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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Sufficiency of the evidence to support a felony-firearm conviction; People v. Unger; People v. Kanaan; People v. Jolly; MCL 750.227b(1); People v. Avant; Possession; People v. Minch; People v. Davis; People v. Burgenmeyer; People v. Flick; Affirmative defense under MCL 333.26428 (§ 8 of the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MCL 333.26421 et seq.)); People v. Bylsma; People v. Hartwick; MCL 333.26428(a)(1)-(3); Franks hearing; Motion to suppress; Jury misconduct; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 20; People v. Miller; People v. Nick; People v. Dunigan; Prejudice; People v. Fetterley; People v. Jackson; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Anderson (After Remand); People v. Heft; People v. Bass; People v. Horn; People v. Garza; People v. Ericksen
Holding, among other things, that the jury could have inferred from the evidence presented that defendant possessed the gun, actually or constructively, while growing illegal marijuana, and he failed to present prima facie evidence of § 8(a)(3), the court affirmed. He was convicted of manufacturing marijuana over 45 kilos, felony-firearm, and maintaining a drug house. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for felony-firearm because he did not know where the gun was at the time it was discovered by the police. The prosecution “established that the gun, which was registered to defendant, was found under the only mattress in the house in which defendant lived and in which he was conducting the ongoing felony of illegally growing marijuana.” Thus, the evidence showed he had constructive possession. Although he cited a friend’s testimony that she had helped him “look for the gun a month or two before because he had misplaced it, the jury was free to have disbelieved the friend’s testimony.” Again, in reviewing the evidence, the court did not substitute its judgment for that of the jury as to witness credibility or the weight of the evidence. His argument treated the statute “as though it prohibits possession of a firearm when a person is arrested for a felony,” but this is not the proper inquiry. Instead, “[t]he proper question . . . is whether the defendant possessed a firearm at the time he committed a felony.” Thus, it was irrelevant whether he knew the gun was under the mattress at the time the police searched the house.
Sufficiency of the evidence to support a second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II) conviction; People v. Duenaz; MCL 750.520c(1)(a); Sexual contact defined; MCL 750.520a(q); Intimate parts defined; People v. DeLeon; An attempt defined; MCL 750.92; People v. Thousand; People v. Robinson; Jury instruction according to M Crim JI 4.4 (flight, concealment, escape or attempted escape); Sentencing; Lifetime electronic monitoring; MCL 750.520c(2)(b); MCL 750.520n(1); People v. Johnson
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s CSC II conviction. Also, as the trial court had a factual basis to give the objected to instruction, the court was precluded from finding that the trial court abused its discretion by giving M Crim JI 4.4. Finally, there was no language in MCL 750.92 pertaining to lifetime electronic monitoring, so the trial court erred when it sentenced him to it. This error was plain, and it affected his substantial right to a valid sentence. Thus, his convictions were affirmed, his sentences were affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case was remanded to the trial court for the entry of an amended judgment of sentence. Relative to his claim that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence, the court noted that review of the record revealed that “the victim testified that defendant touched her numerous times on her back, chest, and thighs while she was lying on defendant’s bed.” She also testified that he “ran his fingers ‘underneath’ the ‘lining’ of her ‘training bra.’” According to her, he “also touched her thigh and buttocks, he would ‘rub the lining of [her] underwear,’ and he would stick part of his fingers underneath the lining of her underwear and ‘just rub.’” Also, she testified that he “touched her on multiple occasions after he instructed her to sit with her legs crossed on the couch.” According to her testimony, during those incidents he would “‘stick his hand on [her] inner thigh close to where the crease of [her] leg [was]’ as they watched ‘TV or [ate] ribbon candy.’” He would “just hold [her] thigh.” However, the side of his hand and pinky finger “touched the side of [her] girl’s business.” As to his claim that the prosecution only introduced evidence that he touched the areas “near” the victim’s genitals, the court noted the record showed evidence that directly refuted his assertions. The record evidence presented by the victim was that he touched the bottom of her breast, her inner thigh near the crease of her leg and her genital area. “MCL 750.520a(f) provides that ‘intimate parts’ include ‘the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttock, or breast of a human being.’”
Sufficiency of the evidence; People v. Nowack; First-degree premeditated murder; MCL 750.316(1)(a); People v. Bowman; “Premeditation & deliberation” defined; People v. Jackson; People v. Oros; Use of deadly force in self-defense or defense of others; MCL 780.972(1)(a); People v. Dupree; People v. Stevens; People v. Harris; People v. Orlewicz; Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; Right to cross-examine witnesses; People v. Gaines; Right to present a defense; People v. King; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to raise a meritless argument; People v. Foster; Voluntary manslaughter instruction; People v. Hess; People v. Mendoza; Malice; People v. Reese; Distinguishing between first-degree murder & second-degree murder; MCL 750.317; People v. Carter; Harmless error; People v. Cornell; People v. Wilson; People v. Sullivan; Great weight of the evidence; People v. Anderson; Aiding & abetting; People v. Bosca; Circumstantial evidence; People v. Ericksen
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant-Maxwell’s convictions, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit evidence. It also held that the trial court did not err as to the self-defense or defense of others jury instructions or by denying defendant-Solomon’s request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Finally, it found that the verdict as to Solomon was not against the great weight of the evidence. Maxwell shot and killed the victim, D, who was Solomon’s off-and-on boyfriend and father of three of her children. Maxwell was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and felony-firearm. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for murder, to be served consecutive to a two-year sentence for felony-firearm. Solomon was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The court rejected Maxwell’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, noting there was “clearly evidence sufficient to support premeditation and deliberation by Maxwell before he shot and killed” D, and “more than sufficient evidence to prove that the killing was not the result of any reasonable fear of imminent death or injury to Solomon.” It also rejected his claim that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to admit evidence about why D had been absent for a period before his death. He failed to “point to any evidence that he was aware of [D’s] recent release and parole status at the time of the murder, and thus, fail[ed] to demonstrate relevancy.” The court next rejected Solomon’s contention that the trial court erred as to its instructions on self-defense and defense of others that were provided to her jury, including a clarifying instruction given immediately before the jury was excused to deliberate. It held that she waived this issue when her counsel “clearly and unequivocally expressed satisfaction with” the jury instructions, and that counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless argument. As to the trial court’s refusal to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction, a “conclusion that the murder was premeditated is entirely inconsistent with a conclusion that it was committed in a heat of passion.” As such, any error was harmless. Finally, her conviction was not against the great weight of the evidence. There was “ample evidence showing that [she] encouraged Maxwell to kill [D], and that she intended for [D] to be killed if he refused to return the children.” Affirmed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Rockey; People v. Messenger; Failure to make a meritless argument; People v. Gist; Identification evidence; People v. Kurylczyk; People v. McCray; People v. Davis; People v. Gray; People v. Kachar; People v. Barclay; Sufficiency of the evidence; Identity; People v. Yost; People v. Jelks; Principle that when a witness’s identification of the defendant is less than 100% solid, the question remains one for the jury; People v. Abernathy; People v. Smith
The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, and the evidence was sufficient to establish his identity as the shooter. He was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, felon in possession (FIP), and felony-firearm. The trial court sentenced him to two years for the felony-firearm conviction, to be served before and consecutively to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment without parole for the murder conviction and two to five years for the FIP conviction. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s appellate counsel’s argument that defendant’s trial attorney was ineffective for not having moved the trial court to suppress the eyewitness’s identification on the grounds that the witness’s identification “from the investigation onward was tainted by improper suggestiveness or otherwise as the result of reliance by the police and prosecution of unqualified sign-language interpreters.” It noted that “[a]lthough the eyewitness’s deafness presented special communication problems, appellate counsel has failed to show that the police or prosecution did not recognize those challenges and meet them head on.” Appellate counsel “failed to show that the eyewitness’s identification of defendant as the shooter was tainted by improper suggestiveness. Because the eyewitness appeared at trial with no improper taint regarding his ability to identify defendant, defense counsel would have had nothing to gain from seeking to suppress that identification.” The court also rejected appellate counsel’s alternative argument that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to establish defendant’s identity as the shooter and that defense counsel was ineffective for not having moved the trial court to either quash the bindover or direct a verdict of acquittal at trial. “[I]n addition to the eyewitness’s seemingly equivocal identification at trial, the jury had for its consideration the evidence of that witness’s emphatic selection of defendant’s image each time a six-image photographic array was shown to him.” Also in evidence was “defendant’s own account of being at the” place of the shooting near the time of the shooting. And “even if not conclusive by itself, good circumstantial evidence linking defendant to the crime was that the shooter, as described by the eyewitness, was wearing black pants and red shoes similar to what defendant was wearing while admittedly at the” place of the shooting. Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (g); In re Mason; In re Terry; In re Fried; Michigan’s Medical Marihuana Act (MCL 333.26421 et seq.); MCL 333.26424(d); Child’s best interests; MCR 3.977(K); MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Moss Minors; In re White
The court held that the trial court properly terminated respondent-father’s parental rights to his child where §§ (c)(i) and (g) were established by clear and convincing evidence, and it was in the child’s interests. In light of his “persistent use of illegal drugs, his failure to attend required drug screens, and his violation of probation related to the cocaine conviction,” the court was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake when it found clear and convincing evidence that substance abuse was a condition that led to” his adjudication and continued to exist. Moreover, there was “no reasonable likelihood that the condition would be rectified within a reasonable time.” By the time of the statutory-basis determination, the child had been removed from the father’s care for more than 19 months. During that time, he made repeated promises to complete drug screens and stop using drugs, but the promises were empty. “The trial court did not clearly err in finding that there was no reasonable attempts to minimize his illegal substance abuse and his failure to screen by arguing that he was using marijuana for medicinal purposes—to alleviate back pain from scoliosis and to combat stress.” The father’s “failure to screen and his continued unlawful use of marijuana were properly considered as bases supporting termination.” Also, there was “no reasonable likelihood that he would have attended all the required drug screens within a reasonable time if additional accommodations had been made.” Affirmed.