Due process right to a fair trial; Evidence defendant was on parole; MRE 404(b); Relevance; MRE 401; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; First-degree murder; Sufficient evidence for an AWIM conviction; Intent; Right to a speedy trial; People v Williams; Barker v Wingo; Reasons for the delay; People v Smith; Prejudice; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Prosecutorial misconduct

The court held that (1) defendant was not denied his right to a fair trial by the admission of evidence he was on parole, (2) his speedy trial violation and related ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit, (3) there was sufficient evidence to support his AWIM conviction, and (4) he failed to establish prosecutorial misconduct. He was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, felony-firearm, FIP, and AWIM. The court first found that his “parole status was admitted for the proper purpose of proving motive.” He stipulated he was not legally allowed to possess a firearm, and victim-B “threatened to send his parole agent a picture of him with a gun. If [B] made good on her threats, then defendant’s liberty might be at risk. The testimony of several witnesses indicated that [he] was worried about this possibility.” And his parole status was relevant “because it made it more probable that defendant was impelled to murder [B] because her threats, if carried out, could have led to the revocation of [his] parole and the loss of his liberty.” The court also found no merit in “his implicit argument that the verdict rested on the evidence that he was on parole. The evidence of a premeditated murder was strong as was the evidence pointing to defendant as the killer.” Both victims were shot four times. “They suffered two deadly shots to the backs of their heads, with one shot each being fired at close range. The number and placement of the gunshots strongly suggested an intent to kill.” In addition, evidence that “defendant essentially lured [B] to a specific location late at night arguably suggested planning and premeditation.” Use of a borrowed car and phone, instead of his own, also suggested premeditation. Further, the trial court gave a limiting jury instruction that his parole status was only to be considered in regard to whether he “had a reason for committing murder or specifically intended to kill” B. As to his speedy trial claim, only the reasons for delay and the prejudice factors were at issue. Given that “the delay attributable to COVID-19 is not attributable to the prosecution and delays attributable to post-COVID-19 docket congestion are, at most, given a neutral tint and assigned minimal weight,” this factor did not support his claim. As to prejudice, “video and cell phone evidence—upon which delays had no effect—corroborated testimony about [his] movements and ruled out” his father, who he suggested was the killer, as a suspect. Affirmed.