Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Interpretation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); Rory v Continental Ins Co; Unjust enrichment claim barred by contract; AFT MI v Michigan; Promissory estoppel elements; Klein v HP Pelzer Auto Sys, Inc
The court held that the MOU did not give plaintiff an enforceable right to a lease extension. The parties’ five-year lease expired in 2023. An MOU stated they would negotiate a further five-year term and identified possible rent options. The parties were unable to agree to terms for an extension and plaintiff sued, asserting “the MOU required defendant to enter into a new lease with plaintiff at the same” amount of monthly rent. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition. On appeal, the court held that the MOU’s plain language required only that the parties “engage in negotiations,” and that reading it to mandate an extension would render the negotiation clause nugatory. The court explained that “an unambiguous contractual provision is reflective of the parties’ intent as a matter of law,” and the record showed negotiations occurred but no agreement was reached. It also concluded that unjust enrichment was unavailable because the lease expressly provided that structural improvements became the landlord’s property at the end of the term, so an express contract covered the subject. The court further held that promissory estoppel failed because there was no promise to extend the lease on which reliance could reasonably rest. Alleged factual disputes about rent, incompatibility, or premises issues were immaterial to whether the MOU created a right to an extension. Affirmed.
Breach of a real property purchase agreement; Anticipatory repudiation; Stoddard v Manufacturers Nat’l Bank of Grand Rapids; Good faith & fair dealing; Rodgers v JPMorgan Chase Bank NA; The law of the case doctrine; Compliance with remand instructions; Whether a party waived the right to enforce any breach by the other; Alleged forfeiture of the right to terminate the agreement
Finding no merit in plaintiff’s anticipatory repudiation, good faith and fair dealing, law of the case doctrine, waiver, and forfeiture arguments, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment for defendants on her claims for breach of contract and specific performance. The case arose from an agreement for plaintiff to purchase real property from defendants. On appeal, she asserted as to her anticipatory repudiation argument that the trial court clearly erred in finding that defendants did not repudiate the Purchase Agreement (PA) through a text message sent by defendant-El-Bathy. “The trial court found that the text message was ‘an open invitation to discuss the matter and hardly a clear indication that non-performance is occurring.’ [It] found that El-Bathy’s testimony was more credible than plaintiff’s testimony; on the basis of El-Bathy’s testimony, the trial court found that the text message ‘was merely trying to express urgency to [plaintiff] to actually move forward and close on the transaction after numerous delays by [plaintiff].’” Based on the record, and giving “due deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations,” the court concluded that it “did not err by finding that defendants did not anticipatorily repudiate the [PA] in this regard.” It also rejected her claim “that defendants’ delay in delivering the executed [PA] constituted a” repudiation. Next, it found that “the trial court did not err by rejecting plaintiff’s argument about the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” given that Michigan does not recognize such a cause of action. The court declined to address her law of the case argument because while she provided some general case law about the doctrine, she offered “little analysis on how it applies to these facts.” Finally, she contended that because they “allowed her to continue efforts to secure financing after [5/31/21], defendants waived the right to enforce any breach by plaintiff stemming from her failure to timely close.” The court found this argument meritless. The PA listed the closing date as 5/31/21, “but the parties eventually extended that deadline to [6/28/21]. Even assuming that there were a waiver of certain dates and deadlines, there is no evidence supporting plaintiff’s assertion that defendants waived their rights to terminate the” PA. After she did not close by 6/28/21, they “exercised their right to terminate” it on 7/1/21. Thus, they “also did not forfeit their right to terminate the” PA.
Departure reasonableness & proportionality; People v Steanhouse; Consecutive sentencing for CSC I; MCL 750.520b(3); People v Norfleet
The court held that the resentenced terms above the mandatory minimum and the consecutive-sentencing decision were reasonable and proportionate, and it affirmed. A jury convicted defendant of multiple counts of CSC I and CSC II against two young relatives. On prior appeal the case was remanded for fuller reasoning. At resentencing the trial court imposed 30 to 60 years on four CSC I counts, 25 to 50 years on a fifth CSC I, and 10 to 15 years on two CSC II counts, with the fifth CSC I and the CSC II sentences to run consecutive to the others. The court explained that it was adding 5 years above the 25-year minimum due to “all the incidents,” the continuing nature of the abuse, and the harm to the victims and family. On appeal, the court held that the trial court addressed offense seriousness and offender factors and articulated why the chosen sentences were more proportionate than a lesser term. The court further held that consecutive sentencing was authorized for offenses arising from the same transaction and that the trial court articulated specific reasons, including the victims’ ages, simultaneous acts, threats to silence disclosures, the physical injury described, probationary status at the time of the offenses, and absconding, all of which supported the exercise of discretion.
Terrorist-threat mens rea; MCL 750.543m; People v Kvasnicka (On Remand) (Kvasnicka III); Malicious use of telecommunications; MCL 750.540e(1)(a); In re JP
The court held that the jury was improperly instructed on the mens rea for making a terrorist threat and vacated that conviction, but it affirmed the conviction for malicious use of a telecommunications service. Defendant left multiple profane calls for a probate judge, including “the bogeyman is coming his way” and “he is gonna get smoked.” The jury convicted on both counts. On appeal, the court held that after Kvasnicka III, the prosecution must prove the defendant recklessly threatened to commit an act of terrorism and that the jury must be instructed that the defendant “consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be viewed as threatening violence.” The model instruction given in this case used an objective reasonable-person standard and did not convey the required subjective recklessness, so an instructional error occurred and a new trial was required on that count. As to MCL 750.540e(1)(a), the court found sufficient evidence that defendant used a telecommunications device and threatened physical harm with the intent to terrorize, frighten, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy, or disturb the judge’s peace, citing the language of the calls and the judge’s reaction.
Divorce; Property division; Sparks v Sparks; Berger v Berger; Spousal support; Loutts v Loutts; Motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award; Washington v Washington
Concluding that defendant-ex-husband did not identify any actionable error by the arbitrator, the court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to vacate the arbitrator’s property or spousal support awards in this divorce case. The parties agreed to binding arbitration. As to the property division, defendant alleged “the arbitrator exceeded his authority by failing to apply controlling Michigan law because he did not address the Sparks factors when dividing the marital estate. This is incorrect. The arbitrator expressly cited Sparks in the arbitration award, as well as other caselaw applicable to the equitable distribution of marital property. While the arbitrator did not formally label them as belonging to Sparks, the award” showed that he considered these factors in dividing the marital property. Defendant also contended “the distribution of the marital estate was inequitable because he had no legal interest in the rental properties.” The court noted that his “argument turns on an alleged factual error made by the arbitrator.” The court “‘may not review the arbitrator’s findings of fact,’ and defendant” did not allege any “actual error of law that is ‘discernable on the face of the award itself.’” Further, it saw “no legal error on the award’s face in failing to consider an alleged debt that was never proven, let alone presented, during the actual arbitration proceedings[.]” As to owed income taxes, “with no discernable legal error on” the face of the award, the court would “‘not engage in a review of [the] arbitrator’s mental path’ as to why the income taxes for defendant’s business were not factored into the award.” As to the spousal support award, defendant asserted “the arbitrator erred by (1) not imputing enough income to plaintiff, (2) imputing too much income to defendant, and (3) failing to consider that plaintiff did not show, and did not have, any need for spousal support given the substantial property award she would receive in addition to her own earning capacity.” The court noted that while he again tried “to frame these alleged errors” as ones of law, they were “actually factual determinations by the arbitrator that” evaded review. He did not allege any “legal errors” warranting relief. Affirmed.
Tenant’s slip & fall on parking lot black ice; Premises liability; Notice; Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc; Constructive notice; Banks v Exxon Mobil Corp; Claim under MCL 554.139; Fitness for intended use; MCL 554.139(1)(a); Allison v AEW Capital Mgmt, LLP; Estate of Trueblood v P&G Apts, LLC
Holding that plaintiff-tenant offered evidence creating a genuine issue of fact as to “whether defendants had constructive notice of the ice in the parking lot,” the court concluded the trial court erred in granting them summary disposition on his premises liability claim. But it did not err in granting them summary disposition on his statutory claim because he did not present evidence showing a genuine issue of fact as to whether they “failed to keep their parking lot fit for its intended use[.]” Plaintiff alleged that he slipped on black ice in the parking lot of defendants’ senior-living community. As to his premises liability claim, the court agreed with the trial court “that the record would not allow a finding that defendants had actual notice of the alleged dangerous condition.” However, it reached “a different conclusion” as to the second of his two theories of constructive notice, “that the alleged defect—black ice formed from melting snowbanks—'existed for a sufficient length of time and under circumstances that the defendant is deemed to have notice . . . .’” Plaintiff contended “that given several days of snowfall and fluctuating temperatures, the formation of black ice in a senior-living community parking lot was of such a type or character that defendants should be deemed to be on notice.” The court concluded he raised a genuine issue of material fact on this theory. He “presented an expert report from a meteorologist stating that the ice that he slipped on was present in the parking lot for 49 hours after two winter storms and continued freezing temperatures.” The report concluded “that black ice was present in the parking lot for two full days and that defendants should have therefore been on notice of the danger.” Given this “report and plaintiff’s testimony about the presence of snowbanks and the black ice,” the court determined there was “a question of fact as to whether defendants had constructive notice of the ice that caused plaintiff to fall.” But it held that “defendants did not breach their statutory duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) to keep the parking lot fit for its intended use.” Plaintiff did not testify, and no evidence showed, “that the entire parking lot was completely covered in ice, rendering it unavoidable to park or walk on hazardous terrain.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.