Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Action for breach of a real property purchase agreement; Dismissal of claim for monetary damages; Lost profits; Fera v Village Plaza, Inc; Contractual attorney fees; “Prevailing party”; Van Zanten v H Vander Laan Co, Inc; Mitchell v Dahlberg; Postjudgment motion to enforce an addendum reflecting a settlement agreement; Medical marihuana facility (MMF)
The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in determining plaintiff “failed to prove lost profits with reasonable certainty” and in granting defendants’ motion for involuntary dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for money damages in this action for breach of a real property purchase agreement. It further concluded that the trial court did not err in denying contractual attorney fees to both plaintiff and defendants on the basis none of the parties were prevailing parties. Finally, it did not abuse its discretion in declining to address defendants’ postjudgment motion to enforce an addendum. After plaintiff filed this suit, defendants “acknowledged that they wrongfully breached the” agreement. In the 2019 Addendum, the parties stipulated to dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against defendant-Premier, “except for any monetary damages from breach of the” agreement, and “agreed that if plaintiff received an award of monetary damages, it would be offset against the balance of payment” plaintiff owed defendants. After they closed the sale, plaintiff resold the property, making at least a $200,000 profit. At trial, it sought to recover “damages for lost profits it allegedly would have received if it had obtained a license and operated an MMF on the property.” The court concluded that even if plaintiff’s proffered testimony “was competent to show with a reasonable degree of certainty anticipated revenue from on ongoing MMF, . . . there were other deficiencies in the evidence related to plaintiff’s claim of lost profits, given that plaintiff never actually opened an MMF and the evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate how soon plaintiff would have been able to obtain the necessary licensure to operate an MMF if it had been able to move sooner, or the costs involved in establishing the property as an operational MMF. The trial court, as the trier of fact, had reasonable bases for questioning the reliability of plaintiff’s proffered evidence of lost profits.” The court also held that it “did not abuse its discretion or misconstrue the contract when it concluded that neither party fully prevailed in this action. Defendants were nonprevailing parties” as to the stipulations admitting liability for breach of the agreement and “paid a $5,000 application fee for” plaintiff. Plaintiff was a nonprevailing party as “to the claims dismissed pursuant to the parties’ stipulations and” the one claim resolved at trial. Affirmed.
Sentencing; Refusal to admit guilt; People v Payne; Upward departure; People v Lampe
Rejecting defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly relied on his refusal to admit guilt in sentencing him, and concluding that it properly justified its upward departure from the guidelines, the court affirmed his sentences. He was convicted of AWIGBH and assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer. He was sentenced as a second-offense habitual offender to concurrent terms of 100 to 180 months and 24 to 36 months, respectively. His minimum guidelines range for his AWIGBH conviction was 34 to 83 months. Considering the Payne factors used to determine if “a sentencing court improperly considered a defendant’s refusal to admit guilt[,]” the court found that defendant failed to show the trial court erred. As to the first factor, it acknowledged he asserted “he acted in self-defense (however reasonable that assertion is)” and had never admitted guilt. As to the second factor, nothing in the record substantiated that the trial court tried to make him admit guilt. It simply stated his “apology lacked remorse, and that this was exemplified by him maintaining that he acted in self-defense.” He conflated its determination that he failed to show “remorse with the proposition that it could not consider defendant’s admission, or lack thereof, of guilt.” Finally, there was no indication he “would have received a lesser sentence if he had expressly admitted guilt.” The record showed “the trial court did not factor a lack of admission into” its sentence. Rather, it was concerned with his ability to be rehabilitated; his “danger to society given the nature of his assault; and defendant’s lack of remorse.” As the court held in Lampe, expressions of remorse and rehabilitation potential are factors that may be considered in sentencing. As to the upward departure, there was no merit in defendant’s claim “the trial court improperly took into account his relapse with drug addiction” – it connected his “relapse with his ability to be rehabilitated.” The court disagreed that his sentence “was disproportionate and unreasonable.” The trial court stated that the guidelines “did not account for the seriousness of the offense because defendant slit [victim-C’s] throat from behind and repeatedly stabbed him,” while C was unable to defend himself due to positioning in the car. It also stated that the guidelines failed to properly account for his “lack of remorse and ability to rehabilitate himself after his prior convictions.”
Petition to modify the child’s birth record to reflect petitioner’s correct name as the mother
The court reversed the trial court’s order denying petitioner-mother’s petition to modify the birth record of her child (DSG) and dismissing the case, and remanded. Her brief was “largely devoted to explaining why she provided a false name for herself at the time DSG was born and arguing that MCL 333.2831(b) violates equal protection.” However, the fundamental issue was whether she could “amend DSG’s birth certificate to correctly reflect petitioner’s actual name where petitioner has been unable to identify a statute explicitly directed at providing a remedy for the unusual factual circumstances presented.” Nonetheless, the court could “discern no legitimate reason petitioner should not be granted the relief she seeks.” She admitted that “she provided the false name and was the cause of the current issue. She has provided evidence to establish that she is the biological mother of DSG.” There was no one “disputing her contention about how her name should be listed on the birth certificate. Petitioner, DSG, and the public all have an interest in the accuracy of birth records.” The court was “not aware of any legal authority prohibiting the correction sought” here. Pursuant to MCR 7.216(A)(7), the court remanded and directed to the trial “court to enter an appropriate order authorizing the correction of DSG’s birth certificate to reflect petitioner’s correct name as DSG’s mother.”
Divorce; De novo hearing; MCL 552.507; MCR 3.215(E)(4) & (F)(2); MCL 552.507(4); Judgment of divorce (JOD)
The court concluded that “the trial court committed clear legal error by failing to hold a live hearing at which plaintiff could present evidence, subject to the restrictions permitted by MCR 3.215(F)(2).” Thus, it vacated the trial court’s opinion affirming the recommended JOD and remanded for a de novo hearing in accord with MCL 552.507 and MCR 3.215. Plaintiff-ex-husband contended that the trial court erred by not conducting a live judicial hearing after he timely objected to the referee’s recommended JOD and uniform support order. Defendant-ex-wife argued that “the trial court was not required to conduct a live hearing because plaintiff did not identify new evidence that he intended to present.” However, the court concluded that the “plain language of MCL 552.507(4) does not support this position.” Section 507(4) “requires a trial court to hold a hearing, not simply a review of the record created at the referee hearing. . . . A court may impose reasonable restrictions ‘to conserve the resources of the parties and the court’ if the conditions in § 507(5) are met, but the court’s ability to limit the evidence presented at a de novo hearing does not stand for the proposition that the court can do away with the hearing altogether unless the party requesting the hearing intends to present new evidence.” The court concluded that, “because plaintiff filed timely objections to the referee’s recommended [JOD] and asked for a judicial hearing, he was entitled to a live hearing at which he could present evidence, subject to the trial court’s reasonable restrictions.” The court found that the “trial court was permitted to render its decision on the basis of the referee’s record, but it was required by statute and court rule to allow the parties to appear and present evidence, subject to certain restrictions.” The court held that failure “to provide such a hearing constituted clear legal error.”
FOIA request for information about tax credits under the Michigan Economic Growth Authority (MEGA) Act; Exemption in MCL 125.2005(9) (part of the Michigan Strategic Fund Act); MCL 125.2005(11); “Relates”; “Financial or proprietary information” defined (MCL 125.2005(12)); Whether the tax credit cap “relates to financial or proprietary information submitted by the applicant”; The constitutional-doubt canon; Const 1963, art 9, § 23; “Financial,” “record” & “report”; General Motors LLC (GM)
The court held that MCL 125.2005(11) required defendant-Michigan Economic Development Corporation “to disclose an unredacted version of the tax credit agreement containing the ‘tax credit cap’ of the tax credits awarded to GM under the MEGA Act in response to plaintiff’s FOIA request.” Thus, it reversed the Court of Appeals judgment and remanded to the Court of Claims. Plaintiff-Sole claimed that he was entitled to disclosure of the unredacted version of the agreement between GM and defendant, which would show the total value of tax credits that may be claimed by GM under the MEGA Act. Defendant, which administers the credits, argued that “the total value of the awardable tax credits is exempt from FOIA disclosure under MCL 125.2005(9) and that the exception to that exemption set forth in MCL 125.2005(11) is inapplicable. In other words, according to defendant, an unredacted version of the agreement is not subject to disclosure.” However, the court held that “while the agreement provision at issue, which is known as the ‘tax credit cap,’ fits within the terms of MCL 125.2005(9), it is nonetheless subject to disclosure under MCL 125.2005(11).” The Court of Appeals ruled that Subsection (11) applied “to the document but not the information in it.” But the court found "no basis in the text for the conclusion that Subsection (11) is limited to the document itself and not its contents. Moreover, the result of the Court of Appeals’ reading would seem to be that a defendant could hand over a fully redacted document. It is unclear what purpose such a document would serve.” The court added that its determination was “buttressed by the constitutional-doubt canon because the contrary interpretation would raise significant doubts about the constitutionality of MCL 125.2005.”
Invalidation of a trust; Whether an oral trust was created; MCL 700.7407; Clear & convincing evidence; Requirements to create a trust; MCL 700.7402(1); Applicability of the statute of limitations (SOL) applicable to revocable trusts (MCL 700.7604); Whether the complaint was one alleging conversion; Applicability of the SOL in MCL 600.5805; The doctrine of election; Holzbaugh v Detroit Bank & Trust Co; Laches; Claim brought within the SOL in MCL 600.5813
The court held that the SOLs in MCL 700.7604 and MCL 600.5805 did not bar plaintiff-Mary Sparling’s claim seeking to invalidate the irrevocable trust at issue. Further, there was no evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, that grantor-Walter Sparling intended to or did create a separate oral trust. The court also concluded that neither the doctrine of election nor laches barred Mary’s claim, noting it was brought within MCL 600.5813’s six-year SOL. Thus, the court affirmed “the trial court’s opinion and order invalidating the Walter Sparling Irrevocable Trust.” Walter and Mary were married for 66 years before Walter’s death in 2013. Defendant-appellant John Sparling was one of their children and co-trustee of the Irrevocable Trust. Mary filed her complaint in 2017 seeks to invalidate the trust. As to John’s argument that the two-year SOL for actions contesting the validity of revocable trusts barred her claim, there was “no dispute that the Irrevocable Trust was not revocable at Walter’s death.” Further, John offered the court no authority supporting that it “should ignore the plain words of the statute when deciding this issue. The Irrevocable Trust simply does not fall within the ambit of MCL 700.7604, and we emphatically reject John’s suggestion that we ignore the words in the statute.” Further, his argument that “the reference to revocable trusts applies equally to irrevocable trusts because once a settlor is deceased, all of the settlor’s trusts become irrevocable” likewise ignored the statute’s plain language. If “the Legislature intended that all trusts—revocable or irrevocable—were subject to MCL 700.7604, it would not have needed to add the phrase ‘revocable at the settlor’s death.’” As to his reliance on MCL 600.5805, the court found that Mary had not filed a claim for conversion. As to the trial court’s decision to invalidate the Irrevocable Trust, the court rejected John’s argument that a separate oral trust was formed, concluding there was no evidence supporting the creation of such a trust. It also rejected his assertion the alleged “benefits Mary received through the creation of the Irrevocable Trust acted to estop her from invalidating it.” She did not actually receive “a benefit from the impending tax consequences because the tax increase never occurred” and there was no evidence she received a benefit in the form of peace of mind.
Medical malpractice; Whether claims were ordinary negligence claims; Trowell v Providence Hosp & Med Ctrs, Inc; Sturgis Bank & Trust v Hillsdale Cmty Health Ctr; Distinguishing Harrier v Oakwood Skilled Nursing Ctr-Trenton (Unpub) & In re Kilburn Estate (Unpub)
The court held that because plaintiff’s claims all required consideration of medical judgment and thus, sounded exclusively in medical malpractice, the trial court erred when it denied defendant-Hospital’s motion for partial summary disposition of plaintiff’s ordinary negligence claims. It reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting defendant’s motion. The case arose from an accident that occurred when plaintiff was injured while using the bathroom in the Hospital. The court found that Trowell and Sturgis were instructive. As in those cases, it concluded “plaintiff’s claims sound exclusively in medical malpractice.” In his amended complaint, he alleged that the manager of imaging services (P) and a registered nurse (A) at the Hospital “took him to the bathroom and, despite being a fall risk, left him on the toilet unattended.” Plaintiff’s expert, R, testified that their “sole error was their failure to maintain constant visual contact with plaintiff while he was on the toilet.” In contrast to Harrier, “defendant here did not abandon plaintiff in the face of a known danger. When [P] first learned plaintiff needed to use the bathroom, he offered plaintiff the use of a bed pan, knowing that plaintiff was a fall risk.” When plaintiff refused, P and A assisted him to the toilet seat. “There, they instructed him not to get up and how to use the pull cord.” Because he would not allow P or A to remain in the bathroom with him, P stood outside of the door to allow plaintiff some privacy. P “asked plaintiff at least two times before he fell if he was okay, to which plaintiff responded in the affirmative. These facts are quite distinct from those in Harrier where, despite knowing the plaintiff was a fall risk, she was left completely unattended to use the bathroom. Here, plaintiff was not left unattended; rather, he was attended to in all respects except that [P] did not maintain constant visual contact with him.” The court also noted that in contrast to the plaintiff in “Kilburn, who was unsteady and left on her feet during a medical procedure, plaintiff here was safely escorted to and seated on the toilet and instructed to stay seated until he was finished and he could be helped up. In other words, while the failure to take any preventative action with an unsteady patient may sound in ordinary negligence under . . . Kilburn, the reasonableness of precautionary measures actually taken by medical staff sound under medical malpractice.” Unlike the Kilburn plaintiff, plaintiff here “was not left in risk of imminent harm from a known danger.”
Children’s best interests; Anticipatory-neglect doctrine; Best-interests analysis
The court vacated the portion of the trial court’s order holding that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights to the child (AM) was not in AM’s best interests and remanded. He is AM’s biological father, and his girlfriend's other two children looked to him as a father figure. The DHHS filed a petition to terminate his parental rights to AM based on the physical abuse of one of the other children, JH. The trial court found statutory grounds to terminate parental rights, but held that termination was not in AM’s best interests. “Respondent viciously beat JH, causing injuries that were reminiscent of a motor-vehicle accident. He will be incarcerated until at least 2028, when AM will be seven years old, and he cannot have any contact with her while incarcerated because she is a member of JH’s family.” Any bond he may have had with AM was “diminished and likely cannot be strengthened for more than five years. Respondent’s beating of JH may be indicative of how he may treat AM in the future.” Additionally, his “assault of JH was not an isolated incident because he also choked AM’s mother during an argument.” While the trial court was “correct that AM’s mother could obtain full legal and physical custody of AM, that will not protect AM as much as an order terminating respondent’s parental rights would.” Additionally, the “mother obtaining full legal and physical custody of AM would depend on her completing her service plan and being reunified with AM. If she did not do so, then respondent would be AM’s only legal parent.” Although, at the time of the termination hearing, the “mother appeared to be progressing well toward reunifying with AM, she had not yet done so. Accordingly, there was no guarantee at the time of the termination hearing that AM’s mother would even have the opportunity to seek full legal and physical custody of AM. Additionally, the trial court stressed the importance of AM having a father and the comfort it could give her to know that she has a father, even though he is incarcerated.” However, it failed to explain why her having him "in her life should be treated any differently from any other termination-of-parental-rights case in which a child may lose access to her then-legal parent.” The court held that “the trial court’s best-interests analysis was deficient on several grounds. The trial court’s conclusion was in clear error. Whether a more developed factual record and sound analysis with respect to the best-interests factors will favor termination or not is left for the trial court to consider in the first instance.”