Whether trust distributions conformed to the trust’s terms; Validity of a document; Necessity of an evidentiary hearing; Trust interpretation; Settlor’s intent

Holding that disputed questions of fact existed as to the validity of a document and the settlor’s intent, the court vacated the probate court’s opinion and order directing the final distribution of the trust at issue (the Wessels Trust). Appellant contended “the final distribution as directed by the probate court did not comport with the language of the Wessels Trust.” Specifically, appellant asserted “there were disputed questions of fact regarding the settlor’s intent that needed to be resolved before the probate court ordered the final distribution of trust assets.” The court agreed. It first considered “the probate court’s conclusion that the Schedule of Prior Distributions was invalid and, therefore, the $100,000 and $10,000 prior distributions were unenforceable.” The court concluded the probate court lacked “sufficient information before it to make an informed decision on this issue without holding an evidentiary hearing.” The court determined that omissions “and inconsistencies on the face of the Schedule” raised questions about its validity that could not be resolved without such a hearing. The probate court also decided a second issue without an evidentiary hearing – whether the settlor intended to credit the value of a parcel of real property (the Klug-Lincoln Parcel) to one beneficiary’s (S) “share in the final distribution. Resolution of this issue involves interpretation of § 2.5 of the” trust. The probate court determined “that the unambiguous language of the amendments showed that the settlor intended to credit the value of the Klug-Lincoln Parcel to” S’s share. The court found that this was “a reasonable interpretation of § 2.5; however, the language used in the Second Amendment is imprecise and susceptible to more than one interpretation.” The court determined that it was “also a reasonable interpretation to conclude that the portions of the First Amendment that were not restated in the Second Amendment were intentionally omitted or deleted from the Wessels Trust. The trust is susceptible to either construction and is, therefore, patently ambiguous.” It remanded for the fact-finder to “resolve the disputed questions of fact with the benefit of extrinsic evidence from the interested parties and the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses that may appear before it.”