Dispute as to the elementary school of the parties’ son; Parenting time; Shade v. Wright; “Established custodial environment” (ECE); Pierron v. Pierron (Pierron I & II); Rittershaus v. Rittershaus; Best-interest determination; Consideration of the child’s reasonable preferences (MCL 722.23(i)); Kubicki v. Sharpe

The trial court’s determination that there was no change to the ECE was not against the great weight of the evidence and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. However, it erred when it failed to consider the child’s (TW) reasonable preferences. The case arose from a dispute between the parents as to TW’s elementary school. The plaintiff-mother argued that the trial court’s findings of fact as to whether the change in schools and modification in parenting time would change the ECE were against the great weight of the evidence, the trial court erred when it analyzed the best interest factors under a preponderance of the evidence standard, and the trial court’s decision to change the ECE was an abuse of discretion. The court disagreed. The trial court properly ruled that there was an ECE with both parents. It properly determined that TW “looks to both parents for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” Plaintiff testified that TW “has a strong relationship with defendant and a very strong relationship with” her. There was also testimony that both parents provide TW with guidance, and that the defendant-father “provides for TW and paid child support.” He testified that TW “naturally looks to him for the necessities of life and parental comfort.” He also believed that TW “looks to plaintiff for guidance and discipline.” Defendant disciplines TW by “taking electronics away, by taking his allowance away, and by giving him more chores to do.” He believed that he had a very strong bond with TW and that his bond was the same as plaintiff’s bond with TW. He believed that plaintiff has TW’s best interests at heart. This evidence was sufficient for the trial court to find that there was an ECE with both parents because TW “looks to both parents for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that there was no change to the ECE, and its decision was not against the great weight of the evidence. It also did not err in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard as to the best-interest determination. However, “TW was old enough to express a preference on the issue” of his elementary school since he was nine years old. While he had not attended either school district, “TW’s preferences on the issue would not have been arbitrary or inherently indefensible solely because he has not attended the schools.” Vacated and remanded.