Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Validity of a lease; Meeting of minds; Kloian v Domino’s Pizza; MCL 566.108; Waiver of affirmative defenses; MCR 2.111; Dell v Citizens Ins Co of Am; Unconscionability & equitable estoppel; Mitigation & remittitur; MCR 2..611; Landin v Healthsource Saginaw; Present cash value; Freeman v Lanning Corp; Judicial reassignment; Bayati v Bayati
The court held that the lease between the parties was valid and enforceable, that defendant waived its affirmative defenses, and that the damages award must be reduced to present cash value. The dispute arose after defendant missed a 30-day cancellation deadline on a 10-year commercial lease for a cannabis-related property that it had previously sold to plaintiff, leading plaintiff to sue for breach of contract. The trial court found the lease valid and enforceable, rejected defendant’s defenses, and entered a judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $6,747,200 in damages. On appeal, the court held that the lease satisfied all essential terms of a valid agreement, noting that the “agreement contained the name of the parties, the length of the lease term, and the amount of rent,” and that the trial court properly found “a meeting of the minds and a valid lease agreement signed by both parties.” The court also found that defendant’s defenses of unconscionability and equitable estoppel were waived because “a party that fails to raise an affirmative defense as required by MCR 2.111(F) waives the defense,” and defendant never moved to amend its pleadings. Addressing the damages, the court held that plaintiff made “good faith, robust, and vigorous attempts” to mitigate losses, and the trial court’s findings that market conditions had deteriorated were supported by the record. However, the court also found that “Michigan law clearly requires that damages for future losses be reduced to present value,” and remanded for calculation of the award’s present cash value. Finally, the court rejected defendant’s request for reassignment, concluding there was no showing the judge “would have difficulty putting aside his previous findings or that reassignment is necessary to preserve the appearance of justice.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Mistrial after unresponsive remark; People v Griffin; Admission of a Facebook post; Relevance & unfair prejudice; MRE 401 & MRE 403; People v Mills; Cross-examination; MRE 611(c); Confrontation; People v Morton
The court held that none of defendant’s claims warranted reversal, affirming his convictions for first-degree murder and conspiracy. The prosecution proved that defendant orchestrated the killing with codefendants, procured a gun, lured the victim to an abandoned facility, and later made a Facebook post calling himself the “Grim Reaper,” naming his “reapers” crew, and saying the victim had to “go and never come back.” The trial court denied a mistrial after a witness mentioned defendant’s prior incarcerations, admitted the Facebook post, and barred cross-examination of a witness about his prior informant status. On appeal, the court held that “an unresponsive, volunteered answer to a proper question is not grounds for the granting of a mistrial,” and the prompt curative instruction directing jurors to disregard the remark cured any prejudice. The court also found that the Facebook post was properly admitted because it was probative of motive, premeditation, intent, and relationships among alleged conspirators. It explained that “exclusion is required under MRE 403 only when the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” Addressing confrontation, the court held that limiting cross-examination about a witness’s prior informant role was error because bias is always a proper subject. It noted that “a limitation on cross-examination that prevents a defendant from placing before the jury facts from which bias, prejudice, or lack of credibility of a prosecution witness might be inferred constitutes denial of the constitutional right of confrontation.” But it concluded the error was harmless in light of other bias evidence, cumulative testimony, and the strong proof of guilt.
Judicial bias; People v Stevens; Double jeopardy; Convictions of AWIM & felonious assault; People v Miller; People v Gardner
While the court rejected defendant’s judicial bias claim it held that his convictions of AWIM and felonious assault in one of these consolidated appeals violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. Thus, it vacated his felonious assault convictions and affirmed all his other convictions (felony-firearm, domestic violence, first-degree premeditated murder, AWIM, and first-degree home invasion). The cases arose from two incidents and were tried in a consolidated trial. He asserted that references to him and use of the words “uh oh” during the final jury instructions “cast him in a negative light such that it would indicate to the jury that [he] was untrustworthy.” The court noted that “the trial court interspersed jury instructions with anecdotes and stories to provide the jury with examples of its obligations at trial. The purpose of the quoted statement was to clarify to the jury its obligation to duly weigh the evidence before it and to assess and decide matters of credibility through reason and common sense.” The court concluded it “was not unreasonable for the trial court to take extra time to ensure the jury understood its role to make credibility determinations and weigh the evidence before it. For this purpose, the trial court did not make any direct comments about defendant, but used him as one of various examples of how individuals rely on bias to make decisions.” The court noted that the “statement was not critical of defendant, hostile toward him, or indicate incredibility toward” him. Further, even if it assumed the “commentary was inappropriate, it was a single comment in the context of a five-day trial, which included several days of witness testimony. The totality of the circumstances does not demonstrate that the trial judge harbored deep-seated antagonism against defendant.” But the Supreme Court’s order in Gardner was dispositive of his double jeopardy claim. He “was convicted of two counts of AWIM and two counts of felonious assault for” his assaults against the victims. “As explained in Gardner, the convictions for AWIM and felonious assault arising from the same conduct violate double jeopardy. For the reasons explained in Gardner, defendant has established plain error affecting substantial rights.” The court exercised its discretion to vacate his felonious assault convictions “because the impermissible convictions and sentences for these offenses seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings.”
Prosecutorial error; Improper vouching; People v Lowrey; Use of prearrest silence; People v Solmonson; Ineffective assistance; Failure to make a futile objection; SORA punishment & ex post facto challenge; People v Kiczenski; Judicial disqualification; People v Hill; Cumulative error; People v Dobek
The court held that none of defendant’s claims warranted reversal and affirmed the CSC II conviction and probationary sentence with SORA registration. On appeal, the court held that the detective’s testimony describing the forensic interview as consistent with the CPS report was not impermissible vouching. The “testimony, which did not comment on or provide an opinion on the credibility of the complainant, was not improper vouching.” The court also found that the prosecutor’s reference to defendant’s failure to meet for a prearrest interview did not violate the right to remain silent because “where a defendant has received no Miranda warnings, no constitutional difficulties arise from using the defendant’s silence before or after his arrest as substantive evidence unless there is reason to conclude that his silence was attributable to the invocation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege.” Addressing ineffective assistance, the court explained that objections would have been futile and that “trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a futile objection.” It also rejected defendant’s speculation about counseling records. The court further concluded that the trial judge’s remark in the bench trial that the testimony was “unrebutted” did not penalize defendant’s silence. As to SORA, the court held that the 2021 scheme “does not constitute punishment” for a CSC II offender and thus did not violate the prohibitions on cruel or unusual punishment or ex post facto laws. Finally, the court found no basis for reassignment to a different judge and noted that “absent the establishment of errors, there can be no cumulative effect of errors meriting reversal.”
Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; Reunification services; Aggravated circumstances; MCL 722.638(1) & (2); MCL 722.638(1)(a)(ii); In re Barber/Espinoza; The doctrine of anticipatory neglect; In re Mota; Criminal sexual conduct (CSC)
Holding that a preponderance of the evidence supported that terminating respondent-father’s parental rights was in each child’s best interests, the court affirmed the termination order. The case began after allegations arose that he sexually abused his children’s half sibling (C). He asserted “that the trial court did not give sufficient weight to the bond he shared with the children and” that it conducted “a very limited best-interests analysis.” The court disagreed, noting that the “trial court acknowledged that respondent had a bond with each of the children, but found that the risk” he posed to them outweighed it. The court also noted that while he “and nonrespondent mother were not married, respondent referred to C[] as his stepdaughter and testified that he considered [her] his daughter. [He] had been in [her] life since she was a year old. He maintained that he cared for and protected [her]. But respondent took advantage of his role and committed heinous acts of sexual abuse against” C. This abuse of C “from the age of 11 until the age of 16 was ‘an especially egregious violation of a child who had looked to respondent for care and protection as a father figure.’” The court noted that his treatment of C was “probative of how he may treat her half-siblings:” a 12-year-old, a 9-year-old, an 8-year-old, and a 6-year-old. The fact that two of these children were “boys is of no consequence because, as” the court recognized in Mota, “‘abuse is abuse.’” While there was no evidence he “abused any of his four children,” the court was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake by concluding that the factors that weighed against termination of respondent’s parental rights were outweighed by the risk that he may harm” them. It also rejected his claim “that he should have been offered reunification services and given additional time to demonstrate his commitment to the children.” While the trial court did not explicitly state in its written orders that it “found aggravating circumstances under MCL 722.638(1) and (2),” it implicitly did so “by finding that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent’s parental rights under” § (k)(ii). The court concluded that the “record evidence supported that both MCL 722.638(1) and” 722.638(2) were satisfied. Thus, the “DHHS was ‘not obligated to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family.’”
Whether trust distributions conformed to the trust’s terms; Validity of a document; Necessity of an evidentiary hearing; Trust interpretation; Settlor’s intent
Holding that disputed questions of fact existed as to the validity of a document and the settlor’s intent, the court vacated the probate court’s opinion and order directing the final distribution of the trust at issue (the Wessels Trust). Appellant contended “the final distribution as directed by the probate court did not comport with the language of the Wessels Trust.” Specifically, appellant asserted “there were disputed questions of fact regarding the settlor’s intent that needed to be resolved before the probate court ordered the final distribution of trust assets.” The court agreed. It first considered “the probate court’s conclusion that the Schedule of Prior Distributions was invalid and, therefore, the $100,000 and $10,000 prior distributions were unenforceable.” The court concluded the probate court lacked “sufficient information before it to make an informed decision on this issue without holding an evidentiary hearing.” The court determined that omissions “and inconsistencies on the face of the Schedule” raised questions about its validity that could not be resolved without such a hearing. The probate court also decided a second issue without an evidentiary hearing – whether the settlor intended to credit the value of a parcel of real property (the Klug-Lincoln Parcel) to one beneficiary’s (S) “share in the final distribution. Resolution of this issue involves interpretation of § 2.5 of the” trust. The probate court determined “that the unambiguous language of the amendments showed that the settlor intended to credit the value of the Klug-Lincoln Parcel to” S’s share. The court found that this was “a reasonable interpretation of § 2.5; however, the language used in the Second Amendment is imprecise and susceptible to more than one interpretation.” The court determined that it was “also a reasonable interpretation to conclude that the portions of the First Amendment that were not restated in the Second Amendment were intentionally omitted or deleted from the Wessels Trust. The trust is susceptible to either construction and is, therefore, patently ambiguous.” It remanded for the fact-finder to “resolve the disputed questions of fact with the benefit of extrinsic evidence from the interested parties and the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses that may appear before it.”