Become a mentor! The Mentor Center needs experienced attorneys to offer support & advice to young attorneys.
 
  • News and Moves

    Robert J. Andretz
    Michael P. Ashcraft Jr.
    Andrew W. Barnes
    Mohammad G. Beydoun
    Jeffrey Bullard Jr.
    John R. Colip
    Jennifer E. Consiglio
    Matthew S. Derby
    Zachary J. Diederichs
    Mowitt (Mitt) S. Drew III
    Jennifer Dukarski
    William M. Engeln
    Jordan D. Florian
    Audrey J. Forbush
    Fraser Trebilcock Davis Dunlap & Cavanaugh P.C.
    Andrew S. Gipe
    Michael F. Golab
    Michael D. Hanchett
    Laura E. Johnson
    Garett Koger
    Bill Lentine
    Scott K. Lites
    MDTC
    Daniel P. Makarski
    Fadee A. Nakkash
    Sarah L. Nirenberg
    Amber D. Peters
    Rachel Roseman
    Kelly L. Travis

 

Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.

 

 

Case Summary

Please note: The State Bar of Michigan will be closed Thursday, November 25 and Friday, November 26, in observance of the Thanksgiving holiday. The e-Journal will resume publication on Monday, November 29.


Cases appear under the following practice areas:

  • Criminal Law (7)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 76483
    Case: People v. Callaghan
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Gleicher, K.F. Kelly, and Ronayne Krause
    Issues:

    Sufficiency of the evidence; Assault; Voir dire; Judgment of sentence (JOS)

    Summary:

    Finding that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s assault conviction and that the manner in which the trial court conducted voir dire did not provide a ground for reversal of his convictions, the court affirmed, but remanded for the ministerial correction of the JOS. He was also convicted of felony-firearm. He was sentenced to two years for his felony-firearm conviction, and one year of probation for his assault conviction. The court held that an assault clearly occurred, given defendant’s admission that he pointed a loaded gun at victim-K. “Indeed, having a gun pointed at one’s body would cause a reasonable person to fear or apprehend an immediate battery.” K testified that “defendant appeared to debate whether or not he would shoot [K], and [K’s] life flashed before his eyes because he believed defendant would pull the trigger.” Also, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that defendant intended to put K “in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery. Pointing a gun at someone is an action likely to cause them to reasonably fear an immediate battery, particularly if the gun is loaded, as it was” here. Nonetheless, defendant submitted that there was insufficient evidence to support his assault conviction because he “did not have the necessary mens rea to commit the crime of assault, but rather, he acted to protect himself and his young son from the threats and sound of an assault that he heard coming from upstairs.” K testified as to “an argument that precipitated his travel to the basement where defendant pointed a gun at him. On the contrary, defendant testified that he heard threats and the sound of an assault coming from upstairs that caused him to draw his weapon in defense of himself and his son. Despite this claim of self-defense, the jury rejected” his testimony and convicted him of assault.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 76470
    Case: People v. McCall
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Gleicher, K.F. Kelly, and Ronayne Krause
    Issues:

    Sufficiency of the evidence for convictions of larceny of more than $1,000 & less than $20,000 (MCL 750.356(3)(a)) & larceny in a building (MCL 750.360); Distinguishing People v Edwards

    Summary:

    Holding that there was sufficient evidence to support that defendant-McCall was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of larceny of more than $1,000 but less than $20,000 and larceny in a building, the court affirmed. He challenged the existence of the first and fourth elements of larceny, asserting that the prosecution did not show the existence of the $4,000 he was charged with stealing. But the prosecution established via victim-G’s “testimony that he kept under his bed a small safe with important documents and cash savings.” G testified that before 8/4/18, “he had placed $4,000 cash in the safe from earnings from his landscaping business[.]” The court noted that it was the trial court’s prerogative in defendant’s bench trial to believe G’s testimony, and the court had to regard G’s “testimony as to the existence of the $4,000 as fact.” While defendant cited Edwards, the court found that case “readily distinguishable” because the inferences the trial court drew here were “strong and appropriately drawn directly from the testimony of the owner of the money.” The court also rejected defendant’s assertion that the prosecution did not “establish a reasonable timeframe within which the money was” stolen. It noted that he stayed in G’s bedroom between 7/28 and 8/6, and spent nearly $1,500 in cash on 8/1. The trial “court could reasonably infer from the evidence that” he took the money between 7/28 and 8/1/18. He spent nearly $1,500 in cash two days before G’s “$4,000 in ‘crisp $100 bills’ was discovered missing, and slept in [G’s] room alone several times within the relevant timeframe. This evidence” supported a reasonable inference that he took the money. In addition, it could be inferred that although police “could not recover latent fingerprints at the scene, McCall’s admission that his fingerprints would be found on the safe and its contents were an attempt to explain away the possibility of their recovery.”

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 76467
    Case: People v. McDonald
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Gleicher, K.F. Kelly, and Ronayne Krause
    Issues:

    Admission of the victim’s oral & written statements under MCL 768.27c; People v Olney; MRE 801(d)(1)(A); MRE 403; People v Blackston; “Unfairly prejudicial”; People v Cameron; Effect of a trial being a bench trial

    Summary:

    Holding that the challenged statements admitted under MCL 768.27c were properly not excluded under MRE 403 and did not improperly bolster the victim’s credibility, the court affirmed defendant’s third-offense domestic violence conviction. He argued that the trial court in his bench trial erred in admitting the victim’s oral and written statements about the two incidents giving rise to the charge. There was no merit in his assertion “MCL 768.27c was intended for prosecution of domestic abuse cases of uncooperative complainants, not cooperative ones such as the victim.” The court held in Olney that there is “no requirement [in MCL 768.27c] that the complainant-declarant be unavailable in order to admit evidence of a statement that otherwise satisfies the statutory requirements.” While he contended that the “prior oral and written statements to police were only proper to impeach the victim’s in-court testimony to the extent the statements were inconsistent under MRE 801(d)(1)(A)” the court concluded that restricting “MCL 768.27c under MRE 801(d)(1)(A) would circumvent the statute’s purpose.” In addition, it held that “MRE 403 did not warrant the exclusion of the prosecution’s MCL 768.27c evidence because the probative value of the victim’s written statement and” an officer’s (C) testimony about her “oral statement was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect. Moreover, this evidence was not merely cumulative, but served to supplement testimony that the victim either could not recall at trial or declined to volunteer in an effort to protect defendant.” The court further found that the statements created “a clear timeline of the incidents” and that the evidence was not “needlessly cumulative.” There was information in them “that she was unable to recall at trial. The victim’s statements provided a gap-filling function to the victim’s in-person testimony, presenting a clearer picture of what happened than the trial court would have been able to glean without them[.]” In addition, the trial court noted “the details in the statements corroborated events that were relayed by” C, another witness, or portrayed in the photos. The court found that the “significant probative value of the statements, combined with defendant’s inability to show anything beyond ordinary prejudice, satisfies MRE 403.”

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 76462
    Case: People v. Ontiveroz
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Swartzle, Sawyer, and Letica
    Issues:

    Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to call an expert witness on trauma reactions to explain defendant’s attempt to conceal his role in the homicide; Failure to call an expert witness to testify about how the drugs in the victim’s system affected his behavior; Prosecutorial error; Self-defense

    Summary:

    Holding that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel or entitled to relief due to prosecutorial error, the court affirmed. He was convicted of second-degree murder, felony-firearm, and third-degree fleeing and eluding a police officer. Defendant argued that his trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance “because he did not call an expert witness to explain and contextualize his post-shooting behavior.” He did not submit "any offer of proof that an expert existed who would testify that fleeing the shooting, disposing of evidence, sleeping away from home, eluding a traffic stop by driving with excessive speed, and barricading oneself in a relative’s home before surrendering, then initially giving the police false information, could be considered a normal reaction to a traumatic situation.” Even if such an expert was produced, it was “not apparent that the trial court would have determined that expert testimony about the effects of trauma on a young man’s mind would be relevant to assist the jury in understanding the evidence.” It was possible that defendant’s attorney did not wish to call another witness to discuss “post-shooting behavior because highlighting defendant’s flight and hiding from police and destruction of evidence could focus the jurors on these actions and lead them to conclude that defendant’s post-shooting actions were the result of a consciousness of guilt rather than concluding they were individually and in combination a normal reaction to the trauma of being involved in a shooting. Choosing not to highlight or emphasize unfavorable testimony can be reasonable trial strategy.” Moreover, the court held that “counsel, through defendant’s testimony and closing argument, was able to have the jury consider that defendant was too panicked, afraid, and unable to think clearly to report a shooting in self-defense and so reacted by concealing his actions.” Because there was testimony that his “actions after the shooting resulted from trauma, not guilt, there is not a reasonable probability that expert testimony to the same effect would have resulted in a different outcome at trial.” For these reasons, appellate counsel did not show that “defense counsel’s performance was deficient for not calling an expert in trauma reactions.”

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 76468
    Case: People v. Swilling
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Swartzle, Sawyer, and Letica
    Issues:

    Double jeopardy; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 10, 13, 14, & 17; Mootness; Judgment of sentence (JOS)

    Summary:

    The court vacated one of defendant’s first-degree home invasion convictions and sentences and remanded to the trial court for it to correct his JOS. It held that the trial court properly scored OVs 10, 13, and 14, and the issue regarding the scoring of OV 17 was moot. He was convicted of armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, first-degree home invasion, unlawful imprisonment, FIP, and felony-firearm, second offense. He was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender to serve 28 to 50 years for each armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery conviction, 15 to 25 years for each first-degree home invasion and unlawful imprisonment conviction, 40 to 60 months for the FIP conviction, and 5 years for each felony-firearm conviction. Defendant argued that his first-degree home invasion convictions and sentences violated the double jeopardy provisions of the Michigan and U.S. Constitutions because only one entry into the house occurred. The prosecution agreed that defendant should have been convicted and sentenced for only one first-degree home invasion count. The parties were correct that these convictions and sentences violated double jeopardy.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 76466
    Case: People v. Washington
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Murray, Markey, and Riordan
    Issues:

    Sufficiency of the evidence; Second-degree murder; People v Smith; Right to a fair & impartial jury; Sleeping juror; People v Dunigan; Prosecutorial error; People v Dobek; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Strickland v Washington; Failure to request a limiting instruction on other acts evidence; People v Rice (On Remand)

    Summary:

    The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s second-degree murder conviction, that he was not denied his rights to a fair and impartial jury and the effective assistance of counsel, and that the prosecution did not commit error. He was also convicted of AWIM and felony-firearm. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his second-degree murder conviction. The AWIM victim’s (W) testimony was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the first shot fired by defendant struck the murder victim (T), and the autopsy revealed that T was killed by a single gunshot wound. “Considering this evidence, a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the charge of second-degree murder for the death of” T were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also rejected his claim that his right to a fair and impartial jury was violated because a juror was observed to be sleeping during part of the trial, noting defendant failed to show “the juror at issue could not fairly and competently consider the charges against” him and thus, failed to show the juror was not qualified to give a verdict. The court next found that none of defendant’s three alleged instances of prosecutorial error entitled him to relief. Finally, it rejected his contention that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel in six different instances at trial. It found that counsel “was not ineffective for failing to object to any of the three alleged instances of prosecutorial” error, for not objecting to testimony about defendant robbing another individual, for failing to request a jury instruction limiting W’s other act testimony to the charge that defendant shot him, for not discussing in closing argument the prosecution’s theory as to defendant’s motive to shoot T, or for failing to capitalize on a statement made by the prosecutor that defendant believed contradicted the prosecution’s theory of the case. Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 76456
    Case: Wesson v. Shoop
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: Sutton, Stranch, and Nalbandian
    Issues:

    Habeas corpus; Allowing a confession into evidence where petitioner claimed he was intoxicated when he made it; Attempted withdrawal of a Miranda waiver

    Summary:

    The court affirmed the district court’s denial of a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the Ohio state courts did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent by denying petitioner-Wesson’s motion to suppress his confession based on his alleged intoxication. The facts did not support his claims and precedent does not extend Fifth Amendment protections to inebriated persons. After being convicted of aggravated murder, he sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the state court unreasonably applied the law by admitting his confession into evidence, claiming it was taken while he was intoxicated, in violation of his Miranda rights. But the court concluded that “the circumstances of the interrogation were not unusual,” and the state courts’ findings did not support his claim that he was intoxicated, resulting in the conclusion that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The state courts chose to believe the testimony of four officers that Wesson did not appear intoxicated, noting “that Wesson’s statements were ‘inconsistent.’” After viewing the taped interrogation, and considering Wesson’s familiarity with the criminal system, the court could not say that the state courts’ conclusion was an unreasonable determination of the facts. Additionally, the court noted that the Fifth Amendment protects against “police coercion, not self-created explanations for confessions,” and precedent has applied this reasoning “even for defendants who were severely intoxicated.” The court rejected Wesson’s claim that he had tried to withdraw his Miranda waiver during the interrogation, holding that his statement “‘ain’t got nothin’ to say to y’all’ more accurately conveys an expression of frustration at his plight,” rather than an attempt to end his interrogation.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Family Law (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 76484
    Case: Echols v. Kabza
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Swartzle, Sawyer, and Letica
    Issues:

    Custody dispute; Great weight of the evidence; MCL 722.28; Martin v Martin; Joint custody & parenting time; MCL 722.26a(1) & (7); Lieberman v Orr; Proper cause or a change in circumstances; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Vodvarka v Grasmeyer; Established custodial environment; The statutory best-interest factors; MCL 722.23; Motion to remove the child’s lawyer-guardian ad litem (L-GAL); MCL 722.24(2)

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding sole legal and physical custody of the child to plaintiff-mother, or err by denying defendant-father’s motion to remove the child’s L-GAL and declining to appoint a new lawyer. After their divorce, the parties shared custody of their child, exercising approximately equal parenting time. They “managed to cooperate for a couple years” but eventually needed court intervention. The trial court eventually awarded plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the child. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a change in custody based on findings that were contrary to the great weight of the evidence. It first determined that the trial court’s findings that factor (b) favored plaintiff were supported by the record evidence. “There was evidence that [defendant] repeatedly had personality conflicts with persons involved in [the child’s] education, and that his behaviors were a significant cause of the conflicts.” Factor (c) also favored plaintiff. “There was ample evidence to support the trial court’s finding [defendant] lacked the disposition to provide for [the child]; rather, the evidence tended to suggest that [he] was selective about [the child’s] needs. Even in the area of her medical needs, there was evidence that permitted an inference that [he] placed his own agenda and fears before [the child’s] best interests.” As to factor (j), while the record supported findings that both parties “allowed their dislike for each other to interfere with [the child’s] relationship with the other parent, the record amply demonstrated that [defendant] had taken the more extreme steps to interfere with” plaintiff’s parenting. As to his motion to remove the child’s L-GAL and appoint a new lawyer, because the L-GAL owed her duties to the child, defendant did not have standing to assert that her “representation did not meet minimum standards of professional representation.” In any event, he could not show that the L-GAL’s remarks were improper or prejudiced his hearing, or that she held a bias against him. And “[g]iven the late stage in the litigation, the fact that the trial court had actually interviewed [the child], and the nature of the inconsistent positions, the trial court could reasonably conclude that it was unnecessary to appoint a second lawyer to represent” the child’s preferences. Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Litigation (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Negligence & Intentional Tort

    e-Journal #: 76482
    Case: Stout v. Chapman
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Murray and O’Brien; Dissent – M.J. Kelly
    Issues:

    Premises liability; Notice of the dangerous condition; Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc; Constructive notice; Violation of a scheduling order; MCR 2.116(G)(1)(a)(i); Prejudice

    Summary:

    Concluding that plaintiff did not offer evidence allowing a reasonable juror to find that defendant-homeowner could have noticed and been aware of the dangerous condition, and that the trial court did not err in accepting her amended summary disposition motion, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant in this premises liability case. Plaintiff fell through the stairs leading to defendant’s basement, which was not accessible from her house but only via an outside storm door. He did not offer any evidence that she had actual notice of the dangerous condition. Rather, the crux of his appellate argument was that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that she had constructive notice. No “one noticed any defects in the staircase before it fell, not even plaintiff, an experienced handyman. Plaintiff’s expert nevertheless opined in his report that, when he observed the stringers, the bottoms of the stringers were visibly rotting, and that, based on defendant’s testimony that the bottoms of the stringers were visible, this rot at the bottoms of the stringers would have been discovered upon reasonable inspection.” However, the court concluded that “the condition at the base of the steps would not have alerted defendant to the danger that the stairs attached to the stringers could collapse.” As a result, it determined that plaintiff did not proffer “sufficient evidence to establish a question of fact whether defendant had constructive notice of the dangerous condition, so summary disposition” for her was proper. The court also disagreed with plaintiff’s assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in considering her summary disposition motion even though she “supplemented her allegedly deficient motion within 21 days of the hearing date in violation of MCR 2.116(G)(1)(a)(i).” It noted that he failed to explain how the trial court’s decision to rule on her amended motion prejudiced him. It was unclear how he “could be prejudiced by defendant merely including the correct quotations and citations from the depositions in” the amended motion. Reversal was unwarranted absent any showing of prejudice.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Negligence & Intentional Tort (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Litigation

    e-Journal #: 76482
    Case: Stout v. Chapman
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Murray and O’Brien; Dissent – M.J. Kelly
    Issues:

    Premises liability; Notice of the dangerous condition; Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc; Constructive notice; Violation of a scheduling order; MCR 2.116(G)(1)(a)(i); Prejudice

    Summary:

    Concluding that plaintiff did not offer evidence allowing a reasonable juror to find that defendant-homeowner could have noticed and been aware of the dangerous condition, and that the trial court did not err in accepting her amended summary disposition motion, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant in this premises liability case. Plaintiff fell through the stairs leading to defendant’s basement, which was not accessible from her house but only via an outside storm door. He did not offer any evidence that she had actual notice of the dangerous condition. Rather, the crux of his appellate argument was that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that she had constructive notice. No “one noticed any defects in the staircase before it fell, not even plaintiff, an experienced handyman. Plaintiff’s expert nevertheless opined in his report that, when he observed the stringers, the bottoms of the stringers were visibly rotting, and that, based on defendant’s testimony that the bottoms of the stringers were visible, this rot at the bottoms of the stringers would have been discovered upon reasonable inspection.” However, the court concluded that “the condition at the base of the steps would not have alerted defendant to the danger that the stairs attached to the stringers could collapse.” As a result, it determined that plaintiff did not proffer “sufficient evidence to establish a question of fact whether defendant had constructive notice of the dangerous condition, so summary disposition” for her was proper. The court also disagreed with plaintiff’s assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in considering her summary disposition motion even though she “supplemented her allegedly deficient motion within 21 days of the hearing date in violation of MCR 2.116(G)(1)(a)(i).” It noted that he failed to explain how the trial court’s decision to rule on her amended motion prejudiced him. It was unclear how he “could be prejudiced by defendant merely including the correct quotations and citations from the depositions in” the amended motion. Reversal was unwarranted absent any showing of prejudice.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Real Property (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 76481
    Case: TCF Nat'l Bank v. Decker
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Murray, Markey, and Riordan
    Issues:

    Foreclosure by advertisement; Effect of failure to redeem property before the expiration of the redemption period; MCL 600.3236; MCL 600.3240; Bryan v JPMorgan Chase Bank; The equitable “fraud or irregularity” exception to the redemption period; El-Seblani v IndyMac Mtg Servs (6th Cir)

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court correctly ruled that defendant lost all rights in and to the subject property after the statutory redemption period expired regardless of her allegations of fraud and irregularity. Plaintiff-bank initiated a foreclosure by advertisement against defendant and purchased the property after a sheriff’s sale. Defendant did not redeem the property during the redemption period. The trial court found defendant lacked standing to contest the foreclosure because the redemption period had expired, thereby extinguishing her rights in and to the property. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court erred by granting plaintiff’s motions for summary disposition without making a determination regarding her allegations of fraud and irregularity in the foreclosure process. “[W]hile courts may equitably extend the redemption period, they may not revive a redemption period that has already been extinguished.” Here, defendant did not file her counterclaims until 2020, “several months after the six-month redemption period expired.” Thus, regardless of whether she “showed fraud or irregularity, the trial court did not possess the equitable authority to revive the redemption period, and it correctly ruled that defendant had no rights in and to the subject property.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Termination of Parental Rights (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 76492
    Case: In re Tokarski
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Swartzle, Sawyer, and Letica
    Issues:

    Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Failure to inquire whether respondent was disabled & needed specialized services; Duty under the Americans with Disabilities Act; Child’s best interests

    Summary:

    Holding that § (c)(i) was met and that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed. The trial court focused on her history of substance abuse in determining that termination was warranted under § (c)(i). She argued that “she should have been given more time to address her substance abuse issue.” Overall, she was offered services during the pandemic but failed to benefit from them because she continued to show that “she could not remain sober after being in a controlled environment such as inpatient treatment or jail.” She further argued that “the trial court failed to inquire whether she was disabled and needed specialized services.” She did not present any support for what disability she had, "let alone how the services should have been tailored to address it." Although she “may have had short-term memory issues, there was no evidence that respondent did not understand she was expected to live a substance-free lifestyle.” Thus, she failed to demonstrate that “she would have fared better had she completed a neurological examination.”

    Full Text Opinion

Ads