Unfair labor practice (ULP) claim under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA); Decatur Pub. Schs. v. Van Buren Cnty. Educ. Ass’n; The Public Employee Relations Act (MCL 423.201 et seq.); Prohibited subjects of bargaining; MCL 423.215(3) & (4); Mt. Pleasant Pub. Schs. v. Michigan AFSCME Council 25; Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Michigan Employment Relations Comm’n; Expansion of the list of prohibited subjects of bargaining; 2011 PA 103; Teacher placement as a prohibited subject of bargaining; MCL 423.215(3)(j); Baumgartner v. Perry Pub. Schs.; “Any,” “decision,” & “placement” defined; Legislative history; Department of Transp. v. Thrasher; Klida v. Braman; In re Certified Question (Kenneth Henes Special Projects Procurement v. Continental Biomass Indus., Inc.); Statutory interpretation; In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC MI; Braska v. Challenge Mfg. Co.; Spartan Stores, Inc. v. Grand Rapids; In re Consumers Energy; Michigan Educ. Ass'n v. Secretary of State (On Rehearing); Johnson v. Recca; The Michigan Employment Relations Commission’s (MERC) authority; Sault Ste. Marie Area Pub. Schs. v. Michigan Educ. Ass’n; MERC’s discretion to grant oral argument; MI Admin. Code R. 423.178; Smith v. Lansing Sch. Dist.; Proceedings before MERC; MCL 423.216(a) & (b); Detroit v. Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n, Local 3434, IAFF; North Dearborn Heights Fed’n of Teachers v. North Dearborn Heights Sch. Dist.

The court held that the MERC did not err by dismissing the charging party-union’s ULP charge against the respondent-school district arising from respondent’s failure to hold a “bid-bump” meeting as set forth in the CBA. Respondent argued that “the enactment of MCL 423.215(3)(j) removed any duty to bargain over teacher-placement decisions and gave it unilateral authority to make decisions relating to teacher placement.” The ALJ agreed with respondent, holding that § 15(3)(j) “was clear and that it prohibited bargaining over any decision pertaining to teacher placement, including the bid-bump procedure.” MERC affirmed and dismissed the charge. On appeal, the court upheld the decision, finding that the plain meaning of § 15(3)(j) “demonstrates the intent of the Legislature to give public school employers discretion regarding a broad spectrum of teacher placement decisions. This broad discretion applies not only to placement decisions themselves, but also to any decision the employer makes in regard to how it decides to go about making those decisions. Any decision regarding teacher placement, which is a prohibited subject of bargaining, cannot be the subject of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Thus, it concluded that there were “no cogent reasons for overturning MERC’s interpretation of this statute.” The court also rejected the charging party’s remaining arguments. It found that its challenge to the sufficiency of the MERC’s factual findings was meritless, and that the MERC did not err by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. Finally, it held that the MERC did not err by declining to hold oral argument. “Unlike a hearing before an ALJ, Rule 423.178 does not mandate oral argument; rather, it simply states that a party may request oral argument.” The “language employed in MCL 423.216 indicates that MERC has discretion over whether to grant oral argument after the matter has been heard by the ALJ. There is no merit to charging party’s contention that it is entitled to reversal because MERC found additional oral argument would be unnecessary to its review of the case.” Affirmed.