Defendant-Soto's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; Strickland v. Washington; United States v. Dado; Kimmelman v. Morrison; United States v. Baker (4th Cir.); United States v. Leon; United States v. Carpenter; United States v. Higgins; Defendant-Santana’s claim that the drug-trafficking and kidnapping offenses should have been severed; Fed.R.Crim. P. 12(b)(3) & (c)(3); United States v. Walden; United States v. Olano; Rule interpretation; Perez v. Postal Police Officers Ass’n; Fed.R.Crim.P. 1(a)(1); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.; “Joinder”; Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a) & 14; Zafiro v. United States; Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Santana and defendant-Espinoza of "aiding and abetting" possession with intent to distribute cocaine; United States v. Bearden; United States v. Hardy; Coleman v. Johnson; Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant-Respardo-Ramirez of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine; United States v. Atkin; United States v. Welch; Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Respardo-Ramirez's kidnapping conviction; United States v. Toledo (10th Cir.); Sentencing for "second or successive convictions"; United States v. Mack; United States v. Paige; Alleyne v. United States; Respardo-Ramirez's "variance" claim; United States v. Adams; Sufficiency of the evidence to support Espinoza's and Respardo-Ramirez's convictions of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense; Aiding & abetting; Rosemond v. United States

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] In an amended opinion (see e-Journal # 59445 in the 3/16/15 edition for the original opinion), the court again held that defendant-Soto could not establish the prejudice element of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that the joinder of defendant-Santana’s kidnapping and drug-trafficking counts was not error (let alone plain error), and that there was sufficient evidence to support all four defendants’ convictions. It again concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the evidence Soto argued counsel should have moved to suppress “would have been admitted under the good-faith exception” to the exclusionary rule. In the amended opinion, the court more extensively discussed Santana’s claim (raised for the first time on appeal) that the district court erred by trying the kidnapping and the drug-trafficking counts together. The government maintained that he “waived his right to challenge the district court’s decision” because he did not file a motion to sever before trial. The court reviewed the rules regarding waiver, and whether Santana’s failure to file a timely Rule 12(b)(3) motion resulted in a waiver of appellate review. It held that the new version of Rule 12(c)(3) intentionally eliminated the term “waiver,” and that “courts may no longer treat a party’s failure to file a timely Rule 12(b)(3) pretrial motion as an intentional relinquishment of a known right.” The court also held that plain-error review applies to claims of misjoinder raised for the first time on appeal, and concluded that joinder of the cocaine counts with the kidnapping counts did not prejudice Santana’s defense. There was also sufficient evidence that “Respardo-Ramirez participated in the conspiracy to distribute narcotics[,]” and it rejected his claim that there was a “variance” between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial that affected his substantial rights. The court rejected Santana’s and Soto’s claim of an Alleyne violation, concluding that “any alleged Alleyne error was harmless.” Affirmed.