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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.

 

 

Case Summary

Includes a summary of one Michigan Supreme Court order under Criminal Law.


Cases appear under the following practice areas:

  • Corrections (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 70644
    Case: Kasben v. Department of Corr.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Gleicher, Ronayne Krause, and O’Brien
    Issues:

    Original action seeking a writ of mandamus to order a discharge of parole; Riley v. Parole Bd.; A ministerial act; Hanlin v. Saugatuck Twp.; The defendant-Parole Board’s jurisdiction; MCL 791.234(1); The defendant-Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) policy directive relating to a “non-controlling sentence” (MDOC PD 03.01.135(PP))

    Summary:

    Concluding that it could not grant plaintiff-prisoner any relief related to the alleged rescission of his parole as defendant-Parole Board lost jurisdiction over him and never actually revoked or rescinded his parole, the court denied his request for a writ of mandamus. He sought to have the court direct the Parole Board to discharge his parole arising from his 2011 fraud-based convictions. He was granted parole in 2014 for a 15-month period set to expire in 1/16. He was arrested and charged in two separate CSC cases in 2015. In one case, he pled guilty to CSC II and was sentenced to 10 to 15 years. In the other, he pled guilty to CSC IV and was sentenced to 16 months to 2 years. He has completed the latter sentence, but his earliest possible release date for the CSC II conviction is in 2023. After his arrest in 2015, the MDOC notified him “that his parole for the 2011 offenses was ‘rescinded’ based on the CSC charges levied against him.” The court noted that this “notice conflated parole rescission with parole revocation.” No rescission interview or fact-finding hearing was held because plaintiff’s “parole actually was not rescinded and because [his] felony CSC convictions rendered him ineligible for a revocation hearing.” He unsuccessfully filed a series of grievances, and then filed an original action in the court for a writ of mandamus. The court held that it could not grant him any relief. Defendants had never actually entered an order rescinding his parole and there was no order for the court to vacate. It also could not order defendants “to conduct a parole-revocation hearing or to discharge” him from parole retroactive to 1/16. He was “in prison on new charges and will remain there until at least 2023. The Parole Board lacks jurisdiction to make any decisions until that time.” The court noted that this resolution was supported by MDOC PD 03.01.135(PP), which “provides that a ‘non-controlling sentence,’ such as [his] shorter check fraud sentences, ‘shall be terminated upon completion of the maximum sentence plus any applicable dead time.’ When that date is reached, defendants will be required to terminate the sentences arising from his 2011 convictions.” In the meantime, he was not entitled to relief.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Criminal Law (5)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 70719
    Case: People v. Wilder
    Court: Michigan Supreme Court ( Order )
    Judges: McCormack, Viviano, Markman, Zahra, Bernstein, Clement, and Cavanagh
    Issues:

    Harmless error; People v. Lukity

    Summary:

    In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated Part III of the Court of Appeals opinion (see e-Journal # 69092 in the 12/5/18 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of defendant’s argument as to the cross-examination of his wife (T) about her knowledge of his prior firearms-related convictions. The court held that the Court of Appeals erred in asserting that T’s erroneously admitted testimony about “her knowledge of the defendant’s prior firearms-related convictions was harmless due to the ‘untainted and unequivocal testimony’ of two police officers that they saw the defendant in possession of the gun. The Court of Appeals failed to acknowledge that two other witnesses” (R and W) gave testimony that contradicted the officers’ testimony. This “failure resulted in the Court of Appeals effectively determining that the officers’ testimony was credible and that” the testimony of R and W was not. “On remand, the Court of Appeals shall engage in ‘an examination of the entire cause,’” as provided in Lukity, and reconsider whether it was “more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.”

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Juvenile Law

    e-Journal #: 70643
    Case: In re Triplett
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Shapiro, Borrello, and Beckering
    Issues:

    Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Trakhtenberg; People v. Rodgers; Failure to advise defendant of the pros & cons of testifying in his own defense; Failure to discuss possible defense strategies

    Summary:

    Holding that respondent-juvenile was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, the court affirmed the order of adjudication sustaining the charges of fourth-degree fleeing and eluding and possession of tobacco by a minor, and dismissing the charge of possession of marijuana. The case arose from a traffic stop. Respondent argued that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of the advantages and disadvantages of testifying in his own defense. Even if the court assumed for the sake of argument that counsel did not discuss with him the pros and cons of testifying, respondent “failed to present evidence that, but for this alleged deficiency, the outcome of the bench trial would have been different.” The trial court did not rely on his “trial testimony to find him guilty of fleeing and eluding a police officer, but on the properly admitted dash camera video from” Deputy R’s patrol vehicle. Ruling from the bench, the trial court said that it found respondent’s reply to R’s “question about why he pulled into the first driveway indicative of respondent’s frame of mind.” It noted that “it had counted the lapse of time between when the deputy activated his lights and when respondent pulled into the second driveway and concluded that respondent had had plenty of time to stop before getting to the second driveway.” The fact that he “did not stop, coupled with his statement indicating, in the words of the court, ‘that he knew he was being followed earlier or that he would be . . . and he did not want to be pulled over,’ proved beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent was guilty of fleeing and eluding.” Based on “the fact that the trial court based its guilty verdict on the dash camera video and not on respondent’s testimony, even if respondent’s counsel had discussed with him the pros and cons of testifying, and even if respondent had elected not to testify, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.” He also contended that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to discuss possible defenses with him. This contention was without merit. Counsel “provided a defense consistent with respondent’s explanation" of events. Respondent did “not indicate what other reasonable defenses might have been available under the circumstances, nor has he proven that, but for counsel’s failure to discuss defenses with him, the outcome of the case would have been different.”

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 70646
    Case: People v. Doolittle
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Shapiro, Borrello, and Beckering
    Issues:

    Sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict for conviction of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH); MCL 750.84; People v. Blevins; People v. Harrington; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 7 at 50 points; “Aggravated physical abuse”; MCL 777.37(1); People v. Steanhouse (On Remand); Excessive brutality defined; People v. Rosa; People v. Urban; People v. Kegler; Restitution award

    Summary:

    The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s jury trial conviction of AWIGBH, and that the trial court did not err in assessing 50 points under OV 7 based on his treatment of the victim with excessive brutality, or in awarding $268 in restitution. Defendant argued that the evidence did not support a finding that he had the intent to do great bodily harm less than murder because one witness testified that he “wasn’t punching real ‘hard’ hard, he just had his arm all the way back . . . ,” there was no evidence that he “kicked the victim or hit him with the railing that dislodged, and the victim’s injuries were not severe.” The court disagreed. Review of the record revealed that the evidence unequivocally established the elements necessary to sustain the jury’s verdict. “Defendant punched the victim 31 times, mostly in the head, all the while repeatedly exclaiming that he intended to kill the victim and did not care whether the victim died, ignoring the pleas of the victim and several bystanders. The assault lasted upwards of 10 minutes, and for much if not all of that time, the victim remained curled up in a fetal position, attempting to protect himself from the blows.” When slamming the victim into the wall, he “used enough force to break a railing or banister fixture off the wall, and another witness testified that the beating was ‘real bad.’” In reaching its conclusion, the court found that his argument that he could have resorted to more severe actions did “not negate or reduce the criminality of the actions to which he did resort,” which it held were wholly sufficient to sustain his conviction. Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 70640
    Case: People v. Hall
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Tukel and Gadola; Concurring in part, Dissenting in part - Shapiro
    Issues:

    Batson challenge; Batson v. Kentucky; People v. Knight; People v Bell; Hernandez v. New York; People v. Tennille; People v. Williams; Credibility assessments; MCR 2.613(C); A fact-finder’s choice between two permissible views of the evidence; Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, NC; Lack of voir dire; Miller-El v. Dretke; Whether the prosecutor truthfully set forth the reason for the juror strike; Admission of a party-opponent under MRE 801(d)(2)(A); Applicability of MRE 404(b); People v. Goddard; People v. Sabin (After Remand); Harmless error; People v. Denson; People v. Snyder; Admission of a transcript of defendant’s police interview; The best evidence rule; MRE 1002; People v. Karalla; Accuracy of the transcript; People v. Lester; United States v. King (6th Cir.); United States v. Wilkinson (6th Cir.); People v. Benton

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court did not err in finding no Batson violation, and it found no basis for rejecting the trial court’s determination that the juror strike was permissible. Further, considering the weight and strength of the properly admitted evidence, it was highly unlikely that any error in the admission of defendant’s statement under MRE 801(d)(2)(A) or the transcript of his police interview affected the outcome of trial. He was convicted of CSC I and II. He argued that the prosecution “used peremptory challenges to systematically exclude African-Americans from the jury without valid, race-neutral reasons.” Both parties asserted that the trial court did not “faithfully adhere to the three-step Batson process for assessing the constitutional propriety of a peremptory challenge.” Considering the Batson steps in order, the prosecution was “correct that the trial court did not address the first step insofar as the trial court failed to consider whether defendant” had made a prima facie showing of discrimination. “However, ‘[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant’” made such a showing becomes moot. Having conceded the first step in the trial court, the prosecution could not now ask the court to determine that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination. Instead, the issue before the court involved an analysis of the application of steps two and three. As to step two, the trial court did not err by holding that the prosecution “offered race-neutral reasons for excusing the jurors in question.” As to step three, the court held that because “the trial court entertained competing arguments on the jurors’ behavior and the question of pretext, the trial court clearly understood its role and, in crediting the prosecutor’s reasons as ‘legitimate,’ the trial court made a reasoned determination that the prosecutor’s strikes were, in fact, not racially motivated and therefore not pretextual.” The court noted that the trial court considered the circumstances surrounding the exercise of the peremptory challenges. There were “two permissible views of the evidence—either the prosecutor’s explanations were pretextual or they were sincere.” The trial court’s factual determination as to the genuineness of the explanations “could not be clearly erroneous.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 70650
    Case: People v. Seamon
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Swartzle, M.J. Kelly, and Tukel
    Issues:

    Sentencing; People v. Steanhouse; People v. Lockridge; People v. Conley; Effect of a within guidelines sentence; People v. Schrauben; MCL 769.34(10); Presumptive proportionality; People v. Bowling; Consecutive sentences; People v. Norfleet; MCL 333.7401(3)

    Summary:

    Given that defendant’s minimum sentence was within his guidelines range, the court concluded that it had to affirm his sentence. It also rejected his challenge to the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences, noting that this was authorized by MCL 333.7401(3) and holding that the trial court articulated a sufficient reason for imposing them. He pled guilty to 2 counts of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of narcotics, in violation of MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 3-1/2 to 20 years for each conviction. His guidelines range was 19 to 47 months. The trial court justified his minimum 42-month “sentence in part by stating that it was within the guidelines,” and thus, sufficiently articulated its reasons for imposing it. He did not allege that the guidelines were erroneously scored “or that the trial court relied on inaccurate information,” and he did not identify “any unusual circumstances that would render his within-guidelines sentence disproportionate.” The court also rejected his challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences, which was authorized by law. To the extent he suggested that his two proportionate sentences were “disproportionate merely because they are to be served consecutively,” this had no merit. In Norfleet, the court rejected “the argument that proportionality challenges for consecutive sentencing should be based on the cumulative effect of the sentences; instead, ‘a proportionality challenge to a given sentence must be based on the individual term imposed.’” While he also claimed that the trial court failed to sufficiently articulate its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, the court disagreed. The “trial court noted that defendant had a long history of dealing and selling drugs and had failed to ‘straighten out and do something else,’ despite his numerous prior controlled substance convictions and sentences and his background, which afforded ‘no real excuse for this.’” As shown by Norfleet, a trial court is permitted “to rely on a defendant’s excessive criminal history and ‘multiple failures to rehabilitate,’ in deciding to impose consecutive sentencing.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Employment & Labor Law (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 70647
    Case: Gleason v. Delta Coll.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Shapiro, Borrello, and Beckering
    Issues:

    The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) (MCL 15.361 et seq.); MCL 15.362; Prima facie case; West v. General Motors Corp.; Causation; Shaw v. Ecorse; Timing of the adverse action combined with other factors; Henry v. Detroit; Failure to follow internal policies; Credibility determination; People v. Lemon; Rebuttable presumption of retaliation; Debano-Griffin v. Lake Cnty.; Legitimate reasons for the termination decision; Due process; Failure to support an argument; Ambs v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Rd. Comm’n; Reporting of a suspected violation of the Family Educational Rights & Privacy Act (FERPA) (20 USC § 1232g)

    Summary:

    Holding that plaintiff did not establish the causation element of his WPA claim, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant. He was formerly a professor employed by defendant. He alleged that he was terminated for reporting a suspected FERPA violation. The only contested issue was causation. While he argued that he offered “sufficient circumstantial evidence of retaliation to survive summary disposition by showing that the timing of” the adverse employment action in relation to the protected activity was suspicious, the court disagreed. Rather, it concluded that his implication of a causal link was simply speculation. The circumstantial evidence he proffered to establish causation—a memorandum by a dean, another professor’s (W) professional integrity complaint, and the college president’s “indication that plaintiff was concerned about a FERPA violation—do not ‘facilitate reasonable inferences of causation.’” The court concluded that the fact these events occurred after he reported a potential FERPA violation did not establish “a causal connection between the protected activity and defendant’s eventual termination of plaintiff’s employment.” The record clearly showed that there was “nothing ‘suspicious’ about the evidence proffered by plaintiff as demonstrative of causation.” Further, he did not point to any “evidence indicating that defendant treated him differently after he reported the potential FERPA violation.” The evidence he offered indisputably arose from “the unresolved conflict between plaintiff and [W]; considered in the context of the whole record, plaintiff’s report of the FERPA violation appears as a minor incident in the otherwise ongoing professional dispute.” Thus, he did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation based on the timing of events. Because he did not establish a prima facie case from which a fact-finder could reasonably infer the existence of a causal link "between plaintiff’s report of a potential FERPA violation and defendant’s eventual termination of plaintiff’s employment, no presumption of retaliation” arose. Thus, the court did not have to consider his claim “that defendant’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its adverse employment action were mere pretexts.” The court added that, if it were to consider this argument, it “would find it lacking.”

    Full Text Opinion

  • Juvenile Law (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Criminal Law

    e-Journal #: 70643
    Case: In re Triplett
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Shapiro, Borrello, and Beckering
    Issues:

    Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Trakhtenberg; People v. Rodgers; Failure to advise defendant of the pros & cons of testifying in his own defense; Failure to discuss possible defense strategies

    Summary:

    Holding that respondent-juvenile was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, the court affirmed the order of adjudication sustaining the charges of fourth-degree fleeing and eluding and possession of tobacco by a minor, and dismissing the charge of possession of marijuana. The case arose from a traffic stop. Respondent argued that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of the advantages and disadvantages of testifying in his own defense. Even if the court assumed for the sake of argument that counsel did not discuss with him the pros and cons of testifying, respondent “failed to present evidence that, but for this alleged deficiency, the outcome of the bench trial would have been different.” The trial court did not rely on his “trial testimony to find him guilty of fleeing and eluding a police officer, but on the properly admitted dash camera video from” Deputy R’s patrol vehicle. Ruling from the bench, the trial court said that it found respondent’s reply to R’s “question about why he pulled into the first driveway indicative of respondent’s frame of mind.” It noted that “it had counted the lapse of time between when the deputy activated his lights and when respondent pulled into the second driveway and concluded that respondent had had plenty of time to stop before getting to the second driveway.” The fact that he “did not stop, coupled with his statement indicating, in the words of the court, ‘that he knew he was being followed earlier or that he would be . . . and he did not want to be pulled over,’ proved beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent was guilty of fleeing and eluding.” Based on “the fact that the trial court based its guilty verdict on the dash camera video and not on respondent’s testimony, even if respondent’s counsel had discussed with him the pros and cons of testifying, and even if respondent had elected not to testify, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.” He also contended that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to discuss possible defenses with him. This contention was without merit. Counsel “provided a defense consistent with respondent’s explanation" of events. Respondent did “not indicate what other reasonable defenses might have been available under the circumstances, nor has he proven that, but for counsel’s failure to discuss defenses with him, the outcome of the case would have been different.”

    Full Text Opinion

  • Litigation (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Negligence & Intentional Tort

    e-Journal #: 70638
    Case: Palmer v. Attorney Gen.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Sawyer, Cavanagh, and Servitto
    Issues:

    Collateral estoppel; Ditmore v. Michalik; Monat v. State Farm Ins. Co.; Crossover estoppel between civil & criminal cases; Barrow v. Pritchard; Identical issues; Keywell & Rosenfeld v. Bithell; Principle that a matter resolved by a no contest plea has not been “actually litigated”; Lichon v. American Universal Ins. Co.; MRE 410; Defamation; Sakar v. Doe; Smith v. Anonymous Joint Enter.; Requirement that a defamation claim be pled with specificity; Ghanam v. Does; Words charging the commission of a crime as defamation per se; Lawrence v. Burdi; Truth as an absolute defense; Wilson v. Sparrow Health Sys.; Collins v. Detroit Free Press, Inc.; Whether an affidavit created genuine issues of material fact; Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co.; Right result reached for the wrong reason; Wickings v. Artic Enters., Inc.; Tortious interference with business relationships; Health Call of Detroit v. Atrium Home & Health Care Servs., Inc.; Badiee v. Brighton Area Schs.; Cedroni Assoc., Inc v. Tomblinson, Harburn Assoc., Architects & Planners, Inc.; Lakeshore Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Perry; A manufactured or false representation; Wood v. Herndon & Herndon Investigations, Inc.; Establishing that a lawful act was done with malice; BPS Clinical Labs. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of MI; Injunctive relief; Davis v. City of Detroit Fin. Review Team; MCR 3.310; Objective of a preliminary injunction; Michigan AFSCME Council 25 v. Woodhaven-Brownstown Sch. Dist.

    Summary:

    While collateral estoppel did not apply, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants on plaintiffs’ defamation and tortious interference with business relationships claims. It concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the allegedly false and defamatory statements were substantially true or that plaintiffs failed to establish the third element of their tortious interference claim. Finally, their motion for a preliminary injunction was also properly denied. The case arose from “the issuance and online posting of a press release by defendants” about plaintiff-Palmer, a former State Representative, who was a partner of plaintiff-Amerivest and acted as its president and manager. Defendant-Schuette was the former Michigan Attorney General, and defendant-Teter is an assistant attorney general. A misdemeanor complaint was filed against Palmer alleging a count of neglect of duty. He pled no contest. The misdemeanor complaint was used as a factual basis for the plea. The court noted that “a matter resolved by a no contest, or nolo contendere plea, has not been ‘actually litigated’ for” collateral estoppel purposes. Thus, the trial court erred in determining “that plaintiffs had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ whether the introductory paragraphs of the misdemeanor complaint and the statements made at the hearing were actually true.” Further, collateral estoppel did not apply because plaintiffs did “not challenge the factual basis included in the misdemeanor complaint and on the record as the basis for which Palmer entered his no contest plea.” Instead, they challenged “the language used in the press release, issued after the plea hearing and entry of the plea, as defamatory and constituting a tortious interference with business relations.” The trial court misapplied the collateral estoppel doctrine to their claims in this case. However, defendants were properly granted summary disposition on the defamation claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “because the complaint and the transcript from [the] plea and sentencing hearing established that the allegedly false and defamatory statements were substantially true, so there were no genuine issues of material fact.” Plaintiffs also failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as to “an ‘intentional interference by the defendant inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy.’” They offered “no evidence of malice, or any actions taken with the purpose of interfering with” their businesses. Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Negligence & Intentional Tort (2)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 70663
    Case: Castro v. Duesette
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Tukel and Gadola; Dissent - Shapiro
    Issues:

    Auto negligence; Elements of negligence; Loweke v. Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co., LLC; The No-Fault Act (MCL 500.3101 et seq.); McCormick v. Carrier; Serious impairment of body function; MCL 500.3135(1) & (5); Proximate cause; Wilkinson v. Lee; Craig v. Oakwood Hosp.; Weymers v. Khera; Legal cause; Ray v. Swagger; Cause in fact; Patrick v. Turkelson; Speculation or conjecture; Sniecinski v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of MI; Aggravation or triggering of a preexisting condition; Fisher v. Blankenship

    Summary:

    The court held that because plaintiff’s assertion of cause and effect was “purely speculative,” the trial court properly determined that he did not establish cause in fact. Also, because there appeared to be no change in his general ability to lead his normal life, defendants were correctly granted summary disposition, as there was no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff had not suffered a serious impairment of body function. The case arose from his claim that he suffered injuries due to the 2013 auto accident at issue. In 1998 and 2003, plaintiff was involved in other auto accidents. Also, he reported a workplace injury in 2012. Defendants contended that he failed to show that his alleged injuries were caused by the 2013 collision. They supported their claims with the report of a doctor who examined plaintiff and his medical history. Plaintiff presented his treatment records from physical therapy, and argued that they represented an opinion by the physical therapists that his injuries arose from the 2013 collision. He asserted that “four Treatment and Assessment Plans created by” the therapists indicated that his “neck and shoulder injuries were the direct result of the 2013 collision.” However, review of the reports suggested that they were simply evaluations of his condition by the treatment staff and did “not represent a medical opinion of causation.” He also submitted the report of Dr. B, an orthopedic surgeon who examined him on behalf of an insurer. B stated “that there was a causal relation between the collision and plaintiff’s injuries, but also stated: ‘There is no evidence of any medical condition that predated the motor vehicle accident that has been exacerbated by the accident.’” The report indicated it was “based in part on plaintiff’s history as reported by plaintiff.” B’s report was not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on causation. Plaintiff’s medical history clearly showed that he “suffered from preexisting neck and shoulder conditions, and necessitates comparison of the medical evidence before and after” the 2013 collision to ascertain whether his condition changed as a result of it. B’s report demonstrated that “his opinion was made without this necessary comparison of the medical evidence. Rather, [B] simply accepted plaintiff’s word that he had no preexisting condition and that his symptoms were related to” the 2013 collision. To show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 2013 “collision was the cause in fact of his alleged injuries” plaintiff had to “establish a logical sequence of cause and effect” – mere speculation was inadequate. Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Litigation

    e-Journal #: 70638
    Case: Palmer v. Attorney Gen.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Sawyer, Cavanagh, and Servitto
    Issues:

    Collateral estoppel; Ditmore v. Michalik; Monat v. State Farm Ins. Co.; Crossover estoppel between civil & criminal cases; Barrow v. Pritchard; Identical issues; Keywell & Rosenfeld v. Bithell; Principle that a matter resolved by a no contest plea has not been “actually litigated”; Lichon v. American Universal Ins. Co.; MRE 410; Defamation; Sakar v. Doe; Smith v. Anonymous Joint Enter.; Requirement that a defamation claim be pled with specificity; Ghanam v. Does; Words charging the commission of a crime as defamation per se; Lawrence v. Burdi; Truth as an absolute defense; Wilson v. Sparrow Health Sys.; Collins v. Detroit Free Press, Inc.; Whether an affidavit created genuine issues of material fact; Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co.; Right result reached for the wrong reason; Wickings v. Artic Enters., Inc.; Tortious interference with business relationships; Health Call of Detroit v. Atrium Home & Health Care Servs., Inc.; Badiee v. Brighton Area Schs.; Cedroni Assoc., Inc v. Tomblinson, Harburn Assoc., Architects & Planners, Inc.; Lakeshore Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Perry; A manufactured or false representation; Wood v. Herndon & Herndon Investigations, Inc.; Establishing that a lawful act was done with malice; BPS Clinical Labs. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of MI; Injunctive relief; Davis v. City of Detroit Fin. Review Team; MCR 3.310; Objective of a preliminary injunction; Michigan AFSCME Council 25 v. Woodhaven-Brownstown Sch. Dist.

    Summary:

    While collateral estoppel did not apply, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants on plaintiffs’ defamation and tortious interference with business relationships claims. It concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the allegedly false and defamatory statements were substantially true or that plaintiffs failed to establish the third element of their tortious interference claim. Finally, their motion for a preliminary injunction was also properly denied. The case arose from “the issuance and online posting of a press release by defendants” about plaintiff-Palmer, a former State Representative, who was a partner of plaintiff-Amerivest and acted as its president and manager. Defendant-Schuette was the former Michigan Attorney General, and defendant-Teter is an assistant attorney general. A misdemeanor complaint was filed against Palmer alleging a count of neglect of duty. He pled no contest. The misdemeanor complaint was used as a factual basis for the plea. The court noted that “a matter resolved by a no contest, or nolo contendere plea, has not been ‘actually litigated’ for” collateral estoppel purposes. Thus, the trial court erred in determining “that plaintiffs had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ whether the introductory paragraphs of the misdemeanor complaint and the statements made at the hearing were actually true.” Further, collateral estoppel did not apply because plaintiffs did “not challenge the factual basis included in the misdemeanor complaint and on the record as the basis for which Palmer entered his no contest plea.” Instead, they challenged “the language used in the press release, issued after the plea hearing and entry of the plea, as defamatory and constituting a tortious interference with business relations.” The trial court misapplied the collateral estoppel doctrine to their claims in this case. However, defendants were properly granted summary disposition on the defamation claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “because the complaint and the transcript from [the] plea and sentencing hearing established that the allegedly false and defamatory statements were substantially true, so there were no genuine issues of material fact.” Plaintiffs also failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as to “an ‘intentional interference by the defendant inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy.’” They offered “no evidence of malice, or any actions taken with the purpose of interfering with” their businesses. Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

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