; People v. Dixon-Bey; People v. Walden
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s request for a duress jury instruction. Also, the trial court’s articulated reasons showed that his 10-year minimum sentence qualified as proportionate under Milbourn, and thus was reasonable under Lockridge. He was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, OWI causing death, UDAA, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in serious impairment or death. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 10 to 15 years each for manslaughter and OWI causing death, 2 to 5 years for UDAA, and 40 months to 5 years for failure-to-stop. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on the defense of duress for the offenses of UDAA and failure to stop. The court held that the trial court’s decision to deny the requested instruction "did not fall outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” In order to establish the duress defense, “the threat compelling the defendant’s conduct must be ‘present, imminent, and impending[.]’” In this case, he “contended that he had been in a fight and believed that his assailants were chasing him to further assault him, which caused him to steal a vehicle and later flee the scene of the car accident.” While he presented “evidence of his belief that he was in imminent danger, there was no evidence of an actual threat.” His mere unsupported claim “that he was being chased was insufficient to support a duress defense. As the trial court observed, the evidence showed that defendant was not being chased.” Witnesses who observed his conduct did not see anyone pursuing him “on the road before the accident or when he fled the scene after the accident, and witnesses who were present at the earlier fight testified that no one followed” him when he left. Further, as the trial court noted, the fight occurred in one township, but the minivan was stolen in a different township and the accident occurred in that township. Thus, both events occurred “a considerable distance from the location of the fight. The fight also happened more than 2-1/2 hours before defendant stole the minivan and recklessly crashed into” the victim's car. In light of “the distance between the fight and the location of the offenses, the time interval between them, and the absence of any evidence showing the presence of an actual threat to defendant’s safety at the time the minivan was stolen or when” he left the accident scene, there was no basis for an instruction on the defense of duress. Affirmed.
Pretrial motion to suppress on-the-scene identification; People v. Winters; People v. Williams; People v. Colon; People v. Libbett; People v. Barclay; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Strickland v. Washington; People v. Russell; People v. Leblanc; People v. Ericksen; Failure to object to hearsay presented by the detective who testified regarding what witnesses told him with respect to defendant; MRE 801(c); MRE 802; People v. Chambers; People v. Gursky; Presenting witness testimony damaging to the defense; Trial strategy; People v. Dunigan; Failure to present an alibi defense; People v. Chapo; People v. Grant; People v. Hoag
The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in denying defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress. Also, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of armed robbery, felonious assault, and felony-firearm. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress the pizza delivery driver’s on-the-scene identification. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court agreed “with the trial court’s ruling, after an evidentiary hearing, that the pizza delivery driver’s on-the-scene identification of defendant was not based on an impermissibly suggestive procedure leading to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.” The driver’s testimony “indicated that he had a good opportunity to view the person who robbed him. The robber was within a couple feet of him during the robbery and wore nothing to hide his face.” The driver also “indicated that the parking lot was lit by streetlights and that he was very focused on the robber and the gun during the encounter. He provided a description of the robber and his actions. Based on his description, police were quickly able to connect the robbery to the later firing of shots from defendant’s vehicle.” The driver was “then quickly able to identify defendant as the robber with a high degree of certainty.” Also, the delivery driver identified defendant about an hour after the robbery occurred. Thus, the robber’s appearance was still fresh in his mind. The court has held “that it is proper . . . for the police to promptly conduct an on-the-scene identification.” The fact that defendant was in handcuffs near police cruisers and that an officer told the driver that he would not be able to see him was insufficient to show “clear error after the trial court clearly found that the other factors weighed in favor of the reliability of the identification.” Also, the issue whether the police told the delivery driver that they had “the guy” or “a guy” was “inconclusive because the delivery driver did not remember what wording was used. Regardless, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that the other factors weighed in favor of admitting the evidence of the on-the-scene identification.” Affirmed.
Disclosure of a confidential informant (CI); United States v. Doxey; Roviaro v. United States; United States v. Barnett; United States v. Lloyd; United States v. Ray; United States v. Sharp; United States v. Sierra-Villegas; United States v. Moore; Whether the government was required to release the CI’s identity so defendant could impeach him; United States v. Sales (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Cromer; Disclosure on the basis it was necessary for the asserted defense that the CI planted the gun; United States v. Beals; United States v. McManus; Motion for acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 on the basis defendant’s identity was not sufficiently established at trial; United States v. Clay; McDaniel v. Brown; United States v. Davis; United States v. Boyd (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Green (7th Cir.); Sentencing; Enhancement under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) & application of the “fortress theory”; United States v. Seymour; United States v. Ennenga; Buford v. United States; United States v. Angel; United States v. Shields; Proximity of the gun; United States v. Taylor
The court held that defendant-Shanklin was not entitled to have the identity of the CI disclosed because the CI’s statements were not offered for their truth, and in light of the evidence, Shanklin’s claim that he may have been framed was too speculative. The court also held that the district court properly denied his Rule 29 motion for acquittal as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of his identity as the perpetrator, and that the enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) was properly applied in sentencing him. He was convicted of felon in possession of a firearm. During a search of his home for drugs, police found a gun and ammunition in a nightstand. He argued that disclosure of the identity of a CI who saw the marijuana plants in his home was material to his defense as the CI or others may have framed him. The court rejected his claim that he should have been able to cross-examine the CI because the CI’s statements were not introduced for their truth, and they did not relate to the charged crime, but were only introduced as “background” for the search. He also offered no evidence that he did not own the gun or had never been seen possessing a weapon in the house. Additionally, the CI was “more aptly described as a ‘tipster,’ rather than an active participant.” The court also rejected Shanklin’s claim that his own identity as the perpetrator was not established at trial. He was continually referred to without objection as “the defendant,” and defense counsel referred to him by name and did not raise the identity issue during the trial. As to the application of the four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), he argued that the government did not show a “nexus” between the charged offense and the other felony. However, the court held that the district court properly applied the “fortress theory,” which sanctions the imposition of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) “‘if it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction.’” The court noted that there was no “bright-line test” for proximity in this circuit, but under deferential review, “the number and value of the marijuana plants[,] . . .the small size of the residence, the location of the loaded weapon in the bedroom, and the presence of drug paraphernalia throughout the house,” supported application of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Affirmed.
Motion to terminate civil-contempt sanctions; 28 USC § 1826; United States v. Mitchell; Armstrong v. Guccione (2d Cir.); Palmer v. United States (8th Cir.); Shillitani v. United States; 18 USC § 401(3); Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement; Interpretation of a plea agreement; United States v. Quesada; United States v. Lukse; Whether a term is ambiguous; Northwest OH Adm’rs, Inc. v. Walcher & Fox, Inc.; Whether defendant was a witness; § 1826(a); In re Martin-Trigona (2d Cir.); Non-testimonial conduct
The court held that because defendant-Thompson’s civil contempt was not predicated only on his failure to testify or answer questions but was also based on his failure to fulfill the non-testimonial requirements of his plea agreement, his incarceration for civil contempt did not fall under § 1826’s 18-month limitation. He was subject to civil contempt in an underlying civil suit after he transferred certain treasure-trove gold contrary to the district court’s orders. He then failed to attend his contempt hearing and “absconded to Florida[.]” An arrest warrant and a criminal complaint ensued. He entered into a plea agreement. The civil parties and receiver later moved for civil contempt, claiming he violated that agreement by not answering their questions at a debtor’s examination. After a criminal-contempt sentencing and a civil-contempt show-cause hearing, the district court sentenced Thompson to two years for criminal contempt but held that sentence in abeyance pending completion of his civil contempt sentence. For his civil contempt, it ordered him to “be incarcerated indefinitely” until he complied with the court order to provide the type of information he had agreed in the plea agreement to provide. Upon reaching 18 months of incarceration, he moved to terminate his civil contempt sanctions, arguing that his actions fell under § 1826(a), “the recalcitrant-witness statute,” and that he should be released under the statute’s 18-month limitation. The district court denied his motion. On appeal, the court examined the denial of his motion “for what it actually was: an interpretation of Thompson’s plea agreement.” It considered whether § 1826(a) applied to Thompson and held that under the statute’s plain language, the 18-month stricture would apply if he was held in contempt for “failing solely to sit for a debtor’s examination and to testify about the location of his assets[.]” However, his plea agreement and the district court’s order also required that he “‘assist’ the civil plaintiffs ‘in identifying and recovering assets.’” Thus, to the extent he “still refuses to comply with the district court’s order to sign a limited power of attorney, § 1826 does not limit the length of Thompson’s incarceration.” Instead, it is only restricted by the Due Process Clause and any changed circumstances that would prevent him from curing his contempt, and he presented no argument under either theory. Affirmed.
Sanction of dismissal; Vicencio v. Ramirez; Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co.; Duray Dev., LLC v. Perrin; MCR 2.504(B); Disobeying a court order to attend mediation; MCR 2.410(D)(3); MCR 2.410(D)(3)(b)(i)
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by levying the harsh sanction of dismissing plaintiff's claims and that dismissal under the circumstances resulted in manifest injustice. If his conduct in failing to attend court-ordered mediation “required a sanction, a lesser sanction would have better served the interests of justice.” Thus, it reversed the order dismissing plaintiff’s claim and remanded. The case arose out of a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff was driving when another driver, defendant-Dunn, “failed to yield the right of way to plaintiff’s vehicle, causing a collision in which plaintiff became disabled.” Defendant-Hastings Mutual Insurance Company “provided plaintiff with uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance coverage.” The only issue on appeal was whether dismissal was a proper sanction under the circumstances. Plaintiff contended that “it was not because he was available to attend the mediation telephonically and had no history of failing to participate in discovery or in the resolution process.” Hastings Mutual argued that “dismissal was proper because the trial court’s order demanded his attendance and did not specifically permit him to attend the mediation telephonically.” It appeared from the record that the trial court dismissed his claim “following one failure to appear as directed.” There was no indication that it “explored less extreme sanctions for plaintiff’s failure to appear personally at the mediation.” While it was unclear whether his physical absence “was willful or accidental, the record does not indicate that plaintiff had a history of refusing to comply with previous court orders or that he was deliberately delaying the proceedings.” Also, he tried “to cure his defect by being available telephonically for the mediation.” Further, there was no record evidence that Hastings Mutual “was unduly prejudiced by plaintiff’s absence. In light of these considerations, the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim as a sanction for not complying with the trial court’s order to appear at mediation seems unduly harsh.” For the same reasons, the court agreed “with plaintiff that the entry of a dismissal under the circumstances presented here causes manifest injustice.” His case was filed in 12/15 and “proceeded through extensive discovery, negotiations, settlement with the at-fault driver, and case evaluation until the dismissal in [3/18]. Given plaintiff’s pursuit of his claims thus far, it seems unreasonable to infer from [his] single absence that he had abandoned his cause, particularly given his attorney’s presence at the mediation and his offer to attend telephonically.”
Responsibility for payment of tax under the lessee-user statute (MCL 211.181); Use & user defined; The concession exemption; Skybolt P’ship v. City of Flint; Kalamazoo v. Richland Twp.; Seymour v. Dalton Twp.; Golf Concepts v. City of Rochester Hills
On remand from the Supreme Court, and after remand to the Tax Tribunal (TT), the court held that the TT did not err in finding that petitioner operated the golf course as a business, rather than providing services to a village in operating the village’s course. Further, the TT did not err in concluding that the concession exemption in MCL 211.181(2)(b) did not apply. Thus, it affirmed the TT’s determination that petitioner was responsible for paying tax under the lessee-user statute. The court previously reversed the TT’s ruling, but the Supreme Court reversed the court, concluding that it should have remanded the case to the TT for a determination of whether petitioner used the course in connection with a for-profit business, and directing the court to do so. On remand, after reviewing the dictionary definitions of use and user, the TT concluded that petitioner fell within those definitions. The court noted that petitioner presented little argument that it was “not a ‘user’ under the statute beyond the fact that the golf course has consistently operated at a loss.” But the court already rejected this argument in its prior opinion. Further, as the TT found, the sole member of petitioner (an LLC) reported all profit and losses from petitioner and other LLCs “on his personal income tax return, and in 2014 and 2015, offset profits with losses, and personally made money.” This reinforced the TT’s “conclusion that petitioner operated the golf course as a business, rather than operating a property management business that provided such services to the village in operating the village’s golf course.” Thus, the court was not persuaded that the TT “erred in determining that, under the structure established by the agreement in this case, this is not a case of petitioner operating a management company managing a golf course, but using the Village’s property to operate a golf course company.” The court also was not persuaded that the TT erred in concluding that the concession exemption did not apply. It agreed with the TT that “the agreement in this case left too much operational control in the hands of petitioner in privatizing the entire golf course operation.” Similar to the court’s analysis of the lessee-user issue, “under this agreement, petitioner operated a golf course on the village’s property rather than operating a concession at the village’s golf course.”
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (j), (k)(ii), & (k)(ix); In re VanDalen; In re HRC; In re LE; Sexual abuse defined; Section 520a of the Michigan Penal Code; 1931 PA 328; MCL 750.520a; MCL 722.622(z); MCL 750.520a(q); Sexual penetration defined; MCL 750.520a(r); In re AH; In re Hudson; Child’s best interests; In re Moss Minors; In re White; In re Olive/Metts Minors; Third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC III)
The court held that the trial court properly terminated respondent-father’s parental rights to the child (R) where the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence and it was in R’s best interests. The father argued that the DHHS failed to establish the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence because there was no evidence that R faced a reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to his care. The case arose from the termination of the father’s parental rights because he sexually abused R’s half-sister, D, in R’s presence. The father pled guilty in a criminal case to performing oral sex on D and digitally penetrating her. D was 17 years old when the abuse occurred. The father pled guilty to CSC III and the trial court took judicial notice of his criminal case. Thus, the DHHS established by clear and convincing evidence that he sexually abused one of R’s siblings as required by §§ (b)(i) and (k)(ix), and the sexual abuse included penetration as required by § (k)(ii). There was also a reasonable likelihood that R would be harmed if returned to the father’s care. His sexual abuse of D was probative of how he may treat R. The evidence established that R witnessed the father sexually abuse D. R “suffered trauma from that experience for which she received ongoing trauma therapy. Evidence established that” the father’s actions negatively affected R’s mental and emotional health. Thus, clear and convincing evidence established that a reasonable likelihood existed that R will be harmed if returned to the father’s care. Affirmed.