Breach of a real property purchase agreement; Anticipatory repudiation; Stoddard v Manufacturers Nat’l Bank of Grand Rapids; Good faith & fair dealing; Rodgers v JPMorgan Chase Bank NA; The law of the case doctrine; Compliance with remand instructions; Whether a party waived the right to enforce any breach by the other; Alleged forfeiture of the right to terminate the agreement

Finding no merit in plaintiff’s anticipatory repudiation, good faith and fair dealing, law of the case doctrine, waiver, and forfeiture arguments, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment for defendants on her claims for breach of contract and specific performance. The case arose from an agreement for plaintiff to purchase real property from defendants. On appeal, she asserted as to her anticipatory repudiation argument that the trial court clearly erred in finding that defendants did not repudiate the Purchase Agreement (PA) through a text message sent by defendant-El-Bathy. “The trial court found that the text message was ‘an open invitation to discuss the matter and hardly a clear indication that non-performance is occurring.’ [It] found that El-Bathy’s testimony was more credible than plaintiff’s testimony; on the basis of El-Bathy’s testimony, the trial court found that the text message ‘was merely trying to express urgency to [plaintiff] to actually move forward and close on the transaction after numerous delays by [plaintiff].’” Based on the record, and giving “due deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations,” the court concluded that it “did not err by finding that defendants did not anticipatorily repudiate the [PA] in this regard.” It also rejected her claim “that defendants’ delay in delivering the executed [PA] constituted a” repudiation. Next, it found that “the trial court did not err by rejecting plaintiff’s argument about the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” given that Michigan does not recognize such a cause of action. The court declined to address her law of the case argument because while she provided some general case law about the doctrine, she offered “little analysis on how it applies to these facts.” Finally, she contended that because they “allowed her to continue efforts to secure financing after [5/31/21], defendants waived the right to enforce any breach by plaintiff stemming from her failure to timely close.” The court found this argument meritless. The PA listed the closing date as 5/31/21, “but the parties eventually extended that deadline to [6/28/21]. Even assuming that there were a waiver of certain dates and deadlines, there is no evidence supporting plaintiff’s assertion that defendants waived their rights to terminate the” PA. After she did not close by 6/28/21, they “exercised their right to terminate” it on 7/1/21. Thus, they “also did not forfeit their right to terminate the” PA.