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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.

 

 

Case Summary

Includes a summary of one Michigan Supreme Court opinion under Criminal Law.


Cases appear under the following practice areas:

  • Criminal Law (2)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75935
    Case: People v. Washington
    Court: Michigan Supreme Court ( Opinion )
    Judges: Clement, McCormack, Bernstein, and Cavanagh; Dissent – Viviano, Zahra, and Welch
    Issues:

    The trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to resentence defendant; Whether it was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction when the Court of Appeals assumed its appellate jurisdiction over the case; People v George; Luscombe v Shedd’s Food Prod Corp; “Presumption against divestment of jurisdiction”; People v Veling; Successive motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.502(G)(2); Principle that defects in a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction render a judgment void ab initio; Judgment of sentence (JOS)

    Summary:

    The court held that the “trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when it resentenced defendant in 2006 while” his application for leave to appeal was pending in the court and thus, the 2006 judgment was void. It further concluded that although he raised “this argument in a successive motion for relief from judgment and jurisdictional error is not an exception to the successive-motion bar, the trial court did not err by vacating its" JOS and setting the case for resentencing in 2016. Thus, the court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment (which reversed the trial court’s order vacating defendant’s resentencing) and remanded “to the trial court for resentencing consistent with its 2016 order.” In 2006, the Court of Appeals remanded defendant’s case for resentencing, and while his application for leave to appeal was still pending in the court, the trial court resentenced him. Because the Court of Appeals’ remand order was not final at the time, the trial court erred in doing so. The issue was whether the error was one of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that it was, concluding that “the trial court was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction when the Court of Appeals assumed its appellate jurisdiction over the case.” The court noted that it “answered this question under the former court rules when it encountered an error similar to” this one in George. After clarifying George, the court applied it to rule that defendant’s appeal from the 2004 JOS "divested the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Turning to the question of whether defendant was entitled to relief, the court noted the “longstanding rule that defects in a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction render a judgment void ab initio.” As a result, “there was no valid sentence to review, and MCR 6.501 does not limit a trial court’s ability to recognize a subject-matter jurisdiction error and remedy it.” When he raised the issue, it “had the duty to recognize its lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and act accordingly.”

    Dissenting, Justice Viviano (joined by Justices Zahra and Welch) concluded that “the relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and court rules gave the trial court subject-matter jurisdiction over this case and did not divest it of that jurisdiction during the appeal.” As a result, the dissenting justices “would hold that the trial court did not lack subject-matter jurisdiction when it resentenced defendant in 2006.”

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75877
    Case: United States v. Pioch
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: Moore, Siler, and Donald
    Issues:

    Recovery of a “surcharge” under 28 USC § 3011(a) (part of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA)) on the judgment in a criminal case including restitution & a special assessment

    Summary:

    The court vacated the district court’s calculations as to the amount defendant-Pioch owed as a surcharge under the FDCPA on amounts she owed under the judgment in her criminal case, and remanded for it to recalculate the amount she owed when the Government filed the applications for writs of garnishment to collect the restitution and a special assessment. It held that the Government may collect a 10% surcharge under § 3011(a) only after the assessment and restitution (the debt) is paid off, and that the surcharge amount is to be added to, not subtracted from, the judgment. In addition to her prison sentence, Pioch was ordered to pay a $3,700 special assessment and $2,037,783.30 in restitution (for a total judgment of $2,041,483.30) arising from her involvement in a scheme to defraud an elderly individual. At issue was a 10% surcharge the Government sought to apply under § 3011(a), and exactly what amount was subject to the surcharge. The Government’s current position was that it was entitled to 10% of the debt that was outstanding when it filed two garnishments ($2,039,391.82), for a surcharge of $203,939.18. Pioch argued that the 10% surcharge only applied to the $367,681.47 balance in her garnished accounts. After reviewing § 3011, the court agreed with the Government that “when the Government initiates an action or proceeding under FDCPA subchapter B or C to recover debt owed to the United States, the United States is entitled to recover a surcharge of 10% of the outstanding debt.” The court emphasized the elements of § 3011(a) that were relevant to this case. “First, the Government may collect the 10% surcharge only after Pioch has fully paid the assessment, the restitution owed to [the defrauded victim’s heir], and the restitution owed to the IRS, in that order. Second, the ‘surcharge’ is an amount to be added to, and not subtracted from, the judgment.” The district court granted the Government’s original request for a surcharge on the original balance, the $2,041,483.30 judgment.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Environmental Law (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Litigation

    e-Journal #: 75889
    Case: Department of Envtl. Quality v. Eric Kirby & Sons, LLC
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Fort Hood, Markey, and Gleicher
    Issues:

    Action arising from the filling & alteration of wetlands; Venue; Right to a jury trial; Department of Envtl Quality v Morley; Length of motion briefs; MCR 2.119(A)(2)(a); Fine assessment for violations of part 303 of the Natural Resources & Environmental Protection Act (NREPA); Department of Envtl Quality v Gomez; Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)

    Summary:

    Finding no error requiring reversal, the court affirmed the denial of defendant-Eric Kirby & Sons’ motion for change of venue, the circuit court’s decision to allow plaintiff-DEQ to exceed the 20-page limit in its summary disposition pleadings, and the $168,000 fine assessed for Kirby’s violations of Part 303 of the NREPA. Kirby “filled in and altered wetlands on its agricultural property in Arenac County despite repeated notices from” the DEQ that this conduct was illegal. The DEQ levied fines and filed suit in Ingham Circuit Court to enjoin Kirby’s activities. Kirby moved to change venue to Arenac County. "In its motion, Kirby admitted that venue was proper in Ingham County, but asserted that Arenac County would be a more convenient venue.” Kirby argued in the circuit court that “all witnesses relevant to the operation and maintenance of the farmland are located in and around Arenac and Bay Counties, as is the farmland itself.” A principal member of Kirby and defense counsel were both based in Bay City. “The DEQ retorted with evidence that Bay City is a 30-minute drive from the Arenac County courthouse and a 90-minute drive to the Ingham County courthouse. Changing venue would save defense counsel and some of its witnesses 60 minutes of travel time. However, the DEQ argued, changing venue would add two hours of travel time for . . . all of the DEQ’s witnesses, who were based in and around Lansing. The court deferred to the plaintiff’s choice of venue and noted that Kirby failed to adequately support that Ingham County was so inconvenient as to warrant a move. Instead, the move would significantly inconvenience the DEQ and its witnesses.” This decision was not clearly erroneous. Kirby’s vague claims about the locations of its witnesses “did not persuasively show inconvenience or prejudice sufficient to overcome the deference afforded the DEQ’s choice of venue.” Kirby further asserted that “a change in venue was required because it was accused of crimes against the environment and therefore was entitled to a local jury trial.” But the court noted that “Kirby never filed a jury trial demand or submitted the jury fee. Kirby thereby waived its right to a trial by jury.” Further, the court held in Morley, “a case brought under Part 303 of the NREPA, that US Const, Am VII ‘does not confer a federal constitutional right to trial by jury in state court civil cases.’” Although Kirby complained that Morley was wrongly decided, the court was bound to follow it under MCR 7.215(J)(1).

    Full Text Opinion

  • Immigration (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75875
    Case: Sanchez-Gonzalez v. Garland
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: McKeague, Gilman, and Bush
    Issues:

    Jurisdiction over motion to reopen removal order; 8 USC §§ 1231(a)(5) & 1252(a)(2)(D); Whether there is an exception for an alleged “gross miscarriage of justice” in § 1231(a)(5)

    Summary:

    The court affirmed the BIA, holding that because petitioner-Sanchez’s removal was twice reinstated when he illegally re-entered the country two times, the BIA lacked jurisdiction to reopen the removal order in light of § 1231(a)(5). It also held that the savings clause, § 1252(a)(2)(D), did not give the court jurisdiction to review the removal order, and that there is no “gross miscarriage of justice” exception to § 1231(a)(5). The court noted that under § 1231(a)(5), if a “‘prior order of removal is reinstated . . . [the order] is not subject to being reopened.’” It agreed with the BIA that the court had jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D) to review any legal questions involved in the BIA’s reading of § 1231(a)(5). But this did not mean that it had “jurisdiction to review the 2008 removal order itself—that petition would be time-barred.” The court agreed with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that § 1231(a)(5) “‘unambiguously bar[s] reopening a reinstated prior removal order.’” It concluded that it could not grant Sanchez the relief he sought—the reopening of the underlying removal order. The court rejected his claim that an exception exists when the “original removal proceedings were a ‘gross miscarriage of justice.’” While the BIA and other Courts of Appeals have applied such an exception the context of reinstatement proceedings, the court declined to adopt the exception and apply it here. First, it found the exception contrary to the text of § 1231(a)(5). Second, there was “no support for such an exception within our Circuit.” Third, it found that Sanchez did not meet the standard even if the court were to adopt it. Thus, the court dismissed his petition for review from the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his 2008 removal order.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Litigation (2)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Environmental Law

    e-Journal #: 75889
    Case: Department of Envtl. Quality v. Eric Kirby & Sons, LLC
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Fort Hood, Markey, and Gleicher
    Issues:

    Action arising from the filling & alteration of wetlands; Venue; Right to a jury trial; Department of Envtl Quality v Morley; Length of motion briefs; MCR 2.119(A)(2)(a); Fine assessment for violations of part 303 of the Natural Resources & Environmental Protection Act (NREPA); Department of Envtl Quality v Gomez; Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)

    Summary:

    Finding no error requiring reversal, the court affirmed the denial of defendant-Eric Kirby & Sons’ motion for change of venue, the circuit court’s decision to allow plaintiff-DEQ to exceed the 20-page limit in its summary disposition pleadings, and the $168,000 fine assessed for Kirby’s violations of Part 303 of the NREPA. Kirby “filled in and altered wetlands on its agricultural property in Arenac County despite repeated notices from” the DEQ that this conduct was illegal. The DEQ levied fines and filed suit in Ingham Circuit Court to enjoin Kirby’s activities. Kirby moved to change venue to Arenac County. "In its motion, Kirby admitted that venue was proper in Ingham County, but asserted that Arenac County would be a more convenient venue.” Kirby argued in the circuit court that “all witnesses relevant to the operation and maintenance of the farmland are located in and around Arenac and Bay Counties, as is the farmland itself.” A principal member of Kirby and defense counsel were both based in Bay City. “The DEQ retorted with evidence that Bay City is a 30-minute drive from the Arenac County courthouse and a 90-minute drive to the Ingham County courthouse. Changing venue would save defense counsel and some of its witnesses 60 minutes of travel time. However, the DEQ argued, changing venue would add two hours of travel time for . . . all of the DEQ’s witnesses, who were based in and around Lansing. The court deferred to the plaintiff’s choice of venue and noted that Kirby failed to adequately support that Ingham County was so inconvenient as to warrant a move. Instead, the move would significantly inconvenience the DEQ and its witnesses.” This decision was not clearly erroneous. Kirby’s vague claims about the locations of its witnesses “did not persuasively show inconvenience or prejudice sufficient to overcome the deference afforded the DEQ’s choice of venue.” Kirby further asserted that “a change in venue was required because it was accused of crimes against the environment and therefore was entitled to a local jury trial.” But the court noted that “Kirby never filed a jury trial demand or submitted the jury fee. Kirby thereby waived its right to a trial by jury.” Further, the court held in Morley, “a case brought under Part 303 of the NREPA, that US Const, Am VII ‘does not confer a federal constitutional right to trial by jury in state court civil cases.’” Although Kirby complained that Morley was wrongly decided, the court was bound to follow it under MCR 7.215(J)(1).

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75890
    Case: Rolfe v. Baker Coll.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Borrello, Servitto, and Stephens
    Issues:

    Case evaluation sanctions; MCR 2.403(O); “Verdict”; A consent judgment; Acorn Inv Co v Michigan Basic Prop Ins Ass’n; Whether sanctions should be imposed under MCR 1.109(E)(5)(b) & (6)

    Summary:

    The court held that because the consent judgment was not a verdict for purposes of MCR 2.403(O)(2)(c), defendant was not entitled to case evaluation sanctions and the trial court erred in granting them. But it rejected plaintiff’s argument that sanctions should be imposed on defendant pursuant to MCR 1.109(E)(5)(b) and (6). Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract after she was dismissed from its nursing program. The “parties stipulated to the entry of a final judgment” for plaintiff with an award of $15,000 in damages and a waiver of any remaining debt she owed defendant. She unsuccessfully appealed the trial court’s earlier ruling limiting her damages. Defendant then successfully moved for case evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O). Plaintiff argued that it was not entitled to them because the consent judgment did not constitute a “verdict” under MCR 2.403(O)(2). There was no dispute that the only definition of the term implicated here was “MCR 2.403(O)(2)(c), which states that a verdict includes ‘a judgment entered as a result of a ruling on a motion after rejection of the case evaluation.’” The court noted that in Acorn, the Michigan Supreme Court explained that “a consent judgment is not the kind of ‘judgment’ required by MCR 2.403(O)(2)(c) because the court does not ‘determine . . . the rights and obligations of the parties’ in a consent judgment.” Because the final judgment here “was a consent judgment that was the product of the parties’ voluntary agreement, it did not constitute a ‘judgment’ or ‘verdict’ for purposes of” MCR 2.403(O)(2)(c). Further, to the extent the judgment referenced defendant’s prior motions for summary disposition or as to damages, or any other prior motion, none of them “could have actually resulted in the judgment that was entered because the final judgment at issue expressly indicates multiple times that the terms of the judgment were mutually agreed upon by the parties. Thus, the language of the consent judgment makes it clear that the judgment and its terms were the product of the parties’ agreement rather than a ruling by the trial court.” Finally, regardless of whether “the parties agreed to preserve defendant’s right to seek case evaluation sanctions[,]” whether a party is entitled to them is defined by MCR 2.403(O). Reversed and remanded.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Tax (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75901
    Case: Harmon v. Department of Treasury
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Borrello, Servitto, and Stephens
    Issues:

    Principal residence exemption (PRE) (“homestead exemption”); MCL 211.7cc & 211.7dd; “Principal residence”; “Occupied”; The medical exception; MCL 211.7cc(5); Tax Tribunal (TT)

    Summary:

    The court affirmed the final opinion and judgment of the TT upholding respondent’s denial of petitioner’s request for a PRE for tax years 2015-18. Petitioner argued that the TT erred by holding that he had not occupied the property as his principal residence and thus, that he was not eligible for the claimed PRE. He asserted that the TT erred by holding that he had not satisfied the requirements for the medical exception to the occupancy requirement. As the person claiming the tax exemption, he “was required to ‘present evidence linking’ him to the Brownstown property as the claimed principal residence.” In reaching its conclusion, the TT “relied on the record evidence that petitioner used his parents’ Taylor address for purposes of his driver’s license, vehicle registration, voter registration, and tax returns during the time period at issue" here. The court’s review confirmed that this documentary evidence linked him “to his parents’ address during the relevant time period.” Further, he did not deny this link. He instead maintained that he used their "address as his mailing address to ensure that he actually received important mail while continuing to reside at the Brownstown property.” The TT implicitly rejected this claim, finding that his “longstanding pattern of using of his parents’ address for important legal documents demonstrated that he was acting in a manner inconsistent with occupying the Brownstown property as his principal residence.” He did not show that the TT “erred because even if another result could also be supported by the record, we may not set aside the [TT’s] factual findings on that basis.” The evidence linking him “to his parents’ address throughout the relevant time period was sufficient to allow a reasonable mind to accept the [TT’s] conclusion that petitioner did not occupy the Brownstown property as his principal residence.” As to the exception in MCL 211.7cc(5), the TT “found that although petitioner established that he had a medical reason for residing away from the Brownstown property to convalesce” after surgery in 2/16, he “did not qualify to maintain a PRE under subsection (5) because he did not establish that he occupied the Brownstown property as his principal residence at the time preceding his medical issues and related” convalescence period. The TT’s determination was supported by the evidence linking him to his parents’ address.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Termination of Parental Rights (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75908
    Case: In re Hudson
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Tukel, Sawyer, and Cameron
    Issues:

    Whether an adjudication trial violated a respondent’s due process rights; In re Sanborn; In re Vazquez; Participation via Zoom; Ability to confer with an attorney; The remote nature of the hearing; Sufficiency of the evidence to establish jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2b(1); Establishment of a juvenile guardianship; MCL 712A.19a(9); In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson Minors; Effect of a claim of appeal; MCR 7.208(A); MCL 600.1401

    Summary:

    The court rejected respondent-father’s claim that his adjudication trial violated his due process rights, and held that there was sufficient evidence to establish jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2b(1). It further rejected both respondents’ challenges to the trial court’s decision to form a juvenile guardianship over their three children (SH, TH, and JH). He argued that “his inability to attend the adjudication trial either in person or by videoconference technology, and not simply by” phone, violated his due process rights. The court noted that at the time of the adjudication trial, the case “had been open for nearly five years.” He was adjudicated as to JH in 3/18. Thus, at the 5/20 adjudication trial as to SH and TH, he “had been subject to the trial court’s jurisdiction for over two years. Further,” from 3/18 to 2/20, he “was in jail or prison. Consequently, during the vast majority of the two years he was subject to the trial court’s jurisdiction, [he] appeared before [it] via videoconference technology or telephonically.” Thus, the trial court was not only familiar with the father, but “was abundantly familiar with [him] in a remote setting. In other words, the trial court being required to listen to [his] testimony remotely at the adjudication trial was not out of the ordinary. Instead, the trial court was incredibly prepared to consider [his] testimony and apparent veracity on the basis of his appearance via telephone.” The court noted that he “was provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard, either by videoconference or telephonically. [He] chose to appear via telephone, and was represented by an attorney whom he was permitted to speak with, in confidence, whenever he requested the opportunity.” He did not allege that “he could not hear the proceedings, that he wanted to talk but could not be heard, or that his attorney erred in some manner. While participating by telephone might not be a ‘meaningful manner’ of participation for some parents in an adjudication trial, there” was no record evidence suggesting that he fell under this category. The court also held that “the trial court’s decision that a preponderance of the evidence supported that SH and TH were ‘subject to a substantial risk of harm to [their] mental well-being’ if returned to [his] care was proper and adequately established jurisdiction.” Finally, it properly concluded that establishing a juvenile guardianship was in the children’s best interests. Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

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