Petition to initiate child protective & removal proceedings; Notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) & the Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA); 25 USC § 1912(a); MCL 712B.9(3); MCR 3.977(G); In re Beers; “Indian child”; § 1903(4); MCL 712B.3(k); Sufficient information of Indian heritage; MCL 712B.9(4)(a) & (6); In re Morris; Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA); Ineffective assistance of counsel; In re Casto; Probable cause; MCL 712A.13a(2); MCL 712A.2(b); In re KNK; Failure to make a futile objection

The court held that the trial court and DHHS complied with the notice requirements under ICWA and MIFPA, and that respondent-mother was not denied the effective assistance of counsel in this child protective proceeding. The trial court found that her “acknowledgment of her home conditions, as well as the child’s mental health—which was impacted by respondent’s conduct—established sufficient probable cause to authorize the” petition to initiate child protective proceedings and remove the child from her care. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court failed to comply with the notice requirements under the ICWA and the MIFPA. “The trial court ordered respondent to provide DHHS with the names of the tribes to which she thought that the child may be a member or eligible for membership. Respondent complied with” the order and DHHS notified the tribes identified as well as a local tribe. DHHS ultimately received denial letters from two tribes, and because it did not receive a response from a third tribe, it sent an additional notice to the BIA. It did not receive responses from the BIA or another tribe, but “it received green cards, indicating that its inquiries were received by both. These contacts and receipts demonstrate DHHS’s due diligence to contact the Indian tribes and verify the child’s eligibility for membership.” The court also rejected her claim that she was denied effective assistance of counsel because her counsel failed to object to the finding of probable cause at the preliminary hearing. “Although respondent’s counsel did not object to [the] petition’s allegation of an unfit home, any such objection would have been futile considering that respondent: (1) informed CPS that her home was in deplorable condition, (2) was unwilling to allow CPS to inspect the home, and (3) informed DHHS that she did not want the child returned home because of the home’s condition.” Affirmed.