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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Whether the tolling provision in MCL 767.24 violated defendant’s constitutional right to interstate travel or his right to equal protection under the law; Right to travel; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Jones v. Helms; People v. Crear; Commonwealth v. Lightman (PA Super.); Equal protection; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2; Crego v. Coleman; As-applied challenge; Village of Willowbrook v. Olech; Lima Twp. v. Bateson; Rational-basis review; Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth (6th Cir.); TIG Ins. Co., Inc. v. Department of Treasury; Presumption of constitutionality; People v. Conat; “Similarly situated”; State v. March (TN App.); Burns v. Lafler (ED MI); State v. Sher (WI); General interests served by a statute of limitations; Toussie v. United States
The court held that the tolling provision of MCL 767.24 did not violate defendant’s right to travel or his right to equal protection. Defendant, a resident of Alaska, allegedly sexually assaulted a female minor while visiting Michigan in the 1990s. The limitations periods expired in 2006 and 2007, but the crime was not reported until 2012. The trial court granted his motion to dismiss CSC III charges on equal-protection grounds because, had he been a resident, the limitations period would have expired before the crime was reported. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the tolling provision violated his constitutional right to travel, noting the provision “only applies when a party is not usually and publicly residing in Michigan” and thus, “does not restrict in any way a person’s right to travel within, across, or outside of Michigan’s borders.” Although it “does create a negative consequence for someone who resides outside of Michigan and becomes a suspect in a crime that occurred within the state,” it “‘advances a compelling state interest in permitting later prosecutions in cases where a defendant no longer resides in the jurisdiction.’” The court also rejected his claim that applying the tolling provision to him would be to treat him unequally to those residents who are similarly situated. It first found that he was not similarly situated, noting that a “state’s power to investigate and prosecute a person is severely diminished when that person does not reside” within its borders, and that “other states may not share Michigan’s priorities with respect to” criminal law. Courts have held for these and other reasons that “residents and nonresidents are not similarly situated for equal-protection purposes.” It next found that “nowhere in the statute is there a requirement that ‘the party charged’ has to have been an actual suspect in an identified crime prior to the expiration of the untolled” limitations period, and that it is “conceivable that an unreported crime will more likely be discovered when” the alleged perpetrator resides in the state where it occurred. Further, “the Legislature has seen fit to draw a distinction between” residents and nonresidents, and it had a rational basis for doing so. Reversed and remanded.
Sufficiency of the evidence; Operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated; MCL 257.625(1); People v. Hyde
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The trial court sentenced him as a second-offense habitual offender to 24 to 90 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the evidence that he operated a motor vehicle and that he did so while intoxicated was insufficient. First, it found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that he was the driver. “A witness who called 911 about the accident testified that he saw a car going too fast down a hill, through a stop sign, and into a ditch.” In addition, “[t]wo police officers who arrived at the scene of the accident saw a car in a ditch, and they learned that the car was registered to” defendant. “The witness who saw the accident also watched [defendant’s] friends arrive and try to pull the car out of the ditch.” Another friend testified that he “drove the car involved in the accident shortly before the accident.” And defendant “testified that the car was his, he had difficulty getting out of the driveway while driving the vehicle, and the car slid past the stop sign when he came down the hill on the dirt road.” Second, the court found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that he was intoxicated. The police officer testified that defendant said, “I’ve been drinking all night.” He further testified that defendant’s friend said that defendant “had been drinking before driving the car that went into the ditch.” The witness “described his impression that the driver was driving drunk.” In addition, “a blood draw taken more than two hours after the accident showed [his] blood alcohol level to be 0.185%, and the responding police officers described [him] as belligerent and unable to walk without assistance.” Although defendant “presented evidence that snow may have contributed to the accident,” it rejected defendant’s argument that “the prosecution was required to disprove this alternative explanation for the jury to find” him guilty of the offense. “The jury reasonably chose not to credit [his] testimony that he was not drunk when he drove the car in favor of other witness testimony showing that he was.” Affirmed.
Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); People v. VanderVliet; People v. Knox; Relevance; MRE 401; A material fact; People v. Mills; MRE 403; People v. McGhee; Limiting instruction; People v. Orr; Sufficiency of the evidence for a conspiracy to deliver or manufacture meth conviction; MCL 750.157a; MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i); People v. Cotton; Sufficiency of the evidence for an operating or maintaining a meth lab conviction; MCL 333.7401c(2)(f); People v. Meshell; Prior consistent statement; MRE 801(d)(1)(B); Plain error review; People v. Carines; Harmless error; People v. Mateo; Admission of a hearsay statement cumulative to in-court testimony; People v. Duenaz; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v. Watson; Good-faith efforts to admit evidence; People v. Dobek; Opening statement remarks; People v. Unger; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Vaughn; Strickland v. Washington; People v. Trakhtenberg; Failure to raise a futile objection; People v. Ericksen; Failure to move to suppress evidence; Kimmelman v. Morrison; Probable cause; People v. Chapo; People v. Kazmierczak; People v. Wood; People v. LoCicero (After Remand); Sentencing; Scoring of OV 14; MCL 777.44(1)(a), (2)(a), & (2)(b); A “leader”; People v. Dickinson
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other acts evidence, and that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions of conspiring to deliver or manufacture meth and operating or maintaining a lab involving meth. Further, even if testimony should not have been admitted under MRE 801(d)(1)(B), any error was harmless. The court also rejected defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct claims, and held that the trial court properly scored 10 points for OV 14 at sentencing. He was sentenced as a fourth offense habitual offender to concurrent terms of 8 to 30 years for each conviction. The prosecution’s theory of the case was that defendant and two women (SB and AB) agreed to manufacture a batch of meth. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting SB’s testimony that she had previously seen him make meth, which usually took place in the woods. The court disagreed, noting that his “intent and knowledge were highly relevant to both charges, particularly where the pseudoephedrine pills and tree spikes found during the police stop were themselves legal products to possess,” which he emphasized at trial and throughout his appellate brief. That he had previously made meth “by using tree spikes and preparing the drug in the woods was highly probative of defendant’s intent and knowledge in purchasing the tree spikes on” this occasion. The information “was also relevant because the particulars of defendant’s method, even if not particularly novel,” supported SB’s and AB’s versions of the conspiracy as to how he would use the tree spikes and pseudoephedrine to make meth, which supported their credibility. As to the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions, the court concluded that the trial testimony and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence “was sufficient to enable a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant conspired with” SB and AB to manufacture meth, and that he “possessed both the pseudoephedrine pills and tree spikes for the purpose of making” meth. Affirmed.
Other acts evidence of domestic violence; MCL 768.27b; MRE 403; People v. Cameron; Hearsay evidence as substantive evidence of domestic violence; MCL 768.27c; People v. Meissner; Officers’ use of police reports to refresh their memories; MRE 612 & 613; MRE 803(5); Waiver of claim as to jury instructions; People v. Matuszak; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Trakhtenberg; Failure to raise meritless or futile objections; People v. Putman; Presumption jurors follow their instructions; People v. Mahone; Unresponsive testimony by a prosecution witness; People v. Hackney; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 3, 4, & 9; MCL 777.33(1)(d) & (3); People v. Maben; MCL 777.34(1)(a) & (2); People v. Wellman; People v. Gibbs; MCL 777.39(1)(c); People v. Sargent; Upward departure; Reasonableness; People v. Lockridge; People v. Steanhouse; Proportionality; People v. Dixon-Bey; Emergency medical technician (EMT)
Holding that the challenged evidence was admissible under MCL 768.27b and 768.27c, that the police reports used to refresh officer witnesses’ memories were not used improperly, and that defense counsel was not ineffective, the court affirmed defendant’s convictions. It also affirmed his sentences because OVs 3, 4, and 9 were properly scored at 10 points, and the trial court’s upward departure was justified. He was convicted of assault by strangulation, third-offense domestic violence, and witness bribery, intimidation, and interference. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth offense habitual offender to 140 to 480 months for the assault, 80 to 480 months for domestic violence, and a consecutive sentence of 60 to 180 months for witness interference. The prosecution gave timely notice of intent to offer evidence under MCL 768.27b and 768.27c. Three women and nine officers testified about his prior acts of domestic violence. He argued that “the prosecution improperly called uncooperative witnesses for the purpose of impeaching them with the police officers’ testimony and using that testimony as substantive evidence. Because the police officers’ testimony conformed to the requirements of MCL 768.27c, their statements were admissible to prove relevant evidence, not solely for the purpose of impeaching other witnesses.” Thus, their testimony was not improperly introduced as substantive evidence. Further, the prosecution provided him with the police reports before trial, and he had an opportunity to cross-examine the officers. They “testified that they refreshed their recollections by reviewing their reports. The prosecution did not seek to admit the police reports into evidence.” The court also concluded that “other testimony about the charged incident was sufficient to establish” his guilt, including that of the victim and the EMT who attended her at the scene. As to sentencing, the trial court justified the upward departure by examining defendant’s “long criminal history and the gravity of his conduct in this case.” The court held that it did not abuse its discretion by finding that the guidelines as to prior convictions did not adequately account for his pattern of conduct, dating back to 1997.
Whether aiding & abetting Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the force clause of 18 USC § 924(c) (§ 924(c)(3)(A)); United States v. Gooch; United States v. Davis; United States v. Maselli; United States v. Garcia-Ortiz (1st Cir.); United States v. Deiter (10th Cir.); In re Colon (11th Cir.); The district court’s role on limited remand; United States v. Campbell; Tapco Prod. Co. v. Van Mark Prod. Corp.; United States v. McFalls; United States v. Woodside; United States v. Orlando; Whether defendant’s sentence violated Johnson v. United States; United States v. Taylor; Shuti v. Lynch; Sessions v. Dimaya; United States v. Salas (10th Cir.); United States v. Davis (5th Cir.); United States v. Eshetu (DC Cir.); United States v. Barrett (2d Cir.); Sentencing; The procedural & substantive reasonableness of the district court’s decision to reinstate defendant’s original sentence; United States v. Vonner; United States v. Moore (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Whether some of defendant’s objections were appropriate on limited remand; United States v. Williams (Unpub. 6th Cir.) Right to allocute; Pasquarille v. United States; Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii); United States v. Jeross
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] In an issue of first impression, the court held that a conviction for aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s force clause. The case was before the court after a limited remand to the district court to determine whether defendant-Richardson’s sentence for aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a crime of violence under § 924(c) violated Johnson. The court first held that its prior remand order constituted a “limited remand,” confining the district court to determining only whether Richardson’s sentence was constitutional after Johnson. Richardson argued that Johnson’s holding that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of a violent felony was unconstitutionally vague also applied to § 924(c)’s residual clause because its definition of the term, “crime of violence,” is similar to the language at issue in Johnson. The court noted that while it held in Taylor that § 924(c)’s residual clause was not unconstitutionally vague, “more recent decisions from this court and the Supreme Court, however, suggest that Taylor stands on uncertain ground.” Nevertheless, the court left Taylor’s continuing viability for another day, and affirmed Richardson’s conviction under § 924(c)’s force clause. Although it had not previously considered whether aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the force clause, it held in Gooch that “the principal offense of Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the force clause[,]” and noted that “an aider and abettor is punishable as a principal.” Thus, the court joined three other circuits and held that “aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery satisfies the force clause.” It then rejected Richardson’s argument that the district court’s decision to reinstate his original sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable, again noting the limited scope of remand. Finally, the district court allowed him “to allocute when it did not have to,” and did not err in terminating his “allocution after he twice sought to contest the merits of his underlying conviction.” Affirmed.
Custody; Motions for increased parenting time; The Child Custody Act (CCA) (MCL 722.21 et seq.); MCL 722.27(1)(c); In re AP; Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer; Corporan v. Henton; “Shall”; Kalin v. Fleming; MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii); Whether the trial court relied on the Friend of the Court (FOC) recommendation as the basis for its decision; Harvey v. Harvey; Bowling v. McCarrick; Whether the FOC’s recommendation was inadmissible hearsay; In re Utrera; Plain error review; Marik v. Marik; MRE 801(c); MRE 802; MRE 1101(a) & (b)(9); MCR 552.55(1)(g) & (h); Duperon v. Duperon; Truitt v. Truitt; Due process & the consolidation of hearings; Frowner v. Smith; Okrie v. Michigan; Wortelboer v. Benzie Cnty.; Whether the trial court’s sua sponte order violated MCR 3.920(D)(1); MCR 3.901(A)(1) & (B); MCR 3.201(A)(2)(a); MCR 3.213; MCR 2.119(C)(1)-(2); Whether the order reapportioning the guardian ad litem’s (GAL) fees was barred by law of the case, collateral estoppel, & res judicata; Augustine v. Allstate Ins. Co.; William Beaumont Hosp. v. Wass; Adair v. Michigan; Monat v. State Farm Ins Co.; Leahy v. Orion Twp.; Hill v. City of Warren
The court held that defendant-mother did not show that the trial court erred by entering the 3/17 and 9/17 orders denying her motions for increased parenting time. Also, as to the apportionment of the GAL’s fees, the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel did not apply. Her arguments were based on her contention that the 9/16 order “required implementation of or transition to a 50/50 parenting time schedule when” she satisfied its conditions. Based on this interpretation, she argued that the orders she appealed should be construed as orders modifying the 9/16 order “by changing custody from the ordered equal parenting time arrangement to the restrictive parenting time schedules enforced by” the appealed orders. Thus, she contended that the 3/17 and 9/17 orders were “erroneously entered without the trial court first finding proper cause or a change of circumstances to justify a change of custody, and erroneously effectuated a change of custody without” the necessary findings as to the statutory best-interest factors. Her interpretation of the 9/16 order was “based on the trial court’s statement in that order that ‘[o]nce a determination is made that unsupervised parenting time is appropriate and in [the child’s] best interest, parenting time shall be as follows unless a transitional period is recommended prior to this schedule taking effect,’ followed by” a schedule. However, she improperly interpreted “this order as mandating a future parenting time schedule without satisfying the statutory requirements for modifying custody. The order contains the conditional phrase, ‘Once a determination is made.’” This necessarily indicated that the trial court had to initially make the required determination, and do so in compliance with the CCA. The only reasonable interpretation of the phrase was that “defendant must comply with statutory requirements for modifying a custody order. Based on these requirements,” the court held that the 9/16 order did not provide her with “a shortcut method for establishing grounds for implementing a 50/50 parenting time schedule.” Also, the 3/17 and 9/17 orders should not, as she suggested, “be construed as orders changing custody from a 50/50 parenting time arrangement to the restrictive arrangement.” The court previously concluded that these orders were “final orders under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii) because they are orders denying defendant’s motion ‘seeking a change from plaintiff having primary physical custody of the minor child to the parties sharing equal physical custody.’” Affirmed.
Will dispute; Judicial disqualification for failure to disclose an acquaintance sooner; Alleged violation of MCR 2.003 & Canon 2 of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct; Kloian v. Schwartz; MCR 2.003(D)(1)(a); MCR 2.003(D)(2); MCR 2.003(D)(3)(a)(i); In re MKK; Waiver; Davis v. Chatman; Law Offices of Lawrence J Stockler, PC v. Rose; Plain error review; Wolford v. Duncan; MCR 2.003(C); Caperton v. Massey; MCR 2.003(C)(1)(b) & (c); Inadequate discovery; Truel v. City of Dearborn; Personal representative inaction
Holding that the trial judge’s disqualification was not warranted, the court affirmed the order finding valid the will of appellant-Brittney’s father, Ronald Mochty (Mr. Mochty), and determining his heirs. Brittney contended that “the trial court should have notified the parties sooner of its personal acquaintance with Mr. Mochty,” it abused its discretion by not giving her “an adequate opportunity to obtain medical records about Mr. Mochty’s medical condition at the time he made the will,” and it failed to hold accountable the temporary personal representative for failing to respond to requests to authorize the release of Mr. Mochty’s medical records. She filed a motion for disqualification 17 days after the potential basis for disqualification arose. The motion did not include an affidavit, and she did not seek de novo review of the denial of her motion by the chief judge. Thus, she “waived the issue by failing to follow the proper procedure.” Further, she did not show plain error. Brittney argued that the trial judge’s failure to notify the parties sooner that he knew Mr. Mochty created an appearance of impropriety. But the acquaintance here was too casual to support that argument. The judge stated that “he knew Mr. Mochty in 1999 and that he did not remember the time frame of their acquaintance.” It was not clear how often they interacted, “particularly in 2008 when Mr. Mochty made the will.” Thus, Brittney’s argument failed. Moreover, even if the judge “had disclosed his social acquaintance with Mr. Mochty sooner,” his recusal would not have been necessary. The judge “clearly relied on admitted evidence to conclude that Mr. Mochty was of sound mind when he made the will.” The judge relied on the testimony of P, the attorney who prepared and notarized the will. P “believed that Mr. Mochty was of sound mind when he made and signed the will.” P also stated that “Mr. Mochty knew the objects of his bounty and the nature of his assets.” P further testified that “Mr. Mochty was a savvy businessman who did what he wanted and took orders from no one. Brittney’s only countervailing evidence was her testimony that Mr. Mochty was a longtime alcoholic and her belief that her siblings did not like her.” She offered no evidence to show that longtime alcoholism correlates “with a level of cognitive impairment consistent with legal incapacity. She called no witnesses to testify that Mr. Mochty was incapable of thinking rationally and making a will.” Also, P’s testimony undermined her belief that her siblings unduly influenced their father.
Personal injury action; Vicarious liability; Ormsby v. Capital Welding, Inc.; Candelaria v. BC Gen. Contractors, Inc.; Campbell v. Kovich; Reeves v. Kmart Corp.; Janice v. Hondzinski; Agency; St. Clair Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Intermediate Educ. Ass’n/MI Educ. Ass’n; Laster v. Henry Ford Health Sys.; Little v. Howard Johnson Co.; Independent contractor; Utley v. Taylor & Gaskin, Inc.; Kidder v. Miller-Davis Co.; Ostensible agency; Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp.
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition for defendant-business entity on plaintiff’s negligence claims. Plaintiff was injured at a kids event when the rear car of the train ride she was on with her daughter tipped over. She sued defendant as well as the owners and operators of the train. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims against defendant, noting that “a claim for the negligent hiring of an independent contractor [i]s not a viable claim in Michigan” and that defendant “did not exercise sufficient control over the operation of the train . . . to be held responsible for” the negligence of codefendants. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that summary dismissal of her claim of vicarious liability was improper under actual agency principles and a theory of ostensible or apparent agency. The court found that defendant “did not retain sufficient control over the manner in which” the owners and operators of the train “performed the contracted-for-work.” It noted that the agreement the train owners entered into did not indicate that defendant retained the right to control the work they were hired to perform. Further, the evidence was not sufficient to establish that defendant “actually ‘directed, supervised, or otherwise had any input,’ or exercised control, over how” they performed the contracted-for work of providing the train rides at defendant’s event. Moreover, there was no evidence that it “directed or exercised any control over the specific manner or method of providing and operating the train rides.” The court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred in dismissing her claims of vicarious liability based on ostensible agency against defendant. It noted that although defendant’s “promotional materials announced the featured attractions and did not identify the contractors who operated them, and all tickets for the attractions were sold by” defendant, plaintiff did not prove “that she relied on any purported agency relationship to her detriment.” Affirmed.
Proximate cause of injury; Loweke v. Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co., LLC; Skinner v. Square D Co.; Ray v. Swager; Wilson v. Alpena Cnty. Rd. Comm’n; Successive motions for summary disposition; MCR 2.116(E)(3); Brown v. Brown; The law of the case doctrine; People v. Mitchell (On Remand)
The court held that because a reasonable jury could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant-Barley Trucking & Excavating was a cause-in-fact of plaintiff-Jill’s injuries, Barley was entitled to summary dismissal of plaintiffs’ negligence claim. It also held that the law of the case doctrine did not apply because the motions for summary disposition were brought in the same proceedings, not “subsequent proceedings.” Jill parked her car next to a cart corral in a parking lot owned by defendants-Angelis. She tripped over a pipe protruding from the corral causing her to strike her knee on the pavement. Plaintiffs sued Barley, a plowing company, alleging that it negligently bent the pipe by hitting it with a plow truck. As to causation, they contended that there was overwhelming circumstantial evidence to support a conclusion that Barley’s employees damaged the corral. First, plaintiffs relied on the fact that Barley had damaged a cart corral in the past. However, the testimony of its employees revealed that this was not a common occurrence. The record reflected “a single incidence of damage to a cart corral caused by an employee in 2008 or 2009, and there was uncontested testimony that defendant adhered to its mandatory damage-reporting process and promptly repaired the cart corral that morning.” Nobody filed a damage report for damage to a cart corral on the date at issue and Barley’s employees denied damaging it or seeing any damage to it. A “maintenance person for Angelis at the time of the accident who had worked for Angelis for more than 30 years, testified that he was not aware of any damage done by defendant’s employees to the cart corrals.” On the one “occasion on which defendant had damaged a canopy, defendant took the necessary steps to report and repair the damage.” The testimony did not suggest that it had a history of damaging cart corrals or causing and leaving damage unreported. On the contrary, the record indicated that it rarely damaged property and, when it did, consistently reported and repaired it. “Thus, the reasonable inference from the evidence was that, if defendant had damaged the cart corral, defendant would have taken the appropriate damage-reporting steps and fixed the damage, as it had done in the past.” While plaintiffs argued that Barley’s plowing operations were the only reasonable explanation for the damage to the cart corral, they did not offer any expert testimony that it was more likely than other possible explanations that the damage was caused by Barley or even a plow truck. Affirmed.
Quiet title action; Ingle v. Musgrave; Claim the Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA) (MCL 565.101 et seq.) extinguished building restrictions in a 1940 deed rendering them invalid; MCL 565.101; MCL 565.103; MCL 565.106; MCL 565.104; Fowler v. Doan; Construing a deed; Department of Natural Res. v. Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc.; Giving effect to unambiguous deed language; Minerva Partners, Ltd. v. First Passage, LLC; Distinguishing von Meding v. Strahl; Whether an easement in the deed was exclusive; Penrose v. McCullough; Applying plain & unambiguous easement language as written; Little v. Kin
Noting that whether the MRTA extinguished the 1940 deed restrictions did not resolve the dispute, the court held that defendant-Walloon Lake Country Club (WLCC) was properly granted summary disposition on plaintiff’s MRTA claim because he was subject to the restrictions based on the plain language of the 2014 deed by which the property was conveyed to him. The trial court also did not err in ruling that WLCC had an exclusive right to use a 75-foot parcel encumbered by an easement created in the 1940 deed. Plaintiff did not cite any authority that would prevent the sellers “from including a reference to the 1940 deed restrictions even though those rights and restrictions had been extinguished.” This made the case distinguishable from von Meding. The 2014 deed did not simply “refer to a previously-recorded easement. Rather, it referred to the terms of that easement, using a reference to the previously-recorded restrictions to define the scope of the restrictions established in the 2014 conveyance.” Thus, the sellers’ intent to convey the property to plaintiff subject to the building restrictions was apparent in the deed language. He also argued that he was “entitled to reasonable use of the 75-foot parcel encumbered by the easement” created in ¶ (d) of the 1940 deed, asserting it was not intended for WLCC’s exclusive use. However, the court found that the trial court properly determined the language of ¶ (d) was unambiguous and created an exclusive easement. While such easements are generally disfavored, this “does not prevent courts from finding that an easement is exclusive.” Although ¶ (d) did not use the word “exclusive,” it stated that the “particular part of the subject property ‘shall be reserved for the use of and be maintained by’” WLCC. Plaintiff argued that the easement was ambiguous because the 75-foot strip would not have been conveyed if WLCC planned to maintain exclusive use of it. But under the language of the 1940 deed, if WLCC were to “cease operations as a golf course, it would have no remaining interest in the 75-foot easement.” The trial court correctly found that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the easement’s scope.