Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Fifth Amendment due-process rights; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed Bureau of Narcotics; Whether the court had jurisdiction to consider the Bivens issue where the issue on appeal was the denial of qualified immunity; Extending Bivens outside of the approved Supreme Court precedents; Hernandez v Mesa (Hernandez I & II)
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] Joining other circuits, the court declined to extend Bivens to the border/immigration context. Plaintiff-Elhady was stopped at the Canadian border when returning to the U.S. Border-patrol agents, including defendant-Bradley (the lead officer), placed him in a cold cell without his jacket and shoes, despite his complaints. When he was released four hours later, he asserted that he was too ill to drive, and an ambulance was called. A doctor told him that he was “good to go” once he had rested and his body temperature returned to normal. Elhady sued under Bivens, claiming that the agents violated his Fifth Amendment due-process rights. Defendants argued that applying Bivens was inappropriate here, but the district court disagreed. It later granted all the agents summary judgment, except Bradley, who it found “had violated Elhady’s right to be ‘free from exposure to severe weather and temperatures.’” Because the district court ruled that the right was clearly established, it denied Bradley qualified immunity. He appealed. Elhady argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Bivens issue because the issue on appeal was the denial of qualified immunity, and Bradley forfeited the Bivens issue by not raising it on appeal. But the court held that it had jurisdiction because the Bivens issue was “‘directly implicated by the defense of qualified immunity[,]”’ and that under Hernandez I, “[a] cause of action’s availability under Bivens is an ‘antecedent’ question that we can address even if it was not raised below.” It noted that if there is no cause of action, courts should not consider the “hypothetical” qualified immunity issue. After discussing the limited circumstances under which the Supreme Court has applied Bivens, the court concluded that extending Bivens to border-patrol agents constituted “a new Bivens context.” And, in Hernandez II, the Supreme Court “made clear that national security will always be a special factor counseling against extending Bivens to the border context.” Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for Bradley.
The six-year limitations period for a contractor’s faulty workmanship; MCL 600.5839(1)(a); The six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract; MCL 600.5807(9); Tolling based on fraudulent concealment; MCL 600.5855; Doe v Roman Catholic Archbishop of Archdiocese of Detroit; Sills v Oakland Gen Hosp; Distinguishing King v Park W Galleries, Inc (Unpub)
The court held that because plaintiffs-homeowners failed to allege any facts supporting a fraudulent concealment theory, the trial court properly dismissed their claims against defendant-plumber on the ground they were time-barred. Plaintiffs claimed defendant’s faulty plumbing resulted in a sewer gas odor and caused health issues. Another contractor later fixed the problem. Plaintiffs sued defendant 10-1/2 years after it completed its work for breach of contract, breach of implied warranty, private nuisance, and negligence. On appeal, the court rejected their argument that the limitations periods were tolled because defendant fraudulently concealed its faulty workmanship, finding they did not sufficiently assert that defendant committed fraudulent conduct so as to toll the limitations period. “The word ‘claim,’ read in context, does not suggest that the [trial] court expected plaintiffs to raise a separate count of fraudulent concealment. Rather, [it] used the word ‘claim’ synonymously with ‘allege,’ communicating that plaintiffs did not allege any facts supporting that [defendant] fraudulently concealed its defective workmanship; i.e. that [it] acted or made misrepresentations with the goal of preventing discovery of plaintiffs’ claims.” In addition, they did not allege that defendant “covered its work with a cement basement floor for the purpose of hiding its defective work so that plaintiffs would not discover their legal claim. If simply burying a sewer line underground amounts to an act of concealment, every installment of plumbing material would be an act of fraudulent concealment.” And although the contractor who fixed the problem “opined that the workmanship was defective, he did not attest that [defendant] covered the condition to prevent plaintiffs’ discovery of their claims.” Further, defendant did not fraudulently conceal its faulty workmanship by telling plaintiffs that “the problem ‘was normal, nothing to worry about and to just pour some bleach down the drain.’” There was no allegation that it “actually knew that its work was inferior or that it did not believe its advice would resolve the problem.” The court distinguished King, noting there was no allegation that defendant “touted the quality of its work to lull plaintiffs into complacency.” Affirmed.
Alleged evidentiary error; Character evidence; MRE 404(a); People v Roper; Motion to suppress; Custodial interrogation; Miranda v Arizona; Sentencing; Departure sentence; People v Lockridge; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v Milbourn; Consideration of a defendant’s ethnic background; MCL 769.34(3)(a); People v Gjidoda; Scoring of OVs; Acquitted conduct; People v Beck
The court held that defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to allow him to present character witnesses, and the trial court did not err by denying his motion to suppress his police statements. However, it found he was entitled to resentencing because the trial court failed to adequately justify its decision to impose a departure sentence. Thus, it affirmed his conviction, but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. “The 66-year-old defendant, a subdeacon and sacrist,” was convicted of CSC III for sexually assaulting the 14-year-old male victim at their church. The trial court sentenced him to 4 to 15 years. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial court erroneously refused to allow him to present character witnesses. “[T]o the extent that trial counsel’s performance was deficient for agreeing with the trial court’s misunderstanding of the evidentiary rules and for not offering any argument explaining why the rules of evidence would permit the proposed character testimony, there [wa]s no reasonable probability that the lack of general character-related evidence affected the outcome of the trial.” Further, any character testimony would not have been relevant to the issue of his “ability to comprehend the nature of his admissions.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements, noting the “totality of the objective circumstances indicate that defendant was not ‘in custody’ during the interview such that Miranda warnings were required.” Finally, as to his contention that he was entitled to resentencing, one “of the reasons given by the trial court for departing from the guidelines range (i.e., its reference to acquitted conduct) was an impermissible reason for imposing a departure sentence.” While it gave “other permissible reasons that would support a departure from the guidelines range, and [it] may well have departed from the guidelines range on the basis of those remaining reasons, [it] did not adequately explain its reasoning for the extent of the departure imposed, and it is unclear whether [it] would have departed to the same extent without the one improper reason for departure.”
Motion to quash a bindover; Whether an officer’s entry into defendant’s home was lawful; MCL 764.21; People v Clement; Steagald v United States; Lawful police action as an element of assaulting/resisting/obstructing a police officer under MCL 750.81d(1); Lawful resistance; People v Moreno; Reasonable belief that a suspect is present; Payton v New York; Police body-cam video; Relevance; MRE 401; Impeachment evidence; MRE 607 & 609; People v Jenkins
The court held that the circuit court erred when it held that the officer’s entry into defendant’s residence was lawful under MCL 764.21 and thus, abused its discretion to that extent. It also held that the circuit court did not err by admitting the allegedly improper impeachment evidence. Defendant was arrested and charged with assaulting/resisting/obstructing a police officer for interfering with an officer’s attempt to arrest an individual inside her home. After a preliminary hearing in the district court, she was bound over for trial on that charge. The circuit court denied her motion to quash the bindover and dismiss the charge on the basis that the officer’s entry was unlawful, and therefore, she had the right to resist. The circuit court found the officer’s entry into her home was lawful. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that the circuit court erred when it found that “obtaining a search warrant was superfluous and that Clement and Steagald were inapplicable to the instant case because of the reasonableness of” the officer’s belief that the individual was inside the home. The circuit court erred “when it concluded that a search warrant is not required if the police officer’s belief that the subject of an arrest warrant is inside a third-party residence is reasonable.” The court also agreed in part with defendant that because the officer’s entry was unlawful, the circuit court erred when it denied her motion to quash and dismiss. “The circuit court erred when it reasoned that MCL 764.21 independently authorized [the officer’s] entry into defendant’s residence. To the extent that the circuit court engaged in such incorrect reasoning, it abused its discretion.” However, because it was not addressed in the circuit court or on appeal, the court declined to analyze whether the officer “reasonably believed at the time that [the individual] resided within defendant’s residence, and whether such a belief would render his entry of defendant’s residence lawful under Payton.” The court next found that defendant’s argument that the officer’s body-cam video footage should have been excluded pursuant to the exclusionary rule was moot, and disagreed that it was improperly admitted as impeachment evidence where “it was admitted as substantive evidence of what occurred[.]” Vacated and remanded.
Action for first-party no-fault benefits by a medical provider after an assignment of rights; Principle that a party that has been assigned a right to sue is not bound by a judgment obtained after the assignment was made unless that party had a right to have the merits of its claim adjudicated; Aultman, Miller & Co v Sloan; Res judicata; Sewell v Clean Cut Mgmt, Inc; Mecosta Cnty Med Ctr v Metro Group Prop & Cas Ins Co (Unpub); Comparing Taylor v Sturgell; Distinguishing Dawoud v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co; Privity; Adair v Michigan; Howell v Vito’s Trucking & Excavating Co
The court held that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing plaintiff-medical provider’s action seeking no-fault benefits for services it provided to defendant-insurer’s insured (J) on res judicata grounds. In the first action, J sued defendants for injuries she sustained in an auto accident. During the case, she assigned her rights to plaintiff, which was not part of that litigation. The trial court dismissed the case. Plaintiff then filed its own suit against defendants, seeking payment for the chiropractic services it had provided to J. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s case as well, finding it was barred by res judicata. On appeal, the court held that plaintiff “was not bound by the judgment against [J] in the first action because the assignment was made before the judgment against [J] was entered and [plaintiff] had no opportunity to be heard in that case.” It compared this case to Sturgell, where “the United States Supreme Court observed that ‘[t]he federal common law of preclusion is, of course, subject to due process limitations,’ and Aultman supports that Michigan’s common law, too, embraces this principle.” It then distinguished Dawoud, noting the providers in that case “were parties in the first case, rather than ostensible ‘privies.’ The application of res judicata in that circumstance was a no-brainer, as both the first and the second action involved ‘the same parties.’” Reversed and remanded.
Case evaluation; MCR 2.403; Principle that nuisance-abatement claims are equitable in nature; Ypsilanti Twp v Kircher; Order of demolition; Bonner v City of Brighton
The court held that the trial court had discretion to exempt plaintiff-city’s equitable nuisance-abatement claim from the case-evaluation process, and that it did not err by deeming the condition of defendant’s properties public nuisances and ordering demolition of the buildings. Plaintiff sued defendant and his various companies “to abate the nuisance caused by his dilapidated industrial buildings, housing thousands of corroding barrels of toxic, flammable, and explosive chemicals.” The parties accepted a case-evaluation award for plaintiff on its damages claims, and its nuisance-abatement claim was decided in its favor after trial. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the parties’ mutual acceptance of the case-evaluation award resolved not only the issue of damages, but also the issue of nuisance abatement. Plaintiff “delayed in filing its motion to exempt the nuisance-abatement claim from the case-evaluation process until the evaluation had already been made. However, neither party had yet accepted or rejected the evaluation and therefore the court still had discretion to consider this motion.” In addition, as permitted by MCR 2.403(A)(3), on good cause shown, the trial court “exempted from the case-evaluation process the equitable nuisance-abatement claim. When the parties subsequently accepted the case-evaluation award, the acceptance applied only to the damages claim.” The judgment of dismissal “also only applied to the damages claim, the only claim then before the case-evaluation panel.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred by finding the conditions on his properties constituted public nuisances, noting it could “discern no error in the trial court’s findings that all of [his] buildings presented current or possibly impending public nuisances.” Finally, the court rejected his contention that the trial court’s selected remedy for abating the nuisance, specifically ordering demolition of certain buildings and portions of another, was improper. Given defendant’s “history of lawbreaking and noncompliance, ordering [him] to take remediation efforts before bringing” the buildings up to code would not protect the public health and safety. And evidence of his “complete disregard for government authority and his own agreements more than sufficed to support that a remedy short of demolition would have no impact.” Affirmed.
Whether the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts; In re Fried; Case service plan; In re Hicks/Brown; A parent’s duty to participate in & benefit from services; In re TK
Holding that the DHHS provided reasonable reunification efforts, the court affirmed termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights. Her rights were terminated based primarily on her relationship with a registered sex offender who sexually abused one of her children. In addition, her psychological evaluation found she “would require treatment for a significant amount of time before she could be safely reunified with her children,” and the DHHS did not believe she was benefiting from the services she was receiving. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the services offered were not adequate to overcome her psychological problems and develop her parenting skills. There was “nothing in the record to support respondent’s assertion that weekly [therapy] sessions were insufficient to meet her needs. Indeed, [she] never requested additional sessions, and [her] therapist testified that she was making some progress.” Moreover, the DHHS provided her with additional services and a second evaluation, but even her own “expert witness testified that her problems were ‘chronic,’ he was ‘very cautious’ about reunification, and ‘the best outcome’ would be ‘to have her not independently in charge of her children.’” Finally, there was nothing in the record to support respondent’s assertion that “anyone would have benefited from compelled visitation” between her and one of her daughters, and the daughter’s therapist testified that there was nothing the DHHS “could have done to assist in attempting to reunify” them. In sum, the DHHS “made considerable efforts to reunify respondent with her children and to facilitate a nurturing relationship between” them. However, she failed to benefit from those services. The DHHS “noted the children’s need for permanency and that respondent failed to show she would be able to rectify the problems in a reasonable amount of time.”