Termination under the Adoption Code; Whether the trial court properly analyzed the respondent-father’s putative father status under MCL 710.39(1) instead of MCL 710.39(2); In re MKK; In re BKD; In re Lang; The child’s best interests; Best interest factors (g)(i)-(xi); In re Ballard; Fletcher v. Fletcher; In re Zimmerman; In re RFF; Claim that the trial court should have waited to analyze the best interest factors and instead given respondent & his family an opportunity to plan for the child

[Unpublished opinion.] The court concluded that the trial court did not err in analyzing the respondent-father’s putative father status under MCL 710.39(1) instead of MCL 710.39(2). Also, because six of the eight applicable factors did not favor him, the trial court did not err in finding that granting custody to him was not in the child’s (MGG) best interests. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to MGG under the Adoption Code. Petitioner was the 17-year-old birth mother to MGG. Respondent, also 17-years-old, was the putative father. Petitioner determined early in her pregnancy that she wanted MGG to be adopted. Respondent, who was incarcerated at the time of the birth and during the trial court proceedings, would not consent. He challenged the trial court’s finding that he came within the provisions of § 39(1) and that termination of his parental rights was in MGG’s best interests. He did not dispute that he failed to establish a custodial relationship with MGG. He argued that if the trial court had analyzed the support and care obligation of § 39(2) in terms of his “ability to do so,” it should have found that he came within § 39(2) and not § 39(1). The court disagreed. The record as presented did not support a finding that he was a putative father under § 39(2) based upon his lack of support for the child. He argued that “his incarceration and the maternal grandmother’s decision to have MGG adopted unfairly prohibited him from being able to provide support or care for petitioner or MGG.” The court found no merit to either contention. There was “no record of respondent providing support to petitioner during her pregnancy or to MGG within 90 days after she was born. There was competent testimony from petitioner that she spoke to respondent” before MGG’s birth and that he was aware of the impending birth. The trial court rejected his argument that “he was prevented from providing support because of the interference of petitioner’s mother.” The rejection was supported by the record including the testimony of the petitioner, her mother, and grandmother. There was “evidence of gifts and other items provided after the birth” but there was “no evidence that respondent provided substantial and regular support in the months after her birth.” While he was incarcerated for a portion of MGG’s life, “he failed to use his funds before incarceration for the support of the child and instead utilized those funds to purchase a car.” The court has opined that § 39 “does not contain an incarcerated parent exception.”