Motion to strike an affidavit & motion in limine to preclude testimony; Interpretation of MCR 2.412; Wilcoxon v. Wayne Cnty. Neighborhood Legal Servs.; Mediation; MCR 2.411(A)(2); Mediation communications; MCR 2.412(B)(2) & (C); Confidentiality; Mediation party; MCR 2.412(B)(3); Mediation participant; MCR 2.412(B)(4); Purpose & duty of a receiver; Band v. Livonia Assoc.; Westgate v. Westgate; Mediation proceedings; MCR 2.411(C)(2); Attorney-client privilege; Herald Co., Inc. v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch.; McCartney v. Attorney Gen.; Stephenson v. Golden; Motion to amend the complaint; MCR 2.116(I)(5); MCR 2.118(A)(2); Miller v. Chapman Contracting; Anton, Sowerby & Assoc, Inc. v. Mr C’S Lake Orion, LLC; Undue delay; Traver Lakes Cmty. Maint. Ass’n v. Douglas Co.; Futility; Gonyea v. Motor Parts Fed. Credit Union; MCR. 2.118(D); Accrual; MCL 600.5827; Supplemental pleading; MCR 2.118(E); Jawad A Shah, MD, PC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Defamation; Mitan v. Campbell; Ghanam v. Does; Lakin v. Rund; Sarkar v. Doe; Thomas M Cooley Law Sch. v. Doe 1; Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8); Beaudrie v. Henderson; Lack of specificity; Fraudulent concealment; MCL 600.5855; Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Archdiocese of Detroit; Mays v. Snyder; Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when discovery was incomplete; Liparoto Constr., Inc. v. General Shale Brick, Inc.; Bellows v. Delaware McDonald’s Corp.; MCR 2.116(H) affidavits; Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Tr. v. Bloomfield Hills Country Club; Personal injury protection (PIP)

In Docket No. 348231, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendants’ motion to strike an attorney’s (AW) affidavit and motion in limine to preclude her testimony based on a finding that defendant-Findling’s statements to her were confidential and inadmissible mediation communications. Thus, the order striking her affidavit and ordering her testimony inadmissible evidence was vacated. Also, given this, the court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and remanded for consideration of her affidavit and testimony. In Docket No. 350126, it affirmed summary disposition to defendants. At the center of the case was plaintiff’s representation of a client in a case against a nonparty law firm for malpractice and conversion of attorney fees. The client allegedly suffered a brain injury as a result of his auto accident(s). AW bought PIP cases on the client's behalf. In Docket No. 348231, when defendant-Findling became aware of the context of the utterances attributed to him, he filed a motion in limine and motion to strike, which the trial court granted. The basis of the trial “court’s decision was that the statements were made within a confidential and privileged environment under MCR 2.412.” Plaintiff argued that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendants’ motion to strike AW’s affidavit and motion in limine to preclude her testimony. The court agreed. “The expectation of confidentiality belongs to the mediation parties.” Findling attended the “mediation as a Receiver, not a mediation party.” His statements to AW “were also not mediation communications.” The court held that sitting “in a room designated for plaintiff neither made him the party plaintiff nor did his presence in that room start the mediation.” AW and Findling were not going to learn from the mediation whether the client “was involved in drug related activities. Instead, the purpose of the discussion was related to future discovery that needed to be done in the PIP action, and not the mediation.” No evidence supported defendants’ position that Findling’s statements to AW “were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.”