DNA testing of biological material; MCL 770.16; Whether the blood samples sought to be tested were relevant to the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator; MCL 770.16(4)(a); People v. Barrera

On remand from the Michigan Supreme Court, the court held that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s petition for DNA testing. He was convicted of first-degree murder. The case involved the testing of blood found on and around the victim's body. After a lengthy procedural history, he petitioned the trial court (a second time) for DNA testing, but it denied his petition, finding that "the jury had been fully aware that defendant was not the source of any crime-scene blood, given the blood-type evidence,” but still convicted him, and thus, DNA testing excluding him as a donor would “add nothing of relevance if a new trial took place." The court affirmed on the basis of the law of the case doctrine. But the Supreme Court reversed, holding that no provision “in MCL 770.16 prohibits the issuance of an order granting DNA testing of previously tested biological material” and that the law of the case doctrine did not apply. On remand, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of his petition for DNA testing, finding that the blood samples sought to be tested were material to the issue of defendant’s identity as the perpetrator. “Because DNA testing of a blood sample could possibly connect another person to the crime scene or exclude defendant, the sample would be of some consequence or have a logical relationship to the issue of identity and would be linked to both the crime and the criminal.” Further, “it would be improper to deny DNA testing on the basis that a court concludes that it would deny a future motion for new trial regardless of the results of any DNA testing.” In addition, DNA testing was justified because there was prima facie “proof that the blood samples, which will be subjected to DNA testing, are material to defendant’s identity as the perpetrator, where the DNA testing could point to another specific individual as the perpetrator.” Finally, it noted that the Barrera dicta had no bearing on its analysis because this was not a case where the biological evidence had already excluded a defendant. “[T]he Barrera panel was necessarily envisioning circumstances where there was exclusionary evidence and in light of this evidence the parties did not dispute identity. Such was not the case here, considering that the whole trial focused on the disputed issue of the identity of the perpetrator, alleged by the prosecutor to be defendant,” despite the blood-type evidence excluding him as a source of the blood. Reversed and remanded for entry of an order directing DNA testing.