Child custody; Subject-matter jurisdiction; The Paternity Act; MCL 722.720; Standing; Effect of an order of filiation; Glaubius v Glaubius; Motion to adjourn; MCR 2.503(B); Attorney fees; MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) & (b); Moot substituted service issue

The court held that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff-mother’s action, and she “had standing to bring a support action against defendant as the father.” Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for an adjournment where he fired his attorney days before trial. The court also upheld the award of attorney fees to plaintiff. As to defendant’s argument for dismissal and summary disposition due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and standing, “plaintiff filed a complaint requesting child support and attorney fees on the basis of an order of filiation entered in a previous paternity action in which defendant was determined to be” the child’s biological father. Thus, the trial court “had subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action.” Further, there was no merit in his claim plaintiff lacked standing “because the original paternity action did not establish” that he was the father. An “‘order of filiation is a judicial order establishing that a man has been determined in a court to be a child’s father.’” Defendant next asserted that he “had a legally sufficient or substantial reason for an adjournment after his attorney moved to withdraw on the first day of trial. This justification may constitute good cause in some cases, but not here because [he] fired his attorney just days before trial was scheduled with little or no justification provided.” He also did not give the court “reason to discount the trial court’s gamesmanship finding[.]” As to prejudice, he failed to explain “what exhibits he was unable to submit into evidence, which witnesses he was not allowed to call, or how they were necessary for the proper presentation of his case.” The court found no abuse of discretion in the award of attorney fees. As to MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a), plaintiff “testified that she did not have a current income, relied on financial assistance from her family, and used retirement funds, which amply supported a finding that attorney fees were necessary for [her] to defend her suit.” Further, her “imputed income was less than the amount of attorney fees owed, which the trial court was allowed to consider as a factor in” its decision. As to MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b), “defendant’s actions and eventual payments under threat of court intervention demonstrate that he violated the trial court’s orders for tuition and child support[.]” Affirmed.