Constitutional right to a speedy trial; People v. Rivera; People v. Williams; A delay of less than nine months; People v. Cain; Barker v. Wingo; Applicability of the “180-day rule” (MCL 780.131(1)); People v. McLaughlin; People v. Lown; Constitutional right to present a defense; People v. Hayes; Evidence that the victim had a prior carrying a concealed weapon (CCW) conviction; “Relevant evidence”; MRE 401; People v. Crawford; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Swain; People v. LeBlanc; People v. Matuszak; MRPC 3.3; Decision to proceed with “an all or nothing defense” as a legitimate trial strategy; People v. Nickson; Suppression of an alleged plea deal; People v. Elston; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 4 & 9; People v. McChester; MCL 777.34(1)(a) & (2); MCL 777.39(1)(c) & (2)(a); People v. Laidler; Whether defendant was entitled to resentencing; People v. Francisco; Judicial fact-finding; Alleyne v. United States; People v. Herron; Assault with intent to murder (AWIM)

The court concluded that the 180-day rule did not apply, and that the defendant could not establish plain error affecting his substantial rights as to his constitutional right to a speedy trial claim. Further, because the proposed evidence was not relevant, he was not denied his constitutional right to present a defense by the trial court’s refusal to allow him to introduce evidence that the victim had a prior CCW conviction. The court also rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and concluded that there was no support for his contention that the jury was misled about any alleged consideration a witness received for his testimony. Thus, the court affirmed his AWIM, felon in possession, and felony-firearm convictions. It also upheld his sentences, concluding that OV 4 was properly scored at 10 points and that any error in the scoring of OV 9 did not require resentencing. Given that the record showed defendant was awaiting trial in the county jail, the court held that the plain language of MCL 780.131(1) revealed that the 180-day rule did not apply. As to defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, a “delay of less than nine months is not particularly lengthy or noteworthy.” He made no effort to argue that the delay was prejudicial, and the court concluded, after briefly considering the remaining Barker factors, that he could not establish plain error affecting his substantial rights. The “second factor—the reason for the delays—does not weigh heavily in favor of either defendant or the prosecution. Defendant was responsible for a portion of the delays in the proceedings, as was the prosecutor. Some of the delay can also be attributed to docket congestion, and should not be assigned significant weight.” As to the third factor, “defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial prior to trial, nor did he express that he believed his right had been violated until his sentencing hearing.” The record showed that he consented to one adjournment and asked for another. He contended that he would have asserted his speedy trial rights if he had been given correct information as to when the 180 days expired. However, the record contained no indication that he would have asserted his right under different circumstances.