Ineffective assistance of counsel; United States v. Cronic; People v. Swain; Presumption of effective assistance; Failure to challenge the validity of an investigative stop; People v. Coscarelli; People v. Chapo; Principle that a brief detention does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer has a "reasonably articulable suspicion" that criminal activity is afoot; People v. Jenkins; Principle that the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure is personal and may not be invoked on behalf of third parties; People v. Zahn; Failure to make meritless or futile motions; People v. Eisen; Suppression as a remedy for an unconstitutional stop; People v. Chambers; Trial strategy; People v. Payne; People v. Vaughn; Great weight of the evidence; Credibility of witnesses; People v. Lemmon; People v. Unger; Sufficiency of the evidence; Circumstantial evidence; People v. Schumacher; Whether the prosecution was required to offer fingerprint evidence or multiple witnesses to defendant’s crime; People v. Nowack; Principle that the fact-finder is “free to believe or disbelieve, in whole or in part, any of the evidence presented”; People v. Perry; Double jeopardy; People v. Calloway; Carrying a concealed weapon (CCW)

The court held that the defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. It also held that his convictions were not against the great weight of the evidence and that there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions. He was convicted of felon in possession, felony-firearm, and CCW. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for an evidentiary hearing on the validity of the initial police stop, noting that “even if counsel had successfully challenged the stop” the firearm would not have been suppressed. “In the absence of the ability to suppress the firearm, defendant cannot establish a reasonable probability that, if counsel had challenged the stop, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” It also rejected his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request an adjournment for fingerprint testing upon learning that the gun recovered from the scene was not tested for prints. It found that “counsel employed a reasonable trial strategy in citing the absence of fingerprint evidence in support of her argument that the prosecution had not sufficiently tied defendant to the firearm.” It further rejected his argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to call the prosecutor as a witness to determine whether the prosecutor had informed the police witnesses about the incorrect street name on the morning of trial, noting that his suspicion was unsupported and contradicted by the record. He also failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged failure, the outcome of the trial would have been different. The court next rejected his claim that his convictions were against the great weight of the evidence, finding that, to the extent there was testimony contradicting one witness’s version of events, “it did not deprive his testimony of all probative value or render it contradictory to indisputable physical facts or realities.” It also rejected his contention that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he constructively possessed the recovered handgun, noting that the testimony that he “threw an object later determined to be a handgun into the bushes was sufficient to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant possessed a firearm.” Finally, his convictions and sentences for felon-in possession and felony-firearm did not violate double jeopardy, as the Supreme Court expressly rejected this argument in Calloway. Affirmed.