Alleged judicial bias in statements to the victims and questioning the defendant; People v. Conley; MRE 614(b); People v. McDonald; People v. Conyers; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Strickland v. Washington; People v. Swain; Failure to raise meritless objections; People v. Ericksen; A “substantial defense”; People v. Dixon; Factual predicate requirement; People v. Hoag; MCL 750.520j (the rape-shield law); People v. Arenda; People v. Morse; People v. Jackson; Offer of proof requirement in order to offer evidence of a victim’s prior false accusation; People v. Adamski; Failure to present documentary evidence of defendant’s prior incarceration to rebut “other acts” testimony; Admissibility of the other acts evidence; MCL 768.27a; MRE 403; People v. Watkins; People v. Brown; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v. Dobek; People v. Unger; People v. Howard; Presumptions that jurors follow their instructions & instructions cure most errors; People v. Abraham; Cumulative error; People v. Cooper

Concluding that the trial court’s comments to the victims did not show bias, and that its questions to the defendant did not violate his due process rights, the court rejected his claim of judicial bias. It also rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged other acts evidence in this CSC case. Defendant’s prosecutorial misconduct claims also failed, as did his cumulative error claim. Thus, the court affirmed his convictions of four counts of CSC II. It disagreed with his assertion on appeal that the trial judge’s statements to victims VR and MR “improperly showed sympathy towards the victims and indicated that the judge believed their testimony had been truthful.” It concluded that the trial court’s “comments were instructive rather than improperly sympathetic in nature. When read in context, it is clear that the court merely informed the victims that it was permissible for them to speak about their testimony to a mental health professional, although it was impermissible for them to speak about it to anyone else for any other purpose.” Further, the comments to VR “about a counselor came after defense counsel elicited testimony about” VR seeing a counselor. Thus, information that she was seeing a counselor was already before the jury. The court also noted “that the victims were relatively young in this case. The trial court’s statement to them simply clarified what they could and could not do.” As to the trial court’s questions to defendant, a “trial court is permitted to interrogate witnesses.” The court concluded that the record did not show “that the trial court’s questions were intimidating, argumentative, or that they otherwise showed partiality.” The trial court “did not invade the prosecutor’s role or question defendant’s credibility.” Rather, its questions “were restricted to the narrow issue of whether defendant was able to recall his actions during his blackouts. It was proper for the court to clarify defendant’s testimony, as his answers to defense counsel’s questions on this issue were confused and nonresponsive.” Other questions “were narrowly focused to clarify defendant’s testimony” as to the reason for his blackouts, which “was quite unclear” up to the point of the trial court’s questioning.