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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Claims under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (CRA) (MCL 37.2101 et seq.); Religious discrimination; MCL 37.2202(1)(a); Hazle v. Ford Motor Co.; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green; Retaliatory discharge; MCL 37.2701(a); Meyer v. City of Ctr. Line; DeFlaviis v. Lord & Taylor, Inc.; Causation; Barrett v. Kirtland Cmty. Coll.; Rymal v. Baergen; Accommodation of religious beliefs; Wessling v. Kroger Co. (ED MI); Reasonable attempts at religious accommodation; Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook; Yanfeng US Automotive Interior Systems II (Yanfeng); Human resources (HR); Collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
Concluding that there was no evidence allowing the inference that plaintiff was fired for practicing his Muslim faith, and that defendant-Yanfeng articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (continuing unexcused absences) for his discharge, the court affirmed the summary dismissal of his religious discrimination claim. It also affirmed the summary dismissal of his retaliatory discharge claim, holding that there was no evidence of a causal connection between his grievance and his discharge. While “the reason he sought to leave work early on Fridays was to go to his mosque and participate in Jumu’ah, Yanfeng’s termination decision was based on the undisputed fact that plaintiff accumulated 21 attendance points for unexcused absences. Plaintiff defiantly ignored repeated warnings that he did not have permission to leave early on Fridays, that he would accumulate attendance points for continued unexcused absences, and that he would eventually be terminated if he kept failing to stay until his shift ended” on Fridays. The court saw nothing in an 11/6/15 email “that even remotely reflects religious bias” and further, the options the HR manager presented to plaintiff – return to his old position or work third shift as an assembler – were made after this email but before his termination. As to his retaliatory discharge claim, “the evidence quite clearly and as a matter of law established that plaintiff was terminated because of unexcused absences and not in retaliation for filing the grievance with the union.” His own testimony was that he was warned “long before the grievance was filed, that he would not be allowed to leave work early on Fridays, yet he” continued to do so. There was no evidence of a causal connection between the grievance and his firing. While he was fired just a couple of weeks after the filing of the grievance, “the firing at that point in time was because plaintiff had by then accumulated the number of attendance points for unexcused absences that justified termination under the CBA.” The court declined to decide whether the CRA establishes a duty for employers to accommodate employees’ religious beliefs as plaintiff failed to develop any legal analysis or argument on the issue.
Sentencing; People v. Lockridge; Affirmance of a within-guidelines sentence absent an error in scoring the guidelines, reliance on inaccurate information, or any constitutional violation; People v. Schrauben; Cruel & unusual punishment; U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Proportionality; People v. Skinner; People v. Milbourn; People v. Daniel; People v. Lemons
The court held that defendant was not entitled to resentencing. She was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, felon in possession (FIP), and felony-firearm. The trial court sentenced her as a third-offense habitual offender to concurrent terms of 12½ to 30 years for the manslaughter conviction and 5 to 10 years for the FIP conviction, to be served consecutively to a 2-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that her sentence for manslaughter was “unreasonable, disproportionate, and unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.” It first noted that although she was correct that a sentence exceeding the advisory guidelines minimum range is reviewed for reasonableness, she “did not receive a departure sentence. Rather, she was sentenced at the top end of the applicable guidelines range of 50 to 150 months as enhanced for defendant’s habitual-offender status. When a trial court does not depart from the recommended minimum sentence range, the minimum sentence must be affirmed unless there was an error in scoring the guidelines or the trial court relied on inaccurate information.” Defendant did not argue that there was an error in scoring or that the trial court relied on inaccurate information. Thus, the court was required to affirm absent any constitutional violation. It found no such violation. First, the fact that her sentence was at the top of the guidelines was “of no consequence because there was no departure.” While she also emphasized her lesser culpability, the trial court recognized this by acquitting her of second-degree murder and convicting her off the lesser involuntary manslaughter offense. “[G]iven [her] age of 44 years, defendant inaptly characterizes her sentence as closely resembling a sentence of life without parole.” She failed “to overcome the presumption of proportionality.” As such, she did not show “that her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” Affirmed.
MCL 769.25; Miller v. Alabama; Judicial fact-finding; People v. Skinner; People v. Hyatt
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated part II.B. of the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 61786 in the 2/18/16 edition, in which defendant was a codefendant in People v. James) and remanded the case to that court to review defendant’s first-degree murder sentence for an abuse of discretion. The court had previously held the application for leave to appeal in abeyance pending the decisions in Skinner and Hyatt, which were decided on 6/20/18.
Sentencing; Miller v. Alabama; People v. Skinner; People v. Hyatt; MCL 769.25 & 769.25a
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 61769 in the 2/9/16 edition) and remanded the case to that court to review defendant’s first-degree murder sentence for an abuse of discretion. The court had previously held the application for leave to appeal in abeyance pending the decisions in Skinner and Hyatt, which were decided on 6/20/18.
Motion for directed verdict; People v. Aldrich; People v. Couzens; Self-defense; People v. Roper; The Self-Defense Act (SDA) (MCL 780.971 et seq.); People v. Dupree; People v. Guajardo; Whether the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence; People v. Musser; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 6; MCL 777.22(1); MCL 777.65; People v. Strawther; Assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH)
Rejecting defendant-Luckett’s claim that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal and his assertion that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, the court affirmed his convictions. However, it vacated his sentences due to an error in scoring OV 6, and remanded for resentencing. He was convicted of AWIGBH and felonious assault. The case arose from a confrontation between Luckett and victim-J. Luckett asserted the affirmative defense of self-defense, shifting the burden to the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense. The court concluded that a rational juror could have found from the evidence that he “did not honestly and reasonably believe that he faced an imminent unlawful use of force.” Despite his claim that “he was being verbally threatened and cornered by three men, it was for the jury to determine which of the conflicting stories was more credible. The jury also viewed the surveillance footage showing the moments leading up to the stabbing and could have concluded that the video evidence supported [J’s] description of the altercation.” Further, even if it “determined that Luckett’s belief of imminent harm was honest and reasonable, it could still conclude from the evidence that Luckett’s use of a knife to stab [J] in the stomach was an excessive use of force, thereby depriving Luckett of the protections of the SDA.” Either finding could have negated his self-defense claim “and led a rational juror to conclude that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt” that he did not act in self-defense when he stabbed J. But OV 6 should not have been scored where he was convicted of AWIGBH.
Sentencing; Review of a departure sentence for reasonableness; People v. Lockridge; Proportionality; People v. Milbourn; People v. Steanhouse; Sentencing after revocation of probation; People v. Hendrick; Whether the trial court provided justification for the departure; People v. Smith; People v. Steanhouse (On Remand)
Due to the lack of record evidence as to the trial court’s rationale for the extent of its sentencing departure and how the departure was proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and the criminal, the court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. He pled guilty to manufacturing 45 kilograms of more of marijuana and was sentenced to 3 years’ probation. After he later pled guilty to a fifth probation violation, the trial court revoked his probation and sentenced him to 5 to 15 years in prison. While he argued that the trial court did not consider his guidelines range in sentencing him, the court found that the trial court’s comments at sentencing indicated it was aware of the information in the PSIR and of the minimum guidelines range applicable to defendant. He also argued that the trial court did not provide justification on the record for the extent of the departure it imposed. His minimum guidelines range was 5 to 17 months. “In sentencing defendant, the trial court noted that it believed compelling reasons existed for the departure based on defendant’s probation violations, blatant disrespect for the trial court’s orders related to probation, and failure to make a successful effort at rehabilitation while on probation.” While it appeared that “the trial court properly provided a rationale for the sentence it imposed,” the court could not find in the record where it “directly acknowledged that the sentence constituted a departure from the minimum” guidelines range. It also could not find in “the record evidence that the trial court properly connected the reasons for departure to the extent of the departure chosen. Additionally, the trial court did not explain why a departure sentence was more proper under the circumstances than a sentence within the minimum” range.
Motion to dismiss based on the right to a speedy trial; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 20; MCR 6.004(A); Barker v. Wingo; Michigan’s nolle prosequi procedure; People v. Curtis; People v. Ostafin; United States v. MacDonald; Principle that in Michigan an indefinite adjournment violates a defendant’s right to a speedy trial; Hicks v. Judge of Recorder’s Court of Detroit; Distinguishing Klopfer v. North Carolina; Principle that a 6-month delay is necessary to trigger further investigation when a defendant raises a speedy trial issue; People v. Daniel
Holding that defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated, the court reversed the order dismissing the charges and remanded for further proceedings. He was charged with and arrested for CSC II in 4/05. An order of nolle prosequi was entered in 8/05, and the charges were dismissed. The prosecution refiled them just three weeks later. Around the same time, defendant moved out of state. Almost 12 years later, he was “arrested in Nevada and extradited back to Michigan.” He successfully moved to dismiss based on an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial. The court agreed with the prosecution that “the trial court erred in finding a speedy trial violation and dismissing the charges.” The parties disputed whether the right to a speedy trial attached when defendant was first arrested in 4/05 on the charges that were dismissed or when he “was arrested in 2017 after the refiling of the same charges.” Resolving the dispute turned on Michigan’s nolle prosequi procedure. The trial court relied on Klopfer to find that the relevant time period began with the 2005 arrest. However, the court concluded that it misapplied Klopfer because North Carolina’s nolle prosequi procedure discussed in that case was legally distinct from the Michigan procedure. “North Carolina allowed the prosecution to suspend charges indefinitely without discharging the indictment, which tolled the statute of limitations and permitted the prosecution to reinstate the charges at any time.” Thus, the reinstatement “was simply a continuation of the initial proceeding.” However, in Michigan, “an indefinite adjournment violates a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.” After an order of nolle prosequi has been entered here, “the prosecution must ‘obtain a new indictment and begin proceedings anew if [it] wished to reinstate the original charge.’” Given that procedural distinction, this case was more similar to MacDonald. The “trial court incorrectly concluded that the reissued charges were a continuation of the initial charges that were dismissed.” Defendant’s right to a speedy trial “attached when he was arrested in 2017 for the refiled charges.”
Involuntary mental health treatment; A “person requiring treatment”; MCL 330.1401(1)(a); Due process; Sidun v. Wayne Cnty. Treasurer; Notice under the Mental Health Code (MCL 330.1001 et seq.); MCL 330.1453(1); MCR 5.734(A) & (C); In re KB; Clear & convincing evidence; In re Martin; Principle that even unintentional falls from 10 feet or less may be sufficient to cause serious bodily injury or death; Reetz v. Tipit, Inc.; Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Elec. Supply Co.; Grasser v. Fleming; Jackson v. PKM Co.
The court held that the notice respondent received was adequate, and that the trial court did not err by finding that she was a “person requiring treatment” under MCL 330.1401(1)(a). Respondent contemplated suicide and received mental health treatment. When she began to miss appointments and medication, the trial court eventually found she was a “person requiring treatment” and ordered her to participate in involuntary mental health treatment. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that she received constitutionally deficient notice of the hearing on the petition, finding “the notices, although undesirable, adequately informed respondent of the time and location for her hearing with sufficient time to prepare, whatever confusion she suffered was a consequence of factors independent of the notices, and, in any event, she appears to have suffered no actual prejudice.” It also rejected her claim that petitioner failed to establish that respondent was a “person requiring treatment” under MCL 330.1401, noting “any expectation that [she] might cause herself serious physical injury can be directly attributed to her mental illness.” And “her longstanding pattern of noncompliance with treatment can reasonably be extrapolated to the future.” Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), & (j); Effect of a parent’s failure to comply with the court-ordered treatment plan; In re Trejo Minors; In re BZ; In re White; Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.19a(2); In re Rood; Principle that a respondent has a commensurate responsibility to participate in the services offered; In re Frey; The DHHS’s obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 USC § 12101 et seq.) & the Michigan Probate Code; MCL 712A.18f(3)(d); In re Hicks/Brown; In re Terry; Best interests of the child; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re Jones; In re VanDalen
The court held that the trial court properly terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights to the child where the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, §§ (c)(i), (g), and (j) supported termination, and it was in the child’s best interests. The trial court terminated her parental rights on the basis of her history of mental illness, multiple psychiatric hospitalizations, unstable housing, and domestic violence issues, and her failure to sufficiently progress with her treatment plan. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the DHHS’s efforts at family reunification were not reasonable because it failed to take into consideration her cognitive and mental health issues. “Considering respondent’s failure to cooperate, [the DHHS] cannot be criticized for failing to take additional measures to accommodate [her] mental health and cognitive issues.” It also rejected her claim that the trial court erred by finding there were statutory grounds for termination, noting she “made no meaningful progress with her treatment plan, and she failed to overcome her barriers to reunification.” It could not conclude that there was “any reasonable expectation that respondent [would] change course in the foreseeable future and be able to overcome her primary barriers to reunification within a reasonable time.” Finally, it rejected her claim that termination was not in the child’s best interests. “After having been in care for more than two years, [the child] was entitled to stability, consistency, and finality. Indeed, these were essential to fostering his continued growth and development.” Affirmed.
Challenge to a will & trust; Undue influence; Kar v. Hogan; In re Erickson Estate; In re Peterson Estate; Bill & Dena Brown Trust v. Garcia; Fiduciary relationship defined; Confidential & fiduciary relationship defined; In re Karmey Estate; Motion for reconsideration; MCR 2.611(A)(1)(f); Murchie v. Standard Oil Co.; Effect of the existence of a power of attorney; In re Susser Estate; Sanctions for a frivolous action; MCL 600.2591(1) & (3)(a)(ii); MCR 2.114(F) & 2.625(A)(2); In re Costs & Attorney Fees; Personal representative (PR)
Holding that petitioners presented only their own opinions and speculation to support their claim that appellee-DeBroske (the PR of the estate and trustee of the trust) exerted undue influence over the parties’ mother (Krum), the court affirmed summary disposition for DeBroske in this consolidated case challenging Krum’s will and trust. It also affirmed the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, and the imposition of sanctions against them. The court concluded that even if DeBroske handpicked the attorney (S) who drafted the will and trust and intentionally omitted petitioners’ names from an estate planning questionnaire, the record did not support the assertion that S took direction from DeBroske. “Petitioners’ names were written on the questionnaire completed two weeks before the will. [S] stated that she had no doubt about Krum’s testamentary capacity or intent and that she discussed with Krum why she wanted to disinherit petitioners. This uncontested evidence” showed that S knew of petitioners when she drafted the will. While they “testified that they had their doubts about Krum’s intent,” they offered no evidence supporting their belief that DeBroske unduly influenced S’s preparation of the will and trust. As to the claim that “DeBroske’s close relationship with Krum, particularly [her] participation in Krum’s financial affairs,” showed the existence of “a confidential or fiduciary relationship triggering a presumption of” undue influence, the court noted that there was no evidence supporting that “DeBroske controlled Krum’s finances as early as 2003.” Petitioners did not show how her help “with Krum’s financial matters starting in 2013 affected Krum’s decision to change her will nearly two years earlier. DeBroske’s assistance may reflect her close relationship with her mother, but the relationship between a child and an aging parent does not establish a confidential or fiduciary relationship or undue influence.” Even if she “inserted herself into disagreements between petitioners and Krum and took Krum’s side,” they did not establish “that these incidents showed that DeBroske overpowered Krum’s will and caused her to change her estate plan in 2011.”